Biosafety level#Levels

File:Structure of NIAID Integrated Research Facility.jpg level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory{{cite web|title=Integrated Research Facility|url=http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/irf/Pages/facilityOverview.aspx|website=niaid.nih.gov|publisher=NIAID|access-date=14 November 2014|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141128061044/http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/irf/Pages/facilityOverview.aspx|archive-date=28 November 2014}}]]

A biosafety level (BSL), or pathogen/protection level, is a set of biocontainment precautions required to isolate dangerous biological agents in an enclosed laboratory facility. The levels of containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1 (BSL-1) to the highest at level 4 (BSL-4).{{cite book |last1=Biosecurity & Health Security Protection [BSP] |title=Laboratory Biosafety Manual |date=2020-12-21 |publisher=World Health Organization |location=Geneva |isbn=978-92-4-001131-1 |edition=4 |url=https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240011311 |access-date=2025-05-10}} In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have specified these levels in a publication referred to as Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL).{{cite book |url=https://www.cdc.gov/labs/pdf/SF__19_308133-A_BMBL6_00-BOOK-WEB-final-3.pdf |title=Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories |publisher=Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |year=2020 |isbn=978-0-1608-5042-4 |veditors=Chosewood LC, Wilson DE |edition=6th |access-date=20 Dec 2024}} In the European Union (EU), the same biosafety levels are defined in a directive.Directive 2000/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 2000 on the protection of workers from risks related to exposure to biological agents at work (seventh individual directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) In Canada the four levels are known as Containment Levels.{{cite web|url=https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/canadian-biosafety-standards-guidelines/laboratory-biosafety-guidelines-3rd-edition-2004/chapter-2.html|title=Chapter 2: The Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines: 3rd Edition 2004 – Biological safety – Canada.ca|first=Public Health Agency of|last=Canada|website=www.canada.ca|access-date=7 May 2018|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180223235144/https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/canadian-biosafety-standards-guidelines/laboratory-biosafety-guidelines-3rd-edition-2004/chapter-2.html|archive-date=23 February 2018}} Facilities with these designations are also sometimes given as P1 through P4 (for pathogen or protection level), as in the term P3 laboratory.{{cite book | publisher = Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, National Cancer Institute, Office of Research Safety | title = Laboratory Safety Monograph: A Supplement to the NIH Guidelines for Recombinant DNA Research | pages=passim | no-pp=y | year = 1978 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=HKU0pta6Y20C&pg=PA121 }}

At the lowest level of biosafety, precautions may consist of regular hand-washing and minimal protective equipment. At higher biosafety levels, precautions may include airflow systems, multiple containment rooms, sealed containers, positive pressure personnel suits, established protocols for all procedures, extensive personnel training, and high levels of security to control access to the facility. Health Canada reports that world-wide until 1999 there were recorded over 5,000 cases of accidental laboratory infections and 190 deaths.{{cite news |title=Biosafety at Ryerson |url=https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/facilities-management-development/environmental-health-safety/docs/2-biological-hazard-classification.pdf |access-date=4 February 2021 |publisher=Ryerson University Facilities Management and Design |archive-date=16 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210216105042/https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/facilities-management-development/environmental-health-safety/docs/2-biological-hazard-classification.pdf |url-status=dead }}

History

The first prototype Class III (maximum containment) biosafety cabinet was fashioned in 1943 by Hubert Kaempf Jr., then a U.S. Army soldier, under the direction of Arnold G. Wedum, Director (1944–1969) of Industrial Health and Safety at the United States Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland. Kaempf was tired of his MP duties at Detrick and was able to transfer to the sheet metal department working with the contractor, the H.K. Ferguson Co.{{Cite web |last=Covt |first=Norman M. |date=1997 |url=http://www.detrick.army.mil/cutting_edge/index.cfm |title=A History of Fort Detrick, Maryland |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080922133111/http://www.detrick.army.mil/cutting_edge/index.cfm |archive-date=2008-09-22 }}, 3rd edition. Kaempf retired from Fort Detrick in 1994, having completed more than 50 years service. He was chief of the mechanical branch, Directorate of Engineering and Housing.

On 18 April 1955, fourteen representatives met at Camp Detrick in Frederick, Maryland. The meeting was to share knowledge and experiences regarding biosafety, chemical, radiological, and industrial safety issues that were common to the operations at the three principal biological warfare (BW) laboratories of the U.S. Army.{{cite web|url=http://www.absa.org/abohist1.html|title=A History of the American Biological Safety Association|access-date=2008-08-14|author=Manuel S. Barbeito|author2=Richard H. Kruse|publisher=American Biological Safety Association|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080620063212/http://www.absa.org/abohist1.html|archive-date=2008-06-20|url-status=dead}} Because of the potential implication of the work conducted at biological warfare laboratories, the conferences were restricted to top level security clearances. Beginning in 1957, these conferences were planned to include non-classified sessions as well as classified sessions to enable broader sharing of biological safety information. It was not until 1964, however, that conferences were held in a government installation not associated with a biological warfare program.{{cite web| url = http://riley.nal.usda.gov/nal_display/index.php?info_center=8&tax_level=4&tax_subject=158&topic_id=1982&level3_id=6419&level4_id=10967&level5_id=0&placement_default=0&test| title = American Biological Safety Association Collection : NAL Collections : National Agricultural Library| access-date= 2009-02-11| date = 2009-02-11| publisher = United States Department of Agriculture: National Agricultural Library| url-status = dead| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20090227023644/http://riley.nal.usda.gov/nal_display/index.php?info_center=8&tax_level=4&tax_subject=158&topic_id=1982&level3_id=6419&level4_id=10967&level5_id=0&placement_default=0&test| archive-date = 2009-02-27}}

Over the next ten years, the biological safety conferences grew to include representatives from all federal agencies that sponsored or conducted research with pathogenic microorganisms. By 1966, it began to include representatives from universities, private laboratories, hospitals, and industrial complexes. Throughout the 1970s, participation in the conferences continued to expand and by 1983 discussions began regarding the creation of a formal organization. The American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) was officially established in 1984 and a constitution and bylaws were drafted the same year. As of 2008, ABSA includes some 1,600 members in its professional association.

In 1977, Jim Peacock of the Australian Academy of Science asked Bill Snowdon, then chief of the CSIRO's Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) if he could have the newly released United States' National Institutes of Health and the British equivalent requirements for the development of infrastructure for bio-containment reviewed by AAHL personnel with a view to recommending the adoption of one of them by Australian authorities. The review was carried out by CSIRO AAHL Project Manager Bill Curnow and CSIRO Engineer Arthur Jenkins. They drafted outcomes for each of the levels of security. AAHL was notionally classified as "substantially beyond P4". These were adopted by the Australian Academy of Science and became the basis for Australian legislation. It opened in 1985 costing AU$185 million, built on Corio Oval.{{Cite web|url=http://www.csiro.au/en/Organisation-Structure/National-Facilities/Australian-Animal-Health-Laboratory.aspx|title=CSIRO: Geelong – Australian Animal Health Laboratory}} The Australian Animal Health Laboratory is a Class 4/ P4 Laboratory.{{cite journal |last1=Lowenthal |first1=John |title=Overview of the CSIRO Australian Animal Health Laboratory |journal=Journal of Infection and Public Health |date=May 2016 |volume=9 |issue=3 |pages=236–239 |doi=10.1016/j.jiph.2016.04.007 |pmid=27118215 |pmc=7102798 }}

In 2003, the Chinese Academy of Sciences approved the construction of mainland China's first BSL-4 laboratory at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV). In 2014, the WIV's National Bio-safety Laboratory was built at a cost of 300 million yuan (US$44 million), in collaboration and with assistance from the French government's CIRI lab.{{cite news |title=Inside the Wuhan lab: French engineering, deadly viruses and a big mystery |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/wuhan-lab-covid-china/2021/09/07/f293325c-fb11-11eb-911c-524bc8b68f17_story.html |newspaper=Washington Post }}{{cite journal |last1=Cyranoski |first1=David |title=Inside the Chinese lab poised to study world's most dangerous pathogens |journal=Nature |date=23 February 2017 |volume=542 |issue=7642 |pages=399–400 |doi=10.1038/nature.2017.21487 |pmid=28230144 |bibcode=2017Natur.542..399C |doi-access=free}}{{cite web |title=China Inaugurates the First Biocontainment Level 4 Laboratory in Wuhan |date=3 February 2015 |publisher=Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences |url=http://english.whiov.cas.cn/News/Events/201502/t20150203_135923.html |access-date=9 April 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303215545/http://english.whiov.cas.cn/News/Events/201502/t20150203_135923.html |archive-date=3 March 2016}}

In 2007 a scientific review paper stated that the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health, which was designed in the early 1990s, "has become the prototype for modern BSL4 laboratories".{{cite journal |doi=10.1086/520539 |title=Dedication: Jim Orzechowski (1944–2003) and Michael Kiley (1942–2004) |year=2007 |last1=Feldmann |first1=Heinz |last2=Geisbert |first2=Thomas |last3=Kawaoka |first3=Yoshihiro |last4=Johnson |first4=Karl M. |journal=The Journal of Infectious Diseases |volume=196 |pages=S127–S128 |doi-access=free }}

Starting with the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic near the facilities of the WIV, work in biocontainment facilities has been politicized, especially in the US Senate for example as the result of Rand Paul's work.{{cite news |title=JUST IN: Rand Paul Asks Samantha Power: 'Did USAID Fund Coronavirus Research In Wuhan China?' |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkfaXm56mdU |agency=YouTube |publisher=Forbes Breaking News |date=26 April 2023}} Russia asked questions on 25 October 2022 in the United Nations over the presence in Ukraine of biolabs.{{cite news |last1=LEDERER |first1=EDITH M. |title=Russia seeks UN probe of claims on Ukraine biological labs |url=https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-europe-united-states-nations-biological-weapons-a782591e10eae1530671500710c0b79f |publisher=The Associated Press |date=25 October 2022}} In April 2023, Sudan's descent into civil war caused worries at the World Health Organization over its National Public Laboratory as contending factions battled over its area and NPL staff were kicked out in favor of installing a military base at its premises.{{cite news |last1=Horton |first1=Jake |title=Sudan crisis: WHO warns of biological hazard at seized lab |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-65390285 |publisher=BBC |date=26 April 2023}} At the time, the facility contained organisms rated at BSL-2.{{cite news |last1=Wallace |first1=Danielle |title=WHO official warns of 'high risk of biological hazard' in Sudan after fighters seize laboratory: reports |url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/who-official-warns-high-risk-biological-hazard-sudan-fighters-seize-laboratory-reports |publisher=FOX News Network, LLC |date=25 April 2023}}

Levels

= Biosafety level 1 =

Biosafety level 1 (BSL-1) is suitable for work with well-characterized agents which do not cause disease in healthy humans. In general, these agents should pose minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment.{{cite book |title=Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th ed. |publisher=U.S. Department of Health and Human Services |date=December 2009 |url=https://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/BMBL.pdf |section=Section IV-Laboratory Biosafety Level Criteria |access-date=2 April 2016 |pages=30–59 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160409233223/http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/BMBL.pdf |archive-date=9 April 2016 }} At this level, precautions are limited relative to other levels. Laboratory personnel must wash their hands upon entering and exiting the lab. Research with these agents may be performed on standard open laboratory benches without the use of special containment equipment. However, eating and drinking are generally prohibited in laboratory areas. Potentially infectious material must be decontaminated before disposal, either by adding a chemical such as bleach or isopropanol or by packaging for decontamination elsewhere. Personal protective equipment is only required for circumstances where personnel might be exposed to hazardous material. BSL-1 laboratories must have a door which can be closed to limit access to the lab. However, it is not necessary for BSL-1 labs to be isolated from the general building.

This level of biosafety is appropriate for work with several kinds of microorganisms including non-pathogenic strains of Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus, Bacillus subtilis, Saccharomyces cerevisiae and other organisms not suspected to contribute to human disease.{{cite web |title=Health & Safety Manual – Biological Safety |publisher=Columbia University Environmental Health and Safety |url=http://ehs.columbia.edu/Policy2.2.html |access-date=2 April 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160327090557/http://ehs.columbia.edu/Policy2.2.html |archive-date=27 March 2016 }} Due to the relative ease and safety of maintaining a BSL-1 laboratory, these are the types of laboratories generally used as teaching spaces for high schools and colleges.{{cite web |title=The 1, 2, 3's of Biosafety Levels |author=Richmond JY |url=http://www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/preparedness-and-response/Smallpox/pdf/the-1-2-3s-of-biosafety-levels.pdf |access-date=2 April 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319062105/http://www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/preparedness-and-response/Smallpox/pdf/the-1-2-3s-of-biosafety-levels.pdf |archive-date=19 March 2015 }}

= Biosafety level 2 =

At this level, all precautions used at Biosafety level 1 are followed, and some additional precautions are taken. BSL-2 differs from BSL-1 in that:

"laboratory personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic agents and are directed by competent scientists."{{cite web |title=Principles and Concepts of Biosafety {{!}} Environmental Health & Safety {{!}} University of Missouri |url=https://ehs.missouri.edu/bio/principles |website=ehs.missouri.edu |access-date=25 January 2023}}
Access to the laboratory is limited when work is being conducted.
Certain procedures in which infectious aerosols or splashes may be created are conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical containment equipment.
Extreme precautions are taken with contaminated sharp items.

Biosafety level 2 is suitable for work involving agents of moderate potential hazard to personnel and the environment. This includes various microbes that cause mild disease to humans, or are difficult to contract via aerosol in a lab setting.{{cite book |title=Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th ed. |publisher=U.S. Department of Health and Human Services |date=December 2009 |url=https://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/bmbl5_sect_iii.pdf |section=Section III-Principles of Biosafety |access-date=9 April 2016 |pages=22–28 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160310185023/http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/bmbl5_sect_iii.pdf |archive-date=10 March 2016 }} Examples of pathogens classified as "Risk Group 2" in the United States include seasonal influenza,{{cite web | url=https://ehs.stanford.edu/reference/biosafety-levels-biological-agents | title=Biosafety Levels for Biological Agents | website=stanford.edu | access-date=11 November 2024}} SARS-CoV-2,{{cite web | title=Interim Guidelines for Biosafety and COVID-19 | access-date=11 November 2024|url=https://www.cdc.gov/covid/php/lab/index.html| website=cdc.gov}} hepatitis A, B, and C viruses, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), pathogenic strains of Escherichia coli and Staphylococcus, Salmonella, Plasmodium falciparum, and Toxoplasma gondii.For a list of infectious agents and the recommended biosafety level at which they should be studied, see {{cite book |title=Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th ed. |publisher=U.S. Department of Health and Human Services |date=December 2009 |url=https://www.cdc.gov/labs/BMBL.html |section=Section VIII-Agent Summary Statements |access-date=9 April 2016 |pages=123–289 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160327214745/http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/bmbl5_sect_viii.pdf |archive-date=27 March 2016 }} Notably, the European Union departs from the United States and classifies HIV and hepatitis B {{endash}} G as Risk Group 3 agents best handled at BSL-3.{{cite journal |last1=European Parliament |title=Directive 2000/54/EC – biological agents at work {{!}} Safety and health at work EU-OSHA |journal=Osha.europa.eu |date=4 August 2021 |url=https://osha.europa.eu/en/legislation/directives/exposure-to-biological-agents/77 |access-date=12 March 2023 |issn=0378-6978}}

Prions, the infectious agents that transmit prion diseases such as vCJD, are typically handled under Biosafety Level 2 or higher.{{cite book |title=Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories |date=June 2020 |url=https://www.cdc.gov/labs/pdf/SF__19_308133-A_BMBL6_00-BOOK-WEB-final-3.pdf |section=Section VIII-H: Prion Diseases |publisher=U.S. Department of Health and Human Services |access-date=3 August 2021 |quote=...Prion Diseases...In the laboratory setting, prions from human tissue and human prions propagated in animals can be manipulated at BSL-2 or higher}} This is due to the lack of any evidence of aerosol transmission and relatively higher infective dose of prion diseases, though some circumstances (such as handling animal-infective prions in a facility which cares for vulnerable animals) would require BSL-3 conditions.

= Biosafety level 3 =

File:Influenza virus research.jpg, Atlanta, Georgia, US, working with influenza virus under biosafety level 3 conditions, with respirator inside a biosafety cabinet (BSC).]]

Biosafety level 3 is appropriate for work involving microbes which can cause serious and potentially lethal disease via the inhalation route. This type of work can be done in clinical, diagnostic, teaching, research, or production facilities. Here, the precautions undertaken in BSL-1 and BSL-2 labs are followed, as well as additional measures including:

A laboratory-specific biosafety manual must be drafted which details how the laboratory will operate in compliance with all safety requirements.
All laboratory personnel are provided medical surveillance and offered relevant immunizations (where available) to reduce the risk of an accidental or unnoticed infection.
All procedures involving infectious material must be done within a biosafety cabinet.
Lab personnel must wear solid-front protective clothing (i.e. gowns that tie in the back). This cannot be worn outside of the lab and must be discarded or decontaminated after each use.

Also, the facility which houses the BSL-3 lab must have certain features to ensure appropriate containment. The entrance to the lab must be separated from areas of the building with unrestricted traffic flow. Also, the lab must be behind two sets of self-closing doors (to reduce the risk of aerosols escaping). The construction of the lab is such that it can be easily cleaned. Carpets are not permitted, and any seams in the floors, walls, and ceilings are sealed to allow easy cleaning and decontamination. Also, windows must be sealed, and a ventilation system installed which forces air to flow from the "clean" areas of the lab to the areas where infectious agents are handled. Air from the lab must be filtered before it can be recirculated.

A 2015 study by USA Today journalists, identified more than 200 lab sites in the U.S. that were accredited biosafety levels 3 or 4.{{cite news |last1=Penzenstadler |first1=Nick |title=State incidents highlight bioterror lab concerns |url=https://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/investigations/2015/05/28/state-incidents-highlight-bioterror-lab-concerns/28089943/ |agency=USA Today Network |publisher=Post Crescent |date=28 May 2015}} The Proceedings of a Workshop on "Developing Norms for the Provision of Biological Laboratories in Low-Resource Contexts" provides a list of BSL-3 laboratories in those countries.{{cite news |title=APPENDIX E LIST OF LABS IDENTIFIED IN LOW-RESOURCE COUNTRIES |url=https://www.nap.edu/read/25311/chapter/13 |access-date=4 February 2021 |publisher=National Academy of Sciences |date=2019}}

Biosafety level 3 is commonly used for research and diagnostic work involving various microbes which can be transmitted by aerosol and/or cause severe disease. These include Francisella tularensis, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, Chlamydia psittaci, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Eastern equine encephalitis virus, SARS-CoV-1, MERS-CoV, Coxiella burnetii, Rift Valley fever virus, Rickettsia rickettsii, several species of Brucella, chikungunya, yellow fever virus, West Nile virus, and Yersinia pestis.

= Biosafety level 4{{anchor|Level 4}} =

File:Positive-pressure biosafety suit.jpg

Biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) is the highest level of biosafety precautions, and is appropriate for work with agents that could easily be aerosol-transmitted within the laboratory and cause severe to fatal disease in humans for which there are no available vaccines or treatments. BSL-4 labs are generally set up to be either cabinet laboratories or protective-suit laboratories. In cabinet laboratories, all work must be done within a class III biosafety cabinet. Materials leaving the cabinet must be decontaminated by passing through an autoclave or a tank of disinfectant. The cabinets themselves are required to have seamless edges to allow easy cleaning. Also, the cabinet and all materials within must be free of sharp edges to reduce the risk of damage to the gloves. In a protective-suit lab, all work must be done in a class II biosafety cabinet by personnel wearing a positive pressure suit. To exit a BSL-4 lab, personnel must pass through a chemical shower for decontamination, then a room for removing the positive-pressure suit, followed by a personal shower. Entry into the BSL-4 lab is restricted to trained and authorized individuals, and all persons entering and exiting the lab must be recorded.

As with BSL-3 laboratories, BSL-4 labs must be separated from areas that receive unrestricted traffic. Also, airflow is tightly controlled to ensure that air always flows from "clean" areas of the lab to areas where work with infectious agents is being performed. The entrance to the BSL-4 lab must also employ airlocks to minimize the possibility that aerosols from the lab could be removed from the lab. All laboratory waste, including filtered air, water, and trash must also be decontaminated before it can leave the facility.

Biosafety level 4 laboratories are used for diagnostic work and research on easily transmitted pathogens which can cause fatal disease. These include a number of viruses known to cause viral hemorrhagic fever such as Marburg virus, Ebola virus, Lassa virus, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever. Other pathogens handled at BSL-4 include Hendra virus, Nipah virus, and some flaviviruses. Also, poorly characterized pathogens which appear closely related to dangerous pathogens are often handled at this level until enough data is obtained either to confirm continued work at this level, or to permit working with them at a lower level. This level is also used for work with smallpox virus, though this work is only performed at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, United States, and the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology in Koltsovo, Russia.{{cite book |title=Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th ed. |publisher=U.S. Department of Health and Human Services |date=December 2009 |url=https://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/bmbl5_sect_viii.pdf |section=Section VIII-Agent Summary Statements |page=219 |access-date=4 May 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513215241/http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/bmbl5_sect_viii.pdf |archive-date=13 May 2016 }}

File:NIAID Integrated Research Facility - Positive Pressure Personnel Suit Inspection.jpg|Regular inspection of positive-pressure suits to locate any leaks{{cite news|last1=Seligson|first1=Susan|title=Video Offers Glimpse of Biosafety Level 4 Lab Science webcast "threads the NEIDL"|url=http://www.bu.edu/today/2013/video-offers-glimpse-of-biosafety-level-4-lab/|newspaper=Boston University|access-date=5 December 2014|date=7 March 2013|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141210184637/http://www.bu.edu/today/2013/video-offers-glimpse-of-biosafety-level-4-lab/|archive-date=10 December 2014}}

File:NIAID Integrated Research Facility - SPECT.jpg|alt=SPECT machine at BSL-4 imaging facility that separates subjects with pathogens from the machines.|SPECT machine at BSL-4 imaging facility that separates subjects with pathogens from the machines

File:NIAID Integrated Research Facility - MRI.jpg|The circular containment tube separates the patient table in the "hot" zone (pathogen present) from the "cold" zone around this MRI machine.

File:NIAID Integrated Research Facility - Air Pressure Resistant (APR) door.jpg|Air pressure resistant (APR) door to separate the hot and cold zones

File:NIAID Integrated Research Facility - Positive Pressure Personnel Suit.jpg|Working inside a BSL-4 lab with air hoses providing positive air pressure

File:NIAID Integrated Research Facility - Class III Biosafety Cabinet.jpg|Inside a Class III biological safety cabinet with an aerosol control platform

File:Effluent decontamination system.jpg|Effluent decontamination system of a BSL-4 lab of NIAID

== BSL-4 facilities for extraterrestrial samples ==

Sample-return missions that bring samples from a Category V body back to Earth must be curated at facilities rated BSL-4. Because the existing BSL-4 facilities in the world do not provide the level of cleanliness needed for such pristine samples,{{Cite web |last=Hsu |first=Hsu |date=2009-12-03 |title=How to Protect Mars Samples on Earth |url=https://www.space.com/7625-protect-mars-samples-earth.html |access-date=2024-12-19 |website=Space.com |language=en}} there is a need to design a facility dedicated to curation of restricted (potentially biohazardous) extraterrestrial materials. The systems of such facilities must be able to contain unknown biohazards, as the size of any putative alien microorganism is unknown. Ideally, it should filter particles down to 10 nanometers, and release of a particle 50 nanometers or larger is unacceptable under any circumstance.{{Cite web|url=https://science.nasa.gov/media/medialibrary/2013/01/17/ESF_Mars_Sample_Return_backward_contamination_study.pdf|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160602150139/http://science.nasa.gov/media/medialibrary/2013/01/17/ESF_Mars_Sample_Return_backward_contamination_study.pdf|url-status=dead|title=European Science Foundation – Mars Sample Return backward contamination – Strategic advice and requirements|archivedate=2 June 2016}}

Because NASA and ESA are collaborating on the Mars Sample Return campaign, due to return samples from Mars in the early 2030s, the need for a Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) is becoming more pressing. An SRF is expected to take 7 to 10 years from design to completion,{{cite report|title=Assessment of Planetary Protection Requirements for Mars Sample Return Missions|publisher=National Research Council|page=59|year=2009|chapter=7: "Sample-Receiving Facility and Program Oversight"|chapter-url=http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12576&page=59}}{{Cite web |url=http://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/summary/msr |title=Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations (Planetary Protection Office Summary) |work=Task Group on Issues in Sample Return. National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 1997|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111015062937/http://planetaryprotection.nasa.gov/summary/msr |archive-date=15 October 2011 }} and an additional two years is recommended for the staff to become proficient and accustomed to the facilities.

Safety concerns

A North Carolina Mosquito & Vector Control Association (NCMVCA) study highlighted safety concerns. In the United States, laboratories can be funded by federal, state, private, non-profit, or academically. The last accounts for 72% of the funding.{{Cite web |title=NCMVCA study |url=http://www.ncmvca.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/12andersonlab.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170131192531/http://www.ncmvca.org/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/12andersonlab.pdf |archive-date=2017-01-31 |access-date=2017-01-19}}

High-containment labs that are registered with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Select Agent Program must adhere to Department of Defense standards.{{Cite web |title=DoD Safety Standards for Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories |url=http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/605518m.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170125204212/http://dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/605518m.pdf |archive-date=2017-01-25 |access-date=2017-01-19}} Since BSL3 and 4 laboratories in the United States are regulated by either the CDC or USDA or another federal agency (depending on the pathogens they handle), no single federal agency is responsible for regulating or tracking the number of these labs.{{Cite web |title=GAO publication |url=http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-108T |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170120224803/http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-108T |archive-date=2017-01-20 |access-date=2017-01-19}} U.S. high-containment laboratories that handle pathogens which are declared as "select agents" must be inspected periodically by the CDC or USDA, adhere to certain standards, and maintain ongoing education on biosecurity and biosafety policies as mandated by law.{{cite book |title=Microbial Forensics |date=2011 |publisher=Elsevier, Academic Press |isbn=978-0-12-382006-8 |pages=199–220 |chapter=Chapter 13 - Select Agent Regulations |doi=10.1016/B978-0-12-382006-8.00013-X |last1=Morse |first1=Stephen A. |last2=Weirich |first2=Elizabeth }}

List of BSL-4 facilities

According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report published on 4 October 2007, a total of 1,356 CDC/USDA registered BSL-3 facilities were identified throughout the United States.{{cite web|url=http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08108t.pdf|title=High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on the Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the United States|publisher=United States Government Accountability Office|access-date=26 May 2016|date=Oct 4, 2007|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160212182444/http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08108t.pdf|archive-date=12 February 2016}} Approximately 36% of these laboratories are located in academia. 15 BSL-4 facilities were identified in the U.S. in 2007, including nine at federal labs. As of May 2021, there are 42 BSL-4 facilities in operation around the world, with a further 17 planned or under construction.{{Cite web |last1=Lentzos |first1=Filippa |last2=Koblentz |first2=Gregory D. |date=May 2021 |title=Mapping Maximum Biological Containment Labs Globally |url=https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6048d7a0e9652c472e619f6f/t/60ae71cea2219b008f29d4ca/1622045135314/Mapping+BSL4+Labs+Globally+EMBARGOED+until+27+May+2021+1800+CET.pdf |access-date=3 November 2022 |archive-date=1 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221101184029/http://static1.squarespace.com/static/6048d7a0e9652c472e619f6f/t/60ae71cea2219b008f29d4ca/1622045135314/Mapping+BSL4+Labs+Globally+EMBARGOED+until+27+May+2021+1800+CET.pdf |url-status=dead }}

The following is a list of existing BSL-4 facilities worldwide.

class="sortable wikitable" style="vertical-align:top; font-size:95%;"

! Country

! Location

! Name

! Date
established

! Description

Argentina

| Buenos Aires

| National Service of Healthcare and Agriculture Quality (SENASA)

| Diagnostic laboratory for foot-and-mouth disease.{{cite web |title=Risk Analysis:Risk of Importing Foot-and-Mouth Disease in Susceptible Species and Products from a region of Patagonia, Argentina |publisher=U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Import Export Services, Veterinary Services |date=January 2014 |url=https://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2014/01/pdf/Patagonia_Region_Risk_Analysis_Final.pdf |access-date=3 April 2016 |pages=60–62 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161021024132/https://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/2014/01/pdf/Patagonia_Region_Risk_Analysis_Final.pdf |archive-date=21 October 2016 }}

rowspan="3" | Australia

| Geelong, Victoria

| Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness

| 1985

| Capable of housing from large experimental animals to insects under conditions that exceed all BSL 4 requirements. The antecedent of all such facilities developed since the 1980s. Arguably the most researched design and construction project ever. The ACDP is subdivided into a number of isolation zones that can be managed at differing containment levels concurrently. CSIRO AAHL Project Manager and Architect, William Curnow, provided technical reviews to Canadian, Indian, UK and French Authorities and consulted with Dr Jerry Callis [PIADC] to UN FAO on matters of bio-containment. Formerly known as the Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL) and renamed to Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness April 2020

rowspan="2" | Melbourne, Victoria

| University of Melbourne – Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity

| 2014

| Diagnostic reference lab.{{cite web |title=Members: The Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity |date=May 2013 |publisher=Global Virus Network |url=http://gvn.org/members/australia/ |access-date=3 April 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160320181036/http://gvn.org/members/australia/ |archive-date=20 March 2016 }}{{cite web |author=Racaniello V |title=Visiting biosafety level-4 laboratories |date=14 July 2014 |url=http://www.virology.ws/2014/07/14/visiting-biosafety-level-4-laboratories/ |access-date=3 April 2016 |website=Virology Blog |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160418083602/http://www.virology.ws/2014/07/14/visiting-biosafety-level-4-laboratories/ |archive-date=18 April 2016 }}

National High Security Laboratory

| Operates under the auspice of the Victoria Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory.{{cite web |title=Laboratories: High Security/Quarantine |publisher=Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory |url=http://www.vidrl.org.au/laboratories/high-security-quarantine/ |access-date=8 April 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160419134407/http://www.vidrl.org.au/laboratories/high-security-quarantine/ |archive-date=19 April 2016 }}

Belarus

| Minsk

| Republican Research and Practical Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology (RPPCM)

| Formerly the SRIEM.

rowspan="2" | Brazil

| Pedro Leopoldo, Minas Gerais

| Laboratório Nacional Agropecuário de Minas Gerais (Lanagro/MG)

| 2014

| Focus on Agropecuary diseases and diagnostics, like the foot-and-mouth disease.{{cite web |title=Lanagro/MG é o primeiro do Brasil com nível de biossegurança máximo |publisher=MAPA – Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento |date=August 2014 |url=http://www.portaldoagronegocio.com.br/noticia/lanagro-mg-e-o-primeiro-do-brasil-com-nivel-de-biosseguranca-maximo-114016 |access-date=22 February 2018 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180223053216/http://www.portaldoagronegocio.com.br/noticia/lanagro-mg-e-o-primeiro-do-brasil-com-nivel-de-biosseguranca-maximo-114016 |archive-date=23 February 2018 }}

Campinas, São Paulo

| Laboratório Nacional de Máxima Contenção Biológica (LNMCB)

| 2026 (expected)

| It was announced in 2021 to be built near the Sincrotron lab.{{cite act |type=Act |index= |date=19 November 2021|article=14.242 |article-type= |legislature= |title=

Abre ao Orçamento Fiscal da União, em favor dos Ministérios da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações e da Justiça e Segurança Pública |trans-title= |page= |url=http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2021/lei/L14242.htm |language=pt}}{{Cite web |title=Ministro da Ciência confirma construção de laboratório de biossegurança 4 junto ao Sirius |url=https://g1.globo.com/sp/campinas-regiao/noticia/2021/05/17/ministro-da-ciencia-confirma-laboratorio-de-biosseguranca-4-junto-ao-sirius-em-campinas.ghtml |access-date=2022-05-12 |website=G1 |date=17 May 2021 |language=pt-br}}

rowspan="2" | Canada

| Winnipeg, Manitoba

| National Microbiology Laboratory

| 1999{{cite press release |author= |title=Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health Celebrates 20 Years of Scientific Excellence |url=https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/news/2017/07/government_of_canadaexpandscontainmentlevel4laboratory.html |url-status=live |location=Winnipeg, MB |publisher=Government of Canada |agency=Public Health Agency of Canada |date=2 May 2019 |access-date=2023-03-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220111170142/https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/news/2019/05/canadian-science-centre-for-human-and-animal-health-celebrates-20-years-of-scientific-excellence.html |archive-date=11 January 2022}}

| Located at the Canadian Science Centre for Human and Animal Health, it is jointly operated by the Public Health Agency of Canada and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency.{{cite web |title=National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) Overview |publisher=Public Health Agency of Canada |url=https://www.nml-lnm.gc.ca/overview-apercu-eng.htm |access-date=8 April 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160321162419/https://www.nml-lnm.gc.ca/overview-apercu-eng.htm |archive-date=21 March 2016 }}

Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

| Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization

| 2025 (estimated){{cite web |title=Canada's Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization Bolsters Position as Country's Premier Centre for Pandemic Research |url=https://www.tradelineinc.com/reports/2024-1/canadas-vaccine-and-infectious-disease-organization-bolsters-position-countrys |date=2024-01-17 |access-date=2024-08-31}}

| Operated by the University of Saskatchewan and located near the Canadian Light Source.{{cite web |title=About USask | publisher=University of Saskatchewan | url=https://www.usask.ca/about/index.php |access-date=2024-08-31}}

rowspan="2" | China

| Wuhan, Hubei

| Wuhan Institute of Virology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences

| 2015

| Wuhan Institute of Virology has existed since 1956 and already hosted BSL-3 laboratories. A BSL-4 facility was completed in 2015, and became the first BSL-4 laboratory in China.{{cite web |title=China Inaugurates the First Biocontainment Level 4 Laboratory in Wuhan |date=3 February 2015 |publisher=Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences |url=http://english.whiov.cas.cn/News/Events/201502/t20150203_135923.html |access-date=9 April 2016 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303215545/http://english.whiov.cas.cn/News/Events/201502/t20150203_135923.html |archive-date=3 March 2016 }}

Harbin, Heilongjiang

| Harbin Veterinary Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences

| 2018

| Harbin Veterinary Research Institute researches prevention and control of major infectious diseases. China's second, and the first for large animals, BSL-4 lab.{{cite web |title=China launches high-level biosafety lab

|date=8 August 2018 |publisher=Xinhua|url=http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/08/c_137374368.htm |access-date=13 March 2019 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181014064100/http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/08/c_137374368.htm |archive-date=14 October 2018 }}

Czech Republic

| Těchonín, Pardubice Region

| Biological Defense Center

| 1971, rebuilt 2003–2007

| Hospital and research facility. Located at the Centrum biologické ochrany (Biological Defense Center). Operated by Army of the Czech Republic.{{cite web |url=http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=61370 |access-date=9 April 2016 |title=Biological Defence Department at Techonin |publisher=Ministry of Defense & Armed Forces of the Czech Republic |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160426010419/http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=61370 |archive-date=26 April 2016 }}

rowspan="3" | France

| Brétigny-sur-Orge, Essonne

| French Armed Biomedical Research Institute, French Defence Health Service

| 2015

| French Army laboratory.{{cite news|title=Un laboratoire militaire hautement sécurisé à Brétigny en 2015|url=http://www.leparisien.fr/essonne-91/un-laboratoire-militaire-hautement-securise-a-bretigny-en-2015-20-05-2014-3856819.php|website=Le Parisien|language=fr-FR|date=2014-05-20|access-date=2020-03-05}}

Lyon, Metropolis of Lyon

| Jean Mérieux BSL-4 Laboratory

| 1999

| Built and owned by the Fondation Mérieux. Since 2004, operated by INSERM.{{cite web |title=Jean Mérieux BSL-4 Laboratory |url=http://www.fondation-merieux.org/jean-merieux-bsl-4-laboratory |access-date=11 April 2016 |publisher=Fondation Mérieux |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160506180756/http://www.fondation-merieux.org/jean-merieux-bsl-4-laboratory |archive-date=6 May 2016 }}

Vert-le-Petit, Essonne

| French general directorate of armaments (DGA)

| 2013

| Operated by the Ministry of Defense.{{cite web |title=Inauguration du laboratoire biologique P4 de la DGA |url=http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/actualite/inauguration-du-laboratoire-biologique-p4-de-la-dga |access-date=11 April 2016 |publisher=Ministére de la Défense |language=fr |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160508002253/http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/actualite/inauguration-du-laboratoire-biologique-p4-de-la-dga |archive-date=8 May 2016 }}

Gabon

| Franceville, Haut-Ogooué Province

| Centre International de Recherches Médicales de Franceville

| This facility is operated by a research organization supported by both Gabonese (mainly) and French governments, and is West Africa's only P4 lab (BSL-4).{{cite web|url=http://www.cirmf.org|title=Centre International de Recherches Medicales de Franceville|publisher=CIRMF|access-date=30 September 2014|language=fr|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141015172101/http://www.cirmf.org/|archive-date=15 October 2014}}

rowspan="4" | Germany

| Berlin

| Robert Koch Institute

| 2015

| Diagnostic and experimental lab facility.{{cite web |url=http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Diagnostik_Speziallabore/Hochsicherheitslabor/Hochsicherheitslabor_node.html |access-date=16 April 2016 |title=Das Hochsicherheitslabor im Robert Koch-Institut |publisher=Robert Koch Institut |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160519171625/http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/Infekt/Diagnostik_Speziallabore/Hochsicherheitslabor/Hochsicherheitslabor_node.html |archive-date=19 May 2016 }}

Hamburg

| Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine

| 2014

| Part of the Leibniz Center Infection. National reference lab for tropical viruses.{{cite web |url=http://www.hpi-hamburg.de/en/the-hpi/partners/bernhard-nocht-institute-for-tropical-medicine/ |access-date=16 April 2016 |title=Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine (BNI) |publisher=Heinrich Pette Institute |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160427143123/http://www.hpi-hamburg.de/en/the-hpi/partners/bernhard-nocht-institute-for-tropical-medicine/ |archive-date=27 April 2016 }}

Greifswald, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

| Friedrich Loeffler Institute

| 2010

| Focus on animal viral diseases and diagnostics.{{cite web |url=http://www.caverion.com/references/friedrich-loeffler-institute |access-date=16 April 2016 |title=Friedrich Loeffler Institute, Germany |publisher=Caverion |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160422220425/http://www.caverion.com/references/friedrich-loeffler-institute |archive-date=22 April 2016 }}

Marburg, Hesse

| Philipps University of Marburg

| 2008

| Focuses on hemorrhagic fever viruses.{{cite web |url=http://www.evident-project.eu/about/institutions/pum/ |access-date=16 April 2016 |title=Philipps-University Marburg |publisher=Philipps-University Marburg |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160611065719/http://www.evident-project.eu/about/institutions/pum/ |archive-date=11 June 2016 }}

rowspan="2" | Hungary

| Budapest

| National Center for Epidemiology

| 1998

| Division of Virology operates three WHO National Reference Laboratories. The BSL-4 biosafety laboratory provides a modern means to process dangerous imported zoonotic viral pathogens.{{cite web |url=http://www.oek.hu/oek.web?to=1792&nid=899&pid=1&lang=eng |access-date=16 April 2016 |title=Division of Virology |publisher=Országos Epidemiológiai Központ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130924232255/http://www.oek.hu/oek.web?to=1792&nid=899&pid=1&lang=eng |archive-date=24 September 2013 }}

Pécs, Baranya County

|University of Pécs

|2016

|Opened in 2016, part of Szentágothai János Kutatóközpont.{{Cite web|url=https://szkk.pte.hu/en/premise/bsl_4_laboratory_virology_research_group|title=BSL-4 Laboratory - Virology research group | University of Pécs|website=szkk.pte.hu}}

rowspan="2" | India

| Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh

| National Institute of High Security Animal Disease

| 1998

| This BSL-3+ facility deals especially to zoonotic organisms and emerging infectious disease threats.{{cite web |url=http://www.nihsad.nic.in/Bio-containment.htm |access-date=20 April 2016 |title=Bio-containment Laboratory |publisher=National Institute of High Security Animal Diseases, India |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160319131101/http://nihsad.nic.in/Bio-containment.htm |archive-date=19 March 2016 }}

Pune, Maharashtra

| National Institute of Virology

| 2012

| India's most advanced BSL-4 category lab.{{cite news |url=http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/niv-pune-lab-gets-bsl4/article2305614.ece |access-date=24 April 2016 |newspaper=The Hindu |title=NIV Prune lab gets BSL-4 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170816170052/http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/niv-pune-lab-gets-bsl4/article2305614.ece |archive-date=16 August 2017 }}

rowspan="2" | Italy

| Rome, Lazio

| Istituto Nazionale per le Malattie Infettive

| 1997

| The "National Institute of Infectious Diseases" used to operate within the Lazzaro Spallanzani hospital; the facility is now independent and is home to five BSL-3 labs as well as a single BSL-4 laboratory, which was completed in 1997.{{cite web |url=http://www.inmi.it/storia_dell_istituto.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140307061944/http://www.inmi.it/storia_dell_istituto.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=7 March 2014 |access-date=1 May 2016 |publisher=IRCCS Lazzaro Spallanzani |title=Storia dell'Istituto |language=it }}

Milan, Lombardy

| Ospedale Luigi Sacco

| 2006

rowspan="3" | Japan

| Musashimurayama, Tokyo

| National Institute for Infectious Diseases

| 2015

| Located at National Institute for Infectious Diseases, Department of Virology I. Built in 1981; operated at BSL-3 until 2015 due to opposition from nearby residents.{{cite news |url=http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/15/national/science-health/deadly-disease-lab-opens-amid-local-fears/ |access-date=1 May 2016 |date=15 October 2015 |title=Deadly disease lab opens amid local fears |newspaper=Japan Times |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160428100857/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/10/15/national/science-health/deadly-disease-lab-opens-amid-local-fears#.VyWOGb6YJWV |archive-date=28 April 2016 }}

Nagasaki, Nagasaki Prefecture

| Nagasaki University

| 2021

| Facility for the study of infectious diseases.{{cite web |url=https://www.ccpid.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/about/ |access-date=18 April 2024 |title=高度感染症研究センターとは | 長崎大学高度感染症研究センター }}

Tsukuba, Ibaraki Prefecture

| Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN)

| 1984

| Facility completed in 1984 but not operated as BSL-4 due to local opposition.{{cite web |url=https://www.japanbullet.com/news/bio-lab-handling-highly-dangerous-agents-to-open-in-suburban-tokyo |access-date=14 March 2018 |title=Bio lab handling highly dangerous agents to open in suburban Tokyo |website=Japan Bullet |date=3 August 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180315072024/https://www.japanbullet.com/news/bio-lab-handling-highly-dangerous-agents-to-open-in-suburban-tokyo |archive-date=15 March 2018 }}

Philippines

| New Clark City, Capas, Tarlac

| Virology Institute of the Philippines

| 2024 (expected)

| First BSL-4 Lab in the Philippines when completed.{{Cite web|last=Domingo|first=Katrina|date=2021-05-25|title=Virology Institute of the Philippines to rise in Tarlac in 2 years: DOST|url=https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/25/21/virology-institute-of-the-philippines-to-rise-in-tarlac-in-2-years-dost|access-date=2021-05-26|website=ABS-CBN News|language=en}}

rowspan="2" | Russia

| Sergiyev Posad, Moscow Oblast

| 48th Central Scientific Research Institute Sergiev Posad{{cite journal |last1=Kuhn |first1=Jens H. |last2=Bao |first2=Yiming |last3=Bavari |first3=Sina |last4=Becker |first4=Stephan |last5=Bradfute |first5=Steven |last6=Brister |first6=J. Rodney |last7=Bukreyev |first7=Alexander A. |last8=Caì |first8=Yíngyún |last9=Chandran |first9=Kartik |last10=Davey |first10=Robert A. |last11=Dolnik |first11=Olga |last12=Dye |first12=John M. |last13=Enterlein |first13=Sven |last14=Gonzalez |first14=Jean-Paul |last15=Formenty |first15=Pierre |last16=Freiberg |first16=Alexander N. |last17=Hensley |first17=Lisa E. |last18=Honko |first18=Anna N. |last19=Ignatyev |first19=Georgy M. |last20=Jahrling |first20=Peter B. |last21=Johnson |first21=Karl M. |last22=Klenk |first22=Hans-Dieter|author23-link=Gary Kobinger |last23=Kobinger |first23=Gary |last24=Lackemeyer |first24=Matthew G. |last25=Leroy |first25=Eric M. |last26=Lever |first26=Mark S. |last27=Lofts |first27=Loreen L. |last28=Mühlberger |first28=Elke |last29=Netesov |first29=Sergey V. |last30=Olinger |first30=Gene G. |last31=Palacios |first31=Gustavo |last32=Patterson |first32=Jean L. |last33=Paweska |first33=Janusz T. |last34=Pitt |first34=Louise |last35=Radoshitzky |first35=Sheli R. |last36=Ryabchikova |first36=Elena I. |last37=Saphire |first37=Erica Ollmann |last38=Shestopalov |first38=Aleksandr M. |last39=Smither |first39=Sophie J. |last40=Sullivan |first40=Nancy J. |last41=Swanepoel |first41=Robert |last42=Takada |first42=Ayato |last43=Towner |first43=Jonathan S. |last44=van der Groen |first44=Guido |last45=Volchkov |first45=Viktor E. |last46=Wahl-Jensen |first46=Victoria |last47=Warren |first47=Travis K. |last48=Warfield |first48=Kelly L. |last49=Weidmann |first49=Manfred |last50=Nichol |first50=Stuart T. |title=Virus nomenclature below the species level: A standardized nomenclature for laboratory animal-adapted strains and variants of viruses assigned to the family Filoviridae |journal=Archives of Virology |date=June 2013 |volume=158 |issue=6 |pages=1425–1432 |doi=10.1007/s00705-012-1594-2 |pmid=23358612 |pmc=3669655 |url=https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3669655/table/T2/#TFN3 |access-date=16 June 2021 |issn=0304-8608}}

Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Oblast

| State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology (VECTOR)

| One of two WHO-approved facilities for work on smallpox virus.

Singapore

| Central Region

| DSO National Laboratories

| End-2025 (expected)

| First BSL-4 Lab in Singapore when completed.{{cite web |url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/dso-biosafety-lab-lethal-viruses-biological-threats-14305718 |access-date=4 Mar 2021 |title=DSO biosafety lab to get S$90 million upgrade to handle more lethal and infectious viruses |publisher=DSO National Laboratories |archive-date=16 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210416091612/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/dso-biosafety-lab-lethal-viruses-biological-threats-14305718 |url-status=dead }}

South Africa

| Johannesburg, Gauteng

| National Institute for Communicable Diseases

| 2002

|{{cite web |url=http://ianphiafrica.org/south-africa-national-institute-for-communicable-diseases/ |access-date=4 May 2016 |title=South Africa National Institute for Communicable Diseases |publisher=African National Public Health Institutes |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160318160456/http://ianphiafrica.org/south-africa-national-institute-for-communicable-diseases/ |archive-date=18 March 2016 }}

South Korea

| Cheongju, North Chungcheong Province

| Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

|2017

|First BSL-4 Lab in South Korea.{{cite news |last1=Da-sol |first1=Kim |title=Korea to open first deadly virus biosafety laboratory |url=http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170316000902 |access-date=16 June 2021 |work=The Korea Herald |date=2017-03-16 |language=en}}{{cite journal |last1=Kim |first1=Il-Hwan |last2=Jang |first2=Jun Hyeong |last3=Jo |first3=Su-Kyoung |last4=No |first4=Jin Sun |last5=Seo |first5=Seung-Hee |last6=Kim |first6=Jun-Young |last7=Jung |first7=Sang-Oun |last8=Kim |first8=Jeong-Min |last9=Lee |first9=Sang-Eun |last10=Park |first10=Hye-Kyung |last11=Kim |first11=Eun-Jin |last12=Jeon |first12=Jun Ho |last13=Choi |first13=Myung-Min |last14=Ryu |first14=Boyeong |last15=Jang |first15=Yoon Suk |last16=Kim |first16=Hwami |last17=Lee |first17=Jin |last18=Shin |first18=Seung-Hwan |last19=Kim |first19=Hee Kyoung |last20=Kim |first20=Eun-Kyoung |last21=Park |first21=Ye Eun |last22=Yoo |first22=Cheon-Kwon |last23=Lee |first23=Sang-Won |last24=Han |first24=Myung-Guk |last25=Rhie |first25=Gi-Eun |last26=Kang |first26=Byung Hak |title=2019 Tabletop Exercise for Laboratory Diagnosis and Analyses of Unknown Disease Outbreaks by the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention |journal=Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives |date=October 2020 |volume=11 |issue=5 |pages=280–285 |doi=10.24171/j.phrp.2020.11.5.03 |pmid=33117632 |pmc=7577389 |issn=2210-9099}}

Sweden

| Solna, Stockholm County

| Public Health Agency of Sweden

| 2001

| The only BSL-4 facility in the Nordic region. Constructed for research and diagnostics of hemorrhagic fever viruses.{{cite web|title=P4-laboratoriet vid Folkhälsomyndigheten|date=25 August 2015 |url=https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/publicerat-material/publikationsarkiv/p/p4-laboratoriet-en-viktig-resurs-for-sveriges-krisberedskap/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200313032442/https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/publicerat-material/publikationsarkiv/p/p4-laboratoriet-en-viktig-resurs-for-sveriges-krisberedskap/ |access-date=8 July 2020|publisher=Public Health Agency of Sweden|language=sv|archive-date=13 March 2020 }}

rowspan="3" | Switzerland

| Geneva, Canton of Geneva

| University Hospital of Geneva

| "Glove box" type laboratory; primarily for handling clinical samples.{{cite web |url=http://www.sulm.ch/d/swissmedlab/swiss-medlab-archiv/swiss-medlab-2008/summaries-2008/743 |access-date=10 May 2016 |title=Management of suspect viral hemorrhagic fever patient in Geneva |publisher=Schweizerische Union für Labormedizin |author=Cherpillod, P. |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160816231200/http://www.sulm.ch/d/swissmedlab/swiss-medlab-archiv/swiss-medlab-2008/summaries-2008/743 |archive-date=16 August 2016 }}

Spiez, Canton of Bern

| Spiez Laboratory

| 2013

| Run by the Federal Office for Civil Protection of the Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports.{{cite web |url=http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/B447B5B2BB186601C1257F9400233D47/$file/BWC_CBM_2016_Switzerland.pdf |access-date=10 May 2016 |title=Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction |publisher=Switzerland Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection, and Sports |date=2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160603005904/http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/B447B5B2BB186601C1257F9400233D47/$file/BWC_CBM_2016_Switzerland.pdf |archive-date=3 June 2016 }}

Mittelhäusern, Canton of Bern

| The Institute of Virology and Immunology IVI{{Cite web|url=https://www.ivi.admin.ch/ivi/en/home.html|title = Homepage}}

| Part of the Food Safety and Veterinary Office (FSVO).{{Cite web|url=https://www.blv.admin.ch/blv/en/home.html|title = Federal Food Safety and Veterinary Office}} Primary purpose is diagnostics of highly pathogenic viruses.

rowspan="2" | Taiwan

| rowspan="2" | Taipei

| National Defense University – Institute of Preventive Medicine

| 1983

|{{cite journal |url=http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=2347 |access-date=18 May 2016 |title=Case of SARS reported in a laboratory research worker in Taiwan |journal=Weekly Releases (1997–2007) |publisher=Eurosurveillance |date=18 December 2003 |volume=7 |issue=51 |doi=10.2807/esw.07.51.02347-en |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160611042207/http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=2347 |archive-date=11 June 2016 |doi-access=free }}

|檢驗及疫苗研製中心{{circular reference|date=January 2024}}

rowspan="9" | United Kingdom

| Camden, Greater London

| Francis Crick Institute

| 2015

| Has BSL-4 space but does not work on human pathogens.{{cite journal |last1=Callaway |first1=Ewen |title=London biomedical hub sets its research agenda |journal=Nature |date=6 June 2013 |doi=10.1038/nature.2013.13143 }}

Colindale, Greater London

| Public Health England's Centre for Infections

| Department of Health laboratory. Diagnostics for various viral diseases. Part of the European Network of Biosafety-Level-4 Laboratories.{{cite journal|doi=10.1371/journal.ppat.1003105|pmid=23349630|pmc=3547859|title=Biosafety Level-4 Laboratories in Europe: Opportunities for Public Health, Diagnostics, and Research|journal=PLOS Pathogens|volume=9|issue=1|pages=e1003105|year=2013|last1=Nisii|first1=Carla|last2=Castilletti|first2=Concetta|last3=Raoul|first3=Hervé|last4=Hewson|first4=Roger|last5=Brown|first5=David|last6=Gopal|first6=Robin|last7=Eickmann|first7=Markus|last8=Gunther|first8=Stephan|last9=Mirazimi|first9=Ali|last10=Koivula|first10=Tuija|last11=Feldmann|first11=Heinz|last12=Di Caro|first12=Antonino|last13=Capobianchi|first13=Maria R.|last14=Ippolito|first14=Giuseppe |doi-access=free }}

Mill Hill, Greater London

| National Institute for Medical Research

| Medical Research Council laboratory. Research and diagnostics for highly pathogenic viruses. Closed in 2017 and work moved to the Francis Crick Institute. Site demolished in 2018.

Potters Bar, Hertfordshire

| National Institute for Biological Standards and Control

| Department of Health and Home Office laboratory. Develop assays and reagents for research on virulent pathogens.

Addlestone, Surrey

| Animal and Plant Health Agency

| Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs laboratory. Diagnostics and research for animal diseases.

rowspan="2" | Pirbright, Surrey

| Institute for Animal Health

| Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council laboratory. Research on highly pathogenic animal diseases.

Merial Animal Health

| Private lab. Produces vaccines against foot and mouth disease and bluetongue disease.

rowspan="2" | Porton Down, Wiltshire

| UK Health Security Agency

| Department of Health laboratory. Diagnostics and research for haemorrhagic fever viruses. Part of the European Network of Biosafety-Level-4 Laboratories.

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory

| Ministry of Defence laboratory. Focuses on protection from biological weapons.{{cite book |chapter-url=http://www.nap.edu/read/13315/chapter/26 |access-date=26 May 2016 |title=Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories |date=2012 |chapter=E8: High-Containment Laboratories-UK Case Study |author1=Davison N |author2=Lentzos F |pages=176–177 |publisher=National Academies Press |isbn=978-0-309-22575-5 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160623223351/http://www.nap.edu/read/13315/chapter/26 |archive-date=23 June 2016 }}

rowspan="13" | United States

| rowspan="2" | Atlanta, Georgia

| Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

| Currently operates in two buildings. One of two facilities in the world that officially hold smallpox.

Georgia State University

| 1997

| Research focus on B virus.{{cite web |url=https://www.tradelineinc.com/reports/2003-12/operating-a-bsl-4-laboratory-a-university-setting |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=Operating a BSL-4 Laboratory in a University Setting |date=16 December 2003 |publisher=Tradeline |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160630152153/https://www.tradelineinc.com/reports/2003-12/operating-a-bsl-4-laboratory-a-university-setting |archive-date=30 June 2016 }}

Manhattan, Kansas

| National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)

| 2023

| Facility is operated by the Department of Homeland Security, and will replace the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. Began operation in 2023.{{cite web |url=https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2023/06/01/dhs-completes-construction-commissioning-national-bio-and-agro-defense-facility |access-date=17 October 2024 |title=DHS completes construction commissioning National Bio and Agro-defense Facility |publisher=Department of Homeland Security }}{{cite web |url=http://www.k-state.edu/nbaf/ |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=Leveraging the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility |publisher=Kansas State University |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160610002127/http://www.k-state.edu/nbaf/ |archive-date=10 June 2016 }}

Bethesda, Maryland

| National Institutes of Health (NIH)

| Located on the NIH Campus, it currently only operates with BSL-3 agents.{{cite web |url=http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/BiodefenseRelated/Biodefense/PublicMedia/pages/faqs.aspx |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=An Integrated Research Facility: Questions and Answers |publisher=National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160622183956/http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/BiodefenseRelated/Biodefense/PublicMedia/pages/faqs.aspx |archive-date=22 June 2016 }}

rowspan="3" | Fort Detrick, Maryland

| Integrated Research Facility

| Operated by National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID). Focuses on animal models of human diseases.{{cite web |url=https://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/irf/Pages/facilityOverview.aspx |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=Integrated Research Facility Overview |publisher=National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160705092155/http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/irf/Pages/facilityOverview.aspx |archive-date=5 July 2016 }}

National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center

| Operated by the Department of Homeland Security. Focus on potential bioterrorism threats.{{cite web |url=https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/national-biodefense-analysis-and-countermeasures-center |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center |date=6 July 2009 |publisher=Department of Homeland Security |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160520221104/https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/national-biodefense-analysis-and-countermeasures-center |archive-date=20 May 2016 }}

US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)

| 1969

| Run by the United States Army. Research focuses on biological threats to the U.S. military.{{cite web |url=http://www.usamriid.army.mil/ |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=USAMRIID: Biodefense Solutions to Protect our Nation |publisher=U.S. Army Medical Department |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160605192439/http://www.usamriid.army.mil/ |archive-date=5 June 2016 }}{{cite web |url=http://www.usamriid.army.mil/biosafety/ |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=USAMRIID Biological Safety |publisher=U.S. Army Medical Department |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160518223437/http://www.usamriid.army.mil/biosafety/ |archive-date=18 May 2016 }}

Boston, Massachusetts

| National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory (NEIDL), Boston University

| Built 2008, Opened 2012,{{cite web |url=https://www.bumc.bu.edu/2012/01/27/neidl-goes-public-bu-biosafety-labs-offer-tours-to-press-politicians/ |access-date=30 December 2018 |title=NEIDL Goes Public: BU Biosafety Labs Offer Tours to Press, Politicians}} BSL-4 Approval in 2017{{cite web |url=http://www.bu.edu/today/2017/neidl-bsl-4-lab-approved/ |access-date=30 December 2018 |title=NEIDL BSL-4 Lab Gets Green Light}}

| Focus on potential threats to public health.{{cite web |url=http://www.bu.edu/neidl/about/ |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories: About – Mission and Safety |publisher=Boston University |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160604173418/http://www.bu.edu/neidl/about/ |archive-date=4 June 2016 }} Operated by Boston University School of Medicine.{{Cite web |title=About {{!}} National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories |url=https://www.bu.edu/neidl/about-neidl/ |access-date=2022-12-29 |website=www.bu.edu}}

Hamilton, Montana

| Rocky Mountain Laboratories Integrated Research Facility

| 2008

| NIAID laboratory. Focus on vector-borne diseases.{{cite web |url=http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/rml/Pages/overview.aspx |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=Rocky Mountain Labs Overview |publisher=National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Disease |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160429084234/http://www.niaid.nih.gov/about/organization/dir/rml/Pages/overview.aspx |archive-date=29 April 2016 }}

rowspan="2" | Galveston, Texas

| Galveston National Laboratory, National Biocontainment Facility

| Opened in 2008, facility is operated by the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB).{{cite web|url=http://www.utmb.edu/gnl/about/fact.shtml|title=Galveston National Laboratory Fact Sheet|access-date=30 September 2014|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141005221814/http://www.utmb.edu/gnl/about/fact.shtml|archive-date=5 October 2014}}

Shope Laboratory

| 2004

| Operated by UTMB.{{cite web |url=http://www.utmb.edu/cbeid/safety.shtml |access-date=28 May 2016 |title=Center for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases: Safety and Biocontainment |publisher=UTMB Health |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160105112231/http://www.utmb.edu/cbeid/safety.shtml |archive-date=5 January 2016 }}

San Antonio, Texas

| Texas Biomedical Research Institute

| 1999

| The only privately owned BSL-4 lab in the US.{{cite news |url=http://www.txbiomed.org/about/extraordinary-resources/biosafety-level-4-laboratory |access-date=3 April 2016 |title=About Texas Biomed: Biosafety Level 4 Laboratory |newspaper=Texas Biomedical Research Institute |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160403083323/http://www.txbiomed.org/about/extraordinary-resources/biosafety-level-4-laboratory |archive-date=3 April 2016 }}

Richmond, Virginia

| Virginia Division of Consolidated Laboratories

| 2003

| A BSL-4 lab that also acts as a BSL-3 lab.{{cite web |url=https://news.vcu.edu/article/State_of_the_art_laboratory_opens_in_Richmond |access-date=1 June 2021 |title=State of the art laboratory opens in Richmond |publisher=Virginia Commonwealth University News |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140808044707/https://news.vcu.edu/article/State_of_the_art_laboratory_opens_in_Richmond |archive-date=8 August 2014 }}

References

External links

[https://www.cdc.gov/labs/BMBL.html Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories], CDC publication
[https://fas.org/programs/bio/biosafetylevels.html Federation of American Scientists: Biosafety Level 3 and 4 Labs]

Category:Safety

Category:Biological hazards

Category:Biosafety level 3 laboratories

Biosafety level#Levels

History

Levels

= Biosafety level 1 =

= Biosafety level 2 =

= Biosafety level 3 =

= Biosafety level 4{{anchor|Level 4}} =

== BSL-4 facilities for extraterrestrial samples ==

Safety concerns

List of BSL-4 facilities

See also

References

External links