Cipher security summary

This article summarizes publicly known attacks against block ciphers and stream ciphers. Note that there are perhaps attacks that are not publicly known, and not all entries may be up to date.

Table color key

{{legend|#f9f9f9|No known successful attacks — attack only breaks a reduced version of the cipher}}

{{legend|#ffff90|Theoretical break — attack breaks all rounds and has lower complexity than security claim}}

Best attack

This column lists the complexity of the attack:

If the attack doesn't break the full cipher, "rounds" refers to how many rounds were broken
"time" — time complexity, number of cipher evaluations for the attacker
"data" — required known plaintext-ciphertext pairs (if applicable)
"memory" — how many blocks worth of data needs to be stored (if applicable)
"related keys" — for related-key attacks, how many related key queries are needed

Common ciphers

=Key or plaintext recovery attacks=

Attacks that lead to disclosure of the key or plaintext.

class="wikitable" border="1"
Cipher ! Security claim ! Best attack ! Publish date ! Comment
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| AES128 \| 2¹²⁸ \| {{nowrap\| 2^126.1 time, 2⁸⁸ data, 2⁸ memory }} \| rowspan=3 \| 2011-08-17 \| rowspan=3 \| Independent biclique attack.{{cite journal\|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/449\|title=Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES\|date=2011-08-17\|author1=Andrey Bogdanov\|author2=Dmitry Khovratovich\|author3=Christian Rechberger\|journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive }}
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| AES192 \| 2¹⁹² \| {{nowrap\| 2^189.7 time, 2⁸⁰ data, 2⁸ memory }}
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| AES256 \| 2²⁵⁶ \| {{nowrap\| 2^254.4 time, 2⁴⁰ data, 2⁸ memory }}
style="background: #ff9090; color: black" \| Blowfish \| Up to 2⁴⁴⁸ \| 4 of 16 rounds; 64-bit block is vulnerable to SWEET32 attack. \| 2016 \| Differential cryptanalysis.{{cite journal \|author=Vincent Rijmen \|author-link=Vincent Rijmen \|year=1997 \|title=Cryptanalysis and Design of Iterated Block Ciphers \|journal=Ph.D. Thesis \|url=https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/thesis-4.ps }} Author of Blowfish (Bruce Schneier) recommends using Twofish instead.{{cite web\|url=https://www.computerworld.com.au/article/46254/bruce_almighty_schneier_preaches_security_linux_faithful/\|title=Bruce Almighty: Schneier preaches security to Linux faithful\|date=2007-12-27\|author=Dahna McConnachie\|work=Computerworld\|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120603124940/http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/46254/bruce_almighty_schneier_preaches_security_linux_faithful/\|archive-date=2012-06-03\|access-date=2014-02-13}} SWEET32 attack demonstrated birthday attacks to recover plaintext with its 64-bit block size, vulnerable to protocols such as TLS, SSH, IPsec, and OpenVPN, without attacking the cipher itself.{{cite web \| url=https://sweet32.info/ \| title=On the Practical (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers — Collision Attacks on HTTP over TLS and OpenVPN \| author=Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Gaëtan Leurent \| date=August 2016 \| publisher=ACM CCS 2016}}
Twofish \| 2¹²⁸ – 2²⁵⁶ \| 6 of 16 rounds (2²⁵⁶ time) \| 1999-10-05 \| Impossible differential attack.{{cite web \|author=Niels Ferguson \|author-link=Niels Ferguson \|date=1999-10-05 \|title=Impossible Differentials in Twofish \|website=Schneier \|url=https://www.schneier.com/paper-twofish-impossible.html }}
Serpent-128 \| 2¹²⁸ \| 10 of 32 rounds (2⁸⁹ time, 2¹¹⁸ data) \| rowspan=3 \| 2002-02-04 \| rowspan=3 \| Linear cryptanalysis.{{cite conference \|author1=Eli Biham \|author2=Orr Dunkelman \|author3=Nathan Keller \|date=2002-02-04 \|title=Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent \|conference=FSE 2002 \|doi=10.1007/3-540-45473-X_2 \|doi-access=free }}
Serpent-192 \| 2¹⁹² \| rowspan=2 \| 11 of 32 rounds (2¹⁸⁷ time, 2¹¹⁸ data)
Serpent-256 \| 2²⁵⁶
style="background: #ff9090; color: black" \| DES \| 2⁵⁶ \| 2³⁹ – 2⁴³ time, 2⁴³ known plaintexts \| 2001 \| Linear cryptanalysis.{{cite conference \|last=Junod \|first=Pascal \|url=http://crypto.junod.info/sac01.html \|title=On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack \|conference=Selected Areas in Cryptography \|date=2001 \|pages=199–211 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090527065754/http://crypto.junod.info/sac01.html \|archive-date=2009-05-27 }} In addition, broken by brute force in 2⁵⁶ time, no later than 1998-07-17, see EFF DES cracker.{{cite web \|url=https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto_misc/DESCracker/HTML/19980716_eff_des_faq.html \|quote=On Wednesday, July 17, 1998 the EFF DES Cracker, which was built for less than $250,000, easily won RSA Laboratory's "DES Challenge II" contest and a $10,000 cash prize. \|title=DES Cracker Project \|work=EFF \|access-date=August 26, 2015 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170507231657/https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto_misc/DESCracker/HTML/19980716_eff_des_faq.html \|archive-date=May 7, 2017 }} Cracking hardware is available for purchase since 2006.{{cite web \|title=COPACOBANA – Special-Purpose Hardware for Code-Breaking \|url=http://www.sciengines.com/copacobana }}
style="background: #ff9090; color: black" \| {{nowrap\| Triple DES }} \| 2¹⁶⁸ \| 2¹¹³ time, 2³² data, 2⁸⁸ memory; 64-bit block is vulnerable to SWEET32 attack. \| 2016 \| Extension of the meet-in-the-middle attack. Time complexity is 2¹¹³ steps, but along with proposed techniques, it is estimated to be equivalent to 2⁹⁰ single DES encryption steps. The paper also proposes other time–memory tradeoffs.{{cite conference \|author=Stefan Lucks \|author-link=Stefan Lucks \|book-title=Fast Software Encryption \|date=1998-03-23 \|volume=1372 \|pages=239–253 \|publisher=Springer \|doi=10.1007/3-540-69710-1_16 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|isbn=978-3-540-64265-7 \|title=Attacking Triple Encryption \|doi-access=free }} SWEET32 attack demonstrated birthday attacks to recover plaintext with its 64-bit block size, vulnerable to protocols such as TLS, SSH, IPsec, and OpenVPN.
style="background: #ff9090; color: black" \| KASUMI \| 2¹²⁸ \| 2³² time, 2²⁶ data, 2³⁰ memory, 4 related keys \| 2010-01-10 \| The cipher used in 3G cell phone networks. This attack takes less than two hours on a single PC, but isn't applicable to 3G due to known plaintext and related key requirements.{{cite journal \|author1=Orr Dunkelman \|author2=Nathan Keller \|author3=Adi Shamir \|date=2010-01-10 \|title=A Practical-Time Attack on the A5/3 Cryptosystem Used in Third Generation GSM Telephony \|journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive \|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/013 }}
style="background: #ff9090; color: black" \| RC4 \| Up to 2²⁰⁴⁸ \| {{nowrap\|2²⁰ time, 2^16.4 related keys}} {{nowrap\|(95% success probability)}} \| 2007 \| Commonly known as PTW attack, it can break WEP encryption in Wi-Fi on an ordinary computer in negligible time.{{cite conference \|author=Erik Tews \|author2=Ralf-Philipp Weinmann \|author3=Andrei Pyshkin \|date=2007 \|title=Breaking 104 Bit WEP in Less Than 60 Seconds \|conference=WISA 2007 \|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/120 }} This is an improvement of the original Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack published in 2001.{{cite conference \|author1=Scott Fluhrer \|author2=Itsik Mantin \|author3=Adi Shamir \|date=2001-12-20 \|title=Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 \|conference=Selected Areas in Cryptography 2001 \|url=http://www.crypto.com/papers/others/rc4_ksaproc.pdf }}

class="wikitable" border="1"

Cipher

! Security claim

! Best attack

! Publish date

! Comment

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| AES128

| 2¹²⁸

| {{nowrap| 2^126.1 time, 2⁸⁸ data, 2⁸ memory }}

| rowspan=3 | 2011-08-17

| rowspan=3 | Independent biclique attack.{{cite journal|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/449|title=Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES|date=2011-08-17|author1=Andrey Bogdanov|author2=Dmitry Khovratovich|author3=Christian Rechberger|journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive }}

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| AES192

| 2¹⁹²

| {{nowrap| 2^189.7 time, 2⁸⁰ data, 2⁸ memory }}

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| AES256

| 2²⁵⁶

| {{nowrap| 2^254.4 time, 2⁴⁰ data, 2⁸ memory }}

style="background: #ff9090; color: black"

| Blowfish

| Up to 2⁴⁴⁸

| 4 of 16 rounds; 64-bit block is vulnerable to SWEET32 attack.

| 2016

| Differential cryptanalysis.{{cite journal |author=Vincent Rijmen |author-link=Vincent Rijmen |year=1997 |title=Cryptanalysis and Design of Iterated Block Ciphers |journal=Ph.D. Thesis |url=https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/thesis-4.ps }} Author of Blowfish (Bruce Schneier) recommends using Twofish instead.{{cite web|url=https://www.computerworld.com.au/article/46254/bruce_almighty_schneier_preaches_security_linux_faithful/|title=Bruce Almighty: Schneier preaches security to Linux faithful|date=2007-12-27|author=Dahna McConnachie|work=Computerworld|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120603124940/http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/46254/bruce_almighty_schneier_preaches_security_linux_faithful/|archive-date=2012-06-03|access-date=2014-02-13}} SWEET32 attack demonstrated birthday attacks to recover plaintext with its 64-bit block size, vulnerable to protocols such as TLS, SSH, IPsec, and OpenVPN, without attacking the cipher itself.{{cite web

| url=https://sweet32.info/

| title=On the Practical (In-)Security of 64-bit Block Ciphers — Collision Attacks on HTTP over TLS and OpenVPN

| author=Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Gaëtan Leurent

| date=August 2016

| publisher=ACM CCS 2016}}

Twofish

| 2¹²⁸ – 2²⁵⁶

| 6 of 16 rounds (2²⁵⁶ time)

| 1999-10-05

| Impossible differential attack.{{cite web |author=Niels Ferguson |author-link=Niels Ferguson |date=1999-10-05 |title=Impossible Differentials in Twofish |website=Schneier |url=https://www.schneier.com/paper-twofish-impossible.html }}

Serpent-128

| 2¹²⁸

| 10 of 32 rounds (2⁸⁹ time, 2¹¹⁸ data)

| rowspan=3 | 2002-02-04

| rowspan=3 | Linear cryptanalysis.{{cite conference |author1=Eli Biham |author2=Orr Dunkelman |author3=Nathan Keller |date=2002-02-04 |title=Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Serpent |conference=FSE 2002 |doi=10.1007/3-540-45473-X_2 |doi-access=free }}

Serpent-192

| 2¹⁹²

| rowspan=2 | 11 of 32 rounds (2¹⁸⁷ time, 2¹¹⁸ data)

Serpent-256

| 2²⁵⁶

style="background: #ff9090; color: black"

| DES

| 2⁵⁶

| 2³⁹ – 2⁴³ time, 2⁴³ known plaintexts

| 2001

| Linear cryptanalysis.{{cite conference |last=Junod |first=Pascal |url=http://crypto.junod.info/sac01.html |title=On the Complexity of Matsui's Attack |conference=Selected Areas in Cryptography |date=2001 |pages=199–211 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090527065754/http://crypto.junod.info/sac01.html |archive-date=2009-05-27 }} In addition, broken by brute force in 2⁵⁶ time, no later than 1998-07-17, see EFF DES cracker.{{cite web |url=https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto_misc/DESCracker/HTML/19980716_eff_des_faq.html |quote=On Wednesday, July 17, 1998 the EFF DES Cracker, which was built for less than $250,000, easily won RSA Laboratory's "DES Challenge II" contest and a $10,000 cash prize. |title=DES Cracker Project |work=EFF |access-date=August 26, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170507231657/https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto_misc/DESCracker/HTML/19980716_eff_des_faq.html |archive-date=May 7, 2017 }} Cracking hardware is available for purchase since 2006.{{cite web |title=COPACOBANA – Special-Purpose Hardware for Code-Breaking |url=http://www.sciengines.com/copacobana }}

style="background: #ff9090; color: black"

| {{nowrap| Triple DES }}

| 2¹⁶⁸

| 2¹¹³ time, 2³² data, 2⁸⁸ memory; 64-bit block is vulnerable to SWEET32 attack.

| 2016

| Extension of the meet-in-the-middle attack. Time complexity is 2¹¹³ steps, but along with proposed techniques, it is estimated to be equivalent to 2⁹⁰ single DES encryption steps. The paper also proposes other time–memory tradeoffs.{{cite conference |author=Stefan Lucks |author-link=Stefan Lucks |book-title=Fast Software Encryption |date=1998-03-23 |volume=1372 |pages=239–253 |publisher=Springer |doi=10.1007/3-540-69710-1_16 |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |isbn=978-3-540-64265-7 |title=Attacking Triple Encryption |doi-access=free }} SWEET32 attack demonstrated birthday attacks to recover plaintext with its 64-bit block size, vulnerable to protocols such as TLS, SSH, IPsec, and OpenVPN.

style="background: #ff9090; color: black"

| KASUMI

| 2¹²⁸

| 2³² time, 2²⁶ data, 2³⁰ memory, 4 related keys

| 2010-01-10

| The cipher used in 3G cell phone networks. This attack takes less than two hours on a single PC, but isn't applicable to 3G due to known plaintext and related key requirements.{{cite journal |author1=Orr Dunkelman |author2=Nathan Keller |author3=Adi Shamir |date=2010-01-10 |title=A Practical-Time Attack on the A5/3 Cryptosystem Used in Third Generation GSM Telephony |journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/013 }}

style="background: #ff9090; color: black"

| RC4

| Up to 2²⁰⁴⁸

| {{nowrap|2²⁰ time, 2^16.4 related keys}} {{nowrap|(95% success probability)}}

| 2007

| Commonly known as PTW attack, it can break WEP encryption in Wi-Fi on an ordinary computer in negligible time.{{cite conference |author=Erik Tews |author2=Ralf-Philipp Weinmann |author3=Andrei Pyshkin |date=2007 |title=Breaking 104 Bit WEP in Less Than 60 Seconds |conference=WISA 2007 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/120 }} This is an improvement of the original Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir attack published in 2001.{{cite conference |author1=Scott Fluhrer |author2=Itsik Mantin |author3=Adi Shamir |date=2001-12-20 |title=Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4 |conference=Selected Areas in Cryptography 2001 |url=http://www.crypto.com/papers/others/rc4_ksaproc.pdf }}

=Distinguishing attacks=

Attacks that allow distinguishing ciphertext from random data.

class="wikitable" border="1"
Cipher ! Security claim ! Best attack ! Publish date ! Comment
style="background: #ff9090; color: black" \| RC4 \| up to 2²⁰⁴⁸ \| {{nowrap\|?? time, 2^30.6 bytes data}} (90% probability) \| 2000 \| Paper.{{cite conference \|author=Scott R. Fluhrer \|author2=David A. McGrew \|title=Statistical Analysis of the Alleged RC4 Keystream Generator \|conference=FSE 2000 \|pages=19 – 30 \|url=http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/FluhrerMcgrew.pdf \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140502020708/http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/FluhrerMcgrew.pdf \|archive-date=2014-05-02 }}

class="wikitable" border="1"

Cipher

! Security claim

! Best attack

! Publish date

! Comment

style="background: #ff9090; color: black"

| RC4

| up to 2²⁰⁴⁸

| {{nowrap|?? time, 2^30.6 bytes data}} (90% probability)

| 2000

| Paper.{{cite conference |author=Scott R. Fluhrer |author2=David A. McGrew |title=Statistical Analysis of the Alleged RC4 Keystream Generator |conference=FSE 2000 |pages=19 – 30 |url=http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/FluhrerMcgrew.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140502020708/http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~itsik/RC4/Papers/FluhrerMcgrew.pdf |archive-date=2014-05-02 }}

Less-common ciphers

=Key recovery attacks=

Attacks that lead to disclosure of the key.

class="wikitable" border="1"
Cipher ! Security claim ! Best attack ! Publish date ! Comment
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| CAST (not CAST-128) \| 2⁶⁴ \| 2⁴⁸ time, 2¹⁷ chosen plaintexts \| 1997-11-11 \| Related-key attack.{{cite conference \|author1=John Kelsey \|author2=Bruce Schneier \|author3=David Wagner \|date=1997-11-11 \|title=Related-key cryptanalysis of 3-WAY, Biham-DES, CAST, DES-X NewDES, RC2, and TEA \|editor=Yongfei Han \|editor2=Tatsuaki Okamoto \|editor3=Sihan Quing \|book-title=Information and Communications Security: First International Conference \|publisher=Springer \|url=http://www.schneier.com/paper-relatedkey.html \|volume=1334 \| pages=233–246 \|doi=10.1007/BFb0028479 \|isbn=978-3-540-63696-0 \|citeseerx=10.1.1.35.8112 }}
CAST-128 \| 2¹²⁸ \| 6 of 16 rounds (2^88.51 time, 2^53.96 data) \| rowspan=2 \| 2009-08-23 \| rowspan=2 \| Known-plaintext linear cryptanalysis.{{cite book \|author1=Meiqin Wang \|author2=Xiaoyun Wang \|author3=Changhui Hu \|title=Selected Areas in Cryptography \|chapter=New Linear Cryptanalytic Results of Reduced-Round of CAST-128 and CAST-256 \|date=2009-08-23 \|volume=5381 \|pages=429–441 \|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-04159-4_28 \|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science \|isbn=978-3-642-04158-7 \|s2cid=35612393 }}
CAST-256 \| 2²⁵⁶ \| 24 of 48 rounds (2^156.2 time, 2^124.1 data)
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| IDEA \| 2¹²⁸ \| {{nowrap\| 2^126.1 time}} \| 2012-04-15 \| Narrow-biclique attack.{{cite web \|url=https://www.di.ens.fr/~leurent/files/IDEA_EC12.pdf \|title=Narrow-Bicliques: Cryptanalysis of Full IDEA \|author1=Dmitry Khovratovich \|author2=Gaetan Leurent \|author3=Christian Rechberger \|access-date=2015-08-26 \|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203001223/http://www.di.ens.fr/~leurent/files/IDEA_EC12.pdf \|archive-date=2013-12-03 }}
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| MISTY1 \| 2¹²⁸ \| {{nowrap\| 2^69.5 time, 2⁶⁴ chosen plaintexts }} \| 2015-07-30 \| Chosen-ciphertext, integral cryptanalysis,{{cite journal \|author=Achiya Bar-On \|date=2015-07-30 \|title=A 2⁷⁰ Attack on the Full MISTY1 \|journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive \|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/746 }} an improvement over a previous chosen-plaintext attack.{{cite conference \|author=Yosuke Todo \|date=2015-07-06 \|title=Integral Cryptanalysis on Full MISTY1 \|conference=CRYPTO 2015 \|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/682 }}
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| RC2 \| 2⁶⁴ – 2¹²⁸ \| Unknown{{clarify\|date=May 2014}} time, 2³⁴ chosen plaintexts \| 1997-11-11 \| Related-key attack.
RC5 \| 2¹²⁸ \| {{unk}} \| \|
SEED \| 2¹²⁸ \| {{unk}} \| \|
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| Skipjack \| 2⁸⁰ \| 2⁸⁰ \| \| ECRYPT II recommendations note that, as of 2012, 80 bit ciphers provide only "Very short-term protection against agencies".{{Cite web \|date=30 September 2012\|title=ECRYPT II Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes (2011-2012)\|url=https://cordis.europa.eu/docs/projects/cnect/6/216676/080/deliverables/002-DSPA20.pdf\|id=D.SPA.20 Rev. 1.0, ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II\|website=CORDIS}} NIST recommends not to use Skipjack after 2010.[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-131A/sp800-131A.pdf Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths], NIST
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| TEA \| 2¹²⁸ \| {{nowrap\| 2³² time, 2²³ chosen plaintexts }} \| 1997-11-11 \| Related-key attack.
XTEA \| 2¹²⁸ \| {{unk}} \| \|
style="background: #ffff90; color: black" \| XXTEA \| 2¹²⁸ \| 2⁵⁹ chosen plaintexts \| 2010-05-04 \| Chosen-plaintext, differential cryptanalysis.{{cite journal \|author=Elias Yarrkov \|date=2010-05-04 \|title=Cryptanalysis of XXTEA \|journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive \|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/254 }}

class="wikitable" border="1"

Cipher

! Security claim

! Best attack

! Publish date

! Comment

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| CAST (not CAST-128)

| 2⁶⁴

| 2⁴⁸ time, 2¹⁷ chosen plaintexts

| 1997-11-11

| Related-key attack.{{cite conference

|author1=John Kelsey |author2=Bruce Schneier |author3=David Wagner |date=1997-11-11

|title=Related-key cryptanalysis of 3-WAY, Biham-DES, CAST, DES-X NewDES, RC2, and TEA

|editor=Yongfei Han |editor2=Tatsuaki Okamoto |editor3=Sihan Quing

|book-title=Information and Communications Security: First International Conference

|publisher=Springer

|url=http://www.schneier.com/paper-relatedkey.html

|volume=1334 | pages=233–246

|doi=10.1007/BFb0028479

|isbn=978-3-540-63696-0 |citeseerx=10.1.1.35.8112 }}

CAST-128

| 2¹²⁸

| 6 of 16 rounds (2^88.51 time, 2^53.96 data)

| rowspan=2 | 2009-08-23

| rowspan=2 | Known-plaintext linear cryptanalysis.{{cite book |author1=Meiqin Wang |author2=Xiaoyun Wang |author3=Changhui Hu |title=Selected Areas in Cryptography |chapter=New Linear Cryptanalytic Results of Reduced-Round of CAST-128 and CAST-256 |date=2009-08-23 |volume=5381 |pages=429–441 |doi=10.1007/978-3-642-04159-4_28 |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |isbn=978-3-642-04158-7 |s2cid=35612393 }}

CAST-256

| 2²⁵⁶

| 24 of 48 rounds (2^156.2 time, 2^124.1 data)

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| IDEA

| 2¹²⁸

| {{nowrap| 2^126.1 time}}

| 2012-04-15

| Narrow-biclique attack.{{cite web |url=https://www.di.ens.fr/~leurent/files/IDEA_EC12.pdf |title=Narrow-Bicliques: Cryptanalysis of Full IDEA |author1=Dmitry Khovratovich |author2=Gaetan Leurent |author3=Christian Rechberger |access-date=2015-08-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131203001223/http://www.di.ens.fr/~leurent/files/IDEA_EC12.pdf |archive-date=2013-12-03 }}

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| MISTY1

| 2¹²⁸

| {{nowrap| 2^69.5 time, 2⁶⁴ chosen plaintexts }}

| 2015-07-30

| Chosen-ciphertext, integral cryptanalysis,{{cite journal |author=Achiya Bar-On |date=2015-07-30 |title=A 2⁷⁰ Attack on the Full MISTY1 |journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/746 }} an improvement over a previous chosen-plaintext attack.{{cite conference |author=Yosuke Todo |date=2015-07-06 |title=Integral Cryptanalysis on Full MISTY1 |conference=CRYPTO 2015 |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/682 }}

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| RC2

| 2⁶⁴ – 2¹²⁸

| Unknown{{clarify|date=May 2014}} time, 2³⁴ chosen plaintexts

| 1997-11-11

| Related-key attack.

RC5

| 2¹²⁸

| {{unk}}

SEED

| 2¹²⁸

| {{unk}}

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| Skipjack

| 2⁸⁰

| ECRYPT II recommendations note that, as of 2012, 80 bit ciphers provide only "Very short-term protection against agencies".{{Cite web |date=30 September 2012|title=ECRYPT II Yearly Report on Algorithms and Keysizes (2011-2012)|url=https://cordis.europa.eu/docs/projects/cnect/6/216676/080/deliverables/002-DSPA20.pdf|id=D.SPA.20 Rev. 1.0, ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II|website=CORDIS}} NIST recommends not to use Skipjack after 2010.[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-131A/sp800-131A.pdf Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths], NIST

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| TEA

| 2¹²⁸

| {{nowrap| 2³² time, 2²³ chosen plaintexts }}

| 1997-11-11

| Related-key attack.

XTEA

| 2¹²⁸

| {{unk}}

style="background: #ffff90; color: black"

| XXTEA

| 2¹²⁸

| 2⁵⁹ chosen plaintexts

| 2010-05-04

| Chosen-plaintext, differential cryptanalysis.{{cite journal |author=Elias Yarrkov |date=2010-05-04 |title=Cryptanalysis of XXTEA |journal=Cryptology ePrint Archive |url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/254 }}

=Distinguishing attacks=

Attacks that allow distinguishing ciphertext from random data.

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Cipher ! Security claim ! Best attack ! Publish date ! Comment
CAST-256 \| 2²⁵⁶ \| {{nowrap\| 28 of 48 rounds (2^246.9 time, 2⁶⁸ memory, 2^98.8 data) }} \| 2012-12-04 \| Multidimensional zero-correlation cryptanalysis.{{cite conference \|author=Andrey Bogdanov \|author2=Gregor Leander \|author3=Kaisa Nyberg \|author4=Meiqin Wang \|title=Integral and multidimensional linear distinguishers with correlation zero \|book-title=Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012: 18th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security \|publisher=Springer \|volume=7658 \|pages=244–261 \|date=2012-12-04 \|url=https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2012/76580239/76580239.pdf \|doi=10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4 \|isbn=978-3-642-34960-7 \|s2cid=26601027 }}

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Cipher

! Security claim

! Best attack

! Publish date

! Comment

CAST-256

| 2²⁵⁶

| {{nowrap| 28 of 48 rounds (2^246.9 time, 2⁶⁸ memory, 2^98.8 data) }}

| 2012-12-04

| Multidimensional zero-correlation cryptanalysis.{{cite conference |author=Andrey Bogdanov |author2=Gregor Leander |author3=Kaisa Nyberg |author4=Meiqin Wang |title=Integral and multidimensional linear distinguishers with correlation zero |book-title=Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2012: 18th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security |publisher=Springer |volume=7658 |pages=244–261 |date=2012-12-04 |url=https://www.iacr.org/archive/asiacrypt2012/76580239/76580239.pdf |doi=10.1007/978-3-642-34961-4 |isbn=978-3-642-34960-7 |s2cid=26601027 }}

References

Category:Cryptography lists and comparisons

Cipher security summary

Table color key

Best attack

Common ciphers

=Key or plaintext recovery attacks=

=Distinguishing attacks=

Less-common ciphers

=Key recovery attacks=

=Distinguishing attacks=

See also

References