Clickjacking#MouseJack

In 2002, it had been noted that it was possible to load a transparent layer over a web page and have the user's input affect the transparent layer without the user noticing.{{Cite web|url=https://media.blackhat.com/ad-12/Niemietz/bh-ad-12-androidmarcus_niemietz-WP.pdf|title=UI Redressing Attacks on Android Devices|last=Niemietz|first=Marcus|date=2012|website=Black Hat}} However, fixes only started to trickle in around 2004,{{cite web |title=162020 - pop up XPInstall/security dialog when user is about to click (comment 44) |url=https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=162020#c44 |website=Mozilla/Firefox bug tracker |language=en}} and the general problem was mostly ignored as a major issue until 2008.

In 2008, Jeremiah Grossman and Robert Hansen (of SecTheory) had discovered that Adobe Flash Player was able to be clickjacked, allowing an attacker to gain access to a user's computer without the user's knowledge. Grossman and Hansen coined the term "clickjacking",[http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11535/ You don't know (click)jack] Robert Lemos, October 2008{{Cite web|url=http://www.sectheory.com/clickjacking.htm|title=Facebook Help Number 1-888-996-3777|last=JAstine|first=Berry|access-date=7 June 2016}} a portmanteau of the words "click" and "hijacking".

As more attacks of a similar nature were discovered, the focus of the term "UI redressing" was changed to describe the category of these attacks, rather than just clickjacking itself.

One form of clickjacking takes advantage of vulnerabilities that are present in applications or web pages to allow the attacker to manipulate the user's computer for their own advantage.

For example, a clickjacked page tricks a user into performing undesired actions by clicking on concealed links. On a clickjacked page, the attackers load another page over the original page in a transparent layer to trick the user into taking actions, the outcomes of which will not be the same as the user expects. The unsuspecting users think that they are clicking visible buttons, while they are actually performing actions on the invisible page, clicking buttons of the page below the layer. The hidden page may be an authentication page; therefore, the attackers can trick users into performing actions which the users never intended. There is no way of tracing such actions to the attackers later, as the users would have been genuinely authenticated on the hidden page.

• Classic: works mostly through a web browser
• Likejacking: utilizes Facebook's social media capabilities{{Cite news|url=https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2010/05/31/viral-clickjacking-like-worm-hits-facebook-users/|title=Viral clickjacking 'Like' worm hits Facebook users|date=2010-05-31|work=Naked Security|access-date=2018-10-23|language=en-US}}{{Cite news|url=https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2010/05/31/facebook-likejacking-worm/|title=Facebook Worm – "Likejacking"|date=2010-05-31|work=Naked Security|access-date=2018-10-23|language=en-US}}
• Nested: clickjacking tailored to affect Google+{{Cite web|url=https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot12/woot12-final16.pdf|title=On the fragility and limitations of current Browser-provided Clickjacking protection schemes|last=Lekies|first=Sebastian|date=2012|website=USENIX}}
• Cursorjacking: manipulates the cursor's appearance and location
• MouseJacking: inject keyboard or mouse input via remote RF link{{Cite web|url=http://www.mousejack.com/|title=Wireless Mouse Hacks & Network Security Protection|website=MOUSEJACK|language=en|access-date=2020-01-03}}
• Browserless: does not use a browser
• Cookiejacking: acquires cookies from browsers{{Cite web|url=https://sites.google.com/site/tentacoloviola/cookiejacking|title=Cookiejacking|last=Valotta|first=Rosario|date=2011|website=tentacoloViola – sites.google.com|access-date=2018-10-23|archive-date=7 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190807214255/https://sites.google.com/site/tentacoloviola/cookiejacking|url-status=dead}}
• Filejacking: capable of setting up the affected device as a file server{{Cite web|url=http://blog.kotowicz.net/2011/04/how-to-make-file-server-from-your.html|title=Filejacking: How to make a file server from your browser (with HTML5 of course)|website=blog.kotowicz.net|access-date=2018-10-23}}{{cite web|title=Password Managers: Attacks and Defenses|url=https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-silver.pdf|access-date=26 July 2015}}
• Password manager attack: clickjacking that utilizes a vulnerability in the autofill capability of browsers

Classic clickjacking refers to a situation when an attacker uses hidden layers on web pages to manipulate the actions a user's cursor does, resulting in misleading the user about what truly is being clicked on.{{Cite journal |last1=Sahani |first1=Rishabh |last2=Randhawa |first2=Sukhchandan |date=2021-12-01 |title=Clickjacking: Beware of Clicking |url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11277-021-08852-y |journal=Wireless Personal Communications |language=en |volume=121 |issue=4 |pages=2845–2855 |doi=10.1007/s11277-021-08852-y |s2cid=239691334 |issn=0929-6212}}

A user might receive an email with a link to a video about a news item, but another webpage, say a product page on Amazon, can be "hidden" on top or underneath the "PLAY" button of the news video. The user tries to "play" the video but actually "buys" the product from Amazon. The hacker can only send a single click, so they rely on the fact that the visitor is both logged into Amazon and has 1-click ordering enabled.

While technical implementation of these attacks may be challenging due to cross-browser incompatibilities, a number of tools such as BeEF or Metasploit Project offer almost fully automated exploitation of clients on vulnerable websites. Clickjacking may be facilitated by – or may facilitate – other web attacks, such as XSS.{{cite web|url=http://www.exploit-db.com/papers/12987/|title=The Clickjacking meets XSS: a state of art|date=2008-12-26|publisher=Exploit DB|access-date=2015-03-31}}{{cite web|url=http://blog.kotowicz.net/2011/03/exploiting-unexploitable-xss-with.html|title=Exploiting the unexploitable XSS with clickjacking|author=Krzysztof Kotowicz|access-date=2015-03-31}}

Likejacking is a malicious technique of tricking users viewing a website into "liking" a Facebook page or other social media posts/accounts that they did not intentionally mean to "like".{{cite web|url=http://www.sophos.com/blogs/sophoslabs/?p=9783|title=Facebook Work – "Likejacking"|last=Cohen|first=Richard|date=31 May 2010|publisher=Sophos|access-date=2010-06-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100604193905/http://www.sophos.com/blogs/sophoslabs/?p=9783|archive-date=4 June 2010|url-status=dead}} The term "likejacking" came from a comment posted by Corey Ballou in the article How to "Like" Anything on the Web (Safely),{{cite web|url=http://www.jqueryin.com/2010/06/02/likejacking-term-catches-on/|title="Likejacking" Term Catches On|last=Ballou|first=Corey|date=2 June 2010|publisher=jqueryin.com|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100605073625/http://www.jqueryin.com/2010/06/02/likejacking-term-catches-on/|archive-date=5 June 2010|url-status=dead|access-date=2010-06-08}} which is one of the first documented postings explaining the possibility of malicious activity regarding Facebook's "like" button.{{cite web|url=http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/likejacking_takes_off_on_facebook.php|title="Likejacking" Takes Off on Facebook|last=Perez|first=Sarah|date=2 June 2010|publisher=ReadWriteWeb|access-date=2010-06-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110816223746/http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/likejacking_takes_off_on_facebook.php|archive-date=16 August 2011|url-status=dead}}

According to an article in IEEE Spectrum, a solution to likejacking was developed at one of Facebook's hackathons.{{cite web|url=https://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/innovation/facebook-philosophy-move-fast-and-break-things/2|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110607033033/http://spectrum.ieee.org/at-work/innovation/facebook-philosophy-move-fast-and-break-things/2|url-status=dead|archive-date=7 June 2011|title=Facebook Philosophy: Move Fast and Break Things|last=Kushner|first=David|date=June 2011|publisher=IEEE|access-date=2011-07-15}} A "Like" bookmarklet is available that avoids the possibility of likejacking present in the Facebook like button.{{cite news|url=https://readwrite.com/2010/04/22/how_to_like_anything_on_the_web_safely/|title=How to "Like" Anything on the Web (Safely)|last=Perez|first=Sarah|date=23 April 2010|work=ReadWriteWeb|access-date=24 August 2011}}

Nested clickjacking, compared to classic clickjacking, works by embedding a malicious web frame between two frames of the original, harmless web page: that from the framed page and that which is displayed on the top window. This works due to a vulnerability in the HTTP header X-Frame-Options, in which, when this element has the value SAMEORIGIN, the web browser only checks the two aforementioned layers. The fact that additional frames can be added in between these two while remaining undetected means that attackers can use this for their benefit.

In the past, with Google+ and the faulty version of X-Frame-Options, attackers were able to insert frames of their choice by using the vulnerability present in Google's Image Search engine. In between the image display frames, which were present in Google+ as well, these attacker-controlled frames were able to load and not be restricted, allowing for the attackers to mislead whomever came upon the image display page.

CursorJacking is a UI redressing technique to change the cursor from the location the user perceives, discovered in 2010 by Eddy Bordi, a researcher at vulnerability.fr.{{cite web|url=http://podlipensky.com/2012/08/cursor-spoofing-cursorjacking/|title=Cursor Spoofing and Cursorjacking|last1=Podlipensky|first1=Paul|website=Podlipensky.com|publisher=Paul Podlipensky|access-date=22 November 2017|ref=podlipensky|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122130512/http://podlipensky.com/2012/08/cursor-spoofing-cursorjacking/|archive-date=22 November 2017|url-status=dead}} Marcus Niemietz demonstrated this with a custom cursor icon, and in 2012 Mario Heiderich did so by hiding the cursor.{{cite web|url=http://blog.kotowicz.net/2012/01/cursorjacking-again.html|title=Cursorjacking Again|author=Krzysztof Kotowicz|date=18 January 2012|access-date=2012-01-31}}

Jordi Chancel, a researcher at Alternativ-Testing.fr, discovered a CursorJacking vulnerability using Flash, HTML and JavaScript code in Mozilla Firefox on Mac OS X systems (fixed in Firefox 30.0) which can lead to arbitrary code execution and webcam spying.{{cite web|url=https://www.mozilla.org/security/announce/2014/mfsa2014-50.html|title=Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2014-50|publisher=Mozilla|access-date=17 August 2014}}

A second CursorJacking vulnerability was again discovered by Jordi Chancel in Mozilla Firefox on Mac OS X systems (fixed in Firefox 37.0) using once again Flash, HTML and JavaScript code which can also lead to spying via a webcam and the execution of a malicious addon, allowing the execution of malware on the affected user's computer.{{cite web|url=https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2015-35/|title=Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory 2015-35|publisher=Mozilla|access-date=25 October 2015}}

Different from other clickjacking techniques that redress a UI, MouseJack is a wireless hardware-based UI vulnerability first reported by Marc Newlin of Bastille.net in 2016 which allows external keyboard input to be injected into vulnerable dongles.{{Cite web|url=https://www.bastille.net/research/vulnerabilities/mousejack|title=What is MouseJack!|website=Bastille|language=en-US|access-date=2020-01-03}} Logitech supplied firmware patches but other manufacturers failed to respond to this vulnerability.{{Cite web|url=https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/981271/|title=CERT VU#981271 Multiple wireless keyboard/mouse devices use an unsafe proprietary wireless protocol|website=kb.cert.org|access-date=2020-01-03}}

In Browserless clickjacking, attackers utilize vulnerabilities in programs to replicate classic clickjacking in them, without being required to use the presence of a web browser.

This method of clickjacking is mainly prevalent among mobile devices, usually on Android devices, especially due to the way in which toast notifications work. Because toast notifications have a small delay in between the moment the notification is requested and the moment the notification actually displays on-screen, attackers are capable of using that gap to create a dummy button that lies hidden underneath the notification and can still be clicked on.

CookieJacking is a form of clickjacking in which cookies are stolen from the victim's web browsers. This is done by tricking the user into dragging an object which seemingly appears harmless but is in fact making the user select the entire content of the cookie being targeted. From there, the attacker can acquire the cookie and all of the data that it possesses.{{Clarify|reason=|date=December 2020}}

In fileJacking, attackers use the web browser's capability to navigate through the computer and access computer files in order to acquire personal data. It does so by tricking the user into establishing an active file server (through the file and folder selection window that browsers use). With this, attackers can now access and take files from their victims' computers.

A 2014 paper from researcher at the Carnegie Mellon University found that while browsers refuse to autofill if the protocol on the current login page is different from the protocol at the time the password was saved, some password managers would insecurely fill in passwords for the http version of https-saved passwords. Most managers did not protect against iFrame- and redirection-based attacks and exposed additional passwords where password synchronization had been used between multiple devices.

Protection against clickjacking (including likejacking) can be added to Mozilla Firefox desktop and mobile{{cite web|url=http://noscript.net/nsa/|title=NoScript Anywhere|author=Giorgio Maone|date=24 June 2011|publisher=hackademix.net|access-date=2011-06-30}} versions by installing the NoScript add-on: its ClearClick feature, released on 8 October 2008, prevents users from clicking on invisible or "redressed" page elements of embedded documents or applets.{{cite web|url=http://hackademix.net/2008/10/08/hello-clearclick-goodbye-clickjacking/|title=Hello ClearClick, Goodbye Clickjacking|author=Giorgio Maone|date=8 October 2008|publisher=hackademix.net|access-date=2008-10-27}} According to Google's "Browser Security Handbook" from 2008, NoScript's ClearClick is a "freely available product that offers a reasonable degree of protection" against Clickjacking.{{cite web|url=http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/Part2#Arbitrary_page_mashups_(UI_redressing)|title=Browser Security Handbook, Part 2, UI Redressing|author=Michal Zalevski|date=10 December 2008|publisher=Google Inc.|access-date=2008-10-27}} Protection from the newer cursorjacking attack was added to NoScript 2.2.8 RC1.

The "NoClickjack" web browser add-on (browser extension) adds client-side clickjack protection for users of Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera and Microsoft Edge without interfering with the operation of legitimate iFrames. NoClickjack is based on technology developed for GuardedID. The NoClickjack add-on is free of charge.

GuardedID (a commercial product) includes client-side clickjack protection for users of Internet Explorer without interfering with the operation of legitimate iFrames.{{cite web|url=http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20090204/clickjacking-and-guardedid/|title=Clickjacking and GuardedID ha.ckers.org web application security lab|author=Robert Hansen|date=4 February 2009|access-date=2011-11-30|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120711093803/http://ha.ckers.org/blog/20090204/clickjacking-and-guardedid/|archive-date=11 July 2012|url-status=dead}} GuardedID clickjack protection forces all frames to become visible. GuardedID teams{{Clarify|reason=|date=December 2020}} with the add-on NoClickjack to add protection for Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera and Microsoft Edge.

Gazelle is a Microsoft Research project secure web browser based on IE, that uses an OS-like security model and has its own limited defenses against clickjacking.{{cite web|url=http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/people/helenw/papers/gazelleSecurity09.pdf|title=The Multi-Principal OS Construction of the Gazelle Web Browser|last1=Wang|first1=Helen J.|author-link=Helen J. Wang|last2=Grier|first2=Chris|date=August 2009|publisher=18th Usenix Security Symposium, Montreal, Canada|access-date=2010-01-26|last3=Moschchuk|first3=Alexander|last4=King|first4=Samuel T.|last5=Choudhury|first5=Piali|last6=Venter|first6=Herman}} In Gazelle, a window of different origin may only draw dynamic content over another window's screen space if the content it draws is opaque.

The Intersection Observer v2 API{{cite web|url=https://w3c.github.io/IntersectionObserver/v2/|title=Intersection Observer – W3C Editor's Draft}} introduces the concept of tracking the actual "visibility" of a target element as a human being would define it.{{cite web|url=https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2019/02/intersectionobserver-v2|title=Trust is Good, Observation is Better}} This allows a framed widget to detect when it's being covered. The feature is enabled by default since Google Chrome 74, released in April 2019.{{cite web|url=https://m417z.com/De-anonymization-via-Clickjacking-in-2019/|title=De-anonymization via Clickjacking in 2019}} The API is also implemented by other Chromium-based browsers, such as Microsoft Edge and Opera.

Web site owners can protect their users against UI redressing (frame based clickjacking) on the server side by including a framekiller JavaScript snippet in those pages they do not want to be included inside frames from different sources.

Such JavaScript-based protection is not always reliable. This is especially true on Internet Explorer, where this kind of countermeasure can be circumvented "by design" by including the targeted page inside an