Budget-feasible mechanism

{{distinguish|budget-balanced mechanism}}

{{Auction}}

In mechanism design, a branch of economics, a budget-feasible mechanism is a mechanism in which the total payment made by the auctioneer is upper-bounded by a fixed pre-specified budget. They were first presented by Yaron Singer,{{Cite book|last=Singer|first=Yaron|title=2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science |chapter=Budget Feasible Mechanisms |date=2010-10-01|chapter-url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5671347|pages=765–774|doi=10.1109/FOCS.2010.78|isbn=978-1-4244-8525-3|s2cid=11916656}} and studied by several others.{{Citation|last1=Chen|first1=Ning|title=On the Approximability of Budget Feasible Mechanisms|date=2011-01-23|work=Proceedings of the 2011 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms|pages=685–699|series=Proceedings|publisher=Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics|doi=10.1137/1.9781611973082.54|isbn=978-0-89871-993-2|last2=Gravin|first2=Nick|last3=Lu|first3=Pinyan|s2cid=14406192|doi-access=free|arxiv=1007.3801}}{{Cite book|last1=Horel|first1=Thibaut|last2=Ioannidis|first2=Stratis|last3=Muthukrishnan|first3=S.|author3-link=S. Muthukrishnan (computer scientist)|date=2014|editor-last=Pardo|editor-first=Alberto|editor2-last=Viola|editor2-first=Alfredo|chapter=Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Experimental Design|chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_62|title=LATIN 2014: Theoretical Informatics|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science|volume=8392|language=en|location=Berlin, Heidelberg|publisher=Springer|pages=719–730|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-54423-1_62|arxiv=1302.5724|isbn=978-3-642-54423-1|s2cid=145181}}{{Cite book|last1=Jalaly Khalilabadi|first1=Pooya|last2=Tardos|first2=Éva|date=2018|editor-last=Christodoulou|editor-first=George|editor2-last=Harks|editor2-first=Tobias|chapter=Simple and Efficient Budget Feasible Mechanisms for Monotone Submodular Valuations|chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_17|title=Web and Internet Economics|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science|volume=11316|language=en|location=Cham|publisher=Springer International Publishing|pages=246–263|doi=10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_17|arxiv=1703.10681|isbn=978-3-030-04612-5|s2cid=15747265}}