Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong

{{Short description|1977 book by J. L. Mackie about ethics}}

{{other uses|Ethics (disambiguation)}}

{{Infobox book

| italic title =

| name = Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong

| image = File:Ethics- Inventing Right and Wrong.jpg

| image_size =

| alt =

| caption = First edition

| author = J. L. Mackie

| audio_read_by =

| title_orig =

| orig_lang_code =

| title_working =

| translator =

| illustrator =

| cover_artist =

| country =

| language = English

| series =

| release_number =

| subject = Philosophy

| genre = Non-fiction

| set_in =

| publisher = Penguin Books

| publisher2 =

| pub_date =

| english_pub_date =

| published =

| media_type =

| pages =

| awards =

| isbn =

| isbn_note =

| oclc =

| dewey =

| congress =

| preceded_by =

| followed_by =

| native_wikisource =

| wikisource =

| notes =

| exclude_cover =

| website =

}}

Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong is a 1977 work of ethics by J. L. Mackie known for its espousal of moral skepticism and the argument from queerness.

Contents

The first chapter, "The Subjectivity of Values," opens with Mackie's rejection of moral universalism: "There are no objective values."{{Cite book|last=Mackie|first=J. L. (John Leslie)|url=https://archive.org/details/ethicsinventingr00mack/page/15/mode/1up|title=Ethics : inventing right and wrong|date=1978|publisher=Harmondsworth, Middlesex : Penguin Books|isbn=978-0-14-021957-9|pages=15|via=Internet Archive}} This chapter is well known for advancing two arguments against moral universalism: the argument from disagreement and the argument from queerness. The chapter is excerpted in the fourth (2007) edition of Stuart and James Rachels's The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy.{{Cite web|title=The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy|url=http://www.jamesrachels.org/rtd4e.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100520043253/http://www.jamesrachels.org/rtd4e.htm|url-status=usurped|archive-date=May 20, 2010|access-date=2021-07-15|website=www.jamesrachels.org}}

=Argument from disagreement=

The argument from disagreement, also known as the argument from relativity, first observes that there is a lot of intractable moral disagreement: people disagree about what is right and what is wrong.{{cite web|last1=Joyce|first1=Richard|title=Mackie's Arguments for the Moral Error Theory|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|accessdate=22 December 2017|archive-date=4 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210304175110/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/moral-error-theory.html|url-status=dead}} Mackie argues that the best explanation of this is that right and wrong are invented, not objective truths.

=Argument from queerness=

{{Main|Argument from queerness}}

The argument from queerness has two forms: metaphysical and epistemological. With regards to the metaphysical version, if moral properties or entities were to exist, they would be very unusual ("queer") things. Epistemologically, it is unclear how we could come to know about such entities. The metaphysical and epistemological arguments are tied together, "since we are forced to posit weird epistemological equipment only if it has already been established that the properties in question are weird.". Quantum phenomena have been put forward as providing counterexamples to both of Mackie's arguments from queerness.'Ethical Truth in Light of Quantum Mechanics,' King, I and King, M. 'Philosophy Now' Issue 150 (May/June 2023)

References

{{reflist}}

Literature

  • McDowell, John: [https://books.google.com/books?id=NyEsEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT159 "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World]," in: [https://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/PHS338/John%20McDowell_Mind%2C%20Value%2C%20and%20Reality.pdf Mind, Value and Reality] (1998). , Harvard University Press.