Key-recovery attack
{{Short description|Cyber attack whereby the attacker attempts to recover the key to an encryption scheme}}
A key-recovery attack is an adversary's attempt to recover the cryptographic key of an encryption scheme. Normally this means that the attacker has a pair, or more than one pair, of plaintext message and the corresponding ciphertext.Goldwasser, S. and Bellare, M. [http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/gb.pdf "Lecture Notes on Cryptography"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120421084751/http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/gb.html|date=2012-04-21}}. Summer course on cryptography, MIT, 1996-2001{{rp|52}} Historically, cryptanalysis of block ciphers has focused on key-recovery, but security against these sorts of attacks is a very weak guarantee since it may not be necessary to recover the key to obtain partial information about the message or decrypt message entirely.{{rp|52}} Modern cryptography uses more robust notions of security. Recently, indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2 security) has become the "golden standard" of security.Boneh, Dan. Advances in Cryptology – Crypto 2003: 23rd Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, Usa, August 17–21, 2003, Proceedings. Berlin: Springer, 2003.{{rp|566}} The most obvious key-recovery attack is the exhaustive key-search attack. But modern ciphers often have a key space of size or greater, making such attacks infeasible with current technology.
KR advantage
In cryptography, the key-recovery advantage (KR advantage) of a particular algorithm is a measure of how effective an algorithm can mount a key-recovery attack. Consequently, the maximum key-recovery advantage attainable by any algorithm with a fixed amount of computational resources is a measure of how difficult it is to recover a cipher's key. It is defined as the probability that the adversary algorithm can guess a cipher's randomly selected key, given a fixed amount of computational resources.Goldwasser, S. and Bellare, M. [http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/gb.pdf "Lecture Notes on Cryptography"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120421084751/http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/gb.html|date=2012-04-21}}. Summer course on cryptography, MIT, 1996-2001 An extremely low KR advantage is essential for an encryption scheme's security.
References
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External links
- [http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/gb.pdf cseweb.ucsd.edu paper MIT Lecture Notes on Cryptography] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120421084751/http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~mihir/papers/gb.html |date=2012-04-21 }}
Category:Cryptographic attacks
Category:Theory of cryptography
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