User:Hcberkowitz/Sandbox-Insurgency

Insurgency is most commonly used to describe a movement's unlawfulness by virtue of not being authorized by or in accordance with the law of the land. When used by a state or an authority under threat, "insurgency" implies an illegitimacy of cause upon those rising up, whereas those rising up will see the authority itself as being illegitimate. The term "insurgency" is still neutral. In cases of rebellions, the term insurgents refers to those who are not part of the decision-making entity that has the ability to make laws, but it is still an insurgency. In coups, the insurgents are largely or exclusively part of the existing government.

The Third Geneva Convention, as well as the other Geneva Conventions, are oriented to conflict involving nation-states, and only loosely address irregular forces:

"Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements..."{{citation

| url = http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument

| title = Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention)

| date= 12 August 1949

}}

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines it as "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." The new United States counterinsurgency Field Manual,{{citation | publisher = US Department of the Army | first1 = John A. | last1 = Nagl | first2 = David H.| last2 = Petraeus | first3 = James F. | last3 =Amos |first4 = Sarah | last4 = Sewall

| title = Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency

| comment = While military manuals rarely show individual authors, David Petraeus is widely described as establishing many of this volume's concepts.

| date = December 2006

| url = http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

| accessdate = 2008-02-03}} proposes a structure that includes both insurgency and counterinsurgency[COIN]. (italics in original)

Insurgency and its tactics are as old as warfare itself. Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.{{citation

| last = US Department of Defense

| authorlink = United States Department of Defense

| title = Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

| date = 12 July 2007

| id = JP 1-02 | url = http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf | accessdate = 2007-11-21}} These definitions are a good starting point, but they do not properly highlight a key paradox: though insurgency and COIN are two sides of a phenomenon that has been called revolutionary war or internal war, they are distinctly different types of operations. In addition, insurgency and COIN are included within a broad category of conflict known as irregular warfare.

This definition, however, does not consider the morality of the conflict, or the different viewpoints of the government and the insurgents. It is focused more on the operational aspects of the types of actions taken by the insurgents and the counterinsurgents.

{{quotation|The Department of Defense’s (DOD) definition focuses on the type of violence employed

(unlawful) towards specified ends (political, religious or ideological).3 This characterization fails

to address the argument from moral relativity that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom

fighter.” In essence, this objection to a suitable definition submits that while violence may be

“unlawful” in accordance with a victim’s statutes, the cause served by those committing the acts

may represent a positive good in the eyes of neutral observers.The Department of Defense’s (DOD) definition focuses on the type of violence employed

(unlawful) towards specified ends (political, religious or ideological). This characterization fails

to address the argument from moral relativity that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom

fighter.” In essence, this objection to a suitable definition submits that while violence may be

“unlawful” in accordance with a victim’s statutes, the cause served by those committing the acts

may represent a positive good in the eyes of neutral observers.|Michael F. Morris}}

Insurgencies differ in their use of tactics. Some elements of an insurgency may use bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, hijackings, shootings and other terrorist techniques to target the establishment's power structure and other facilities, often with little regard for civilian casualties or collateral damage. Other elements may restrict their attacks to military objectives and avoid the targeting of civilians. Many times, insurgent groups conduct violent attacks but do not reveal the group's identity or leader.

As an example of a definition that does not cover all insurgencies, consider that of Tomes, and then consider the French Revolution (e.g., no cell system), American Revolution (e.g., little to no attempt to terrorize civilians), or consecutive coups in 1977 and 1999 Pakistan (e.g., initial actions focused internally to the government rather than seeking broad support). Tomes spoke of four requisites:{{citation

| url = http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/04spring/tomes.pdf

| first = Robert R | last = Tomes

| journal = Parameters

| title = Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare

| publisher = United States Army War College

| year = 2004

}} in a 2004 article, identifies four elements that "typically encompass an insurgency":

1. cell-networks that maintain secrecy
2. terrorism used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the movement for protection
3. multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, often by undermining the new regime
4. attacks against the government

This definition fits well with Mao's Phase I , but does not deal well with larger civil wars. Mao does assume terrorism is usually part of the early phases, but it is not always present in revolutionary insurgency.

Tomes offers an indirect definition of insurgency, drawn from Trinquier's definition of counterinsurgency: "an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at the [insurgents’ intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime" {{citation

| url = http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/trinquier/trinquier.asp

| year = 1961

| first = Roger| last = Trinquier | authorlink = Roger Trinquier

| title = Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency

| publisher = Editions de la Table Ronde }}

Metz {{citation

| title = Rethinking Insurgency

| url = http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=790

| first = Steven | last = Metz

| publisher = Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College

| date = 5 June 2007

}} observes that past models of insurgency do not perfectly fit modern insurgency, in that current instances are far more likely to have a multinational or transnational character than those of the past. Several insurgencies may belong to more complex conflicts, involving "third forces (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), who may be distinct from the core insurgents and the recognized government. While overt state sponsorship becomes less common, sponsorship by transnational groups is more common. "The nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or

failure..." [see the discussion of failed states below] Metz suggests that contemporary insurgencies have far more complex and shifiting participation than traditional wars, where discrete belligerents seek a clear strategic victory.

General dictionary definitionsMerriam-Webster's Online Dictionary [http://m-w.com/dictionary/insurgency]Ask Oxford [http://www.askoxford.com/results/?view=searchresults&freesearch=insurgency&branch=&textsearchtype=exact]Dictionary.com [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/insurgency]Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary [http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=41252&dict=CALD]One Look Dictionary Search [http://www.onelook.com/?w=insurgency&ls=a] are rarely adequate, as the reality is that there is no simple definition that will fit into the few paragraphs available in such references. Unfortuntately, public statements by politicians and media, for a variety of reasons, tend to oversimplify conflicts to a point where major issues and tactics are lost.

Not all insurgencies include terrorism, with the caveat that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. While there is no accepted definition in international law, a United Nations-sponsored working definitions include one drafted by Alex P. Schmid for the Policy Working Group on the

United Nations and Terrorism. Reporting to the Secretary-General in 2002, the Working Group stated the following:

Without attempting a comprehensive definition of terrorism, it would be useful to

delineate some broad characteristics of the phenomenon. Terrorism is, in most cases,

essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians

and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for a political or ideological (whether

secular or religious) purpose. Terrorism is a criminal act, but it is more than mere

criminality. To overcome the problem of terrorism it is necessary to understand its

political nature as well as its basic criminality and psychology. The United Nations

needs to address both sides of this equation.”{{citation

| author = Secretary General's Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism

| journal = Focus on Crime and Society

| volume = 4

| issue = 1 & 2

| date = December 2004

| id = (A/57/273-S/2002/875, annex)

| url = http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Forum/V05-81059_EBOOK.pdf

| title = Preface }}

Yet another conflict of definitions involves insurgency versus terrorism. The winning essay of the 24th Annual United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest, by Michael F. Morris, said [A pure terrorist group] "may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program."{{citation

| title = Al Qaeda as Insurgency

| first = Michael F. | last = Morris

| year = 2005

| publisher = United States Army War College

| url = http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil234.pdf

}} Morris made the point that the use, or non-use, of terrorism does not defined insurgency, "but that organizational traits have traditionally provided another means to tell the two apart. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger than those of terrorist organizations." Insurgencies have a political purpose, and may provide social services and have an overt, even legal, political wing. Their covert wing carries out attacks on military forces with tactics such as raids and ambushes, as well as acts of terror such as attacks that cause deliberate civilian casualties.

Mao considered terrorism a basic part of his first part of the three phases of revolutionary warfare. Several insurgency models recognize that completed acts of terrorism widen the security gap; the Marxist guerrilla theoretician Carlos Marighella specifically recommended acts of terror, as a means of accomplishing something that fits the concept of opening the security gap.{{citation

| url = http://www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.htm

| first = Carlos | last = Marighella

| year = 1969

| title = Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla

}} Mao considered terrorism to be part of forming a guerilla movement.

While not every insurgency involves terror, most involve an equally hard to definetactic, subversion. "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front." The exceptional cases of insurgency without subversion are those when there is no accepted government that is providing administrative services.

While it is less commonly used by current U.S. spokesmen, that may be due to the hyperbolic way it was used in the past, in a specifically anticommunist context. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk did in April 1962, when he declared that urgent action was required before the “enemy’s subversive politico-military teams find fertile spawning grounds for their fish eggs.” {{citation

| title = Subversion and Insurgency

| first = William | last = Rosenau

| publisher = RAND National Defense Research Institute

| year = 2007}}

In a Western context, Rosenau cites a British Secret Intelligence Service definition as "a generalized intention to (emphasis added) “overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.” While insurgents do not necessarily use terror, it is hard to imagine any insurgency meeting its goals without undermining aspects of the legitimacy or power of the government or faction it opposes. Rosenau mentions a more recent definition that suggests subversion includes measures short of violence, which still serve the purposes of insurgents. Rarely, subversion alone can change a government; this arguably happened in the liberalization of Eastern Europe. To the Communist government of Poland, Solidarity appeared subversive but not violent.

An insurgency often splits its programs into a covert armed faction and an overt "front group", denying connections between them. One example would be the appropriate incarnation of the Irish Republican Army coupled with the overt political party, Sinn Fein. See the Green Book for the training manual for new IRA recruits. Groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas provide overt social services as well as having armed wings, the latter sometimes with a different name. The Vietnamese National Liberation Front,{{citation

| first = Douglas | last = Pike

| title = Viet Cong: The Organization and Technique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam

| publisher = MIT Press

| year = 1968

}} the FMLN in El Salvador, and the Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka all use a dual political/social and armed approach.

A coup is a special case of subversion, in which the group in opposition to the established government may be partially or exclusively a faction within that government. {{citation

| first = Edward | last = Luttwak | authorlink = Edward Luttwak

| title = Coup d'etat: a practical handbook

| publisher = Harvard University Press

| year = 1968}} It is not at all uncommon to have a coup, by members of the government, while that government is simultaneously fighting an insurgency against a group outside the government. For example, the 1963 South Vietnamese coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem came principally from military officers displeased less with the government's fight with the National Liberation Front and more with repression of the nation's Buddhist majority (see Buddhist Crisis).

Two broad categories of country are likely candidates for insurgency. The obvious category is of weak and failed states, but there are also needs in generally strong states that face specific problems such as terrorism, piracy and illegal drugs. A special case is that of resistance movements in occupied areas, even when there a new government has formed and has international recognition.

There is much media and political focus on transnational terrorism, but insurgency can be national, or at least separatist within one nation and not involve terror. There is also a widespread and incorrect assumption, based on equating terror and insurgency, that insurgency is usually Islamic. Such an assumption can easily be challenged by examples, of which those marked with an asterisk clearly fall into more than one category, and the categories themselves are arbitrary. If a categorization seems incorrect, that reflects the difficulty in analyzing movements.

In the U.S., there tends to be an incorrect assumption that insurgencies are Islamic. A general point here is not only that they are not always Islamic, but not always religious. It is well to expand on Cordesman/s point that

[the US] must show that the US focus on counterterrorism is not anti-Islamic and anti-Arab, and does not put counterterrorism before the same values in the rule of law and human rights that the US seeks to encourage throughout the world. The US should build on its very real successes in quiet bilateral cooperation in counterterrorism, and publicly recognize regional successes as well as point out occasional delays and failures. It must also recognize that every country in the region has a different set of threat perceptions than the US, defines terrorism and terrorist in different ways. Cooperation means partnership, not imposing a US view or issuing threats, sanctions, and demands.

In arguing againt the term Global War on Terror, Fukuyama went on to point out that the United States was not fighting terrorism generically, as in Chechniya or Palestine. The slogan "war on terror" is directed at "radical Islamism, a movement that makes use of culture for political objectives." He suggested it might be deeper than the ideological conflict of the Cold War, but it should not be confused with Huntington's "clash of civilizations". Addressing Huntington's thesis, Fukuyama stressed that the United States and its allies need to focus on specific radical groups, rather than clash with global Islam.

While modern transnational terrorists are utterly determined, and have the potential of obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction, the appropriate description of that which is being opposed is an insurgency, "like other insurgencies in the past." Political means, rather than direct military measures, are the most effective ways to defeat that insurgency. {{citation

| url = http://www.brook.edu/comm/events/summary20030514.pdf

| publisher = Brookings Institution

| first = Francis | last = Fukuyama | authorlink = Francis Fukuyama

| date = May 2003

| title = Phase III in the War on Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities

| contribution = Panel III: Integrating the War on Terrorism with Broader U.S. Foreign Policy}} David Kilcullen wrote "We must distinguish Al Qa’eda and the broader militant movements it symbolises – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself."{{citation

| title = Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism

| first = David | last = Kilcullen | authorlink = David Kilcullen

| url = http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/articles/counteringglobalinsurgency.pdf

| year = 2004}}

There may be utility in examining a war not specifically on the tactic of terror, but in coordination among multiple national or regional insurgencies. It may be politically infeasible to refer to a conflict as an "insurgency" rather than by some more charged term, but military analysts, when concepts associated with insurgency fit, should not ignore those ideas in their planning. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to use precise terminology{{cite document

| title = An Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism

| author = Canonico, Peter J.

| url = http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/canonico04.pdf

| date = December 2004

| publisher = U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

}}

While it may be reasonable to consider transnational insurgency. Cordesman points out some of the myths in trying to have a worldwide view of terror:

:*Cooperation can be based on trust and common values: One man’s terrorist is another man’s terrorist.

:*A definition of terrorism exists that can be accepted by all.

:*Intelligence can be freely shared.

:*Other states can be counted on to keep information secure, and use it to mutual advantage.

:*International institutions are secure and trustworthy.

:*Internal instability and security issues do not require compartmentation and secrecy at national level.

:*The “war on terrorism” creates common priorities and needs for action.

:*Global and regional cooperation is the natural basis for international action.

:*Legal systems are compatible enough for cooperation.

:*Human rights and rule of law differences do not limit cooperation.

:*Most needs are identical.

:*Cooperation can be separated from financial needs and resources

Social scientists, soldiers, and sources of change have been modeling insurgency for nearly a century, if one starts with Mao.{{citation

| url = http://www.marx2mao.com/Mao/PW38.html

| author = Mao Tse-tung

| title = On Protracted War

| work = Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung

| publisher = Foreign Languages Press

| year = 1967

}} Counterinsurgency models, not mutually exclusive from one another, come from Kilcullen, McCormick, Barnett and Eizenstat.

Kilcullen gives a useful visual overview{{cite web

| url = http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf

| title = Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency

| first = David | last = Kilcullen | authorlink = David Kilcullen

| conference = U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C.

| date =28 September 2006

}} of the actors in the models

Image:KilcullenEcosystem.png, which generally agrees with a model represents home as a box defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics. Inside

the box are governments, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general population, which is made up of three groups:

:#those committed to the insurgents

:#those committed to the counterinsurgents

:#those who simply wish to get on with their lives.

Often,

but not always, states or groups that aid one side

or the other are outside the box. Outside-the-box

intervention has dynamics of its own.{{citation

| url = http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/lynn.pdf

| journal = Military Review

| date = July–August 2005

| title = Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

| author = Lynn, John A.

}}

The three pillar model repeats later as part of the gaps to be closed to end an insurgency. Image:Kilcullen3Pillars.png "Obviously enough, you cannot command what you do not control. Therefore, unity of command (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) means little in this environment." Unity of command is one of the axioms of military doctrine{{cite book

| title = Field Manual 3-0: Operations

| date = 14 June 2001

| location=Washington, D.C.

| publisher=Department of the Army

| url = http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf}} change with the use of swarming:{{cite book

| url = http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD189/

| title = Swarming and the Future of War

| author = Edwards, Sean J.A.

| date = September 2004

| series = PhD thesis

| publisher=Pardee RAND Graduate School

}}. In Edwards swarming model, as in Kilcullen's mode, unity of command becomes "unity of effort at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least.''.

As in swarming, Kilcullen "depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem [i.e., the distributed knowledge of swarms], platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction. Each player must understand the others’ strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks)."

McCormick’s model{{cite document

| title = The Shining Path and Peruvian terrorism

| author = McCormick, Gordon

| publisher = RAND Corporation

| comment = often called Magic Diamond

| id = Document Number: P-7297

| year = 1987

}}

is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency (COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both the Insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success. In this way the counterinsurgency model can demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model’s strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore the degree the forces follow the model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the Insurgent or COIN force.

Image:COIN-McCormick.png

The model depicts four key elements or players:

:#Insurgent Force

:#Counterinsurgency force (i.e., the government)

:#Population

:#International community.

All of these interact, and the different elements have to assess their best options in a set of actions:

:#Gaining Support of the Population

:#Disrupt Opponent’s Control Over the Population

:#Direct Action Against Opponent

:#Disrupt Opponent’s Relations with the International Community

:#Establish Relationships with the International Community

In Thomas Barnett's paradigm,{{cite book

| author = Barnett, Thomas P.M.

| authorlink = Thomas P.M. Barnett

| title = The Pentagon's New Map: The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century

| publisher = Berkley Trade

| year = 2005

| isbn-10 = 0425202399

| id = Barnett-2005

}}

the world is divided into a "connected core" of nations enjoying a high level of communications among their organizations and individuals, and those nations that are disconnected internally and externally. In a reasonably peaceful situation, he describes a "system administrator" force, often multinational, which does what some call "nation-building", but, most importantly, connects the nation to the core and empowers the natives to communicate -- that communication can be likened to swarm coordination. If the state is occupied, or in civil war, another paradigm comes into play: the leviathan, a first-world military force that takes down the opposition regular forces. Leviathan is not constituted to fight local insurgencies, but major forces. Leviathan may use extensive swarming at the tactical level, but its dispatch is a strategic decision that may be made unilaterally, or by an established group of the core such as NATO or ASEAN.

Insurgencies, according to Eizenstat et al. grow out of "gaps".{{citation

| url = http://www.cgdev.org/doc/commentary/15_Eizenstat.pdf

| journal = Foreign Affairs

| title = Rebuilding Weak States

| authorlink = Stuart E. Eizenstat

| date = January–February 2005

| volume = 84

| issue = 1

| doi = 10.2307/20034213

| jstor = 20034213

| last1 = Eizenstat

| first1 = Stuart E.

| last2 = Porter

| first2 = John Edward

| last3 = Weinstein

| first3 = Jeremy M.

| pages = 134–146

}} To be viable, a state must be able to close three "gaps", of which the first is most important:

:* security: protection "against internal and external threats, and preserving sovereignty over territory. If a government cannot ensure security, rebellious armed groups or criminal nonstate actors may use violence to exploit this security gap—as in Haiti, Nepal, and Somalia."

:* capacity: The most basic are the survival needs of water, electrical power, food and public health, closely followed by education, communications and a working economic system.{{citation

| url = https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2005/acsc/3569%20-%20Sagraves.pdf

| title = The Indirect Approach: the role of Aviation Foreign Internal Defense in Combating Terrorism in Weak and Failing States

| author = Sagraves, Robert D

| publisher = Air Command and Staff College

| date = April 2005

}} "An inability to do so creates a capacity gap, which can lead to a loss of public confidence and then perhaps political upheaval. In most environments, a capacity gap coexists with—or even grows out of—a security gap. In Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, segments of the population are cut off from their governments because of endemic insecurity. And in postconflict Iraq, critical capacity gaps exist despite the country’s relative wealth and strategic importance."

:* legitimacy: closing the legitimacy gap is more than an incantation of "democracy" and "elections", but a government that is perceived to exist by the consent of the governed, has minimal corruption, and has a working law enforcement and judicial system that enforce human rights.

Note the similarity between Eizenstat's gaps and Kilcullen's three pillars. In the table below, do not assume that a problematic state is not able, while closing its own gaps, is unable to assist other less developed states

Other than brief "Leviathan" takedowns, security building appears to need to be regional, with logistical and other technical support from more developed countries and alliances (e.g., ASEAN, NATO). Noncombat military assistance in closing the security gap begins with training, sometimes in specialized areas such as intelligence. More direct, but still noncombat support, includes intelligence, planning, logistics and communications.

Anthony Cordesman notes that security requirements differ by region and state in region. Writing on the Middle East, he identified different security needs for specific areas, as well as the US interest in security in those areas.{{citation

| title = Security Cooperation in the Middle East

| first = Anthony H. | last = Cordesman

| date = 29 October 2007

| publisher = Center for Strategic and International Studies

| url = http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,4139/type,1/

}}

:*In North Africa, the US focus should be on security cooperation in achieving regional stability and in counterterrorism.

:*In the Levant, the US must largely compartment security cooperation with Israel and cooperation with friendly Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, but can improve security cooperation with all these states.

:*In the Gulf, the US must deal with the strategic importance of a region whose petroleum and growing gas exports fuel key elements of the global economy.

It is well to understand that counterterrorism, as used by Cordesman, does not mean using terrorism against the terrorism, but an entire spectrum of activities, nonviolent and violent, to disrupt an opposing terrorist organization. The French general, Joseph Gallieni, observed, while a colonial administrator in 1898,

A country is not conquered and pacified when a military operation has decimated its inhabitants and made all heads bow in terror; the ferments of revolt will germinate in the mass and the rancours accumulated by the brutal action of force will make them grow again{{cite web

| author = McClintock, Michael

| title = Great Power Counterinsurgency

| publisher = Human Rights First

| date = November 2005

| url =http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/programareas/conferences/presentations/McClintock,%20Michael.ppt

}}

Both Kilcullen and Eizenstat define a more abstract goal than does Cordesman. Kilcullen's security pillar is roughly equivalent to Eizenstat's security gap:

:*Military security (securing the population from attack or intimidation by guerrillas, bandits, terrorists or other armed groups)

:*Police security (community policing, police intelligence or “Special Branch” activities, and paramilitary police field forces).

:*Human security, building a framework of human rights, civil institutions and individual protections, public safety (fire, ambulance, sanitation, civil defense) and population security.

"This pillar most engages military commanders’ attention, but of course military means are applied across the model, not just in the security domain, while civilian activity is critically important in the security pillar also ... all three pillars must develop in parallel and stay in balance, while being firmly based in an effective information campaign."

Anthony Cordesman, while speaking of the specific situation in Iraq, makes some points that can be generalized to other nations in turmoil.{{cite web

| title = The Importance of Building Local Capabilities: Lessons from the Counterinsurgency in Iraq

| author = Cordesman, Anthony H.

| authorlink = Anthony Cordesman

| publisher = Center for Strategic and International Studies

| url = http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,3411/type,1/

| date = August 1, 2006

}} Cordesman recognizes some value in the groupings in Samuel Huntington's idea of the clash of civilizations,{{cite book

| title = The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

| authorlink = Samuel P. Huntington

| author = Huntington, Samuel P.

| publisher= Simon & Schuster

| year = 1996

| isbn-10 = 0684811642

}} but, rather assuming the civilizations must clash, these civilizations simply can be recognized as actors in a multinational world. In the case of Iraq, Cordesman observes that the burden is on the Islamic civilization, not unilaterally the West, if for no other reason that the civilization to which the problematic nation belongs will have cultural and linguistic context that Western civilization cannot hope to equal.

The heart of strengthening weak nations must come from within, and that heart will fail if they deny that the real issue is the future of their civilization, if they tolerate religious, cultural or separatist violence and terrorism when it strikes at unpopular targets, or if they continue to try to export the blame for their own failures to other nations, religions, and cultures.

See the articles on counter-insurgency, or, for U.S. doctrine and historical French and British methods, see foreign internal defense. Before one counters an insurgency, however, one must understand what one is countering.

• Justifiable Insurrection
• Counter-insurgency
• Global Islamic insurgency theory
• Insurrectionary anarchism
• List of revolutions and rebellions

{{reflist | 2}}

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