Automatic train operation

Automatic train operation (ATO) is a method of operating trains automatically where the driver is not required or required for supervision at most.{{cite web |title=IEC 60050 - International Electrotechnical Vocabulary - Details for IEV number 821-09-01: "automatic train operation" |url=https://www.electropedia.org/iev/iev.nsf/display?openform&ievref=821-09-01 |website=www.electropedia.org |access-date=23 January 2024}} Alternatively, ATO can be defined as a subsystem within the automatic train control, which performs any or all of functions like programmed stopping, speed adjusting, door operation, and similar otherwise assigned to the train operator.{{cite book |title=IEEE Standard for Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) Performance and Functional Requirements |url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1405808 |doi=10.1109/IEEESTD.2004.95746 |isbn=0-7381-4487-8 |access-date=28 January 2024 }}

File:Cab of T251 set 2037.jpg train serving the Mass Rapid Transit's Thomson–East Coast Line in Singapore. This line runs under ATO GoA 4, which is automatically controlled without any on-board staff.]]

The degree of automation is indicated by the Grade of Automation (GoA), up to GoA4 in which the train is automatically controlled without any staff on board.{{cite news |title=Thales and Knorr-Bremse will jointly develop ATO for freight trains |url=https://www.railtech.com/rolling-stock/2022/11/04/thales-and-knorr-bremse-will-jointly-develop-ato-for-freight-trains/ |access-date=5 March 2023 |work=RailTech.com |date=4 November 2022}} On most systems for lower grades of automation up to GoA2, there is a driver present to mitigate risks associated with failures or emergencies. Driverless automation is primarily used on automated guideway transit systems where it is easier to ensure the safety due to isolated tracks. Fully automated trains for mainline railways are an area of research.{{cite news |title=Europe's ERTMS dream enters a new era |url=https://www.railjournal.com/analysis/europes-ertms-dream-enters-a-new-era/ |access-date=5 March 2023 |work=International Railway Journal}} The first driverless experiments in the history of train automation date back to 1920s.{{cite book |last1=Liu |first1=Hui |title=Unmanned driving systems for smart trains |date=2021 |location=Amsterdam |isbn=9780128228302}}

Grades of automation

{{see also|List of semi-automatic train systems|List of driverless train systems}}

File:GoA CITYFLO650.jpg

File:ETCS L3 en.svg Level 3 as an example for GoA2]]

According to the International Association of Public Transport (UITP) and the international standard IEC 62290-1, there are five Grades of Automation (GoA) of trains.{{Cite web| url=http://www.uitp.org/sites/default/files/Metro%20automation%20-%20facts%20and%20figures.pdf| title=A global bid for automation: UITP Observatory of Automated Metros confirms sustained growth rates for the coming years| author=International Association of Public Transport| location=Belgium| access-date=2014-06-08| archive-date=2016-05-01| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160501034433/http://www.uitp.org/sites/default/files/Metro%20automation%20-%20facts%20and%20figures.pdf| url-status=dead}}{{Cite web| url=http://www.railway-technology.com/features/feature127703| title=Justifying automation| author=Elisabeth Fischer| date=23 August 2011| work=Railway-Technology.com}}{{Cite web |title=IEC 62290-1:2014 – IEC-Normen – VDE VERLAG |url=https://www.vde-verlag.de/iec-normen/220959/iec-62290-1-2014.html |website=www.vde-verlag.de |access-date=2 May 2022}} These levels correspond with the automotive SAE J3016 classification:{{Cite news |title=Cross-Domain Fertilisation in the Evolution towards Autonomous Vehicles |url=https://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en109/special/cross-domain-fertilisation-in-the-evolution-towards-autonomous-vehicles |access-date=8 May 2022 |work=ercim-news.ercim.eu |agency=ERCIM News}}{{Cite journal |last1=Nießen |first1=Nils |last2=Schindler |first2=Christian |last3=Vallee |first3=Dirk |title=Assistierter, automatischer oder autonomer Betrieb – Potentiale für den Schienenverkehr |journal=Verkehr & Betrieb |date=2017 |url=https://www.via.rwth-aachen.de/downloads/04_17_Niessen_Schindler_Vallee.pdf}}

class="wikitable"

! Grade of automation

! Train operation

! Description and examples

! SAE levels

GoA0

| On-sight

| No automation

| 0

GoA1

| Manual

| A train driver controls starting and stopping, operation of doors and handling of emergencies or sudden diversions. Overseen signals due to human errors are safeguarded by train protection systems like ETCS L1.{{Cite book |last1=Passerini |first1=G. |title=Computers in Railways XVII Railway Engineering Design and Operation. |date=2020 |publisher=WIT Press |location=Southampton |isbn=978-1-78466-403-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Le_6DwAAQBAJ}}

| 1

GoA2

| Semi-automatic (STO)

| Starting and stopping are automated using advanced train protection systems like ETCS L2 or 3,{{Cite book |last1=Peleska |first1=Jan |last2=Haxthausen |first2=Anne E. |last3=Lecomte |first3=Thierry |title=Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification and Validation. Practice |chapter=Standardisation Considerations for Autonomous Train Control |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |date=2022 |volume=13704 |pages=286–307 |doi=10.1007/978-3-031-19762-8_22 |publisher=Springer Nature Switzerland |isbn=978-3-031-19761-1 |language=en|doi-access=free }} but a driver operates the doors, drives the train if needed and handles emergencies. Many ATO systems are GoA2. In this system, trains run automatically from station to station but a driver is in the cab, with responsibility for door closing, obstacle detection on the track in front of the train and handling of emergency situations. As in a GoA3 system, the GoA2 train cannot operate safely without the staff member on board. Examples include the London Underground's Victoria line and New York City Subway's 7 route.

| 2

GoA3

| {{anchor|Driverless train operation}} Driverless (DTO)

| Starting and stopping are automated, but a train attendant operates the doors and drives the train in case of emergencies. In this system, trains run automatically from station to station but a staff member is always in the train, with responsibility for handling of emergency situations. In a GoA3 system, the train cannot operate safely without the staff member on board. Examples include the Docklands Light Railway.

| 3 and 4

GoA4

| {{anchor|Unattended train operation}} Unattended (UTO)

| Starting, stopping and operation of doors are all fully automated without any on-train staff. It is recommended that stations have platform screen doors installed. In this system, trains are capable of operating automatically at all times, including door closing, obstacle detection and emergency situations. On-board staff may be provided for other purposes, e.g. customer service, but are not required for safe operation. Controls are often provided to drive the train manually in the event of a computer failure. CBTC is considered a basic enabler technology for GoA4. Examples include the Vancouver Skytrain, Singapore MRT, Milan Metro line 5, Milan Metro line 4, Line C (Rome Metro), Turin Metro, Brescia Metro, Paris metro lines 1, 4 and 14, Barcelona Metro line 9, Sydney Metro, Dubai Metro, Doha Metro, Riyadh Metro, Nuremberg Metro lines 2 and 3, the Copenhagen Metro, Honolulu Skyline, Delhi Metro Magenta/Pink/Grey Lines and the Suzhou Rail Transit line 11.

| 5

= Additional types =

class="wikitable"

! Grade of automation

! Description and examples

GoA1+

| In addition to GoA1, there is connected on-board train energy optimisation (C-DAS) over ETCS.{{Cite web |author1=European Union Agency for Railways |title=X2Rail–1 ATO over ETCS (up to GoA4) |url=https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/events-news/docs/ccrcc_2017_ato_era_en.pdf |date=2017 |access-date=2022-05-02 |archive-date=2022-07-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220718154845/https://www.era.europa.eu/sites/default/files/events-news/docs/ccrcc_2017_ato_era_en.pdf |url-status=dead }}

GoA2+

| In case of Amsterdam Metro, a GoA2 is able to reverse in GoA4 at the final stations.{{Cite news |last1=Korf |first1=Wim |last2=Grinwis |first2=Piet |last3=Podt |first3=Theo |title=Anticiperen op waardevol vervoer |url=https://www.noordzuidlijnkennis.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rapportage-audit-projectbeheersing-NoordZuidlijn.pdf |agency=Rapportage audit Noord/Zuidlijn |date=2010 |language=nl |access-date=2022-05-02 |archive-date=2022-07-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220718154843/https://www.noordzuidlijnkennis.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rapportage-audit-projectbeheersing-NoordZuidlijn.pdf |url-status=dead }} This is indicated by '+'. GoA2+ is also present on Bucharest Metro line M5, which uses the same URBALIS 400 CBTC as Amsterdam.

GoA2(+)

| This is GoA2 with additional functions related to metre-gauge railway.{{Cite web |last1=Napoli |first1=S. |title=01-03-00079 1.02 Branchenlösung ATO auf GoA2(+) |url=https://www.voev.ch/de/Service/content_?download=18109 |website=VÖV UTP |access-date=25 December 2022 |language=de |date=2018}}

GoA2.5

| Instead of a trained driver, a train attendant sits in the cab, with nothing to do except detect obstacles and evacuate passengers.{{Cite web |title=鉄道：鉄道における自動運転技術検討会 - 国土交通省 |url=https://www.mlit.go.jp/tetudo/tetudo_fr1_000058.html |website=www.mlit.go.jp |access-date=29 May 2022}} Kyushu Railway Company started commercial operation of automatic train operation using the ATS-DK on the Kashii Line (between Nishi-Tozaki and Kashii Stations) on a trial basis on December 24, 2020. The goal is to achieve GoA3, a form of "driverless operation with an attendant".{{Cite news |title=JR九州、自動運転の営業運転スタート！将来は「GoA2.5」の形態目指す {{!}} 自動運転ラボ |url=https://jidounten-lab.com/u_jr-kyushu-goa2-5 |access-date=23 June 2022 |date=4 January 2021 |language=ja}}

GoA3+

| An umbrella term for GoA3 and GoA4 meaning replacement of human train driver.{{Cite book |last1=Tagiew |first1=Rustam |last2=Buder |first2=Thomas |last3=Hofmann |first3=Kai |last4=Klotz |first4=Christian |last5=Tilly |first5=Roman |title=2021 5th High Performance Computing and Cluster Technologies Conference |chapter=Towards Nucleation of GoA3+ Approval Process |date=2 July 2021 |pages=41–47 |doi=10.1145/3497737.3497742 |chapter-url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3497737.3497742 |access-date=2 May 2022 |publisher=Association for Computing Machinery|isbn=978-1-4503-9013-2 |s2cid=245426687 }} The terms GoA3/4, GoA3,4 and autonomous trains are used synonymously.{{Cite book |last1=Lagay |first1=Rémy |last2=Adell |first2=Gemma Morral |title=2018 16th International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems Telecommunications (ITST) |chapter=The Autonomous Train: A game changer for the railways industry |date=October 2018 |pages=1–5 |doi=10.1109/ITST.2018.8566728 |isbn=978-1-5386-5544-3 |s2cid=54463761 |chapter-url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8566728}}

Operation of ATO

File:Grand Central Shuttle platform in 1962.jpeg at track 4 of the 42nd Street Shuttle (right) in 1962]]

Many modern systems are linked with automatic train protection (ATP) and, in many cases, automatic train control (ATC) where normal signaling operations such as route setting and train regulation are carried out by the system. The ATC and ATP systems will work together to maintain a train within a defined tolerance of its timetable. The combined system will marginally adjust operating parameters such as the ratio of power to coasting when moving and station dwell time in order to adhere to a defined timetable.{{cn|date=May 2023}}

Whereas ATP is the safety system that ensures a safe spacing between trains and provides sufficient warning as to when to stop. ATO is the "non-safety" part of train operation related to station stops and starts, and indicates the stopping position for the train once the ATP has confirmed that the line is clear.{{cn|date=May 2023}}

The train approaches the station under clear signals, so it can do a normal run-in. When it reaches the first beacon – originally a looped cable, now usually a fixed transponder – a station brake command is received by the train. The on-board computer calculates the braking curve to enable it to stop at the correct point, and as the train runs in towards the platform, the curve is updated a number of times (which varies from system to system) to ensure accuracy.{{Cite web|url=http://www.railway-technical.com/sigtxt4.shtml|title=ATO|website=Railway Technical Web Page|url-status=dead |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20120412091205/http://www.railway-technical.com/sigtxt4.shtml|archive-date=12 April 2012}}

When the train has stopped, it verifies that its brakes are applied and checks that it has stopped within the door-enabling loops. These loops verify the position of the train relative to the platform and which side the doors should open. Once all this is complete, the ATO will open the doors. After a set time, predetermined or varied by the control centre as required, the ATO will close the doors and automatically restart the train if the door closed proving circuit is complete. Some systems have platform screen doors as well. ATO will also provide a signal for these to open once it has completed the on-board checking procedure. Although described here as an ATO function, door enabling at stations is often incorporated as part of the ATP equipment because it is regarded as a "vital" system and requires the same safety validation processes as ATP.

Once door operation is completed, ATO will accelerate the train to its cruising speed, allow it to coast to the next station brake command beacon and then brake into the next station, assuming no intervention by the ATP system.

= Advantages of GoA3+ =

In 2021, the Florida Department of Transportation funded a review by scientists from Florida State University, University of Talca and Hong Kong Polytechnic University, which showed the following advantages of autonomous trains:{{Cite journal |last1=Singh |first1=Prashant |last2=Dulebenets |first2=Maxim A. |last3=Pasha |first3=Junayed |last4=Gonzalez |first4=Ernesto D. R. Santibanez |last5=Lau |first5=Yui-Yip |last6=Kampmann |first6=Raphael |title=Deployment of Autonomous Trains in Rail Transportation: Current Trends and Existing Challenges |journal=IEEE Access |date=2021 |volume=9 |pages=91427–91461 |doi=10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3091550 |s2cid=235749326 |issn=2169-3536|doi-access=free |bibcode=2021IEEEA...991427S |hdl=10397/92123 |hdl-access=free }}

Eliminating human sources of errors
Increasing capacity by stronger utilisation of existing rail tracks
Reduction of operational costs. Paris Métro reduced its operational costs in case of GoA 4 by 30%.{{Cite journal |last1=Cohen |first1=J. M. |last2=Barron |first2=A. S. |last3=Anderson |first3=R. J. |last4=Graham |first4=D. J. |title=Impacts of Unattended Train Operations (UTO) on Productivity and Efficiency in Metropolitan Railways |journal=National Academy of Sciences|url=https://core.ac.uk/display/77007368}}
Increasing overall service reliability
Improving fleet management and service flexibility
Increasing energy efficiency

= Accidents and incidents involving ATO =

While ATO has been proven to drastically reduce the chance of human errors in railway operation, there have been a few notable accidents involving ATO systems:

Year	Territory	Incident
class="wikitable sortable"
1993	Japan	On 5 October 1993, an automated Nankō Port Town Line train overran the line's southern terminus at Suminoekōen Station and collided with a buffer stop, injuring 217 people. The cause was believed to have been a malfunction in some of the relays in the line's ATO equipment that transmits the brake command signal, causing the brakes to not operate.{{Cite news \|title=大阪市ニュートラム暴走事故原因はリレー回路接続不良運輸省が中間報告ブレーキ指令伝わらず \|newspaper=Kotsu Shimbun \|publisher=Kotsu Shimbunsha \|date=1993-11-09 \|page=1 }} Operations resumed on 19 November 1993 after redundancy equipment was installed and tested on the line.{{Cite news \|title=大阪市交「ニュートラム」きょう運行再開 \|newspaper=Kotsu Shimbun \|publisher=Kotsu Shimbunsha \|date=1993-11-19 \|page=1 }}
2011	China	On 27 September 2011 at 14:51 hours local time (06:51 hours UTC), two trains on Shanghai Metro Line 10 collided between Yuyuan Garden station and Laoximen station, injuring 284–300 people. Initial investigations found that train operators violated regulations while operating the trains manually after a loss of power on the line caused its ATO and signalling systems to fail. No deaths were reported.{{Cite news \|url=http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_CHINA_SUBWAY_CRASH \|title=Signal maker: Not to blame for Shanghai rail crash \|newspaper=AP}}
2015	Mexico	On 4 May 2015, at around 18:00 hours local time (00:00 hours UTC){{Cite news\|url=https://elpais.com/internacional/2015/05/05/actualidad/1430784043_271606.html\|title=Un choque en el metro de México deja al menos 12 heridos\|date=5 May 2015\|access-date=30 May 2021\|language=es\|work=El País\|trans-title=A train crash at Mexico's metro leaves 12 injured\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191227143143/https://elpais.com/internacional/2015/05/05/actualidad/1430784043_271606.html\|archive-date=27 December 2019 }} during heavy rain with hail,{{Cite web\|url=https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/metropoli/2015/05/5/chocan-trenes-en-linea-5-del-metro\|title=Chocan trenes en Línea 5 del Metro\|language=es\|trans-title=Trains crash ate Metro Line 5\|work=El Universal\|date=5 May 2015\|access-date=30 May 2021\|first1=Johana\|last1=Robles\|first2=Fanny\|last2=Ruiz\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210530204027/https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/metropoli/2015/05/5/chocan-trenes-en-linea-5-del-metro\|archive-date=30 May 2021}} two trains crashed at Oceanía station on Mexico City Metro Line 5 while both were heading toward Politécnico station.{{Cite web\|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/04/americas/mexico-city-metro-trains-crash\|title=Mexico City metro trains crash; injuries reported\|date=4 May 2015\|work=CNN\|access-date=30 May 2021\|first=Catherine E.\|last=Shoichet\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210503201939/https://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/04/americas/mexico-city-metro-trains-crash\|archive-date=3 May 2021}} The first train, No. 4, was parked at the end of Oceanía station's platform after the driver reported that a plywood board was obstructing the tracks.{{Cite web\|url=http://www.rieles.com/front/mexico-dan-a-conocer-detalles-del-choque-en-el-metro-oceania/\|title=México:Dan a conocer detalles del choque en el Metro Oceanía\|trans-title=Mexico: Details of crash at Oceanía station released\|author=Noticieros Televisa\|work=Revista Rieles\|publisher=Rieles Multimedio\|date=13 May 2015\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210530231835/http://www.rieles.com/front/mexico-dan-a-conocer-detalles-del-choque-en-el-metro-oceania/\|archive-date=30 May 2021}} The second train, No. 5, left Terminal Aérea station with the analogue PA-135 ATO system turned on despite the driver being asked to turn it off and to operate the train manually,{{Cite web\|url=https://aristeguinoticias.com/1205/mexico/error-humano-causo-choque-en-metro-oceania-comite-investigador/\|title=Error humano causó choque en Metro Oceanía, informa comité investigador\|language=es\|date=12 May 2015\|access-date=30 May 2021\|work=Aristegui Noticias\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150515014335/https://aristeguinoticias.com/1205/mexico/error-humano-causo-choque-en-metro-oceania-comite-investigador/\|archive-date=15 May 2015}} as the protocol requests it when it rains because trains have to drive with reduced speed.{{Cite web\|url=https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/cdmx/y-a-todo-esto-cuantos-choques-han-ocurrido-a-lo-largo-de-la-historia-del-metro-de-la-cdmx/\|title=Y a todo esto, ¿cuántos choques han ocurrido a lo largo de la historia del Metro de la CDMX?\|trans-title=And by the way, how many crashes have occurred throughout the history of the Mexico City Metro?\|language=es\|first=Angélica\|last=Ferrer\|work=El Financiero\|date=11 March 2020\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210530211101/https://www.elfinanciero.com.mx/cdmx/y-a-todo-esto-cuantos-choques-han-ocurrido-a-lo-largo-de-la-historia-del-metro-de-la-cdmx/\|archive-date=30 May 2021}} Train No. 5 crashed into Train No. 4 at {{convert\|31.8\|km/h\|mi/h\|abbr=on}} – double the average on arrival at the platforms – and left twelve people injured.{{Cite web\|url=https://www.milenio.com/estados/error-humano-causo-choque-trenes-metro-oceania\|title=Error humano causó choque de trenes en Metro Oceanía\|date=12 May 2015\|access-date=15 March 2020\|first=Ilich\|last=Valdez\|language=es\|work=Milenio\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200404214935/https://www.milenio.com/estados/error-humano-causo-choque-trenes-metro-oceania\|archive-date=4 April 2020\|trans-title=Human error caused train crash at Oceanía station}}
2017	Singapore	Joo Koon rail accident – on 15 November 2017 at about 08:30 hours local time (00:30 hours UTC), one SMRT East-West Line C151A train rear-ended another C151A train at Joo Koon MRT station in Singapore, causing 38 injuries. At that time, the East-West Line was in the process of having its previous Westinghouse ATC fixed block signalling and associated ATO system replaced with the Thales SelTrac CBTC moving block signalling system. One of the trains involved had a safety protection feature removed when it went over a faulty signalling circuit as a fix for a known software bug, hence "bursting" the signalling bubble and leading to the collision.{{Cite news\|last1=Lim\|first1=Adrian\|title=Joo Koon collision: 'Inadvertent removal' of software fix led to collision\|url=http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/inadvertent-removal-of-software-fix-led-to-collision\|access-date=17 November 2017\|work=Straits Times\|date=16 November 2017\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171117175406/http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/transport/inadvertent-removal-of-software-fix-led-to-collision\|archive-date=17 November 2017\|url-status=live}}
2017 \|India \|Before the prime minister was supposed to ride the train and a few days before the opening, the train was undergoing ATO trials at the Kalindi Kunj Depot. As the train approached the buffer, it hit the buffers and derailed, hitting the front wall. The wall was eventually patched with bricks. However, it was eventually realized that the brakes were not applied by the train by default under the operation.{{cite news \|title=Driverless Delhi Metro Train Crashes Into Wall, These Memes Follow \|url=https://www.ndtv.com/offbeat/delhi-metros-driverless-magenta-line-train-crashes-into-wall-at-kalindi-kunj-memes-follow-1789987 \|access-date=19 September 2024 \|work=NDTV.com}} This led to the trains being controlled by drivers until 2024, delaying the full UTO operations by seven years.
2019	Hong Kong	A similar incident as the above occurred on the MTR Tsuen Wan Line in Hong Kong on 18 March 2019, when two MTR M-Train EMUs crashed in the crossover track section between Admiralty and Central while MTR was testing a new version of the SelTrac train control system intended to replace the line's existing SACEM signalling system. There were no passengers aboard either train, although the operators of both trains were injured.{{Cite news\|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mtr-corp-train-accident-idUSKCN1QZ03K\|title=Hong Kong faces commuter chaos after rare train collision\|newspaper=Reuters\|date=18 March 2019}} Before the crash site had been cleaned up, all Tsuen Wan line trains terminated at Admiralty instead of Central. The same vendor also provided a similar signalling system in Singapore, which resulted in the Joo Koon rail accident in 2017.{{Cite web\|date=19 March 2019\|title= Signalling system in Hong Kong MTR train collision a 'version' of that used in Singapore\|url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/seltrac-thales-signalling-hong-kong-mtr-train-collision-mrt-11356406\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210130123728/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/seltrac-thales-signalling-hong-kong-mtr-train-collision-mrt-11356406\|archive-date=30 January 2021\|access-date=30 January 2021\|website=CNA}} In July 2019, the Electrical and Mechanical Services Department (EMSD) published an investigation report into the incident and concluded that a programming error in the SelTrac signalling system led the ATP system to malfunction, resulting in the collision.{{Cite web\|last=\|first=\|date=5 July 2019\|title=Investigation Report on Incident of the New Signalling System Testing on MTR Tsuen Wan Line\|url=https://www.emsd.gov.hk/filemanager/en/content_1377/TWL_New_Signalling_System_Testing_Incident_Report_(Eng).pdf\|url-status=live\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210130122359/https://www.emsd.gov.hk/filemanager/en/content_1377/TWL_New_Signalling_System_Testing_Incident_Report_%28Eng%29.pdf\|archive-date=30 January 2021\|access-date=30 January 2021\|website=Electrical and Mechanical Services Department}}
2021	Malaysia	2021 Kelana Jaya LRT collision in Kuala Lumpur, in which 213 people were injured due to human error. The controller and backup controller computer have failed, a train driver was called in to drive the train to the depot. The train driver drives in the opposite direction of the track, leading to a collision with a train. ATP was not triggered due to the train's disappearance from the system as a result of both computers failing.{{Cite web\|last=Azman\|first=Fareez\|title=47 parah, 166 cedera ringan LRT bertembung berhampiran Stesen KLCC\|url=https://www.astroawani.com/berita-malaysia/47-parah-166-cedera-ringan-lrt-bertembung-berhampiran-stesen-klcc-299679\|access-date=2021-05-24\|website=Astro Awani}}
2022	China	On 22 January 2022, an elder passenger was caught between the traindoor and screendoor in Qi'an Road station of Line 15 (Shanghai Metro). On seeing the situation, the staff misoperated the traindoor controlling system, allowing the screen door to isolate without detecting, causing the train run a short while and fatally injuring the trapped passenger.{{Cite news \|url=http://shanghai.xinmin.cn/2022/01/24/32103281.html \|title=上海地铁一女乘客被屏蔽门夹住：送医抢救后身亡，有关部门已介入 \|author=董怡虹 \|work=新民晚报 \|date=2022-01-24 \|accessdate=2022-01-25 \|language=zh-cn }}

ATO research projects

Name	Start year	End year	Description	Country	Volume
class="wikitable" \|+
{{interlanguage link\|SMARAGT\|de}}		1999	Automatization of the Nuremberg U-Bahn{{Cite web \|last1=Ritter \|first1=Norbert \|title=Einführungsstrategien für die Automatisierung von Nahverkehrsbahnen \|url=https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/iud:sid~I0130340/Einf%C3%BChrungsstrategien-f%C3%BCr-die-Automatisierung-von \|website=ZEV DET Glasers Annalen – Die Eisenbahntechnik \|access-date=16 October 2022 \|pages=129–130, 132, 134–137 \|date=2001}}	Germany
{{interlanguage link\|RUBIN\|de}}		2001	Automatization of the Nuremberg U-Bahn{{cite web \|last1=Trummer \|first1=Georg \|last2=Rappe \|first2=Jutta \|title=RUBIN: Die erste fahrerlose U-Bahn im Mischbetrieb \|url=https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/iud:sid~I0860310/RUBIN-Die-erste-fahrerlose-U-Bahn-im-Mischbetrieb?cHash=89d0a6eedc0e4187219ecc2a2baa9230 \|website=ZEVrail \|access-date=9 June 2023 \|pages=347–352 \|date=2008}}	Germany
KOMPAS I	2001		Driverless operation on mainline railways{{Cite web \|last1=Haecker \|first1=Thies \|last2=Alcatel-SEL-Aktiengesellschaft \|first2=Unternehmensbereich Transportsysteme \|title=Forschungsvorhaben Komponenten Automatisierter Schienenverkehr KOMPAS, Phase I : Schlussbericht \|url=https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/TIBKAT:371705525/Forschungsvorhaben-Komponenten-Automatisierter \|access-date=16 October 2022 \|date=2003}}	Germany	4.85 million €{{cite web \|author1=Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, Referat Informationstechnik \|title=Förderkatalog \|url=https://www.foerderportal.bund.de \|access-date=4 May 2024 \|language=de}}
AutoBAHN	2010	2014	Autonomous trains on existing regional railway lines{{cite web \|title=autoBAHN - autonom fahrende EisenBAHN auf bestehenden Regionalbahnstrecken \|url=https://energieforschung.at/projekt/autobahn-autonom-fahrende-eisenbahn-auf-bestehenden-regionalbahnstrecken/ \|website=Energieforschung \|access-date=19 September 2024 \|language=de}}	Austria	2.5 million €
RCAS		2010	Collision avoidance without permanent installations{{Cite web \|last1=Müller \|first1=Christoph \|title=RCAS — Collision avoidance without permanent installations \|url=https://www.tib.eu/de/suchen/id/olc:1849213089/RCAS-Collision-avoidance-without-permanent-installations \|website=Internationales Verkehrswesen : Transport and mobility management \|access-date=16 October 2022 \|pages=20–22 \|date=2010}}	Germany
KI-Lok	2021	2024	Safe AI for the rail{{cite journal \|last1=Hemzal \|first1=Georg \|last2=Firnkorn \|first2=Jörg \|last3=Sadeghipour \|first3=Sadegh \|last4=Leuschel \|first4=Michael \|last5=Schlingloff \|first5=Bernd-Holger \|last6=Großmann \|first6=Jürgen \|last7=Strobel \|first7=Timo \|title=KI-LOK – Ein Verbundprojekt über Prüfverfahren für KI-basierte Komponenten im Eisenbahnbetrieb {{!}} Eurailpress Archiv \|journal=eurailpress-archiv.de \|date=2021 \|volume=Ausgabe 10/2021 \|url=https://eurailpress-archiv.de/SingleView.aspx?show=2911184}}	Germany	2.47 million €
SMART 2	2019	2022	Advanced integrated obstacle and track intrusion detection system for smart automation of rail transport{{cite web \|title=Advanced integrated obstacle and track intrusion detection system for smart automation of rail transport \|url=https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/881784/reporting/de \|website=CORDIS \|access-date=19 September 2024}}	EU	1.7 million €
safe.trAIn	2022		Development of AI-Enabled Automated Trains{{cite news \|last1=May \|first1=Tiana \|title=safe.trAIn Project to Advance Development of AI-Enabled Automated Trains \|url=https://railway-news.com/safe-train-project-to-advance-development-of-ai-enabled-automated-trains/ \|access-date=23 January 2024 \|work=Railway-News \|date=29 September 2022 \|language=en-gb}}	Germany	24 million €
AutomatedTrain	2023		Fully automated staging and parking of trains{{cite web \|title=LOK Report - Deutsche Bahn: Ausrüstung von zwei Regionalzügen mit modernster Sensortechnik für vollautomatisiertes Fahren \|url=https://www.lok-report.de/news/deutschland/verkehr/item/42418-deutsche-bahn-ausruestung-von-zwei-regionalzuegen-mit-modernster-sensortechnik-fuer-vollautomatisiertes-fahren.html \|website=www.lok-report.de \|access-date=21 February 2024 \|language=de-de}}	EU	42.6 million €{{cite web \|title=Projekt "AutomatedTrain": Züge fahren vollautomatisiert und fahrerlos {{!}} Verkehrslage \|url=https://verkehrslage.vkw.tu-dresden.de/de/forschung-1/projekt-automatedtrain-zuege-fahren-vollautomatisiert-und-fahrerlos \|website=verkehrslage.vkw.tu-dresden.de \|access-date=21 February 2024}}
R2DATO	2023		Rail to Digital automated up to autonomous train operation{{cite web \|title=eurail-fp2 \|url=https://projects.rail-research.europa.eu/eurail-fp2/ \|website=EU \|access-date=19 September 2024}}	EU	160.8 million €

Future

In October 2021, the pilot project of the "world's first automated, driverless train" on regular tracks shared with other rail traffic was launched in Hamburg, Germany. The conventional, standard-track, non-metro train technology could, according to reports, theoretically be implemented for rail transport worldwide and is also substantially more energy efficient.{{Cite news |title=Germany unveils first self-driving train |url=https://techxplore.com/news/2021-10-germany-unveils-self-driving.html |access-date=15 November 2021 |work=techxplore.com |language=en}}{{Cite news |title=Germany: Hamburg gets first fully automated tram {{!}} DW {{!}} 11 October 2021 |url=https://www.dw.com/en/germany-hamburg-gets-first-fully-automated-tram/a-59470896 |access-date=15 November 2021 |work=Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)}}

ATO was introduced on the London Underground's Circle, District, Hammersmith & City, and Metropolitan lines by 2022. ATO is used on parts of Crossrail. Trains on the central London section of Thameslink were the first to use ATO on the UK mainline railway network{{Cite news|title=Thameslink first with ATO over ETCS|url=https://www.railwaygazette.com/news/traction-rolling-stock/single-view/view/thameslink-first-with-ato-over-etcs.html|agency=Railway Gazette|date=20 March 2018}} with ETCS Level 2.

In April 2022, JR West announced that they would test ATO on a 12-car W7 series Shinkansen train used on the Hokuriku Shinkansen at the Hakusan General Rolling Stock Yard during 2022.{{Cite news|date=25 April 2022 |title=JR West to test ATO on W7 series Shinkansen |url=https://www.railjournal.com/passenger/high-speed/jr-west-to-test-ato-on-w7-series-shinkansen/ |work=International Railway Journal |access-date=28 April 2022}}

The U-Bahn in Vienna was scheduled to be equipped with ATO in 2023 on the new U5 line.

All lines built for the new Sydney Metro feature driverless operation without any staff in attendance.

From 2012, the Toronto subway underwent signal upgrades in order to use ATO and ATC over the next decade.{{Cite web | url = http://www.ttc.ca/PDF/About_the_TTC/yonge_subway_extension_recommended_concept_project_issues_de.pdf | title = Yonge Subway Extension – Recommended Concept/Project Issues | date = 2008-12-17 | first = Charles | last = Wheeler | publisher = TTC }} Work has been completed on sections Yonge–University line.{{Cite web|title=Rail News – TTC extends signal system to Queen Station. For Railroad Career Professionals|url=https://www.progressiverailroading.com/c_s/news/TTC-extends-signal-system-to-Queen-Station--59811|access-date=2020-12-12|website=Progressive Railroading|language=en}} The underground portion of Line 5 Eglinton was equipped with ATC and ATO in 2022. The underground portion will use a GoA2 system while the Eglinton Maintenance and Storage Facility will use a GoA4 system and travel driverless around the yard.{{Cite web |title=How will the Eglinton Crosstown LRT's automatic train control work? We break down every major element in an infographic |date=9 December 2019 |url=https://blog.metrolinx.com/2019/12/09/how-will-the-eglinton-crosstown-lrts-automatic-train-control-work-we-break-down-every-major-element-in-an-infographic/ |access-date=4 June 2020}} The Ontario Line is proposed have a GoA4 driverless system and will open in 2030.{{Cite web |title=Ontario Line will be driven by proven tech rather than futuristic prototypes |date=10 September 2019 |url=https://blog.metrolinx.com/2019/09/10/ontario-line-will-be-driven-by-proven-tech-rather-than-futuristic-prototypes/ |access-date=4 June 2020}}

Since March 2021, SNCF and Hauts-de-France region have begun an experimentation with a French Regio 2N Class, {{ill|equipped with sensors and software|fr|Regio 2N#ATO|vertical-align=sup}} (fr).

In 2025, regular driverless passenger services on the line from Kopidlno to Dolní Bousov will be resumed by AŽD Praha.{{cite news |title=LOK Report - Tschechien: AŽD will Kopidlno - Dolní Bousov im Jahr 2025 autonom betreiben |url=https://www.lok-report.de/news/europa/item/46482-tschechien-azd-will-kopidlno-dolni-bousov-im-jahr-2025-autonom-betreiben.html |access-date=23 March 2024 |work=www.lok-report.de |language=de-de}}

References

External links

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zc08c9u4KWM Tests of train obstacle detection system], project Robotrain, AZD Praha