:Great Firewall

A favorite saying of Deng Xiaoping's in the early 1980s, "If you open the window, both fresh air and flies will be blown in", is considered to be the political and ideological basis of the GFW Project.{{zh|c=打开窗户，新鲜空气和苍蝇就会一起进来。|p= Dǎkāi chuānghù, xīnxiān kōngqì hé cāngying jiù huì yìqǐ jìnlái|scase=yes}}.
There are several variants of this saying in Chinese, including "如果你打开窗户换新鲜空气，就得想到苍蝇也会飞进来。" and "打开窗户，新鲜空气进来了，苍蝇也飞进来了。". Their meanings are the same. The saying is related to a period of the economic reform of China that became known as the "socialist market economy". Superseding the political ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, the reform led China towards a market economy and opened up the market for foreign investors. Nonetheless, despite the economic freedom, values and political ideas of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have had to be protected by "swatting flies" of other unwanted ideologies.R. MacKinnon "Flatter world and thicker walls? Blogs, censorship and civic discourse in China" Public Choice (2008) 134: p. 31–46, Springer

The internet in China arrived in 1994,{{cite web |url=http://www.chinanews.com/special/guoqing/60/2009/06-25/122.shtml |title=中国接入互联网 |publisher=China News Service |access-date=28 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140219141011/http://www.chinanews.com/special/guoqing/60/2009/06-25/122.shtml |archive-date=19 February 2014 |url-status=live }} as the inevitable consequence of and supporting tool for a "socialist market economy". Gradually, while Internet availability has been increasing, the Internet has become a common communication platform and tool for trading information.

The Chinese government's control over the Internet began in 1996 when Premier Li Peng signed State Council Order No. 195, issuing the "Interim Regulations on the Management of International Networking of Computer Information Networks". Article 6 of the Regulations states: "Computer information networks that directly connect to the international network must use the international entry and exit channels provided by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications’ national public telecommunications network. No unit or individual may establish or use other channels to connect to the international network on their own." This regulation was later widely used to punish "climbing over the firewall".{{cite news |author=Edwards |date=2023-09-24 |title=网友称为境外公司远程工作被没收所有违法所得 |url=https://www.solidot.org/story?sid=76177 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105030111/https://www.solidot.org/story?sid=76177 |archive-date=2024-01-05 |access-date=2024-01-15 |work=Solidot}}

The Ministry of Public Security took initial steps to control Internet use in 1997, when it issued comprehensive regulations governing its use. The key sections, Articles 4–6, are:

{{blockquote|Individuals are prohibited from using the Internet to: harm national security; disclose state secrets; or injure the interests of the state or society. Users are prohibited from using the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit information that incites resistance to the PRC Constitution, laws, or administrative regulations; promoting the overthrow of the government or socialist system; undermining national unification; distorting the truth, spreading rumors, or destroying social order; or providing sexually suggestive material or encouraging gambling, violence, or murder. Users are prohibited from engaging in activities that harm the security of computer information networks and from using networks or changing network resources without prior approval."China and the Internet.", International Debates, 15420345, Apr2010, Vol. 8, Issue 4}}

In 1998, the Chinese Communist Party feared that the China Democracy Party (CDP) would breed a powerful new network that CCP elites might not be able to control.Goldman, Merle Goldman. Gu, Edward X. [2004] (2004). Chinese Intellectuals between State and Market. Routledge. {{ISBN|0415325978}} The CDP was immediately banned, followed by arrests and imprisonment.{{cite book |last1=Goldsmith |first1=Jack L. |author-link1=Jack Goldsmith |last2=Wu |first2=Tim |author-link2=Tim Wu |title=Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2006 |location=New York |isbn=0-19-515266-2 |page=[https://archive.org/details/whocontrolsinter00gold/page/91 91] |title-link=Who Controls the Internet? }} That same year, the GFW project was started. The first part of the project lasted eight years and was completed in 2006. The second part began in 2006 and ended in 2008. On 6 December 2002, 300 people in charge of the GFW project from 31 provinces and cities throughout China participated in a four-day inaugural "Comprehensive Exhibition on Chinese Information System".{{cite web|url=https://www.adsale.com.hk/corporate/idx/eng/adsale_group|title=Adsale Corporate Website - Adsale Group|first=Adsale Corporate|last=Website|website=www.adsale.com.hk|access-date=2020-05-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200502184124/https://www.adsale.com.hk/corporate/idx/eng/adsale_group|archive-date=2020-05-02|url-status=live}} At the exhibition, many western high-tech products, including Internet security, video monitoring and human face recognition were purchased. It is estimated that around 30,000–50,000 police were employed in this gigantic project.{{Cite web |date=2015-04-27 |title=What is internet censorship? - Amnesty International Australia |url=http://www.amnesty.org.au/china/comments/10926/ |access-date=2023-12-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150427065800/http://www.amnesty.org.au/china/comments/10926/ |archive-date=27 April 2015 }}

File:Fang binxing.jpg

Fang Binxing is known for his substantial contribution to China's Internet censorship infrastructure, and has been dubbed "Father of China's Great Fire Wall".{{cite web | url=https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/12/%E2%80%98father%E2%80%99-of-china%E2%80%99s-great-firewall-shouted-off-own-microblog/ | title='Father' of China's Great Firewall Shouted Off Own Microblog | work=China Digital Times (CDT) | date=20 December 2010 | access-date=24 October 2019 | first=Xiao | last=Qiang | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191225145914/https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/12/%e2%80%98father%e2%80%99-of-china%e2%80%99s-great-firewall-shouted-off-own-microblog/ | archive-date=25 December 2019 | url-status=live }}{{cite news|url=https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/12/20/father-of-chinas-great-firewall-shouted-off-own-microblog/|title='Father' of China's Great Firewall Shouted Off Own Microblog – China Real Time Report – WSJ|date=20 December 2010|work=The Wall Street Journal|access-date=25 December 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171119154634/https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/12/20/father-of-chinas-great-firewall-shouted-off-own-microblog/|archive-date=19 November 2017|url-status=live}}{{cite web | publisher = Yunnan Information Times | script-title = zh:"防火墙之父"北邮校长方滨兴微博遭网民"围攻" | url = http://china.nfdaily.cn/content/2010-12/23/content_18691581.htm | date = 23 December 2010 | access-date = 20 May 2011 | language = zh | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110721182306/http://china.nfdaily.cn/content/2010-12/23/content_18691581.htm | archive-date = 21 July 2011 | url-status = dead }}

China's view of the Internet is one of "Internet sovereignty": the notion that the Internet inside the country is part of the country's sovereignty and should be governed by the country.{{cite news|last1=Denyer|first1=Simon|title=China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=23 May 2016|access-date=2 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181206113628/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html|archive-date=6 December 2018|url-status=live}}

While the United States and several other western countries passed laws creating computer crimes beginning in the 1970s, China had no such legislation until 1997. That year, China's sole legislative body – the National People's Congress (NPC) – passed CL97, a law that deals with cyber crimes, which it divided into two broad categories: crimes that target computer networks, and crimes carried out over computer networks. Behavior illegal under the latter category includes, among many things, the dissemination of pornographic material, and the usurping of "state secrets."{{Cite web |title=Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (1997) |url=http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm |access-date=2024-01-03 |website=www.npc.gov.cn |archive-date=6 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240106073907/http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm |url-status=live }}

Some Chinese judges were critical of CL97, calling it ineffective and unenforceable. However, the NPC claimed that it intentionally left the law "flexible" so that it could be open to future interpretation and development. Given the gaps in the law, the central government of China relies heavily on its administrative body, the State Council, to determine what falls under the definitions, and their determinations are not required to go through the NPC legislative process. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party has ended up relying heavily on state regulation to carry out CL97.{{cite book |last=Keith |first=Ronald |author2=Lin, Zhiqiu |title=New Crime in China |url=https://archive.org/details/newcrimechinapub00keit |url-access=limited |publisher=Routledge Taylor & Francis Group |date=2006 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/newcrimechinapub00keit/page/n229 217]–225 |isbn=0415314828 }}

The latter definition of online activities punishable under CL97, or "crimes carried out over computer networks", is used as justification for the Great Firewall, and can be cited when the government blocks any ISP, gateway connections, or any access to anything on the internet. The definition also includes using the internet to distribute information considered "harmful to national security," and using the internet to distribute information considered "harmful to public order, social stability, and Chinese morality." The central government relies heavily on its State Council regulators to determine what specific online behavior and speech fall under these definitions.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}}

The reasons behind the Internet censorship in China include:

• Social control: the Internet is a means for freedom of speech, and dissemination of campaigns could lead to protests against the government.
• Sensitive content: to control information about the government in China.
• Economic protectionism: China prefers the use of local companies that are regulated by Chinese regulations, since they have more power over them, e.g. Baidu over Google.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}}{{Cite book|last=Anderson|first=Daniel|title=Splinternet Behind the Great Firewall of China: Once China opened its door to the world, it could not close it again.|publisher=Queue}}

As part of the Great Firewall, beginning in 2003, China started the Golden Shield Project, a massive surveillance and censoring system, the hardware for which was provided by mostly U.S. companies, including Cisco Systems. The project was completed in 2006, and is now carried out in buildings with machines operated by civilians and supervised by China's national police force, the Public Security Bureau (PSB). The main operating procedures of the gatekeepers at the Golden Shield Project include monitoring domestic websites, email, and searching for politically sensitive language and calls to protest. When damaging content is found, local PSB officials can be dispatched to investigate or make arrests. However, by late 2007, the Golden Shield Project proved to operate sporadically at best, as users had long adapted to internet blocking by using proxy servers, among other strategies, to make communications and circumnavigate to blocked content.{{Cite magazine |url=http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-11/ff_chinafirewall |title=The Great Firewall: China's Misguided — and Futile — Attempt to Control What Happens Online |last=August |first=Oliver |date=23 October 2007 |magazine=Wired Magazine |access-date=1 April 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150402093349/http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-11/ff_chinafirewall |archive-date=2 April 2015 |url-status=live }}

Internet cafés, an extremely popular way of getting online in developing countries and where fewer people can afford a personal computer, are regulated by the Chinese government and by local Chinese government officials. Minors (in China, those under the age of 18) are not allowed into Internet cafés, although this law is widely ignored, and when enforced, has spurred the creation of underground "Black Web Bars" visited by those underage. As of 2008, internet cafés were required to register every customer in a log when they used the internet there. These records may be confiscated by either local government officials or the PSB. To illustrate local regulation of internet cafés, in one instance, a government official in the town of Gedong lawfully banned internet cafés from operating in the town because he believed them to be harmful to minors, who frequented them to play online games (including those considered violent) and surf the internet. However, internet cafés in this town simply went underground, and most minors were not deterred from visiting them.{{cite web |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020802389_pf.html |title=Despite a Ban, Chinese Youth Navigate to Internet Cafés |date=9 February 2007 |access-date=1 April 2015 |newspaper=The Washington Post |last=Cody |first=Edward |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141220053356/http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020802389_pf.html |archive-date=20 December 2014 |url-status=live }}

In May 2015, China indefinitely blocked access to the Chinese-language Wikipedia.{{cite news |last1=Smith |first1=Charlie |title=We Had Our Arguments, But We Will Miss You Wikipedia |url=https://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlie-smith/we-had-our-arguments-but-_b_7610130.html |access-date=31 December 2018 |work=Huffington Post |date=18 June 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150619083431/http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charlie-smith/we-had-our-arguments-but-_b_7610130.html |archive-date=19 June 2015 |url-status=live }} In 2017, China discussed plans for its own version of Wikipedia.{{cite news|last1=Toor|first1=Amar|title=China is building its own version of Wikipedia|url=https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/4/15541016/china-wikipedia-encyclopedia-online-censorship|work=The Verge|date=4 May 2017|access-date=4 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170904155402/https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/4/15541016/china-wikipedia-encyclopedia-online-censorship|archive-date=4 September 2017|url-status=live}}{{cite news|last1=Watt|first1=Louise|title=China is launching its own Wikipedia – but only the government can contribute to it|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-wikipedia-chinese-version-government-no-public-authors-contributions-communist-party-line-a7717861.html|work=The Independent|date=4 May 2017|access-date=3 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181210224316/https://www.dw.com/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%80-%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9/a-46669373|archive-date=10 December 2018|url-status=live}} As of May 2019, all language versions of Wikipedia have been blocked by the Chinese government.{{cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/05/15/china-bans-wikipedia-all-languages/|title=Search result not found: China bans Wikipedia in all languages|newspaper=Washington Post|language=en|access-date=6 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190607003155/https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/05/15/china-bans-wikipedia-all-languages/|archive-date=7 June 2019|url-status=live}}

File:Topology of the Chinese firewall.svg

The Great Firewall is mainly deployed at three large internet exchanges in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.{{cite arXiv

|title=Large-scale Spatiotemporal Characterization of Inconsistencies in the World's Largest Firewall

|date=2014-10-03

|eprint=1410.0735

|author1=Roya Ensafi|author2=Philipp Winter|author3=Abdullah Mueen|author4=Jedidiah R. Crandall

|class=cs.NI

}}{{cite web

|url=http://www.solidot.org/story?sid=41450

|date=2014-10-14

|work=Solidot

|title=分析防火长城的故障模式

|author=WinterIsComing

|url-status=dead

|access-date=2024-04-19

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150101164241/http://www.solidot.org/story?sid=41450

|archive-date=2015-01-01

}}

One function of the Chinese firewall is to selectively prevent content from being accessed. It is mostly made of Cisco, Huawei, and Semptian hardware.{{cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/arthurherman/2018/12/10/huaweis-and-chinas-dangerous-high-tech-game/|title=Huawei's (And China's) Dangerous High-Tech Game|last=Herman|first=Arthur|website=Forbes|language=en|access-date=8 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515103447/https://www.forbes.com/sites/arthurherman/2018/12/10/huaweis-and-chinas-dangerous-high-tech-game/|archive-date=15 May 2019|url-status=live}}{{cite web|url=https://c5is.com/cisco-huawei-and-semptian-a-look-behind-the-great-firewall-of-china/|title=Cisco, Huawei and Semptian: A Look Behind the Great Firewall of China|date=15 December 2014|website=C5IS|language=en-US|access-date=8 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190714193154/https://c5is.com/cisco-huawei-and-semptian-a-look-behind-the-great-firewall-of-china/|archive-date=14 July 2019|url-status=live}} Not all sensitive content gets blocked; in 2007, scholar Jedidiah R. Crandall and others argued that the main purpose is not to block 100%, but rather to flag and to warn, in order to encourage self-censorship.{{cite book |author1=Oliver Farnan |author2=Alexander Darer |author3=Joss Wright |title=Proceedings of the 2016 ACM on Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society - WPES'16 |chapter=Poisoning the Well |year=2016 |pages=95–98 |doi=10.1145/2994620.2994636 |isbn=9781450345699 |s2cid=7275132 }} An illustrative but incomplete list of tactics includes:

In addition to previously discussed techniques, the CAC is also using active probing in order to identify and block network services that would help escaping the firewall. Multiple services such as Tor or VPN providers reported receiving unsolicited TCP/IP connections shortly after legitimate use, for the purported purpose of network enumeration of services, in particular TLS/SSL and Tor services, with the aim of facilitating IP blocking. For example, shortly after a VPN request is issued by a legitimate Chinese VPN client and passes outbound though the Great Firewall to a hidden VPN IP, the Great Firewall may detect the activity and issue its own active probe to verify the nature of the previously unknown VPN IP and, if the probe confirms the IP is part of a blacklisted VPN, blacklist the IP.{{cite web|url=https://blog.torproject.org/blog/knock-knock-knockin-bridges-doors|title=Knock Knock Knockin' on Bridges' Doors|last=Wilde|first=Tim|date=7 January 2012|publisher=Tor Project|access-date=3 May 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120113060455/https://blog.torproject.org/blog/knock-knock-knockin-bridges-doors|archive-date=13 January 2012|url-status=live}}{{cite web|url=https://blog.torproject.org/learning-more-about-gfws-active-probing-system|title=Learning more about the GFW's active probing system {{!}} Tor Blog|website=blog.torproject.org|access-date=8 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191008214120/https://blog.torproject.org/learning-more-about-gfws-active-probing-system|archive-date=8 October 2019|url-status=live}} This attack can be circumvented with the Obfs4 protocol, which relies on an out-of-band shared secret.

The Great Firewall scrapes the IPs of Tor and VPN servers from the official distribution channels, and enumerates them.{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=831 |title=28c3: How governments have tried to block Tor |publisher=YouTube |date=2011-12-28 |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200329110424/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=831 |archive-date=2020-03-29 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZB8ODpw_om8&t=743 |title=Roger Dingledine - The Tor Censorship Arms Race The Next Chapter - DEF CON 27 Conference |publisher=YouTube |date=2019-11-15 |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200329111727/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZB8ODpw_om8&t=743 |archive-date=2020-03-29 |url-status=live }}{{cite web|url=https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32117|title=#32117 (Understand and document BridgeDB bot scraping attempts) – Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki|website=trac.torproject.org|date=16 October 2019 |access-date=2020-01-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200327035436/https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/32117|archive-date=2020-03-27|url-status=live}}{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wxpl8naHQCs |title=Jinyang Li - Censorship Circumvention via Kaleidoscope |date=31 March 2010 |publisher=YouTube |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200523012421/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wxpl8naHQCs |archive-date=2020-05-23 |url-status=live }} The strategy to resist this attack is to limit the quantity of proxy IPs revealed to each user and making it very difficult for users to create more than one identity.{{cite web |url=https://people.cs.umass.edu/~amir/papers/TorGame.pdf |title=Tor Games |publisher=people.cs.umass.edu |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200217222223/https://people.cs.umass.edu/~amir/papers/TorGame.pdf |archive-date=2020-02-17 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/rbridge_ndss13.pdf |title=Data |publisher=www-users.cs.umn.edu |access-date=2020-02-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190612072343/https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hoppernj/rbridge_ndss13.pdf |archive-date=2019-06-12 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Sovran2008a.pdf |title=Info |publisher=censorbib.nymity.ch |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160317075430/https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Sovran2008a.pdf |archive-date=2016-03-17 |url-status=live }} Academics have proposed solutions such as Salmon, a volunteer-based proxy network designed to combat censorship.{{cite web |url=https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Douglas2016a.pdf |title=Info |publisher=censorbib.nymity.ch |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-date=8 August 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808050043/https://censorbib.nymity.ch/pdf/Douglas2016a.pdf |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RO3wXRn8BfY |title=Frederick Douglas - Salmon: Robust Proxy Distribution for Censorship Circumvention |publisher=YouTube |date=2016-10-10 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190204190605/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RO3wXRn8BfY |archive-date=2019-02-04 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://community.torproject.org/gsoc/salmon-bridge-distribution/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200626231844/https://community.torproject.org/gsoc/salmon-bridge-distribution/ |archive-date=2020-06-26 |title=Tor Project {{!}} Implementing Salmon as a bridge distribution mechanism}}{{Cite web|url = https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/33|title = Salmon: Robust Proxy Distribution for Censorship Circumvention (PETS 2016) · Issue #33 · net4people/BBS|website = GitHub|access-date = 24 June 2020|archive-date = 30 November 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201130083139/https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/33|url-status = live}} Dynamic IPs are quite effective to flush out from blacklists.

Article 15 of a 20 September 2000 document from the Chinese State Council, posted by the Xinhua News Agency, lists 9 categories of information which should be censored, blocked, or filtered from access to the citizens using the internet within China:

1. Opposing the basic principles as they are confirmed in the Constitution.
2. Jeopardizing the security of the nation, divulging state secrets, subverting state power, or jeopardizing the integrity of the nation's unity
3. Harming the honor or the interests of the nation
4. Inciting hatred against peoples, racism against peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of peoples
5. Disrupting national policies on religion, propagating evil cults and feudal superstitions
6. Spreading rumors, disturbing social order or disrupting social stability
7. Spreading obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder, terror, or abetting the commission of a crime
8. Insulting or defaming third parties, infringing on the legal rights and interests of third parties
9. Containing any other content prohibited by law or administrative rules{{Cite web|date=September 25, 2000|title=Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services|url=https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/measures-for-the-administration-of-internet-information-services-cecc|access-date=April 21, 2021|website=Congressional-Executive Commission on China|archive-date=8 August 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808050045/https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/measures-for-the-administration-of-internet-information-services-cecc|url-status=live}}

To filter this content, the Chinese government not only uses its own blocking methods, but also heavily relies on internet companies, such as ISPs, social media operators such as Weibo,{{Cite news|last=Griffiths|first=James|date=March 20, 2019|title=Weibo's Free-Speech Failure|work=The Atlantic|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/what-went-wrong-chinas-weibo-social-network/584728/|access-date=April 21, 2021|archive-date=1 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201001213308/https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/03/what-went-wrong-chinas-weibo-social-network/584728/|url-status=live}} and others to actively censor their users.“[https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf FORBIDDEN FEEDS: Government Controls on Social Media in China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211118234716/https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf |date=18 November 2021 }}," PEN America. (March 13, 2018) p. 33. This results in private companies censoring their own platform for filtered content, forcing Chinese internet users to use websites not hosted in China to access this information. Much of this information is related to sensitive topics.“[https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf FORBIDDEN FEEDS: Government Controls on Social Media in China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211118234716/https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf |date=18 November 2021 }}," PEN America. (March 13, 2018) p. 24. The Great Firewall's goal is perceived by the Chinese Communist Party as helping to protect the Chinese population by preventing users from accessing these foreign websites which, in their opinion, host content which would be 'spiritual pollution', as well as information about these sensitive topics.{{Cite journal|last=Abbott|first=Jason|date=April 30, 2019|title=Of Grass Mud Horses and Rice Bunnies: Chinese Internet Users Challenge Beijing's Censorship and Internet Controls|url=https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12442|journal=Asian Politics & Policy|volume=11|pages=162–168|doi=10.1111/aspp.12442|s2cid=159308868|access-date=21 April 2021|archive-date=8 August 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808050052/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aspp.12442|url-status=live|url-access=subscription}} These topics include:

• Names of paramount leaders, such as Xi Jinping and Deng Xiaoping
• Political movements and protests
• Falun Gong and other spiritual groups
• The Tiananmen Square Massacre
• The Xinjiang internment camps
• Discussions of Tibetan Independence{{Cite news|last=Xiao|first=Qiang|date=April 30, 2009|title=Baidu's internal monitoring and censorship document leaked|work=China Digital Times|url=https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-document-leaked/|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=19 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210419185003/https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2009/04/baidus-internal-monitoring-and-censorship-document-leaked/|url-status=live}}{{Cite news|last=Shu|first=Catherine|date=June 3, 2019|title=A Look at the many ways China suppresses online discourse about the Tiananmen Square protests|work=Tech Crunch|url=https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/03/a-look-at-the-many-ways-china-suppresses-online-discourse-about-the-tiananmen-square-protests/|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=21 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421202820/https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/03/a-look-at-the-many-ways-china-suppresses-online-discourse-about-the-tiananmen-square-protests/|url-status=live}}“[https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf FORBIDDEN FEEDS: Government Controls on Social Media in China] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211118234716/https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PEN-America_Forbidden-Feeds-report-6.6.18.pdf |date=18 November 2021 }}," PEN America. (March 13, 2018) p. 41-42.

A 2020 study found that the Great Firewall blocks approximately 311,000 domains.{{Cite book |last=Zhang |first=Angela Huyue |title=High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2024 |isbn=9780197682258 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197682258.001.0001}}

The Cybersecurity Law behind the firewall is targeted at helping increase internet user privacy, increase protections on personal data, and making companies more responsible for monitoring bad actors, in hopes to make the Internet a safer place for Chinese citizens.{{Cite news|last=Wang|first=Hairong|date=January 17, 2013|title="Legal Firewall" Beijing Review|work=Beijing Review|url=http://www.bjreview.com/print/txt/2013-01/14/content_512143.htm|access-date=April 21, 2021|archive-date=21 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421202821/http://www.bjreview.com/print/txt/2013-01/14/content_512143.htm|url-status=live}} Despite this, there have been growing criticisms that the actions of the Chinese government have only hurt Chinese free speech, due to increased censorship, and lack of non-sanctioned sources of information, such as Wikipedia and many English news sources.{{Cite journal|last1=Pan|first1=Jennifer|last2=Roberts|first2=Margaret|date=January 2020|title=Censorship's Effect on Incidental Exposure to Information: Evidence from Wikipedia|journal=SAGE Open|volume=10|doi=10.1177/2158244019894068|doi-access=free}} This has resulted in reports of some cases of legal persecution of those charged with spreading this information.

The Chinese government itself does legally support free speech; article 35 of the Constitution of China states that "citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration."[http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html "CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA". People's Daily. December] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200609090748/http://en.people.cn/constitution/constitution.html |date=2020-06-09 }} (4, 1982) Archived from the original on August 12, 2010. Retrieved April 20, 2021. In recent decades, many criticisms of the Chinese government found that some of these laws are often abused. A study by PEN America claimed that "Some of the government's most rights-abusive laws are aimed at criminalizing free speech that — in the eyes of the government — encourages subversion, separatism, or rejection of the State’s authority."

Censorship of sensitive topics in China has also been easier for the government because of the firewall and its filtering. Because the monitoring of social media and chat apps in China presents a possibility of punishment for a user, the discussion of these topics is now limited to the thought of the Chinese Communist Party, or one's home and private spaces, reducing the chance for information about these topics to spread, reducing any threat of protest against the CCP.{{Cite news|last=Wang|first=Yaqiu|date=September 1, 2020|title=In China, the 'Great Firewall' is Changing a Generation|work=Politico|url=https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-great-firewall-generation-405385|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=21 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421202819/https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-great-firewall-generation-405385|url-status=live}}{{Cite web|title=Freedom of Expression in China: A Privilege, Not a Right|url=https://www.cecc.gov/freedom-of-expression-in-china-a-privilege-not-a-right|access-date=April 20, 2021|website=Congressional-Executive Commission on China|date=30 August 2012 |archive-date=19 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210419120225/https://www.cecc.gov/freedom-of-expression-in-china-a-privilege-not-a-right|url-status=live}} According to Yaqiu Wang, a prominent human rights researcher, there was a time in China where the internet provided a method for Chinese citizens to learn about the sensitive topics the government had censored in the news, through access to international news reports and media coverage. She claims that, in the past 10 years, it has been increasingly difficult to access second opinions on events, meaning that students rarely have the opportunity to learn diverging viewpoints — only the "correct" thought of the CCP.

The Great Firewall has also allowed China to develop its own major internet services, such as Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu,{{cite news|last1=Denyer|first1=Simon|date=23 May 2016|title=China's scary lesson to the world: Censoring the Internet works|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181206113628/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinas-scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/2016/05/23/413afe78-fff3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html|archive-date=6 December 2018|access-date=5 September 2017|newspaper=The Washington Post}}{{cite news|last1=Chen|first1=Te-Ping|date=28 January 2015|title=China Owns 'Great Firewall,' Credits Censorship With Tech Success|work=WSJ|url=https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/01/28/china-owns-great-firewall-credits-censorship-with-tech-success/|url-status=live|access-date=2 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171121094528/https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/01/28/china-owns-great-firewall-credits-censorship-with-tech-success/|archive-date=21 November 2017}} Renren, Youku, and Weibo.{{Cite book |last=Shi |first=Song |title=China and the Internet: Using New Media for Development and Social Change |date=2023 |publisher=Rutgers University Press |isbn=9781978834736 |location=New Brunswick, NJ}}{{Rp|page=8}} China has its own version of many foreign web properties, for example: Bilibili and Tencent Video (YouTube), Weibo (Twitter), Moments{{cite web |last1=Hoskins |first1=Peter |author2=Fan Wang |title=WeChat: Why does Elon Musk want X to emulate China's everything-app? |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66333633 |website=BBC News |accessdate=2023-07-30 |date=2023-07-29 |archive-date=12 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231112081132/https://www.bbc.com/news/business-66333633 |url-status=live }} and Qzone (Facebook), WeChat (WhatsApp), Ctrip (Orbitz and others), and Zhihu{{cite news|last1=Millward|first1=Steven|date=12 January 2017|title=China's answer to Quora now worth a billion bucks|work=Tech in Asia|url=https://www.techinasia.com/zhihu-quora-of-china-funding|url-status=live|access-date=4 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170904154318/https://www.techinasia.com/zhihu-quora-of-china-funding|archive-date=4 September 2017}} (Quora). With nearly one quarter of the global internet population (700 million users), the internet behind the GFW can be considered a "parallel universe" to the Internet that exists outside.

While the Great Firewall has had an impact on Chinese citizens' ability to use the internet to find information about sensitive topics about the Chinese Communist Party, it has not completely stopped them from doing so. The firewall itself has caused much frustration amongst both individuals and internationally operating companies in China, many of whom have turned to VPNs, speaking in codes,Lyden, Jacki; Xiao, Qiang (September 7, 2013). [https://www.npr.org/transcripts/220106496 “In China, Avoiding The ‘Great Firewall’ Internet Censors”] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407050205/https://www.npr.org/transcripts/220106496 |date=7 April 2023 }} NPR Podcasts Transcripts. Retrieved April 20, 2021. and other methods to retain their access to the international internet.{{Cite news|last=Li|first=Yan|date=April 6, 2016|title=Chinese Voice Frustration Over 'Great Firewall'; Many Internet users criticize intensified blocking of foreign websites|work=The Wall Street Journal Online|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-voice-frustration-over-great-firewall-1459973164|access-date=April 20, 2021|archive-date=20 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210420110757/https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-voice-frustration-over-great-firewall-1459973164|url-status=live}}

{{See also|Internet censorship in the People's Republic of China#Evasion{{!}}Internet censorship in the People's Republic of China § Evasion|Internet censorship circumvention}}

Because the Great Firewall blocks destination IP addresses and domain names and inspects the data being sent or received, a basic censorship circumvention strategy is to use proxy nodes and encrypt the data. Bypassing the firewall is known as {{transliteration|zh|fānqiáng}} (翻墙, "climb over the wall"), and most circumvention tools combine these two mechanisms:[http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2405036 "Splinternet Behind the Great Firewall of China: The Fight Against GFW"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170920093321/http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2405036 |date=2017-09-20 }}, Daniel Anderson, Queue, Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Vol. 10, No. 11 (29 November 2012), {{doi|10.1145/2390756.2405036}}. Retrieved 11 October 2013.

• Proxy servers outside China can be used, although using just a simple open proxy (HTTP or SOCKS) without also using an encrypted tunnel (such as HTTPS) does little to circumvent the sophisticated censors.
• Freegate, Ultrasurf, Psiphon, and Lantern are free programs designed and experienced with circumventing the China firewall using multiple open proxies.
• VPNs (virtual private networks) are one of the most popular tools used by Westerners for bypassing censorship technologies.{{cite web|url=https://www.techinasia.com/5-ways-sneak-chinas-great-firewall|title=Tech in Asia - Connecting Asia's startup ecosystem|website=www.techinasia.com|access-date=2020-01-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200329074408/https://www.techinasia.com/5-ways-sneak-chinas-great-firewall|archive-date=2020-03-29|url-status=live}} They use the same basic approaches, proxies, and encrypted channels used by other circumvention tools, but depend on a private host, a virtual host, or an account outside of China, rather than open, free proxies.
• Tor partially can be used in China.{{cite web|url=https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/8cjezx/does_tor_still_work_in_china/|title=r/TOR - Does Tor still work in China?|website=reddit|date=16 April 2018|language=en-US|access-date=2019-11-11|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190904021327/https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/8cjezx/does_tor_still_work_in_china/|archive-date=2019-09-04|url-status=live}} Since 2010, almost all bridges at TorProject.org are blocked through proxy distribution. Tor still functions in China using Snowflake,{{cite web | url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlZZQYLIXe8&t=1400s | title=DEF CON 30 - Roger Dingledine - How Russia is trying to block Tor | website=YouTube | date=20 October 2022 | access-date=7 April 2023 | archive-date=26 October 2022 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221026203753/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlZZQYLIXe8&t=1400s | url-status=live }} independently published Obfs4 bridges and meek.{{cite web |url=https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci18/foci18-paper-dunna.pdf |title=Conference paper |publisher=www.usenix.org |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191028052521/https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/foci18/foci18-paper-dunna.pdf |archive-date=2019-10-28 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=949 |title=28c3: How governments have tried to block Tor |publisher=YouTube |date=2011-12-28 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200523011126/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DX46Qv_b7F4&t=949 |archive-date=2020-05-23 |url-status=live }}{{Cite web|url=https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29279|title=Test obfs4 reachability (#29279) · Issues · Legacy / Trac|date=February 2019|access-date=22 July 2020|archive-date=29 October 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201029124816/https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29279|url-status=live}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6xEfNHkFKY|title=Circumventing Internet Censorship with Tor|date=30 June 2020|accessdate=Dec 3, 2022|via=www.youtube.com|archive-date=3 December 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221203172133/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6xEfNHkFKY|url-status=live}}
• I2P or garlic routing is useful when properties similar to Tor's anonymity are needed. Due to I2P being much less popular than Tor, it has faced little to no blocking attempts.

In 2017, the Chinese government declared unauthorized VPN services illegal, requiring VPN providers to obtain state approval.{{Cite news |last=Ye |first=Josh |date=January 2017 |title=China tightens Great Firewall by declaring unauthorized VPN services illegal |work=South China Morning Post |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2064587/chinas-move-clean-vpns-and-strengthen-great-firewall |access-date=April 21, 2021 |archive-date=24 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210424082112/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2064587/chinas-move-clean-vpns-and-strengthen-great-firewall |url-status=live }} Although China restricts VPNs, they remain widely used by private individuals.{{Cite book |last=Šebok |first=Filip |title=Contemporary China: a New Superpower? |publisher=Routledge |year=2023 |isbn=978-1-03-239508-1 |editor-last=Kironska |editor-first=Kristina |chapter=Social Control and Propaganda |editor-last2=Turscanyi |editor-first2=Richard Q.}}{{Rp|page=109}} State-owned enterprises or state institutions also use VPNs for official work.{{Rp|page=109}} The Chinese government has authorized several official VPN providers.{{Rp|page=109}} Those who develop or sell their own VPNs potentially face years in prison.{{Rp|page=109}}

Non-proxy circumvention strategies include:

• Using encrypted DNS may bypass blocking of a few sites including TorProject and all of GitHub, which may be used to obtain further circumvention.{{cite web|url=http://www.tipsforchina.com/how-to-use-dnscrypt-to-bypass-dns-spoofing-poisoning-in-china.html|title=How to Use DNSCrypt to Prevent DNS Spoofing in China | Tips for China|website=www.tipsforchina.com|date=13 May 2019|access-date=2020-02-17|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200217221544/https://www.tipsforchina.com/how-to-use-dnscrypt-to-bypass-dns-spoofing-poisoning-in-china.html|archive-date=2020-02-17|url-status=live}} In 2019 Firefox released an update to make it easy to enable DNS over HTTPS.{{cite web|url=https://blog.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2019/04/02/dns-over-https-doh-update-recent-testing-results-and-next-steps|title=DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) Update – Recent Testing Results and Next Steps|first=Selena|last=Deckelmann|website=Future Releases|date=2 April 2019 |access-date=2020-01-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200107031853/https://blog.mozilla.org/futurereleases/2019/04/02/dns-over-https-doh-update-recent-testing-results-and-next-steps/|archive-date=2020-01-07|url-status=live}} Despite DNS over encryption, the majority of services remain blocked by IP.{{cite web |url=https://dnsencryption.info/imc19-doe.pdf |title=Archived copy |website=dnsencryption.info |access-date=15 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201026013416/https://dnsencryption.info/imc19-doe.pdf |archive-date=26 October 2020 |url-status=dead}}
• Ignoring TCP reset packets sent by the GFW. Distinguishing them by the TTL value (time to live), and not routing any further packets to sites that have triggered blocking behavior.[http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf "Ignoring the Great Firewall of China"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170909233123/http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/ignoring.pdf |date=2017-09-09 }}, Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch, and Robert N. M. Watson, PET'06: Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Springer-Verlag (2006), pages 20–35, {{ISBN|3-540-68790-4}}, {{doi|10.1007/11957454_2}}. Retrieved 11 October 2013.

• The OpenVPN protocol is detected and blocked. Connections not using symmetric keys or using "tls-auth" are blocked at handshake, and connections using the new "tls-crypt" option are detected and throttled (under 56 kbit/s) by the QoS filtering system.{{Citation needed|date=January 2020}}
• GRE tunnels and protocols that use GRE (e.g., PPTP) are blocked.{{Citation needed|date=June 2021}}
• TLS, the Great Firewall can identify the difference between HTTPS TLS and other implementations by inspecting the handshake parameters.{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3z56andRyCY |title=Defcon 21 - Defeating Internet Censorship with Dust, the Polymorphic Protocol Engine |publisher=YouTube |date=2013-11-16 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160707183101/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3z56andRyCY |archive-date=2016-07-07 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBp6opkcxoc&feature=youtu.be&t=361 |title=32C3 - How the Great Firewall discovers hidden circumvention servers |publisher=YouTube |date=2016-04-24 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-date=21 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220321051525/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBp6opkcxoc&feature=youtu.be&t=361 |url-status=live }}{{cite web |url=https://tlsfingerprint.io/static/frolov2019.pdf |title=Data |publisher=tlsfingerprint.io |date=2019 |access-date=2020-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190227201210/https://tlsfingerprint.io/static/frolov2019.pdf |archive-date=2019-02-27 |url-status=live }}{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35l56KjTCb8&feature=youtu.be&t=5315 |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211222/35l56KjTCb8 |archive-date=2021-12-22 |url-status=live|title=Anti-Censorship & Transparency - Roger Dingledine |date=26 October 2010 |publisher=YouTube |access-date=2020-05-24}}{{cbignore}}

In 2010, a root name server run by Netnod in China started returning poisoned DNS results to global users, preventing users in Chile and the U.S. from accessing sites such as Facebook. The server was shut down to stop the poisoning.{{cite web |last1=McMillan |first1=Robert |title=After DNS problem, Chinese root server is shut down |url=https://www.computerworld.com/article/2755924/after-dns-problem--chinese-root-server-is-shut-down.html |website=Computerworld |language=en |date=26 March 2010 |access-date=28 January 2023 |archive-date=9 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230409102959/https://www.computerworld.com/article/2755924/after-dns-problem--chinese-root-server-is-shut-down.html |url-status=live }}

In 2014, two-thirds of China's DNS infrastructure began resolving unrelated domains to 65.49.2.178, an address owned by the US-based Dynamic Internet Technology, Inc., resulting in widespread internet outage in China. No damage to DIT services were reported despite what amounts to an accidental DDoS. While some sources attribute this incident to GFW's DNS poisoning,{{cite web |last1=Leyden |first1=John |title=DNS poisoning slams web traffic from millions in China into the wrong hole |url=https://www.theregister.com/2014/01/21/china_dns_poisoning_attack/ |website=www.theregister.com |language=en |access-date=28 January 2023 |archive-date=29 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230129112348/https://www.theregister.com/2014/01/21/china_dns_poisoning_attack/ |url-status=live }} others (mostly quoting Chinese sources) speculate this incident was somehow caused by DIT themselves.{{Cite web|last=Carsten|first=Paul|title="Massive Internet mishap sparks Great Firewall scrutiny in China"|url=http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-internet-idUKBREA0K04T20140122|access-date=22 Jan 2014|website=Reuters|archive-date=8 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160308013801/http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-internet-idUKBREA0K04T20140122|url-status=dead}}

Reporters Without Borders suspects that countries such as Cuba, Iran,{{Cite web|title=Iran To Work With China To Create National Internet System|url=https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-china-national-internet-system-censorship/30820857.html|access-date=2020-09-30|website=www.rferl.org|archive-date=30 September 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200930031242/https://www.rferl.org/amp/iran-china-national-internet-system-censorship/30820857.html|url-status=live |last1=Esfandiari |first1=Golnaz |date=4 September 2020 }} Vietnam, Zimbabwe, and Belarus have obtained surveillance technology from China, although the censorship in these countries is less stringent than in China.{{cite web|year=2006|title=Going online in Cuba: Internet under surveillance|url=http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_gb_md_1.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090303221407/http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_gb_md_1.pdf|archive-date=3 March 2009|publisher=Reporters Without Borders|df=dmy}}

Since at least 2015, the Russian Roskomnadzor agency collaborates with Chinese Great Firewall security officials in implementing its data retention and filtering infrastructure.{{Cite news|last1=Soldatov|first1=Andrei|last2=Borogan|first2=Irina|date=2016-11-29|title=Putin brings China's Great Firewall to Russia in cybersecurity pact|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/putin-china-internet-great-firewall-russia-cybersecurity-pact|access-date=2017-07-04|issn=0261-3077|archive-date=6 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210706183836/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/29/putin-china-internet-great-firewall-russia-cybersecurity-pact|url-status=live}}{{cite news|date=2017-02-21|title=China: The architect of Putin's firewall|publisher=Eurozine|url=https://www.eurozine.com/china-the-architect-of-putins-firewall/|access-date=2019-12-10|archive-date=3 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210503194417/https://www.eurozine.com/china-the-architect-of-putins-firewall/|url-status=live}}{{cite news|date=2016-04-29|title=Russia's chief internet censor enlists China's know-how|publisher=Financial Times|url=https://www.ft.com/content/08564d74-0bbf-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221211/https://www.ft.com/content/08564d74-0bbf-11e6-9456-444ab5211a2f |archive-date=2022-12-11 |url-access=subscription|access-date=2019-12-10}} During his visit to Beijing in June 2016, Vladimir Putin signed a joint communiqué with Xi Jinping on information space, followed by Russia's National Forum for Information Security in October hosted by Fang Binxing, the architect of the Chinese Great Firewall.

Especially since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, in order to enforce the war censorship law, Russian authorities were making an internet surveillance system akin to Chinese Great Firewall.{{cite web|url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-internet-censorship-efforts-reveal-shortcomings-c2156ead73e1c33cb9357fb954f958f8|title=War censorship exposes Putin's leaky internet controls|website=Associated Press|date=March 14, 2022|access-date=18 December 2022|archive-date=21 May 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230521183313/https://apnews.com/article/russia-internet-censorship-efforts-reveal-shortcomings-c2156ead73e1c33cb9357fb954f958f8|url-status=live}}

Critics have argued that if other large countries begin following China's approach, the whole purpose of the creation of the Internet could be put in jeopardy. If like-minded countries are successful in imposing the same restrictions on their inhabitants and globalized online companies, then the free global exchange of information could cease to exist.{{cite news|title=The Great Firewall of China|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/great-firewall-of-china|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180331034226/https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/great-firewall-of-china|archive-date=31 March 2018|access-date=2 April 2018|website=Bloomberg}}

The United States Trade Representative's (USTR) "National Trade Estimate Report" in 2016 referred the China's digital Great Firewall: "China's filtering of cross-border Internet traffic has posed a significant burden to foreign suppliers."{{cite news|last1=Barfield|first1=Claude|title=China's Internet censorship: A WTO challenge is long overdue|url=https://www.aei.org/publication/chinas-internet-censorship-a-wto-challenge-is-long-overdue/|access-date=26 January 2017|publisher=TechPolicyDaily.com|date=29 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160430114152/http://www.aei.org/publication/chinas-internet-censorship-a-wto-challenge-is-long-overdue/|archive-date=30 April 2016|url-status=live}} Claude Barfield, the American Enterprise Institute's expert of International trade, suggested that the U.S. government should bring a case against the Firewall, a huge trade barrier, in the World Trade Organization in January 2017.{{cite news|last1=Barfield|first1=Claude|title=China bans 8 of the world's top 25 websites? There's still more to the digital trade problem.|url=http://www.aei.org/publication/china-bans-8-of-top-25-websites-still-more-digital-trade-problem/|access-date=26 January 2017|agency=American Enterprise Institute|date=25 January 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170126092521/http://www.aei.org/publication/china-bans-8-of-top-25-websites-still-more-digital-trade-problem/|archive-date=26 January 2017|url-status=live}} Eight of the 24 more trafficked websites in China have been blocked by the Great Firewall. This has created a burden to foreign suppliers who rely on these websites to sell their products or services. The lobby's 2016 business climate survey showed 79 percent of its members reported a negative impact on business due to internet censorship.{{cite news|last1=Martina|first1=Paul|title=U.S. says China internet censorship a burden for businesses|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade-internet/u-s-says-china-internet-censorship-a-burden-for-businesses-idUSKCN0X50RD|newspaper=Reuters|agency=Reuters|access-date=23 March 2018|date=8 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180402225919/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade-internet/u-s-says-china-internet-censorship-a-burden-for-businesses-idUSKCN0X50RD|archive-date=2 April 2018|url-status=live}}

According to Stephen Rosen, the GFW is reflective of the Chinese government's fear of civil disobedience or rebellion among the Chinese population against the Chinese Communist Party's rule:

{{blockquote|If you want to know what people are worried about look at what they spend their money on. If you’re afraid of burglars you buy a burglar alarm. What are the Chinese spending their money on? We’re told from Chinese figures they’re spending on the People's Armed Police, the internal security force is about as big as they’re spending on the regular military. This whole great firewall of China, this whole massive effort to control the internet, this effort to use modern information technology not to disseminate information, empowering individuals, but to make people think what you want them to think and to monitor their behavior so that you can isolate and suppress them. That’s because this is a regime which is fundamentally afraid of its own people. And it’s fundamentally hostile to them.{{cite episode |url=https://conversationswithbillkristol.org/video/stephen-rosen-ii/ |first=Bill |last=Kristol |author-link=Bill Kristol |title=Stephen Rosen interview |date=30 November 2018 |series=Conversations With Bill Kristol |transcript-url=https://conversationswithbillkristol.org/transcript/stephen-rosen-ii-transcript/ |transcript=Transcript |access-date=26 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200325014729/https://conversationswithbillkristol.org/video/stephen-rosen-ii/ |archive-date=25 March 2020 |url-status=live }}}}

{{Portal|China|Internet}}

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• List of websites blocked in mainland China
• Bamboo Curtain
• Censorship in China
• Censorship of Wikipedia by China
• Cypher
• Great Cannon — A distributed denial-of-service attack tool co-located with the Great Firewall.
• GreatFire — An organization monitoring and providing apps, 12 websites, code, tests and tools related to the Great Firewall
• Green Dam Youth Escort
• Great Wall of Sand
• International Freedom of Expression Exchange – monitors{{Cite web |title=China |url=http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/147 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050423180620/http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/147 |archive-date=April 23, 2005 |website=IFEX}}
• Internet censorship circumvention
• Media of China
• Politics of China
• Splinternet
• Who Controls the Internet?

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{{Library resources box}}

• {{Cite book |last=Griffiths |first=James T. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=S72rDwAAQBAJ |title=The Great Firewall of China: How to Build and Control an Alternative Version of the Internet |date=2019 |publisher=Zed Books |isbn=978-1-78699-535-3 |location=London}}
• {{Cite journal |last=Nilekani |first=Nandan |author-link=Nandan Nilekani |date=September–October 2018 |title=Data to the People: Indias Inclusive Internet |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=97 |issue=5 |pages=19–26 |issn=0015-7120 |jstor=44823909}}
• {{Cite journal |last=Segal |first=Adam |author-link=Adam Segal |date=September–October 2018 |title=When China Rules the Web: Technology in Service of the State |journal=Foreign Affairs |volume=97 |issue=5 |pages=10-14, 16-18 |issn=0015-7120 |jstor=44823908}}

• {{Commons category-inline}}
• {{Wiktionary-inline|firewall}}
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{{Censorship in China}}

{{Internet censorship circumvention technologies}}

Category:Internet censorship in China

Category:Firewall software