Anil Gupta (philosopher)

Gupta earned his B.Sc. with first-class honors from the University of London in 1969. He then attended the University of Pittsburgh where he received his M.A. (1973) and Ph.D. (1977).

Gupta has taught at several universities: McGill University (1975-1982), University of Illinois at Chicago (1982-1989), Indiana University (1989-2000).Biographical information from [http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/cv/Anil%20Gupta%20CV%20May%202015.pdf Gupta's CV (PDF)] In 2001 Gupta joined the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh where he served as Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and, since 2013, as Alan Ross Anderson Chair.[http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/person/anil-gupta Gupta's profile at the University of Pittsburgh][https://www.hps.pitt.edu/people/anil-gupta Gupta's profile at the History and Philosophy of Science Department]

{{main|Revision theory}}

Gupta developed an early version of the revision theory of truth.Gupta (1982). Later he generalized this to a theory of circular and interdependent definitions.Gupta (1988). This work was further developed, resulting in the book, The Revision Theory of Truth, co-written with Nuel Belnap.

The revision theory is a semantic theory of truth that combines an unrestricted truth predicate with classical logic.See Gupta and Belnap (1993) for details.

Revision theory takes truth to be a circular concept, defined by the Tarski biconditionals,

:'A' is true if and only if A,

and interprets it in a new way. Rather than interpret the truth predicate via a single extension, as is done with non-circular predicates, revision theory interprets it via a revision process. The revision process is a collection of revision sequences that result when arbitrary hypotheses concerning the interpretation of truth are revised using a rule provided by the Tarski biconditionals. In the revision process, problematic sentences such as the Liar (“this very sentence is not true”) do not settle on a definite truth value. Remarkably, however, ordinary unproblematic sentences do receive a definite truth value. If problematic types of cross-reference are eliminated from the language, then the revision process converges to a fixed point.

Gupta has applied revision theory to rational choice in game theory, building on the work of André Chapuis.See chapter 4 of Gupta (2011).

Gupta has recently applied the informal ideas of revision theory to problems arising in the philosophy of perception.See Gupta (2006).

In Empiricism and Experience, Gupta proposes a novel empiricist account of the logical relation between perceptual experience and knowledge.Gupta (2006)[http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.2009.79.issue-2/issuetoc#group2 Book Symposium on Empiricism and Experience][https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25224-empiricism-and-experience/ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews entry on Empiricism and Experience]

The problem Gupta addresses is that of explaining the role of experience in making our views and, in particular, perceptual judgments rational. Gupta's proposal is that the given in experience is hypothetical.[http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sberker/files/berker-gupta-gambit.pdf?m=1410898507 Berker (2011)] Rather than providing perceptual judgments with categorical rationality, experience confers on these judgments a conditional rationality. A perceptual experience, according to Gupta, makes a subject's judgment rational if the subject's antecedent view is rational.[http://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/gupta/pdf/PPRReplies.pdf Gupta (2009)] An antecedent view is the collection of beliefs, conceptions, and concepts that the subject of an experience brings to bear on the experience.

Gupta uses the notion of the hypothetical given to build a reformed empiricism. He argues that this empiricism has significant advantages over the traditional versions of the view.[http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/sberker/files/berker-gupta-gambit.pdf?m=1410898507 Berker (2011)] Among other features, Gupta's empiricism does not require the acceptance of an anti-realism about commonsense and theoretical objects, and it does not rely on the analytic–synthetic distinction to do any substantive work. Finally, Gupta argues that his reformed empiricism incorporates plausible components of both foundationalism and coherentism.Gupta (2006)

In Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry, Gupta enriches reformed empiricism with an account of empirical dialectic. This account includes an explanation of (1) how empirical reasoning can force a radical transformation of view and (2) how experience contributes to the content of empirical concepts. The latter, which is based on a theory of ostensive definitions, provides a demarcation of legitimate empirical critiques of concepts.

• A.C.L.S. Fellowship, 1988–89; 2003–2004
• N.E.H. Fellowship for University Teachers, 1988–1989; 2003–2004; 2010
• Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, 1998–1999
• Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences[https://www.amacad.org/multimedia/pdfs/classlist.pdf List of the Fellows of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (PDF)]
• Recipient, 225th Anniversary Medallion of the University of Pittsburgh, 2013[http://www.alumni.pitt.edu/alumni/awards/225-medallion/ List of the recipients of the 225th Anniversary Medallion of the University of Pittsburgh]
• Simon Lectures, University of Toronto, 2007
• Whitehead Lectures, Harvard University, 2012

• [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00245939 Modal Logic and Truth (1978).] Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):441–472.
• The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic (1980). Yale University Press.
• [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00302338 Truth and Paradox (1982)]. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11: 1-60.
• The Meaning of Truth (1987). In Ernest Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. Academic Press 453–480.
• [https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545102?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth (1988).] Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89:227–246.
• The Revision Theory of Truth (written with Nuel Belnap) (1993). MIT Press.[https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/revision-theory-truth The Revision Theory of Truth MIT Press page]
• [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2214129 Minimalism (1993)]. Philosophical Perspectives 7: 359–369
• Empiricism and Experience (2006). Oxford University Press.[https://global.oup.com/academic/product/empiricism-and-experience-9780195367263?cc=us&lang=en&# Empiricism and Experience Oxford University Press page]
• [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00289.x/abstract Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to McDowell, Peacocke, and Neta (2009)]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 490–508.
• Truth, Meaning, Experience (2011). Oxford University Press.[https://global.oup.com/academic/product/truth-meaning-experience-9780195136036?q=anil%20gupta&lang=en&cc=us# Truth, Meaning, Experience Oxford University Press page]
• [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2153-960X.2012.00545.x/abstract An Account of Conscious Experience (2012).] Analytic Philosophy 53: 1-29.
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20160306100822/http://monist.oxfordjournals.org/content/96/2/252 The Relationship of Experience to Thought (2013).] The Monist 96 (2):252-294.
• [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-015-9393-3 Conditionals in Theories of Truth (2017)] (written with Shawn Standefer), Journal of Philosophical Logic 46: 27-63.
• [https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674987784 Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry (2019).] Harvard University Press.

• Modal logic
• Revision theory
• Philosophical logic
• Philosophy of perception
• Truth

{{Reflist|30em}}

• Kapitan, T. (1984). [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2215044 Review of The Logic of Common Nouns: An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic]. Noûs 18: 166–173.
• Kremer, P. (1993). [http://individual.utoronto.ca/philipkremer/onlinepapers/guptabelnap.pdf The Gupta-Belnap systems S* and S# are not axiomatisable]. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34: 583–596.
• McGee, V. (1996). [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2108400 Review of The Revision Theory of Truth]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56: 727–730.
• Antonelli, G.A. (1996). [https://www.jstor.org/stable/20117511 What's in a Function?]. Synthese 107: 167–204.
• Orillia, F. (2000). [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1004775802643 Meaning and Circular Definitions]. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29: 155–169.
• Löwe, B. & Welch, P.D. (2001). [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1011946004905 Set-Theoretic Absoluteness and the Revision Theory of Truth]. Studia Logica 68: 21–41.
• Welch, P.D. (2001). [http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9051952&fileId=S107989860000562X On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set]. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7: 345–360.
• Kühnberger, K. et al. (2005). [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11225-005-2803-8 Comparing Inductive and Circular Definitions]. Studia Logica 81: 79–98.
• Martínez-Fernández, J. (2007). [https://web.archive.org/web/20160411013834/http://www.projecteuclid.org/DPubS?verb=Display&version=1.0&service=UI&handle=euclid.ndjfl%2F1193667704&page=record Maximal Three-Valued Clones with the Gupta-Belnap Fixed-Point Property]. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 48: 449–472.
• McDowell, J. (2009). [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00286.x/abstract The Given in Experience: Comment on Gupta]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 468–474.
• Peacocke, C. (2009). [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00287.x/abstract Perception, Content and Rationality]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 475–481.
• Neta, R. (2009). [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00288.x/abstract Empiricism about Experience]. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 482–489.
• Schafer, K. (2011). [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9436-0 The Rationalism in Anil Gupta's Empiricism and Experience]. Philosophical Studies 152: 1–15.
• Berker, S. (2011). [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9435-1 Gupta's Gambit]. Philosophical Studies 152: 17–39.
• Ray, N. (2012). [http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1798&context=etd Ordinary Empirical Judgments and our Scientific Knowledge: An Extension of Reformed Empiricism to the Philosophy of Science] Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. Paper 580.

• [https://anilguptapitt.com/ Gupta's personal website]
• [https://www.philosophy.pitt.edu/people/faculty/anil-gupta Gupta's profile at the University of Pittsburgh]
• [http://philpapers.org/s/anil%20gupta Gupta's profile on Philpapers.org]
• [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-revision/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the Revision Theory of Truth]
• [https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25224-empiricism-and-experience/ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews entry on Empiricism and Experience]
• [https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/32964-ruth-meaning-experience/ Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews entry on Truth, Meaning, Experience]
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20170212164033/http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/post-truth-logical-experience-knowledge-circularity-truth-etc/ Interview with 3:AM Magazine]

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Category:21st-century Indian philosophers

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