King George V-class battleship (1939)

The King George V class was the result of a design process that began in 1928. Under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, a "holiday" from building capital ships was in force to 1931. The battleships of the British Navy consisted of only those old battleships that had been kept after the end of World War I, plus the two new, albeit slow, {{sclass|Nelson|battleship}}s. In 1928, the Royal Navy started considering the requirements for the warships that it expected to start building in 1931.Brown 2000, p. 25

The First London Naval Treaty of 1930 extended the "shipbuilding holiday" to 1937. Planning began again in 1935, drawing on previous work. The new class would be built up to the Treaty maximum displacement of {{cvt|35000|LT}}. Alternatives with 16 in (406 mm), 15 in (381 mm), and 14 in (356 mm) main guns were considered and the 15 in (381 mm) armament was chosen. Most designs were intended to steam at {{cvt|27|kn}} with full power, and it was decided that the likely decisive range in a battle would be from {{cvt|12000|to|16000|yd}}. Armour and torpedo protection formed a much greater portion of the design than that of the previous Royal Navy battleships.Brown 2000, pp. 28–29

In October 1935, the decision was made to use 14 in (356 mm) guns. The United Kingdom was negotiating for a continuation of the Naval Treaties with the other parties of the London Treaty. The British Government favoured a reduction in the maximum calibre of battleship gun to 14 in (356 mm) and in early October, the government learned that the United States would support this position if the Japanese could also be persuaded to do so. Since the large naval guns needed to be ordered by the end of the year, the British Admiralty decided on these guns for the King George V class. The Second London Naval Treaty, a result of the Second London Naval Conference begun in December 1935, was signed in March 1936 by the United States, France and Britain and this set a main battery of 14 in (356 mm) naval guns as the limit.Raven & Roberts, p. 275

The King George Vs were the first British battleships to alternate engine rooms and boilers in the machinery spaces, which reduced the likelihood of one hit causing the loss of all power.Brown 2000, pp. 164–165 The machinery was arranged in four engine (turbine) rooms and four boiler rooms, with the eight machinery compartments alternating in pairs of engine or boiler rooms. Each pair of boiler rooms formed a unit with a pair of engine rooms. Nominal full power was {{cvt|110000|shp|kW|lk=on}} with {{cvt|400|psi|kg/cm2 kPa|lk=on|adj=on}} steam at {{cvt|700|°F|lk=in|°C}}.Journal of Naval Engineering The machinery was designed to operate at an overload power of {{cvt|125000|shp}} and Prince of Wales{{'}} "...main machinery steamed at overload powers of {{cvt|128000|to|134000|shp}} with no difficulties..." during the hunt for the Bismarck.Garzke & Dulin, p. 206 The Admiralty 3-drum boilers operated very efficiently, and similar boilers of nearly identical power, fitted to the older battleship {{HMS|Warspite|03|2}} during her rebuilding in 1937 achieved a full-power specific fuel consumption of 0.748 lb per shp on trials which compared favourably with contemporary battleships.Raven, p. 34Garzke & Dulin, p. 66. The {{ship|French battleship|Dunkerque||6}} achieved 0.753 lb/hr and 0.816 lb/hr on her preliminary and full-power trials, respectively, in 1936.{{efn|Full-power specific fuel consumption is a measure of power plant efficiency. It is calculated by dividing fuel consumption in pounds per hour, into the shaft horsepower produced by the turbines.}} During her full-power trials on 10 December 1940, King George V at {{cvt|41630|LT}} displacement achieved {{cvt|28|kn}} with {{cvt|111700|shp}} at 230 rpm and a specific fuel consumption of 0.715 lb per shp.Brown 1995, p. 28

King George V had her paravanes streamed during her full power trials, which caused an estimated .7 knot loss of speed.Friedman 2015, p.313 The Duke of York at her trials, on 1 November 1941, displacing {{cvt|42970|LT}} (sea slight, wind moderate), attained a speed of {{cvt|20.6|kn}} at 115 rpm and {{cvt|28720|shp}} and {{cvt|28.6|kn}} at 232 rpm and {{cvt|111200|shp}}.Burt (2012), p.402 After 1942 the Royal Navy was forced to use fuel oils with considerably higher viscosity and greater seawater content than these boilers could efficiently use.Gray and Killner, JNE, Volume 2, Book 4, January 1949, Sea Water Contamination of Boiler Fuel Oil – Part II The poor quality of the oil fuel combined with the seawater contamination reduced the efficiency of the steam power plant and increased the maintenance required.JNE, Recent Improvements in Oil-Burning Equipment, Parts I, II, & III. The high seawater content was caused by a number of factors; the King George V class used fuel oil as part of the Side Protection System in the liquid layers of the SPS. As the fuel was consumed, water was allowed to enter the bottom of the layer to maintain its defensive qualities. The low-viscosity fuel used in the early part of the war resisted mixing with seawater, and what seawater contamination did occur was easily removed. Additionally Britain's oil tanker fleet was relatively intact. After 1942 tanker losses to enemy attacks increased, and the demands for more aviation fuel led to a degradation of bunker fuel used in steam-driven naval vessels. This fuel readily absorbed seawater from older oil tankers that had increased propensity for seawater leakage, and from contact with seawater in the SPS system. It was also very much more difficult to remove the seawater once this poorer-quality fuel was contaminated. By 1944 the specific full-power fuel consumption had increased to 0.8 lb per shp, and boiler maintenance was becoming increasingly difficult.JNE, Recent Improvements in Oil-Burning Equipment The Admiralty had been aware of this problem and were designing new types of oil sprayers and burners that could burn fuel oil much more efficiently, and sometime after 1944, Duke of York and Anson were fitted with new, higher-pressure oil sprayers and burners that restored the boilers to full efficiency.JNE, Recent Improvements in Oil-Burning Equipment. Possibly post-war. The same oil sprayers and burners were used in {{HMS|Vanguard|23|6}} along with other detail improvements so that Vanguard achieved a full-power specific fuel consumption of 0.63 lb per shp while using the same steam pressures and temperatures as used on the King George V class.Raven & Roberts, p. 339Garzke & Dulin, pp. 236–297

File:HMSHoweBTurretSydney1944.jpg

The armour protection of the King George V-class battleships was designed after consideration of the Royal Navy's experience of the First World War and upon testing between the wars.Raven & Roberts, p. 263 The design of this class was dominated by the provision of protection.Brown 2000, p. 29 Magazine protection was given priority with a thick belt and deck armour and by placing the magazines at the lowest levels of the ship.Raven & Roberts, p. 285

The horizontal protection over the magazines consisted of three layers with a total thickness of {{cvt|9.13|in}}; the weather deck consisted of {{cvt|1.25|in}} of Ducol (D) steel, the main armoured deck was of non-cemented steel armour {{cvt|5.88|in}} thick over a {{cvt|0.5|in}} D steel deck and above the shell rooms there was another 1.5-inch splinter deck.[http://www.combinedfleet.com/okun_biz.htm Okun, Nathan. Armor protection of the battleship KM Bismarck.]Raven & Roberts, p. 284{{efn|Ducol steel was an extra-high-strength silicon-manganese high-tensile construction steel developed in the 1920s. It had very good armour properties and was used extensively on the King George V-class battleships as a support for deck and belt armour and for hull, deck and splinter-proof plating. }} The powder magazines were below the shell rooms for added protection, a practice that was begun with the Nelson-class battleships. The weather deck thickness was the same over the machinery spaces but there the main armoured deck was reduced to {{cvt|4.88|in}} over a {{cvt|0.5|in}} D steel deck. The main armoured deck was continued forward of the forward armoured bulkhead and gradually reduced from full thickness to {{cvt|2.5|in}}, while aft of the after magazines an armoured turtle-back deck covered the steering gear with {{cvt|4.5|–|5|in}} of armour whilst also providing protection along the waterline.

The main armour belt was {{convert|23.5|ft|m|1}} high and covered the hull side from the main armoured deck to finish {{convert|15|ft|m|1}}Raven & Roberts, p. 415 below the deep waterline.Raven & Roberts, p. 154. Post-World War I studies had indicated that it was possible for delayed-action AP shells to dive under a shallow belt and penetrate into vital areas of the ship and therefore the main belt was made to extend as far below the waterline as possible.Garzke & Dulin, p. 230: "The armour thicknesses and underwater protection scheme evolved from tests completed prior to design work...tests on {{SMS|Baden}}, {{HMS|Superb|1907|6}}, {{HMS|Monarch|1911|6}}, and Empress of India [sic] led to the conclusion that side armour should extend as far below the standard load waterline as practicable." Along the ship, the belt started just forward of the forward turret and finished just aft of the aft turret. The armour consisted of three equal-depth strakes. The strakes were tongue-and-grooved together, and each individual plate in a strake was keyed into neighbouring plates.Brown 2000, pp. 29–30Raven & Roberts, p. 293 The belt was at its thickest above and at the waterline. Most secondary and some primary sources describe the maximum thickness of the belt armour varying between 14 and 15 inches (possibly due to rounding to the nearest inch).Raven & Roberts, pp. 283, 293Admiralty Naval Staff, UK PRO ADM 239/269 Addendum 2 Some sources give more detail: along the magazines, the belt was 14.7 inches thick (373 mm) cemented armour, laminated onto 1 inch (25.4 mm) of "composition material" (cement) and an additional 0.875 inch (22.2 mm) of Ducol steel hull plating (this steel was also effective as armour),Garzke & Dulin, pp. 247–249 over the machinery spaces, the belt was 13.7 inches (349 mm). The lower section of belt tapered to a thickness of between 4.5 in and 5.5 in.Breyer, pp. 182–184 Armour protection was even better than the thickness of armour would indicate due to the improved qualities of the British cemented{{efn|face hardened}} armour which provided excellent resistance.Garzke & Dulin, p. 247: "Side armour protection of these ships was better than indicated in mere thickness tabulations, as the excellent quality of British Cemented armour provided the resistance of about 25% greater thickness of US Class "A" armour."{{cite web|url=http://www.kbismarck.com/proteccioni.html|title=Bismarck Armour|quote=Post WWII proving ground test indicated that KC was only slightly less resistant than British cemented armour (CA), and markedly superior to US Class A plates.|access-date=19 February 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171017031919/http://www.kbismarck.com/proteccioni.html|archive-date=17 October 2017|url-status=dead}} The armoured belt, together with armoured bulkheads fore and aft and the armoured main deck, formed an "armoured citadel" protecting magazines and machinery. The armoured bulkhead was 12 in (305 mm) thick forward and 10 in (254 mm) thick at the after end of the citadel The main armoured belt extended forward and aft of the main armoured bulkheads with reduced height to protect the waterline and gradually reduced in thickness from 13 to 5.5 inches. Immune zone calculations vary widely from source to source.{{Cite web |url=http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm239/adm239-268.php |title=ADM 239/268: C.B.04039, Armour Protection (1939) |access-date=5 March 2010 |archive-date=6 June 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190606021154/http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/adm239/adm239-268.php |url-status=dead }}Raven & Roberts, p. 293 state:"...it was estimated that the belt armour would withstand 15 inch shells at a range of about 13,500 yards (15 inch armour) and 15,600 yards (14 inch armour) at normal inclination...". The Magazines were stated to withstand 15-inch plunging fire up to 33,500 yards.Garzke & Dulin, p. 251, state: Against the British 15 inch Mark I naval gun, firing a 1,938 lb shell, this protection scheme provided an immunity zone from 17,200 to 32,000 yards over the magazines, 19,500 to 28,000 yards over the machinery.[http://www.combinedfleet.com/okun_biz.htm Okun, Nathan. Armor protection of the battleship KM Bismarck.] Nathan Okun calculated against the German 38 cm SK C/34 naval gun (15 inch) mounted on the contemporary {{sclass|Bismarck|battleship|2}}s, the immunity zone was from 21,500 to 36,600 yards over the magazines, 23,800 to 33,200 yards over the machinery. Okun's calculations omit the 1.5" splinter deck over the magazine, as his article states that there is no armour over the magazines below the 5.88" armour deck. The armour provision was designed to offer protection from guns of a greater calibre than the class mounted themselves, and was on a scale second to none at the time the ships were designed. Indeed, the armour protection of these vessels was to be subsequently exceeded only by the Japanese battleships of the{{sclass|Yamato|battleship|4}}.Burt, p. 395

The main gun turrets were relatively lightly protected in comparison to contemporary battleships.Garzke & Dulin, pp. 252–255 Extensive levels of flash protection were employed. Maximum turret and barbette armour was reduced to 12.75 inches in this class from the 16 inches of the Nelson class. The turret faces had 12.75 in (324 mm) of armour at the front; {{convert|8.84|in|mm}} sides (at the gun chamber); 6.86 inches (284–174 mm) on the sides and rear; the roof plate was 5.88 in (149 mm) thick. The main armament barbettes were of varying thickness: 12.75 in (324 mm) thick on the sides, 11.76 in (298 mm) forward and 10.82 in (275 mm) aft of the turret. To some extent the higher quality of the armour minimized the loss of protection and the turret's flat face improved ballistic resistance at long ranges, while the low profile of the turret minimized target area at closer ranges. The reduction in turret and barbette armour was a compromise in favour of the thickest possible protection for the magazines. The extensive anti-flash protection in the turrets and barbettes was designed to ensure that the magazines would remain safe even if the turrets and/or barbettes were penetrated. The secondary gun mounts, casements and handling rooms received only light plating of 0.98 in (25 mm) to protect against splinters.

Unlike contemporary foreign battleships and the preceding Nelson-class battleships, the King George V class had comparatively light conning tower protection with 4-inch (102 mm) sides, 3 in (75 mm) forward and aft and a 1.47 in (38 mm) roof plate.Burt, p. 389. Side and front data from Burt, rest from Garzke and Dulin.Garzke & Dulin, p. 252 The RN's analysis of World War I revealed that command personnel were unlikely to use an armoured conning tower, preferring the superior visibility of unarmoured bridge positions.[http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/official/adm116/adm116-4351_Hood.htm Testimony of Ted Briggs]. For example, Captain Kerr and Admiral Holland commanded the Hood from her unarmoured bridge. Stability and weight considerations clearly played an important part in the British decision to limit superstructure armour. The conning tower armour was sufficient to protect against smaller ship guns and shell fragments.Garzke & Dulin, p. 247

File:KGV-Armor Scheme.jpg

The hull below the waterline, along the main armour belt, formed the side protection system (SPS). It was subdivided into a series of longitudinal compartments in a void-liquid-void layout; the outer and inner were filled with air, and the middle compartment with liquid (fuel or water). The outer hull plating in the region of the SPS was thin to reduce potential splinter damage from a torpedo. The outer compartment of the SPS was normally an empty or 'void' space (containing only air) and this allowed the initial explosion from a torpedo to expand while minimizing damage to the ship. The centre compartment was filled with oil or seawater and this spread the pressure pulse over a larger area while the liquid contained any metal splinters that were created from the torpedo explosion. The inboard compartment was another void space and served to contain any liquid leaking from the liquid layer and any remaining pressure pulse from the torpedo explosion.Brown 2000, pp. 30–31

Inboard of the final void space was an armoured bulkhead which varied in thickness from 1.5 in (37 mm) over the machinery spaces to 1.75 inch (44 mm) abreast of the magazines. This bulkhead formed the "holding bulkhead" and it was designed to resist the residual blast effects from the torpedo hit. If this final inner bulkhead was penetrated a further set of subdivided compartments would contain any leaks; inboard of the holding bulkhead the ship was highly subdivided into small compartments containing auxiliary machinery spaces. The SPS void-liquid-void layer was generally about 13 feet wide, and the auxiliary machinery spaces added approximately another 8 feet of space from the outer hull plating to the major machinery spaces. The only exception to this was abreast A and B Engine Rooms, where the auxiliary machinery spaces were omitted, but another void space, about three feet wide was substituted in its place.Raven & Roberts, pp. 294–297

Above the SPS, and directly behind the armour belt, was a series of compartments, typically used for washrooms or storage spaces, which were designed to allow for upward venting of over-pressure from a torpedo hit. This scheme was designed to protect against a 1000 lb warhead, and had been tested and found effective in full-scale trials.Brown 2000, pp. 30–31 The SPS was also a key component of the ship's damage control system, as lists resulting from flooding could be corrected by counterflooding empty void spaces, and/or draining normally liquid filled compartments. In the case of the loss of the Prince of Wales these spaces were used for counterflooding to reduce list.Death of a Battleship, p. 17

{{HMS|Prince of Wales|53|6}} was sunk on 10 December 1941, from what was believed to have been hits by six aerial launched torpedoesMiddlebrook & Mahoney, p. 288. The figure of six hits seems to stem from post sinking analysis, probably by the Bucknill Committee and some survivor reports. However Appendix 1, Prince of Wales Compass Platform Narrative (recorded during the action) on pp. 329–30, states four torpedo hits, one on the port side and three on the starboard side. Appendix 4, Post Action Statement by Gunnery Officer of HMS Prince of Wales, pp. 338–39, by Lt Cdr McMullen, also states one torpedo hit on the port side and three on the starboard side. and a 500 kg bomb. However, an extensive 2007 survey by divers of the wreck of Prince of Wales determined definitively that there had been only 4 torpedo hits.{{cite web|url=http://www.explorers.org/expeditions/reports/Flag_Reports_PDF/Flag%20118%20-%20Kevin%20Denlay%20-%20Update.pdf|title=Expedition 'Job 74', page 10|access-date=17 March 2010|archive-date=22 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210422145235/https://www.explorers.org/expeditions/reports/Flag_Reports_PDF/Flag%20118%20-%20Kevin%20Denlay%20-%20Update.pdf|url-status=dead}} Three of these four hits had struck the hull outside the area protected by the SPS. In the case of the fourth, the SPS holding bulkhead appeared intact abreast the area where the hull was hit.{{cite web|url=http://www.rina.org.uk/c2/uploads/death%20of%20a%20battleship.pdf|title=Death of a Battleship|last=Garzke, Dulin & Denlay|page=35}}{{dead link|date=December 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}

The conclusion of the subsequent 2009 paper and analysis was that the primary cause of the sinking was uncontained flooding along "B" propeller shaft.Death of a Battleship, Garzke, Dulin & Denlay{{efn|B was the outermost shaft on the port side}} The propeller shaft external shaft bracket failed, and the movement of the unsupported shaft then tore up the bulkheads all the way from the external propeller shaft gland through to B Engine Room itself. This allowed flooding into the primary machinery spaces. The damage and flooding was exacerbated by poor damage control and the premature abandonment of the after magazines and a telephone communications switchboard.Garzke, Dulin & Denlay, pp. 15–20 "B" propeller shaft had been stopped, and then restarted several minutes after being struck by a torpedo.Garzke, Dulin & Denlay, Subsequent inquiries into her loss at the timeMiddlebrook, p. 310: "...the Second Bucknill Committee started its sittings...on 16 March 1942." identified the need for a number of design improvements, which were implemented to a lesser or greater degree on the other four ships of the class.Raven & Roberts, p. 388 Ventilation and the watertightness of the ventilation system were improved, while internal passageways within the machinery spaces were redesigned and the communications system made more robust.Raven & Roberts, p. 297

Improved propeller shaft glands and shaft locking gear were introduced. Some of the supposed failures of the ship were nevertheless predicated on the assumption that a torpedo had hit and defeated the SPS at or about frame 206Garzke & Dulin, p. 368. Frame 206 is the location of a bulkhead that runs across the ship from port to starboard, about 1/3 of its length from the stern and separates Y Action Machinery Room from the Port Diesel Dynamo room. 'B' Engine Room begins about 20 feet forward of frame 206.Middlebrook, pp. 198–203 Middlebrook also assumed a hit at frame 206 based upon the Bucknill Committee analysis but discounted the likelihood of defeat of the SPS. at the same time as the hit that damaged B propeller shaft. The 2007 survey's {{cite web|url=http://www.explorers.org/expeditions/reports/Flag_Reports_PDF/Flag%20118%20-%20Kevin%20Denlay%20-%20Update.pdf|title=Expedition 'Job 74'|access-date=17 March 2010|archive-date=22 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210422145235/https://www.explorers.org/expeditions/reports/Flag_Reports_PDF/Flag%20118%20-%20Kevin%20Denlay%20-%20Update.pdf|url-status=dead}} video footage evidence showed however that the hull is basically intact in this area.[http://www.rina.org.uk/c2/uploads/death%20of%20a%20battleship.pdf Death of a Battleship, Garzke, Dulin and Denlay. While the hull area around Frame 206 is indented, and with split seams and popped rivets, there is no torpedo hole. See 3D images made from the study of Expedition 'Job 74' video footage.]{{dead link|date=December 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}

The inability to survey the wreck during the war no doubt frustrated effortsMiddlebrook, p. 311: "The committee could not have known two things: first, that the Japanese torpedoes contained only 330 or 450 lb of explosive charge (which knowledge would have only increased their dilemma) and secondly, that the extensive damage and flooding had been caused not by the explosion seen on Prince of Wales{{'}}s port side abreast frame 206 but by the unseen torpedo hit underneath the stern. This was the torpedo that damaged the bracket of the port-outer shaft, distorted the shaft itself, and permitted the vast inrush of water. It is small wonder that the committee was baffled..." to arrive at a definitive cause for the loss of Prince of Wales and, subsequently, that somewhat flawed analysisThe Bucknill Committee Inquiry, 1942 has led to a number of incorrect theories regarding the reasons for the sinking being inadvertently disseminated over the years.Garzke & Dulin, p. 241. This volume, for example, proposed three alternative theories based upon a torpedo hit or hits at frame 206 that defeated the SPS.

On examination of the Prince of Wales after her encounter with the German battleship Bismarck and the heavy cruiser {{ship|German cruiser|Prinz Eugen||2}}, three damaging hits were discovered which had caused about 400 tons of water, from all three hits, to enter the ship.[http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/pofw_damage1.htm ADM267/111 Battle Damage Sustained by H.M.S. Prince of Wales, 24 May 1941]:"About 400 tons water in ship mainly abaft after bulkhead"Garzke & Dulin, p. 190, states that Captain Leach had informed Admiral Wake-Walker "...best speed was 27 knots because of 600 tons of flooding water...", but this is contradicted by the official damage report, ADM 267/111.[http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/official/adm234/adm234-509tovey.htm Sinking of the 'Bismarck', 27 May 1941: Official Despatches], paragraph 24: "The effects of all this on her gunnery had been witnessed by the Rear-Admiral (Wake-Walker) Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron, and he knew, in addition, that her bridge was seriously damaged, that she had taken in 400 tons of water aft..."

One of these hits, fired from Bismarck, had penetrated the torpedo protection outer bulkhead in a region very close to an auxiliary machinery space causing local flooding within the SPS, while the inner, 1.5-inch (2×19 mm) D-steel holding bulkhead remained intact, as the German shell was a dud.Garzke & Dulin, pp. 252, 234: "*Two plate construction"Tarrant, p. 31 The German shell would have actually exploded in the water if its fuse had worked properly,{{cite web|title=Underwater Projectile Hits|last=Nathan Okun|url=http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-041.htm}} due to the depth which the shell had to dive before striking the Prince of Wales under her armoured belt.Burt, p. 415

File:British 14in Naval Gun 1930s Model.png

The King George V and the four other ships of the class as built carried ten BL 14 inch Mk VII naval guns, in two quadruple turrets fore and aft and a single twin turret behind and above the fore turret.Garzke & Dulin, p. 176 There was debate within the Admiralty over the choice of gun calibre.Roskill, Naval Policy between the wars, volume II pp. 327–329. There was a routine debate in the Admiralty over gun size, armour, speed, torpedo protection and AA firepower and the correct ratio between these attributes for the King George V battleships; other European powers preferred 15-inch and the U.S. 16-inch main guns.Garzke & Dulin, p. 227 The Admiralty chose a ship with high speed, enhanced protection, heavy AA and ten 14-inch guns. The Admiralty controller wrote that a change to 15-inch guns would entail an 18-month delay (which would have meant no new RN battleships until 1942). Stephen Roskill noted that the London Naval Treaty stipulated a 14-inch maximum gun size, with an opt out clause, which Britain was very reluctant to exercise, since the Admiralty was hoping to persuade the other naval powers to stick to 14-inch guns, though there was little or no debate within Parliament.[https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1936/jul/20/battleship-armament#S5CV0315P0_19360720_HOC_247 Hansard HC Deb 20 July 1936 vol 315 cc32-3]
[https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1937/jul/20/london-naval-treaty-bill Hansard HC Deb 20 July 1937 vol 326 cc2001-53]
[https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1937/jul/20/london-naval-treaty-bill-1 Hansard HC Deb 20 July 1937 vol 326 cc2054-65 London Navy Treaty Bill.]
The member from Epping, Mr Churchill, criticised the choice of 14-inch main armament, as the US and Japan were believed to have selected 16-inch guns for their new ships, see also: Garzke & Dulin, p. 227 The Admiralty studied vessels armed with a variety of main armaments including nine {{convert|15|in|mm|0|adj=on}} guns in three turrets, two forward and one aft.Garzke & Dulin, pp. 167–170 While this was well within the capability of British shipyards, the design was quickly rejected as they felt compelled to adhere to the Second London Naval Treaty of 1936 and there was a serious shortage of skilled technicians and ordnance designers, along with compelling pressures to reduce weight.

The class was designed to carry twelve 14-inch guns in three quadruple turrets and this configuration had a heavier broadside than the nine 15-inch guns. It proved impossible to include this amount of firepower and the desired level of protection on a 35,000 ton displacement and the weight of the superimposed quadruple turret made the stability of the vessel questionable.Garzke & Dulin, p. 175 The second forward turret was changed to a smaller two-gun turret in exchange for better armour protection, reducing the broadside weight to below that of the nine gun arrangement. The 14-inch Armour Piercing (AP) shell also carried a proportionally large bursting charge of {{convert|39.8|lb|kg|abbr=on}}.[http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/index_weapons.htm Naval Weapons index], The KM 38 cm/52 SK C/34 carried a 41.4lb bursting charge, while the USN 16-inch Mk VI 2700 lb AP shell carried a 40.9lb bursting charge[http://www.eugeneleeslover.com/USNAVY/CHAPTER-XIII-PAGE-1.html USN Bureau of Ordnance], Naval Ordnance 1937 Edition, paragraph 1318: "The impact damage which a projectile itself does is entirely secondary to that which results from its burst. The design of most naval projectiles is based primarily on using the projectile as a vehicle with which to carry a quantity of explosive into a ship and secondarily to provide missiles with which to carry the force of the explosion."{{cite web|url=http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_14-45_mk7.htm|title=British 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII |work=NavWeaps |last= Tony DiGiulian}} The armour-piercing capability of the gun and its ammunition is exhibited by the conning tower on the wreck of the German battleship Bismarck, provided with 14-inch thick armour, which is said to resemble a "Swiss cheese".Brown 2000, pp. 31, 35. Recent underwater inspection of the wreck of the Bismarck showed that the 14 inch guns performed at least adequately in this action. The conning tower on Bismarck had greater armour protection than its main belt, which had a maximum thickness of 12.6 inches. The last naval treaty had an escalator clause that permitted a change to 16-inch guns if another signatory did not conform to it by 1 January 1937. Although they could have invoked this clause, the effect would have been to delay construction and it was considered prudent to build with 14-inch rather than find themselves without the new battleships. The U.S. opted to absorb a delay and built its ships with larger guns.Friedman, pp. 270–271 When comparing the British 14-inch gun to the heavier guns mounted on contemporary foreign battleships, the thicker armour of the British battleships tended to result in an equalisation of the relative penetrating power of respective shells.Raven & Roberts, p. 408

In service, the quad turrets proved to be less reliable than was hoped for. Wartime haste in building, insufficient clearance between the rotating and fixed structure of the turret, insufficient full calibre firing exercises and extensive arrangements to prevent flash from reaching the magazines made it mechanically complex,Garzke & Dulin, p. 228 leading to problems during prolonged actions. In order to bring ammunition into the turret at any degree of train, the design included a transfer ring between the magazine and turret; this did not have sufficient clearance to allow for the ship bending and flexing.Brown 2000, p. 31 Improved clearances, improved mechanical linkages, and better training led to greater reliability in the quadruple turrets but they remained problematic.

During the battle of the Denmark Strait against the German battleship Bismarck, the main battery of the newly commissioned Prince of Wales had mechanical problems: it started to fire three-round salvos instead of five-round salvoes, and there were problems in all except for the twin 'B' turret.Tarrant, p. 59 Tarrant notes, on page 63 that "Information on Prince of Wales Gunnery is from PRO Adm 234/509" The main battery output was reduced to 74 percent (Bismarck and Prinz Eugen achieved 89% and 85% output, respectively) during the engagement, as out of seventy-four rounds ordered fired, only fifty-five were possible.{{cite web|url=http://www.bismarck-class.dk/bismarck_class/bismarck/history/bisdenmarkstraitbattle.html|title=The Battle of the Denmark Strait|first=John|last=Asmussen|quote=Bismarck and Prinz Eugen also suffered a loss of output. Bismarck had a "total 104 possible shots Actually fired = 93". Prinz Eugen "Total 184 possible shots Actually fired = 157"}}Garzke and Dulin, pp. 189–190.Tarrant, p. 59{{cite book |title=ADM 234/509: H.M.S. Prince of Wales' Gunnery Aspects of the "Bismarck" Pursuit|url=http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/official/adm234/adm234-509guns.htm |quote=This document is a modern transcription of a portion of Admiralty record ADM 234/509 |publisher=hmshood.org.uk }} 'A' turret was taking in water leading to discomfort for its crewTarrant, p. 54 and 'Y' turret jammed at salvo 20.{{cite book|title=ADM 234/509: H.M.S. Prince of Wales' Gunnery Aspects of the "Bismarck" Pursuit|url=http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/official/adm234/adm234-509guns.htm}}

Problems in Prince of Wales{{'}} turrets during her first action against Bismarck, according to her Gunnery Aspects Report: 'A' Turret: No. 1 gun failed after the 1st salvo, from a previously known defect. No. 2 and no. 4 guns suffered from intermittent safety interlock problems. "A" turret suffered from water entering the lower portion of the turret/barbette structure, but there is no indication that this caused any problems other than discomfort for the crew. At salvo 18, when Prince of Wales turned away, 3 of 'A' turret's guns were in operation.

'B' Turret: No problems reported. At salvo 18, when Prince of Wales turned away, both (2) of 'B' turrets guns were in operation.

'Y' Turret No. 2 gun had loading problems and missed salvo 14 onwards. No. 3 gun had problems with safety interlocks causing it to miss salvoes 15 to 20. At salvo 18, 2 of "Y" turrets guns were in operation. 'Y' Turret's shell-transfer ring jammed at salvo 20, due to a shell sliding out of its tray due to the motion of the ship as the ship turned. The number of known defects in the main armament that was hampering 14-inch fire, the damage sustained and the worsening tactical situation forced Captain Leach to disengage from combat.Garzke & Dulin, p. 190.The Bismarck Episode by Russel Grenfell, p. 54The loss of the Bismarck, by Graham Rhys-Jones, pp. 119–120German Capital Ships and Raiders in WW2, A naval Staff History, Battle Summary 5, p. 8{{citation |url=http://hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/bonomi_denstrait2.htm |title=The Battle of the Denmark Strait, May 24th 1941 Part 2 – The Battle |last=Antonio Bonomi & translated by Phil Isaacs |publisher=hmshood.org.uk |date=23 September 2006 }} With the range down to 14,500 yards and with five of his 14-inch guns out of action, Leach decided to break off his engagement with a superior enemy.Bennett, Naval Battles of WW2, p. 141 Stephen Roskill in the War at Sea (the official British history of the Second World War at sea), Volume 1, describes the decision to turn away: "In addition to the defective gun in her forward turret, another 4-gun turret was temporarily incapacitated by mechanical breakdowns. In these circumstances Leach decided to break off the action and, at 0613, turned away under cover of smoke."Roskill SW, The War at Sea, Volume 1: The Defensive, 1954 p. 406Axis Battleships of WW2, Garzke & Dulin, p. 190, states: "As Prince of Wales turned away at 06:13, 'Y' turret jammed, temporarily leaving only two out of ten 14-inch guns operational". This is not supported by Bennett, Roskill and ADM 234–509. During the later action with Bismarck, {{HMS|King George V|41|6}} was also having trouble with her main battery, and by 09:27 every gun missed at least one salvo due to failures in the safety interlocks for antiflash protection.Garzke & Dulin, pp. 213–214: "At 09:27 a shell hit the Bismarck...By that time KGV was having trouble with her main battery and every gun missed at least one salvo..." John Roberts wrote of main gunnery problems encountered by King George V:

Initially King George V did well achieving 1.7 salvoes per minute while employing radar control but she began to suffer severe problems from 09:20 onward [Note: KGV had opened fire at 08:48 and fired for about 25 minutes at 1.7 salvoes per minute until 09:13, when the Type 284 radar broke down, but with no recorded loss of 14-inch gun output until 09:20.Roberts, pp. 264–268]. 'A' turret was completely out of action for 30 minutes after firing about 23 rounds per gun, due to a jam between the fixed and revolving structure in the shell room and 'Y' turret was out of action for 7 minutes due to drill errors... Both guns in B turret, guns 2 and 4 in 'A' turret and gun 2 in 'Y' turret were put out of action by jams and remained so until after the action – 5 guns out of 10! There were a multitude of other problems with mechanical failures and drill errors that caused delays and missed salvos. There were also some misfires – one gun (3 of 'A' turret) misfired twice and was out of action for 30 minutes before it was considered safe to open the breech.Roberts, pp. 268–269

During the early part of her action against the German capital ship Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943, {{HMS|Duke of York|17|2}}, firing under radar control in poor weather, scored 31 straddles out of 52 broadsides fired and during the latter part she scored 21 straddles out of 25 broadsides, a very creditable gunnery performance. In total, Duke of York fired 450 shells in 77 broadsides. "However, Duke of York still fired less than 70% of her possible output during this battle because of mechanical and "errors in drill" problems."[http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_14-45_mk7.htm British 14"/45 (35.6 cm) Mark VII] navweaps.com

The King George Vs were the only battleships designed for the Royal Navy to use 14-inch guns and turrets. (HMS Canada, originally designed for Chile, had used 14-inch guns during the First World War.)

File:HMS King George V secondary turret SLV Green.jpg

The QF 5.25 inch Mark I dual purpose gun has been dogged with controversy as well. The RN Gunnery Pocket Book published in 1945 states that: "The maximum rate of fire should be 10–12 rounds per minute.".{{cite book|url=http://www.maritime.org/doc/br224/part1.htm#par159|title=The Gunnery Pocket Book|year=1945|page=51}}{{cite book|title=The Gunnery Pocket Book|year=1945|page=51|quote=These guns are combined High Angle and Low Angle Guns. The Mark II Mounting is found in all {{sclass|Dido|cruiser|2}}s. The Mark I Mounting is found in King George V-class battleships, where they fulfil the combined functions of H.A. Long Range Armament and Secondary Armament against surface craft. The main differences between the two mountings lie in the arrangements of the shellrooms and magazines, and the supply of ammunition to the guns. In this chapter, only the Mark II Mounting, as found in Dido-class cruisers, is discussed. The 5.25 in. calibre with separate ammunition is used for dual High Angle and Low Angle Armament, since it gives the reasonable maximum weight of shell which can be loaded by the average gun's crew for sustained periods at all angles of elevation. The maximum rate of fire should be 10–12 rounds per minute.}} Wartime experience revealed that the maximum weight which the loading numbers could handle comfortably was much lower than 80–90 lb and the weight of the 5.25-inch ammunition caused serious difficulties, allowing them to manage only 7–8 rpm instead of the designed 10–12 rpm.Campbell, John, p. 44{{cite web|url=http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/MCGWW2.html|first=Anthony G|last=Williams|title=Medium Calibre guns of the Royal Navy in World War II|access-date=16 May 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090424042426/http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/MCGWW2.html|archive-date=24 April 2009|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}} The mount had a maximum elevation of +70 degrees and the slow elevating and training speeds of the mounts were inadequate for engaging modern high-speed aircraft.[http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_525-50_mk1.htm Naval Weapons of the World From 1880 to Today – British 5.25"/50 (13.4 cm) QF Mark I] Despite this Prince of Wales was credited with several 5.25-inch kills during Operation Halberd and damaged 10 of 16 high-level bombers in two formations during her last engagement, two of which crash landed.Garzke & Dulin, p. 191Garzke & Dulin, p. 195Garzke & Dulin, pp. 206–207 {{HMS|Anson|79|2}} had her 5.25-inch turrets upgraded to RP10 control which increased training and elevating speeds to 20 degrees per second.Campbell, John, p. 45{{efn|Unmodified the training speed was 10 degrees per second.}} These ships were equipped with the HACS AA fire control system and the Admiralty Fire Control clock for surface fire control of the secondary armament.

The King George V-class design had four 0.5-inch quadruple machine gun mounts but in 1939 these were replaced by two Mark VI pom-poms. In 1940, to combat air attack, four Unrotated Projectile (rocket) mountings were fitted, one on "B" turret, two on "Y" turret and one replacing a pom-pom mount added in 1939 at the stern. The pom-poms in King George V were designed and produced by Vickers Armstrongs, as a result of a post-World War I requirement for a multiple mounting which was effective against close-range bombers or torpedo planes. The first model, tested in 1927, was a very advanced weapon for its time and in 1938 the Mark VI* had a muzzle velocity of 2,400 feet per second, a 1.6-inch bore and a barrel length of 40 calibres.Campbell, John, p. 20 The pom-poms fired 1.8-pound shells at a rate of 96–98 rounds per minute for controlled fire and 115 rounds per minute for automatic fire.Campbell, John, p. 71 The range of the Mark VI* was 6,800 yards, at a muzzle velocity of 2,300 feet per second. The Mark VI octuple mount weighed 16 tons and the Mark VII quadruple mount weighed 10.8 tons if power operated; it could be elevated to 80 degrees and depressed to 10 degrees at a rate of 25 degrees per second, which was also the rate of train. The normal ammunition supply on board for the Mark VI was 1,800 rounds per barrel.Garzke & Dulin, p. 229 King George V introduced the Mk IV Pom-pom director to the Royal Navy in 1940, becoming the first ship in the world to feature gyroscopic target tracking in tachymetric anti-aircraft directors.Campbell, John, p. 33Raven & Roberts, p. 291 The anti-aircraft battery of these ships was incrementally augmented throughout the war. The number and disposition of guns varying from ship to ship, King George V in September 1945 carrying: 8 Mark VI octuple pom-poms, 2 quadruple 40 mm Bofors Mk II (US), 2 single 40 mm Bofors, and 24 single 20 mm Oerlikon cannon.Raven & Roberts, pp. 287–288

The main guns of the King George V-class ships were controlled via two director control towers, one on top of the bridge superstructure and one aft of the mainmast. Each of the control towers was equipped with 15 foot rangefinders and fed targeting information to an Admiralty Fire Control Table, Mk IX. In the event that the control towers were disabled both "A" and "Y" turrets had internal 41 foot rangefinders whilst "B" turret had 30 foot rangefinders. The first two ships of the class to be completed, King George V and Prince of Wales, carried four HACS Mk IVGB directors for the ship's secondary 5.25-inch guns as well as six Mk IV pom-pom directors; all ten of these directors featured Gyro Rate Unit, tachymetric fire control. Duke of York and Howe had HACS Mk V directors, with Anson having the Mk V directors replaced by the updated Mk VI.

{{Main|Battle of the Denmark Strait|Last battle of Bismarck}}

King George V was the first ship of the class to join the Home Fleet on 11 December 1940 and her first action was providing distant cover for Operation Claymore in February 1941, before escorting Atlantic convoys HX 114 and HX 115 during March.Chesneau, p. 7 Owing to the threat of the German battleship Bismarck, the Home Fleet sent King George V and the newly completed Prince of Wales on 22 May to help locate Bismarck, along with the battlecruiser {{HMS|Hood|51|6}} and six destroyers.Garzke & Dulin, pp. 177–179 On 24 May, Prince of Wales and Hood made contact with Bismarck and opened fire at 26,000 yards.Garzke & Dulin, p. 209 Prince of Wales{{'}} sixth salvo straddled Bismarck and it was during this salvo, and one other, that she landed two decisive hits, holing Bismarck{{'}}s bow, flooding a generator room and an auxiliary boiler room, and forcing the critical shutdown of two of her boilers, which led to Bismarck making the fateful decision to attempt to return to port.Garzke & Dulin, p. 177 During this time Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had been solely targeting Hood and at 06:01 Hood blew up and sank, with the loss of all but three of her complement of 1,419 officers and men.Garzke & Dulin, p. 179

Following this, Captain Leach of Prince of Wales gave the order to disengage, laying a heavy smokescreen to facilitate the retreat. Prince of Wales would attempt to reengage Bismarck on two more occasions, but was unable to land any further hits owing to the distance being in excess of 20,000 yards, and was then forced to return to Iceland for refueling and would play no further part in actions against the German battleship.Garzke & Dulin, p. 190 Meanwhile, King George V on 24 May was still 300 to 400 miles away from Bismarck and it was not until 27 May that King George V and {{HMS|Rodney|29|6}} were able to engage Bismarck, due to a Swordfish torpedo bomber disabling Bismarck's steering gear on 26 May.Garzke & Dulin, p. 180 During the engagement King George V and Rodney were able to relatively quickly disable the main armament turrets and fire-control systems of Bismarck, rendering her unable to effectively engage the British ships; later they closed to point-blank range. After 32 minutes of firing King George V had fired 335 14-inch shells at Bismarck, scoring multiple hits that contributed to Bismarck sinking soon after.Raven and Roberts, p. 351Garzke & Dulin, p. 214

{{Main|Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse}}

File:HMS Prince Of Wales in Singapore.jpg

After being repaired at Rosyth, Prince of Wales transported Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Canada for a conference with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, that resulted in the Atlantic Charter being declared, which laid out how the allies intended to deal with the post-war world, on 14 August 1941.Chesneau, p. 12 Following the declaration of the charter, Prince of Wales on 24 September provided escort for Operation Halberd, with Prince of Wales downing several Italian aircraft on 27 September. On 25 October 1941, Prince of Wales departed home waters bound for Singapore, with orders to rendezvous with the battlecruiser Repulse and the aircraft carrier Indomitable; however, Indomitable ran aground in Jamaica and was unable to proceed. On 2 December the group docked in Singapore and Prince of Wales then became the flagship of the ill-fated Force Z under Admiral Sir Tom Phillips.Chesneau, pp. 12–13

The force then diverted to British Malaya as they had received intelligence that Japanese forces were landing there, however, this was a diversion and on 10 December the force was spotted by a Japanese submarine.Chesneau, pp. 12–13 At 11:00 the first Japanese air attack began against the force and at 11:30 Prince of Wales was struck by a torpedo. This led to rapid flooding, as the port outer propeller shaft had been damaged; high-speed rotation of this unsupported propeller shaft destroyed the sealing glands around it, allowing water to pour into the hull. The ship subsequently began to take on a heavy list. Prince of Wales was hit by three more torpedoes, before a 500 kg (1100 lb) bomb hit the catapult deck, penetrating through to the main deck before exploding in the makeshift aid centre causing numerous casualties. Several other bombs from this attack were very "near misses", which indented the hull, popped rivets and caused hull plates to "split" along their seams which intensified the flooding aboard Prince of Wales. At 13:15 the order was given to abandon ship and at 13:20 Prince of Wales capsized and sank with Admiral Phillips and Captain Leach being among the 327 fatalities.Chesneau, p. 13 The wreck lies upside down in {{convert|223|ft|m}} of water at {{Coord|3|33|36|N|104|28|42|E}}.Rasor, p. 98

File:HMS Duke of York FL3890.jpg

In October, King George V was involved in Operation EJ, which involved escorting the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious, whose aircraft attacked German shipping in the Glomfjord.[http://naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-01BB-KGV.htm HMS King George V – King George V-class 14in gun Battleship] Duke of York, the third ship of the class, first saw action on 1 March 1942, when she provided close escort for convoy PQ 12 and was later joined by King George V on 6 March, as Admiral John Tovey believed that the German battleship Tirpitz would attempt to intercept the convoy; however, aircraft from Victorious were able to prevent Tirpitz from leaving her base in Norway.Garzke & Dulin, p. 216 During escort duty on 1 May 1942 King George V collided with the destroyer Punjabi, cutting Punjabi in two and damaging 40 feet of her own bow, resulting in King George V being sent to Gladstone Dock for repairs on 9 May before resuming escort duty on 1 July 1942. When the last two ships in the class, Howe and Anson, were completed in late 1942, they were assigned to provide cover for convoys bound for Russia. On 12 September, Anson was joined by Duke of York in providing distant cover for convoy QP. 14. In October, Duke Of York was sent to Gibraltar to support the Allied landings in North Africa in November.Konstam, p. 43 On 31 December, Howe and King George V provided distant cover for Arctic convoy RA 51.Rohwer, pp. 195, 219, 221, 233

{{Main|Battle of the North Cape}}

File:HMS Duke of York gunners A 021168.jpg

Anson covered her last convoy on 29 January 1943, before being relocated, with Duke of York, to the Mediterranean. In June 1943, the two battleships took part in Operation Gearbox, which was designed to draw attention away from Operation Husky.Rohwer, p. 226Chesneau, p. 15 At the same time, King George V and Howe were also relocated to the Mediterranean. They bombarded Trapani naval base on 12 July and defended Algiers against an air raid, before departing to take part in Operation Avalanche. Between 9 and 11 September they provided support for Operation Slapstick and later escorted the surrendered Italian fleet to Malta.Cheneau (2004), p. 16Konstam, p. 44Garzke & Dulin, p. 224

When the German battleship {{ship|German battleship|Scharnhorst||2}} was relocated to Norway, it was deemed necessary to provide more protection for all convoys bound for Russia. On 25 December, Scharnhorst was reported at sea. Initial contact was made the following day by the cruisers of Force 1 ({{HMS|Belfast|C35|6}}, {{HMS|Norfolk|78|2}} and {{HMS|Sheffield|C24|2}}) but following a brief engagement, Scharnhorst was able to outdistance the cruisers.Garzke & Dulin, p. 218

File:HMS Howe (32) underway at sea c1943.jpg

Force 2, which included Duke of York, was able to close the range and Duke of York opened fire on Scharnhorst, scoring hits at ranges in excess of 12,000 yards. Scharnhorst scored two hits upon Duke of York during the engagement, both of which hit masts and failed to explode. One of Duke of York{{'}}s shells exploded in Scharnhorst{{'}}s number one boiler room, slowing her significantly and allowing British destroyers to close to torpedo range.{{cite book|title=Operation "Ostfront" – The Battle off the North Cape (25–26 December 1943)|url=http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/scharnhorst/history/scharnostfront.html}}Garzke and Dulin, p. 219 Their torpedo hits allowed Duke of York to close to a range of 10,400 yards before opening fire once again. All Scharnhorst{{'}}s turrets were silenced and shortly afterwards Scharnhorst sank with the loss of over 1,700 men.Garzke & Dulin, p. 220Chesneau, pp. 14–15

Following this, on 29 March 1944, Duke of York provided cover for convoy JW 58 and in August Duke of York and Anson provided cover for the aircraft carrier Furious, while she carried out air strikes against German targets in Norway as part of Operation Bayleaf. On 3 April, Duke of York provided cover for Operation Tungsten, which succeeded in damaging the German battleship Tirpitz.Rohwer, p. 314Garzke & Dulin, p. 221Garzke & Dulin, p. 222

File:HMS Anson (79) at Devonport, March 1945.jpg

In late March 1945, King George V and Howe began operations in the Pacific as part of Task Force 57. The first major operation that the task force undertook was Operation Iceberg, offshore support for the US landings at Okinawa, which started on 1 April.Chesneau, p. 10Garzke & Dulin, p. 215 During the operation King George V and Howe were subjected to sporadic Japanese kamikaze attacks, however, no damage was inflicted upon them by these attacks, while Howe succeeded in downing an attacking kamikaze plane. On 4 May, the two battleships led a forty-five-minute bombardment of Japanese air facilities in Ryukyu Islands.Garzke & Dulin, p. 225

In mid-July, they joined US battleships in a bombardment of industrial installations at Hitachi. During the Okinawa campaign, the pair supported British carriers. Their last offensive action was a night bombardment of Hamamatsu on 29 to 30 July 1945. Duke of York and Anson arrived too late to take part in hostilities, but on 15 August they accepted the surrender of Japanese forces occupying Hong Kong. King George V and Duke of York were present at the official Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. After the end of World War II, King George V became the flagship of the Home Fleet until December 1946, when she became a training vessel, before being scrapped in 1957.Chesneau, p. 215 Duke of York became the flagship of the Home Fleet after King George V, until April 1949, before being scrapped in 1957. Howe returned to Portsmouth in January 1946 and spent the remainder of her career there before being scrapped in 1957. Anson briefly served as the flagship of the 1st Battle Squadron of the British Pacific Fleet and helped to re-occupy Hong Kong. In 1949 she was placed into reserve before being scrapped in 1957.Garzke & Dulin, p. 223

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• {{cite book|title=British Battleships 1939–45 (1) Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign Classes|series=New Vanguard|volume=154|author1-last=Konstam|author1-first=Angus|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=2009|author-link=Angus Konstam|isbn=978-1-84603-388-9}}
• {{cite book|last=Rasor|first=Eugene L.|title=The China-Burma-India Campaign, 1931–1945: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography|year=1998|publisher=Greenwood Press|location=Westport, Connecticut|isbn=0-313-28872-0}}
• {{cite book |last1=Raven |first1=Alan |title=King George the Fifth Class Battleships |date=1972 |publisher=Bivouac Books |location=[London] |isbn=0-85680-002-3}}
• {{cite book|last1=Raven|first1=Alan|last2=Roberts|first2=John|title=British Battleships of World War Two: The Development and Technical History of the Royal Navy's Battleship and Battlecruisers from 1911 to 1946|publisher=Naval Institute Press|location=Annapolis, Maryland|year=1976|isbn=0-87021-817-4|name-list-style=amp}}
• {{cite book |last1=Roberts |first1=John |editor1-last=Roberts |editor1-first=John |title=Warship |date=1983 |publisher=Conway Maritime Press |location=London |isbn=0-87021-982-0 |pages=262–271 |chapter=The Final Action: The Sinking of the Bismarck|volume=VII}}
• {{cite book|last=Rohwer|first=Jürgen|title=Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two|publisher=Naval Institute Press|location=Annapolis, Maryland|year=2005|edition=Third revised|isbn=1-59114-119-2 |author-link=Jürgen Rohwer}}
• {{cite book|last=Roskill|first=Stephen|year=1976|title=Naval Policy Between Wars. Volume II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930–1939|publisher=Collins |location=London|isbn=0-00-211561-1|author-link=Stephen Roskill}}
• {{cite book|last=Stephen|first=Martin|title=Sea Battles in Close-Up: World War 2|year=1988 |publisher=Naval Institute Press|location=Annapolis, Maryland|isbn=0-87021-556-6 |url=https://archive.org/details/seabattlesinclos00mart}}
• {{cite book |last1=Tarrant |first1=V. E. |title=King George V Class Battleships |date=1991 |publisher=Arms and Armour |location=London |isbn=1-85409-026-7}}

• Hein, David. [http://www.smh-hq.org/jmh/jmhvols/773.html “Vulnerable: HMS Prince of Wales in 1941.” (Abstract)] Journal of Military History 77, no. 3 (July 2013): 955-989.

{{Commons category|King George V class battleship (1939)}}

• [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=it3pOYM0JkA Newsreel footage of Operation Halberd, as filmed from Prince of Wales]
• [http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=23130 Newsreel video of HMS Anson and Howe in 1942] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110708101015/http://www.britishpathe.com/record.php?id=23130 |date=8 July 2011 }}
• [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xsp0Mr5Lcl8 RN 14" gun loading and firing procedure]

{{King George V class battleship (1939)}}

{{WWII British ships}}

{{Late battleships}}

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Category:Battleship classes

Category:Ship classes of the Royal Navy