James Fearon

Fearon has a PhD from UC Berkeley and a BA from Harvard University. At Berkeley, Kenneth Waltz was Fearon's dissertation advisor.{{Cite journal |last1=Waltz |first1=Kenneth |last2=Fearon |first2=James |date=2012-06-15 |title=A Conversation with Kenneth Waltz |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |language=en |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=1–12 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-020511-174136 |issn=1094-2939 |doi-access=free}}{{Cite web |date=2013-12-16 |title=Interview - James Fearon |url=https://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/16/interview-james-fearon/ |access-date=2021-06-06 |website=E-International Relations |language=en-US}} He is a National Academy of Sciences member since 2012.{{Cite web |date=3 May 2012 |title=Six Stanford faculty elected to National Academy of Sciences |url=https://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/may/nas-new-members-050312.html}}

Fearon's work on wars emphasizes the need to explain why rationally-led states end up fighting a war instead of bargaining, even though bargaining can make both sides better off a priori. He also elaborates on how democracies are better able to signal intent in war based on domestic audience costs. Fearon has also contributed to the study of deliberative democracy.{{cite book|author=Elster, Jon (editor)|year=1998|title=Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy)|publisher=Cambridge University Press|chapter=(see intro by Jon Elster and chpt 2 by Fearon)|isbn=978-0-521-59696-1|ref=CITEREFElster1998}} Fearon has three basic assumptions about war. First, war is a more costly choice than peace. Second, war is predictably unpredictable. In other words, although neither side may be sure exactly who will win, they can agree on the relatively likelihood each will win. And third, there are no direct benefits from fighting; Fearon calls these pieces war's inefficiency puzzle. Fearon contends that anarchy by itself cannot explain why rational actors cannot bargain. He offers three explanations for why bargaining breakdowns, and war, occur. First, actors in an anarchic system may suffer from a credible commitment problem, in which there are incentives for either party to renege on their end of an agreement. Second, states may have private information and incentives to misrepresent said information during the bargaining stage. Third, bargaining may be rendered impossible because of what Fearon dubs "issue indivisibility," in which a particular issue in question cannot be divided.{{Cite journal|last=Fearon|first=James|title=Rationalist Explanations for War|journal=International Organization|volume=379-414|issue=3|pages=379–414|doi=10.1017/s0020818300033324|year=1995|s2cid=38573183 }}

Fearon was identified by constructivist scholar Marc Lynch as the "leading rationalist" in international relations theory and credited him with resolving (along with constructivist Alexander Wendt) much of the theoretical debate between the two camps.{{cite web|url=http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/2005/07/ir_constructivi.html|title=Abu Aardvark: IR: Constructivism v Rationalism|last=Lynch|first=Marc|date=July 25, 2007|work=Abu Aardvark|access-date=10 November 2013}} His 2003 study with David Laitin is considered the "most influential" in modern research on civil war.{{Cite journal|last1=Cederman|first1=Lars-Erik|last2=Vogt|first2=Manuel|date=2017-07-26|title=Dynamics and Logics of Civil War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=61|issue=9|pages=1992–2016|doi=10.1177/0022002717721385|s2cid=149212588|issn=0022-0027|url=http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10040601/}}

Besides his 1995 seminal work titled Rationalist Explanations for War, Fearon has been known for his extensive work on the specific causes of the outbreak of civil wars. His 2003 work (coauthored with fellow Stanford political science Professor David Laitin) titled Ethnicity, Insurgency and the Outbreak of Civil War, identifies key factors behind why certain countries experienced civil war outbreak post-World War II, whereas others did not. Fearon and Laitin found that "after controlling for per capita income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence in this period."{{Cite journal |last=Fearon |first=James D. |last2=Laitin |first2=David D. |date=February 2003|title=Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War |url=http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055403000534 |journal=American Political Science Review |language=en |volume=97 |issue=01 |pages=75–90 |doi=10.1017/S0003055403000534 |issn=0003-0554}} The authors further highlight which factors they found were most pertinent, including "poverty—which marks financially and bureaucratically weak states and also favors rebel recruitment—political instability, rough terrain, and large populations."

{{Reflist}}

• [http://fsi.stanford.edu/people/james_d_fearon James Fearon's faculty page]
• [http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/09/theory-talk-18.html Interview with James Fearon by Theory Talks]

{{Recipients of the Karl Deutsch Award (International Studies Association)}}

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Category:1963 births

Category:Living people

Category:American political scientists

Category:Scholars of nationalism

Category:University of California, Berkeley alumni

Category:Harvard University alumni

Category:Stanford University Department of Political Science faculty

Category:Members of the United States National Academy of Sciences

Category:Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute faculty