Institutional analysis and development framework

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The Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) is a theoretical framework for investigating how people ("actors") interact with common-pool resources (CPRs). CPRs are economic goods which are rivalrous (i.e. one person's use reduces the ability of others to use) and non-excludable (i.e. it's impractical to prevent people accessing it) - examples include forests as a source of timber, or fields as a source of pasture.

It was developed by Elinor Ostrom, an American political scientist and the first woman to receive the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009.Ostrom, Elinor. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University. Ostrom researched which institutional structures supported CPR actors to sustainably use their resources, balancing individuals' use with the interest of a wider public. Under rational choice assumptions, the IAD was devised in an attempt to explain and predict outcomes by formally exploring and documenting governance structures, actors' positions, and informal and formal rules. Thus, the IAD is a systematic method to document policy analysis functions similar to analytic technique commonly used in physical and social sciences to understand how institutions operate and change over a period of time.{{cite web|author1=Michael D. McGinnis|title=Updated Guide to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simplified Overview of a Complex Framework for the Analysis of Institutions and their Development|url=https://mcginnis.pages.iu.edu/iad_guide.pdf|publisher=Indiana University|accessdate=29 September 2024}}{{cite book|author1=Margaret M. Polski|author2=Elinor Ostrom|title=An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design|url=https://mason.gmu.edu/~mpolski/documents/PolskiOstromIAD.pdf|accessdate=1 February 2015}}

Components of the framework

File:IAD framework diagram.png

Ostrom thought of the IAD as a "multi-level conceptual map" with which one could zoom in and out of particular hierarchical parts of the governance structures in a social system.

The IAD framework helps to perceive complex collective action problems by dividing them into 'action arenas', that are smaller pieces of practically understandable function. The analyst assumes that the structure of the action situation is fixed in the short-term. For an action situation to exist, there must be "actors in positions" (the number of possible roles that are available in this recurring interaction situation).{{cite book|url=http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8085.pdf|title=Understanding Institutional Diversity|author=Elinor Ostrom|date=2009|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=9781400831739|location=Princeton|accessdate=30 January 2015}} Actors have choices within the existing (rule) structure. In the study of outcomes from collective choice situations, actors are influenced by the institutional arrangements, the socio-economic conditions, and the physical environment.{{cite journal|author1=Krister Andersson|title=Understanding decentralized forest governance: an application of the institutional analysis and development framework|url=http://sspp.proquest.com/archives/vol2iss1/0507-010.andersson.html|journal=Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy|date=2006 |volume=2 |issue=1 |page=25 |doi=10.1080/15487733.2006.11907975 |bibcode=2006SSPP....2...25A |accessdate=2 February 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905060853/http://sspp.proquest.com/archives/vol2iss1/0507-010.andersson.html|archive-date=5 September 2015|url-status=dead|hdl=10535/5284|hdl-access=free}} The institutional arrangements can be studied by seven rule types (as per below).

Rules	Description
class="wikitable plainrowheaders" style="width:90%; align:center; margin:auto;" \|+Rule types in institutional analysis
Position	The number of possible "positions" actors in the action situation can assume (in terms of formal positions these might be better described as job roles, while for informal positions these might rather be social roles of some capacity
Boundary	Characteristics participants must have in order to be able to access a particular position
Choice	The action capacity ascribed to a particular position
Aggregation	Any rules relating to how interactions between participants within the action situation accumulate to final outcomes (voting schemes etc.)
Information	The types and kinds of information and information channels available to participants in their respective positions
Pay-off	The likely rewards or punishments for participating in the action situation
Scope	Any criteria or requirements that exist for the final outcomes from the action situation

Institutional analysis and development framework

Components of the framework

References

Further reading