High Council for the Unity of Azawad

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File:Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad.jpg

The High Council of Azawad was created to promote talks between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government during the early stages of the Mali War. The council was formed by Mohamed Ag Intalla along with other Tuareg representatives who sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Ag Intalla called on the MNLA and the Azawad Islamic Movement (MIA) to join the HCA on the day of its creation. Ag Intalla stated that the HCA "will support all efforts to find through dialogue a negotiated political solution to the crisis that Azawad is going through." and that the movement was "a peaceful movement which does not demand the independence of a part of northern Mali and is against any idea of partition." He also stated the movement was for Malian unification, and against terrorism.{{Cite web |title=Mali : des Touaregs créent un Haut conseil de l'Azawad pour négocier avec Bamako – Jeune Afrique |url=https://www.jeuneafrique.com/170970/politique/mali-des-touaregs-cr-ent-un-haut-conseil-de-l-azawad-pour-n-gocier-avec-bamako/ |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=JeuneAfrique.com |language=fr-FR}}

Ag Intalla received the support from his father, prominent Ifoghas Tuareg amenukal Intalla Ag Attaher, who had previously left the MNLA to join the HCA. Ag Intalla's brother, Alghabass Ag Intalla, declared the dissolution of the MIA and joined the HCUA on May 19 as well.{{Cite web |date=2013-05-19 |title=Mali: le Haut Conseil de l'Azawad met en place ses instances |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20130520-mali-haut-conseil-azawad-instances-intalla-ag-attaher-alghabass-ag-intalla |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}} That same day, the HCA met in Kidal, where Ag Attaher was appointed president of the HCA, and Mohammed was appointed secretary-general. The High Council of Azawad also rebranded to the High Council for the Unity of Azawad at the Kidal meeting.{{Cite web |date=2013-05-19 |title=Azawad: le chef coutumier de l'Adrar des Ifoghas quitte le MNLA et rejoint le HCA |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20130519-azawad-amenokal-patriarche-chef-coutumier-adrar-ifoghas-intalla-ag-attaher-mnla-hca |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}}{{Cite web |title=Actualités |url=https://www.mnlamov.net/actualites.html |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=www.mnlamov.net}}

The MNLA did not criticize the founding of the HCUA, and offered its support to the group. On June 2, 2013, the two groups signed a memorandum of understanding during the Ouagadougou Accords.{{Cite web |date=2013-06-02 |title=Le MNLA et le Haut conseil de l'Azawad s'unissent et veulent garder le contrôle de Kidal |url=https://www.france24.com/fr/20130602-nord-mali-kidal-mnla-haut-conseil-azawad-union-accord-election-presidentielle-bamako-rebellion-touareg |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=France 24 |language=fr}}

The military branch of the HCUA was led by Cheikh Ag Aoussa until October 8, 2016, when he was killed by a mine.{{Cite web |date=2014-05-23 |title=Mali: trois groupes armés à Kidal acceptent un accord de cessez-le-feu |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20140523-mali-trois-groupes-armes-kidal-acceptent-uin-accord-cessez-le-feu |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}} Achafghi Ag Bohada succeeded him on October 25, 2016.{{Cite web |date=2016-10-08 |title=Mali: le chef militaire de l'ex-rébellion tué par l'explosion d'une mine |url=https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2016/10/08/97001-20161008FILWWW00171-mali-le-chef-militaire-de-l-ex-rebellion-tue-par-l-explosion-d-une-mine.php |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=Le Figaro |language=fr}}{{Cite web |date=2016-10-26 |title=Mali: le HCUA a désigné son nouveau chef après l'assassinat de Cheikh Ag Aoussa |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20161026-mali-hcua-designe-nouveau-chef-assassinat-cheikh-haoussa-achafghi-bohada |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}} Around the beginning of July 2015, Alghabass took over as secretary-general, leading a delegation of HCUA, MNLA, and MAA representatives at the Algiers Agreement.{{Cite web |date=2014-07-16 |title=Alger: autorités et groupes armés maliens entament les discussions |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20140716-alger-autorites-groupes-armes-maliens-entament-discussions |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}} On November 30, 2024 the High Council of Azawad merged into the Azawad Liberation Front.{{Cite web |date=2024-12-04 |title=Mali : qu'est-ce que le Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA), nouvelle coalition indépendantiste touareg ? {{!}} TV5MONDE - Informations |url=https://information.tv5monde.com/afrique/mali-quest-ce-que-le-front-de-liberation-de-lazawad-fla-nouvelle-coalition-independantiste |access-date=2025-02-06 |website=information.tv5monde.com |language=fr}}

The bulk of the HCUA is made of up Ifoghas Tuaregs and defectors from Ansar Dine.{{Cite web |date=2014-08-19 |title=Mali : des djihadistes présents à Kidal ? |url=https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/mali-des-djihadistes-presents-a-kidal-19-08-2014-1857620_3826.php |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=Le Point |language=fr}}{{Cite web |title=Nord du Mali : de l'irrédentisme touareg à la guerre tribale ? – Jeune Afrique |url=https://www.jeuneafrique.com/32589/politique/nord-du-mali-de-l-irr-dentisme-touareg-la-guerre-tribale/ |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=JeuneAfrique.com |language=fr-FR}} In a March 2016 report, MINUSMA estimated that HCUA had between 400 and 600 men.{{Cite web |title=Mali : le business du cantonnement ? – Jeune Afrique |url=https://www.jeuneafrique.com/321987/politique/mali-business-cantonnement/ |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=JeuneAfrique.com |language=fr-FR}}

During the 2013 Malian legislative elections, two members of HCUA were elected to the Malian parliament. Mohammed Ag Intalla was elected in Tin-Essako Cercle with 100% of the vote, although 86% were abstentions. Hamada Ag Bibi, the former spokesperson for Ansar Dine who later joined the MIA won 96.69% of the vote in Abeïbara Cercle, with 29% abstentions. Both Ag Bibi and Ag Intalla were under Rally for Mali.{{Cite web |date=2013-12-19 |title=La carte des résultats du second tour des législatives au Mali |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20131219-mali-carte-resultats-legislatives-second-tour-elections |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}}{{Cite web |title=aBamako.com {{!}} Elections Legislatives |url=http://www.abamako.com/elections/legislatives/2013/election/region.asp?ID=8#gsc.tab=0 |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=www.abamako.com}}

The HCUA participated in clashes in Takellote, Kidal Region in 2017 against the El Hadj Ag Gamou-led Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies.{{Cite web |date=2017-07-27 |title=Mali: lourd bilan des combats entre le Gatia et la CMA dans le nord du pays |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20170727-mali-lourd-bilan-combats-entre-le-gatia-cma-nord-pays |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}} In 2019, the HCUA launched an operation dubbed Acharouchou to secure Kidal Region. This was extended to Tombouctou Region later on.{{Cite news |date=2019-11-25 |title=Au Mali, les anciens rebelles font la loi dans la région de Tombouctou |language=fr |work=Le Monde.fr |url=https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/11/25/au-mali-les-anciens-rebelles-font-la-loi-dans-la-region-de-tombouctou_6020488_3212.html |access-date=2023-12-06}} Calm was observed in the regions under HCUA control. In 2023, the HCUA participated in an attack on Malian forces in Taoussa.{{Cite web |date=2023-10-05 |title=Mali: rebels claim capture of new army camp |url=https://www.africanews.com/2023/10/05/mali-rebels-claim-capture-of-new-army-camp/ |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=Africanews |language=en}}

In June 2016, French minister of defense Jean-Yves Le Drian criticized the HCUA's "double game", accusing the group of still having ties to Ansar Dine and Iyad Ag Ghaly.{{Cite web |date=2016-06-09 |title=Mali : les rebelles du HCUA jouent "un double jeu", selon Paris |url=https://www.voaafrique.com/a/mali-les-rebelles-du-hcua-jouent-un-double-jeu-selon-paris/3368599.html |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=Voice of America |language=fr}}{{Cite web |date=2016-07-12 |title=Mali: l'armée française remet la pression sur les jihadistes dans le Nord |url=https://www.lexpress.fr/societe/mali-l-armee-francaise-remet-la-pression-sur-les-jihadistes-dans-le-nord_1811787.html |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=L'Express |language=fr}} The HCUA rebutted these statements, claiming to have broken ties with Ansar Dine.{{Cite web |last=mmaiga |date=2016-06-11 |title=Le HCUA demande à la France de revenir sur sa déclaration |url=https://www.studiotamani.org/72500-le-hcua-demande-a-la-france-de-revenir-sur-sa-declaration |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=Studio Tamani - Informations, débats, magazines : toute l’actualité du Mali, en 5 langues |language=fr-FR}}

In an August 8, 2018 report, the United Nations accused Salah Ag Ahmed, mayor of Talataye and a member of HCUA, of being a double agent for Ansar Dine and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.{{Cite news |date=2018-08-28 |title=Au Mali, des signataires de l'accord de paix accusés de terrorisme |language=fr |work=Le Monde.fr |url=https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/08/28/au-mali-des-signataires-de-l-accord-de-paix-impliques-dans-des-activites-terroristes_5346954_3212.html |access-date=2023-12-06}} Another HCUA member, Mahamadou Ag Rhissa, was accused of migrant smuggling and detaining and sexually exploiting women in Talahandak, Kidal region. Siguidi Ag Madit, an HCUA commander, was also accused of having ties to the Islamic State and being involved with an attack against GATIA in Andéramboukane. On December 20, 2018, Ag Rhissa was sanctioned, and banned from travelling outside of Mali.{{Cite web |date=2018-12-20 |title=Accord de paix: premières sanctions de l'ONU contre des Maliens |url=https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2018/12/20/97001-20181220FILWWW00394-accord-de-paix-premieres-sanctions-de-l-onu-contre-des-maliens.php |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=Le Figaro |language=fr}}

In September 2019, Niger accused the HCUA of participating in the Midal attack, the Baley Beri ambush, and the Inates attack. The HCUA denied all accusations.{{Cite web |date=2019-09-19 |title=Mali: le Niger accuse des membres du HCUA de complicité avec les terroristes |url=https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20190919-mali-le-niger-accuse-membres-hcua-complicite-terroristes |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=RFI |language=fr}}{{Cite web |date=2019-09-22 |title=Crise malienne : le coup de semonce des pays voisins |url=https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/crise-malienne-le-coup-de-semonce-des-pays-voisins-22-09-2019-2337074_3826.php |access-date=2023-12-06 |website=Le Point |language=fr}}

Despite accusations of ties to jihadist movements, HCUA has been the target of jihadist attacks. The most notable attack occurred in Ber on June 20, 2016, when Alassane Ag Intouwa, an HCUA official, was assassinated by AQIM.{{Cite web |date=2017-01-18 |title=Mali : Recrudescence des abus commis par les groupes islamistes armés et du banditisme {{!}} Human Rights Watch |url=https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2017/01/18/mali-recrudescence-des-abus-commis-par-les-groupes-islamistes-armes-et-du |access-date=2023-12-06 |language=fr}}

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Category:Military units and factions of the Mali War

Category:Tuareg independence movement