Fair division of a single homogeneous resource

Fair division of a single homogeneous resource is one of the simplest settings in fair division problems. There is a single resource that should be divided between several people. The challenge is that each person derives a different utility from each amount of the resource. Hence, there are several conflicting principles for deciding how the resource should be divided. A primary conflict is between efficiency and equality. Efficiency is represented by the utilitarian rule, which maximizes the sum of utilities; equality is represented by the egalitarian rule, which maximizes the minimum utility.{{Cite Moulin 2004}}{{rp|sub.2.5}}

Setting

In a certain society, there are:

  • t units of some divisible resource.
  • n agents with different "utilities".
  • The utility of agent i is represented by a function u_i; when agent i receives y_i units of resource, he derives from it a utility of u_i(y_i).

This setting can have various interpretations. For example:{{rp|44}}

  • The resource is wood, the agents are builders, and the utility functions represent their productive power - u_i(y_i) is the number of buildings that agent i can build using y_i units of wood.
  • The resource is a medication, the agents are patients, and the utility functions represent their chance of recovery - u_i(y_i) is the probability of agent i to recover by getting y_i doses of the medication.

In any case, the society has to decide how to divide the resource among the agents: it has to find a vector y_1,\dots,y_n such that: y_1+\cdots+y_n = t

Allocation rules

= Envy-free =

The Envy-freeness rule says that the resource should be allocated such that no agent envies another agent. In the case of a single homogeneous resource, it always selects the allocation that gives each agent the same amount of the resource, regardless of their utility function:

::\forall i: y_i = t/n

= Utilitarian =

The utilitarian rule says that the sum of utilities should be maximized. Therefore, the utilitarian allocation is:

::y = \arg\max_y \sum_i u_i(y_i)

= Egalitarian =

The egalitarian rule says that the utilities of all agents should be equal. Therefore, we would like to select an allocation that satisfies:

::\forall i,j: u_i(y_i) = u_j(y_j)

However, such allocation may not exist, since the ranges of the utility functions might not overlap (see example below). To ensure that a solution exists, we allow different utility levels, but require that agents with utility levels above the minimum receive no resources:

::y_i>0 \implies u_i(y_i) = \min_j u_j(y_j)

Equivalently, the egalitarian allocation maximizes the minimum utility:

::y = \arg\max_y \min_i u_i(y_i)

The utilitarian and egalitarian rules may lead to the same allocation or to different allocations, depending on the utility functions. Some examples are illustrated below.

Examples

= Common utility and unequal endowments =

Suppose all agents have the same utility function, u, but each agent i has a different initial endowment, x_i. So the utility of each agent i is given by:

::u_i(y_i) = u(x_i + y_i)

If u is a concave function, representing diminishing returns, then the utilitarian and egalitarian allocations are the same - trying to equalize the endowments of the agents. For example, if there are 3 agents with initial endowments x=2,4,9 and the total amount is t=8, then both rules recommend the allocation y=5,3,0, since it both pushes towards equal utilities (as much as possible) and maximizes the sum of utilities.

In contrast, if u is a convex function, representing increasing returns, then the egalitarian allocation still pushes towards equality, but the utilitarian allocation now gives all the endowment to the richest agent: y=0,0,9.{{rp|45}} This makes sense, for example, when the resource is a scarce medication: it may be socially best to give all medication to the patient with the highest chances of curing.

= Constant utility ratios =

Suppose there is a common utility function u, but each agent has a different coefficient a_i representing this agent's productivity. So the utility of each agent i is given by:

::u_i(y_i) = a_i\cdot u(y_i)

Here, the utilitarian and egalitarian approaches are diametrically opposed.{{rp|46–47}}

  • The egalitarian allocation gives more resources to the less productive agents, in order to compensate them and let them reach a high utility level:
  • ::a_i>a_j \implies y_j>y_i
  • The utilitarian allocation gives more resources to the more productive agents, since they will use the resources better:
  • ::a_i>a_j \implies y_i>y_j

Properties of allocation rules

See also

References