Hudson v. Craft

{{Use mdy dates|date=September 2023}}

{{Infobox California Supreme Court case

|Litigants=

|ArgueDate=

|ArgueYear=

|DecideDate= March 22

|DecideYear= 1949

|FullName= Guy C. Hudson, a Minor, etc., et al., Appellants, v. Orville Craft, et al., Respondents.

|Citations= 33 Cal.2d 654; 204 P.2d 1

|Prior=

|Subsequent=

|Holding= It is not possible for an individual to consent to an unlawful act or deliberate harm. Judgement reversed.

|ChiefJudge= Phil S. Gibson

|AssociateJudges= John W. Shenk, Douglas L. Edmonds, Jesse W. Carter, Roger J. Traynor, B. Rey Schauer, Homer R. Spence

|Majority= Carter

|JoinMajority= Gibson, Shenk, Traynor, Schauer, Spence

|Concurrence= Edmonds

|JoinConcurrence=

|Dissent=

|JoinDissent=

|LawsApplied=

}}

Hudson v. Craft (33 Cal.2d 654, 1949) is a United States court case defining how the court defines consent as a defense to an intentional harm.{{Cite book |last=California (State) |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N_66798jBW4C |title=California. Court of Appeal (1st Appellate District). Records and Briefs: 4CIV19157, Respondent Brief |pages=9 |language=en}}

Facts of the Case

The Defendants were conducting a carnival where one of the concessions was a boxing exhibition, which was conducted in violation of statutory provisions, distributed prizes and prize money to the contestants, and no license had been issued.{{Cite journal |last1=Landes |first1=William M. |last2=Posner |first2=Richard A. |date=1981-12-01 |title=An economic theory of intentional torts |url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188%2881%2990012-0 |journal=International Review of Law and Economics |language=en |volume=1 |issue=2 |pages=127–154 |doi=10.1016/0144-8188(81)90012-0 |issn=0144-8188|url-access=subscription }} The Plaintiff engaged in a boxing match after being solicited by the Defendants and thereby consented to the contest.

Ruling

The central holding was that an individual cannot consent to an illegal act. Therefore, regardless of whether or not the two individual fighters consented, the promoter could still be held liable for damages.

The court did not make a direct ruling to the suit between the two boxers.

References

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