Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC

{{Infobox SCOTUS case

|Litigants=Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC

|ArgueDate=January 10

|ArgueYear=2005

|DecideDate=April 27

|DecideYear=2005

|FullName=Dennis Bates, et al., Petitioners v. Dow Agrosciences LLC

|Docket=03-388

|USVol=544

|USPage=431

|ParallelCitations=125 S. Ct. 1788; 161 L. Ed. 2d 687; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 3706

|Prior=Summary judgment for defendants, 436 F. Supp. 2d 132 (Me. 2006); reversed, 501 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2007); cert. granted, 552 U.S. ___ (2008)

|Subsequent=

|Holding=Federal law does not preempt the application of state law in insecticide labeling requirements.

|Majority=Stevens

|JoinMajority=Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer

|Concurrence=Breyer

|Concurrence/Dissent=Thomas

|JoinConcurrence/Dissent=Scalia

|LawsApplied={{usc|15|1334(b)}} (Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, § 207(Supp. 2008) (Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act)

}}

Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state law claims, brought by a group of Texas farmers, alleging that one of Dow's pesticides damaged their peanut crop.{{ussc|name=Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC|volume=544|page=431|pin=434|year=2005}}.

Background

A group of 29 peanut farmers in Texas alleged that their peanut crops were severely damaged by Dow's "Strongarm" pesticide.Bates, 544 U.S. at 434. After the farmers informed Dow that they intended to file a lawsuit, Dow filed a request in federal district court for a declaratory judgment stating that a legal claim brought by the farmers would be preempted by FIFRA.Bates, 544 U.S. at 435 (noting that the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.01 et seq. (West 2002), required the farmers to provide notice). The farmers then filed counterclaims against Dow, which alleged tort claims and violations of consumer protection laws.Bates, 544 U.S. at 435-36. The district court granted Dow's motion for summary judgment and found that all but one of the farmers' claims were preempted by FIFRA.Bates, 544 U.S. at 436 ("rejecting one claim on state-law grounds and dismissing the remainder as expressly pre-empted by 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)"). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.Bates, 544 U.S. at 436. In 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split regarding the extent to which FIFRA preempts claims under state law.Bates, 544 U.S. at 436-37.

Opinion of the Court

In an opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the farmers' claims were not preempted by FIFRA.Bates, 544 U.S. at 444 ("petitioners’ claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty are not pre-empted"). Justice Stevens wrote that "[n]othing in the text of FIFRA would prevent a State from making the violation of a federal labeling or packaging requirement a state offense, thereby imposing its own sanctions on pesticide manufacturers who violate federal law."Bates, 544 U.S. at 442. Justice Stevens also distinguished the facts of this case from those in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,{{ussc|name=Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.|volume=505|page=504|pin=|year=1992}}. noting that FIFRA "prohibits only state-law labeling and packaging requirements that are “in addition to or different from” the labeling and packaging requirements under FIFRA."Bates, 544 U.S. at 447.

=Concurring and dissenting opinions=

Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize "the importance of the [Environmental Protection] [A]gency's role in overseeing FIFRA's future implementation".Bates, 544 U.S. at 454-55 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.Bates, 544 U.S. at 455 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas argued that "[a] state-law cause of action, even if not specific to labeling, nevertheless imposes a labeling requirement 'in addition to or different from' FIFRA's when it attaches liability to statements on the label that do not produce liability under FIFRA."Bates, 544 U.S. at 456 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).