Inconsistent triad

{{Short description|Three propositions that cannot all be true together}}

An inconsistent triad is a set of three propositions that cannot all be true together. For example, 'She was an orphan; Tim outlived her; Tim was her father'.{{Cite journal |date=1996-01-01 |title=The Oxford companion to philosophy |journal=Choice Reviews Online |language=en |volume=33 |issue=5 |pages=33–2495–33-2495 |doi=10.5860/CHOICE.33-2495|doi-broken-date=22 February 2025 |s2cid=142841293 }}

All inconsistent triads lead to trilemmas:

  • If A and B are true, C must be false.
  • If A and C are true, B must be false.
  • If B and C are true, A must be false.{{Cite book |last=Sullivan |first=Scott M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MUBdPQAACAAJ |title=An Introduction To Traditional Logic: Classical Reasoning For Contemporary |date=2005-10-26 |publisher=Booksurge Publishing |isbn=978-1-4196-1671-6 |language=en}}

Epistemology

{{Main|Epistemology}}

  1. Knowledge is justified true belief.{{Cite journal |last=de Grefte |first=Job |date=2023-02-01 |title=Knowledge as Justified True Belief |url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-020-00365-7 |journal=Erkenntnis |language=en |volume=88 |issue=2 |pages=531–549 |doi=10.1007/s10670-020-00365-7 |issn=1572-8420}}
  2. Humans cannot provide justification for their beliefs.{{Citation |last=Hume |first=David |title=An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding |url=https://oxfordworldsclassics.com/display/10.1093/owc/9780199549900.001.0001/isbn-9780199549900 |access-date=2025-02-21 |publisher=Oxford University Press |language=en-US |doi=10.1093/owc/9780199549900.001.0001/isbn-9780199549900 |doi-broken-date=22 February 2025 |isbn=978-0-19-192173-5}}
  3. Humans possess knowledge.{{Cite book |last1=Descartes |first1=René |title=Meditations on first philosophy: with selections from the Objections and replies |last2=Moriarty |first2=Michael |date=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-280696-3 |location=Oxford}}

Political philosophy

{{Main|Political philosophy}}

  1. A just society maximizes individual liberty.{{Cite book |last=Nozick |first=Robert |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/NOZASA |title=Anarchy, State, and Utopia |date=1974 |publisher=Basic Books |location=New York}}
  2. A just society maximizes material equality.{{Cite book |last=Rawls |first=John |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjf9z6v |title=A Theory of Justice: Original Edition |date=1971 |publisher=Harvard University Press |doi=10.2307/j.ctvjf9z6v |jstor=j.ctvjf9z6v |isbn=978-0-674-88010-8}}
  3. A just society cannot maximize both liberty and equality.{{Citation |last=Berlin |first=Isaiah |title=Two Concepts of Liberty |date=2002-03-07 |work=Liberty |pages=166–217 |editor-last=Berlin |editor-first=Isaiah |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/7968/chapter-abstract/153281672?redirectedFrom=fulltext |access-date=2025-02-20 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/019924989x.003.0004 |isbn=978-0-19-924989-3 |editor2-last=Hardy|url-access=subscription }}

Ethics

{{Main|Ethics}}

  1. Actions that maximize overall well-being are morally right.{{Cite book |last=Bentham |first=Jeremy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eykSAAAAYAAJ |title=Utilitarianism |date=1890 |publisher=Progressive Publishing Company |language=en}}
  2. Lying can sometimes maximize overall well-being.{{Cite journal |last=Greasley |first=Kate |date=2019 |title=The Morality of Lying and the Murderer at the Door |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45284255 |journal=Law and Philosophy |volume=38 |issue=5/6 |pages=439–452 |doi=10.1007/s10982-018-09342-2 |jstor=45284255 |issn=0167-5249|doi-access=free }}
  3. Lying is always morally wrong.{{Cite journal |last=Wood |first=Allen W. |date=2011 |title=Kant and the right to lie reviewed essay: On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797) |url=http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1692-88572011000200005 |journal=Eidos |language=en |issue=15 |pages=96–117 |issn=1692-8857}}

See also

References

{{Reflist}}

Further reading

  • Brewer, B. (2011). The Inconsistent Triad. [https://academic.oup.com/book/2236 Perception, Causation, and Objectivity], 68.
  • Howard-Snyder, F., Howard-Snyder, D., & Wasserman, R. (2009). [http://catalogs.mhhe.com/mhhe/viewProductDetails.do?isbn=0073407372 The Power of Logic] (4th Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. (p. 336) {{ISBN|978-0-07-340737-1}}

Category:Syllogistic fallacies