Mobile phone tracking#Privacy

The location of a mobile phone can be determined in a number of ways.

{{more citations needed section|date=April 2017}}

The location of a mobile phone can be determined using the service provider's network infrastructure. The advantage of network-based techniques, from a service provider's point of view, is that they can be implemented non-intrusively without affecting handsets. Network-based techniques were developed many years prior to the widespread availability of GPS on handsets. (See {{cite patent |country=US |number=5519760 |gdate=21 May 1996}} for one of the first works relating to this.[http://emits.sso.esa.int/emits-doc/1-5200-RD24-Mobile-positioning-using-wireless-networks.pdf Mobile Positioning Using Wireless Networks])

The technology of locating is based on measuring power levels and antenna patterns and uses the concept that a powered mobile phone always communicates wirelessly with one of the closest base stations, so knowledge of the location of the base station implies the cell phone is nearby.

Advanced systems determine the sector in which the mobile phone is located and roughly estimate also the distance to the base station. Further approximation can be done by interpolating signals between adjacent antenna towers. Qualified services may achieve a precision of down to 50 meters in urban areas where mobile traffic and density of antenna towers (base stations) is sufficiently high.{{Cite book|last1=Laitinen|first1=H.|last2=Lahteenmaki|first2=J.|last3=Nordstrom|first3=T.|title=IEEE VTS 53rd Vehicular Technology Conference, Spring 2001. Proceedings (Cat. No.01CH37202) |chapter=Database correlation method for GSM location |date=2001|location=Rhodes, Greece|publisher=IEEE|volume=4|pages=2504–2508|doi=10.1109/VETECS.2001.944052|isbn=9780780367289|s2cid=195858053 }} Rural and desolate areas may see miles between base stations and therefore determine locations less precisely.

GSM localization uses multilateration to determine the location of GSM mobile phones, or dedicated trackers, usually with the intent to locate the user.

The accuracy of network-based techniques varies, with cell identification being the least accurate (due to differential signals transposing between towers, otherwise known as "bouncing signals") and triangulation as moderately accurate, and newer "advanced forward link trilateration"{{Cite book|last1=Wang|first1=S.S.|last2=Wylie-Green|first2=M.P.|title=IEEE 60th Vehicular Technology Conference, 2004. VTC2004-Fall. 2004 |chapter=Geolocation propagation modeling for cellular-based mobile positioning |date=September 2004|chapter-url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1405083|volume=7|pages=5155–5159 Vol. 7|doi=10.1109/VETECF.2004.1405083|isbn=0-7803-8521-7 |s2cid=38110004 }} timing methods as the most accurate. The accuracy of network-based techniques is both dependent on the concentration of cell base stations, with urban environments achieving the highest possible accuracy because of the higher number of cell towers, and the implementation of the most current timing methods.

One of the key challenges of network-based techniques is the requirement to work closely with the service provider, as it entails the installation of hardware and software within the operator's infrastructure. Frequently the compulsion associated with a legislative framework, such as Enhanced 9-1-1, is required before a service provider will deploy a solution.

In December 2020, it emerged that the Israeli surveillance company Rayzone Group may have gained access, in 2018, to the SS7 signaling system via cellular network provider Sure Guernsey, thereby being able to track the location of any cellphone globally.{{Cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/16/israeli-spy-firm-suspected-accessing-global-telecoms-channel-islands|title=Israeli spy firm suspected of accessing global telecoms via Channel Islands|first1=Crofton|last1=Black|first2=Stephanie|last2=Kirchgaessner|first3=Dan|last3=Sabbagh|newspaper=The Guardian |date=December 16, 2020|via=www.theguardian.com}}

The location of a mobile phone can be determined using client software installed on the handset.Handset-based mobile phone tracking app example 1: [http://www.crystalball.tv/mobile-phone-tracking/ MobileTrack] This technique determines the location of the handset by putting its location by cell identification, signal strengths of the home and neighboring cells, which is continuously sent to the carrier.{{cite web |last1=Reynolds |first1=Bethany |title=Handset-based Mobile phone carrier tracking app |url=https://mobile-tracker-free.org/ |access-date=6 February 2015}} In addition, if the handset is also equipped with GPS then significantly more precise location information can be then sent from the handset to the carrier.

Another approach is to use a fingerprinting-based technique,{{Cite journal|last1=Ibrahim|first1=M.|last2=Youssef|first2=M.|date=2012-01-01|title=CellSense: An Accurate Energy-Efficient GSM Positioning System|journal=IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology|volume=61|issue=1|pages=286–296|doi=10.1109/TVT.2011.2173771|issn=0018-9545|arxiv=1110.3425|s2cid=14790516 }}{{Cite book|last1=Ibrahim|first1=M.|last2=Youssef|first2=M.|title=2010 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference GLOBECOM 2010 |chapter=CellSense: A Probabilistic RSSI-Based GSM Positioning System |date=2010-12-01|pages=1–5|doi=10.1109/GLOCOM.2010.5683779|arxiv=1004.3178|bibcode=2010arXiv1004.3178I|isbn=978-1-4244-5636-9|s2cid=3220133 }}{{Cite book|last1=Ibrahim|first1=M.|last2=Youssef|first2=M.|title=2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) |chapter=A Hidden Markov Model for Localization Using Low-End GSM Cell Phones |date=2011-06-01|pages=1–5|doi=10.1109/icc.2011.5962993|arxiv=1010.3411|isbn=978-1-61284-232-5|citeseerx=10.1.1.750.7082|s2cid=7459928 }} where the "signature" of the home and neighboring cells signal strengths at different points in the area of interest is recorded by war-driving and matched in real-time to determine the handset location. This is usually performed independent from the carrier.

The key disadvantage of handset-based techniques, from service provider's point of view, is the necessity of installing software on the handset. It requires the active cooperation of the mobile subscriber as well as software that must be able to handle the different operating systems of the handsets. Typically, smartphones, such as one based on Symbian, Windows Mobile, Windows Phone, BlackBerry OS, iOS, or Android, would be able to run such software, e.g. Google Maps.

One proposed work-around is the installation of embedded hardware or software on the handset by the manufacturers, e.g., Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-OTD). This avenue has not made significant headway, due to the difficulty of convincing different manufacturers to cooperate on a common mechanism and to address the cost issue. Another difficulty would be to address the issue of foreign handsets that are roaming in the network.

1. Using the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) in GSM and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) handsets, it is possible to obtain raw radio measurements from the handset.ETSI TS 102 223 V9.1.0 SIM standard{{cite news|url=http://www.pcworld.co.nz/article/484018/vodafone_local_zone_-_landline_your_mobile|title= Vodafone Local Zone|work= PC World|author=Ted Gibbons|date=25 August 2008}} Available measurements include the serving Cell ID, round-trip time, and signal strength. The type of information obtained via the SIM can differ from that which is available from the handset. For example, it may not be possible to obtain any raw measurements from the handset directly, yet still obtain measurements via the SIM.

Crowdsourced Wi-Fi data can also be used to identify a handset's location.{{cite web|title=Q&A on Location Data|url=https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/04/27Apple-Q-A-on-Location-Data.html|work=apple.com|publisher=Apple|access-date=2013-03-08}} The poor performance of the GPS-based methods in indoor environment and the increasing popularity of Wi-Fi have encouraged companies to design new and feasible methods to carry out Wi-Fi-based indoor positioning.{{cite journal

| last1=Pourhomayoun

| last2=Fowler

| year=2012

| title=Improving WLAN-Based Indoor Mobile Positioning Using Sparsity

| journal=Asilomar Conference on Signal Processing 2012|url=http://ws2.binghamton.edu/fowler/Improving%20WLAN-Based%20Indoor%20Mobile%20Positioning%20Using%20Sparsity.pdf}} Most smartphones combine Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as GPS and GLONASS, with Wi-Fi positioning systems.

Hybrid positioning systems use a combination of network-based and handset-based technologies for location determination. One example would be some modes of Assisted GPS, which can both use GPS and network information to compute the location. Both types of data are thus used by the telephone to make the location more accurate (i.e., A-GPS). Alternatively tracking with both systems can also occur by having the phone attain its GPS-location directly from the satellites, and then having the information sent via the network to the person that is trying to locate the telephone. Such systems include Google Maps, as well as, LTE's OTDOA and E-CellID.

There are also hybrid positioning systems which combine several different location approaches to position mobile devices by Wi-Fi, WiMAX, GSM, LTE, IP addresses, and network environment data.

In order to route calls to a phone, cell towers listen for a signal sent from the phone and negotiate which tower is best able to communicate with the phone. As the phone changes location, the antenna towers monitor the signal, and the phone is "roamed" to an adjacent tower as appropriate. By comparing the relative signal strength from multiple antenna towers, a general location of a phone can be roughly determined. Other means make use of the antenna pattern, which supports angular determination and phase discrimination.

Newer phones may also allow the tracking of the phone even when turned on but not active in a telephone call. This results from the roaming procedures that perform hand-over of the phone from one base station to another.{{cite web

|url=http://www.thechicagosyndicate.com/2006/12/roving-bug-in-cell-phones-used-by-fbi.html

|work=The Chicago Syndicate -BLOG

|title=Roving Bug in Cell Phones Used By FBI to Eavesdrop on Syndicate

|author=Declan McCullagh and Anne Broache

|date=6 December 2008

}}

A phone's location can be shared with friends and family, posted to a public website, recorded locally, or shared with other users of a smartphone app. The inclusion of GPS receivers on smartphones has made geographical apps nearly ubiquitous on these devices. Specific applications include:

• Geo-fence specific locations of interest such as No Fly Zones
• GPS navigation and maps
• Locator apps like Find My Friends
• Dating apps like Grindr
• Recording a journey, for example to show a hiking accomplishment
• For quantified self purposes such as fitness tracking
• GPS drawing

In January 2019, the location of her iPhone as determined by her sister helped Boston police find kidnapping victim Olivia Ambrose.{{Cite web|url=https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2019/01/23/how-common-smartphone-app-helped-find-missing-woman/RBkDlEaBIBkOIplzJPrtDK/story.html|title=A common smartphone feature helped find missing woman - The Boston Globe|website=BostonGlobe.com}}

Locating or positioning touches upon delicate privacy issues, since it enables someone to check where a person is without the person's consent.{{cite web |last1=Waxman |first1=Seth |title=Brief for technology companies as amici curiae in support of neither party |url=http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-402-ac-technology-companies.pdf |website=scotusblog |publisher=Supreme Court of the United States |access-date=23 June 2018}} Strict ethics and security measures are strongly recommended for services that employ positioning.

In 2012 Malte Spitz held a TED talk{{cite web | url=https://www.ted.com/talks/malte_spitz_your_phone_company_is_watching | title=Your phone company is watching - TEDGlobal 2012 | work=ted.com | date=June 2012 | access-date=26 January 2016}} on the issue of mobile phone privacy in which he showcased his own stored data that he received from Deutsche Telekom after suing the company. He described the data, which consists of 35,830 lines of data collected during the span of Germany's data retention at the time, saying, "This is six months of my life [...] You can see where I am, when I sleep at night, what I'm doing." He partnered up with ZEIT Online and made his information publicly available in an [http://www.zeit.de/datenschutz/malte-spitz-vorratsdaten interactive map] which allows users to watch his entire movements during that time in fast-forward. Spitz concluded that technology consumers are the key to challenging privacy norms in today's society who "have to fight for self determination in the digital age."{{cite news | url=http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/25/malte-spitzs-ted-talk-_n_1701775.html | title=Malte Spitz's TED Talk Takes On Mobile Phone Privacy Debate (VIDEO) | newspaper=Huffington Post | date=25 July 2012 | access-date=26 January 2016 | author=Fitzgerald, Britney}}{{cite news | url=http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2011-03/data-protection-malte-spitz | title=Betrayed by our own data | publisher=ZEIT | date=10 March 2011 | access-date=26 January 2016 | author=Biermann, Kai| newspaper=Die Zeit }}

The Chinese government has proposed using this technology to track commuting patterns of Beijing city residents.{{cite news| url=http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/03/china_said_it_may_begin.html| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110624100746/http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2011/03/china_said_it_may_begin.html| url-status=dead| archive-date=June 24, 2011| author=Cecilia Kang| title=China plans to track cellphone users, sparking human rights concerns| newspaper=The Washington Post| date=March 3, 2011}} Aggregate presence of mobile phone users could be tracked in a privacy-preserving fashion.D. Quercia, Ilias Leontiadis, Liam McNamara, Cecilia Mascolo, Jon Crowcroft (2011). [http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~dq209/publications/spotme.pdf SpotME If You Can: Randomized Responses for Location Obfuscation on Mobile Phones. ] IEEE ICDCS This location data was used to locate protesters during protests in Beijing in 2022.{{Cite web |last=Xiong |first=Nectar Gan, Yong |date=2022-12-02 |title=Chinese police are using cellphone data to track down protesters |url=https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/02/china/china-beijing-protests-police-mobile-signal-intl-hnk/index.html |access-date=2022-12-03 |website=CNN |language=en}}

In Europe most countries have a constitutional guarantee on the secrecy of correspondence, and location data obtained from mobile phone networks is usually given the same protection as the communication itself.{{Cite book|last=Spyropoulos, Philippos K.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/383848443|title=Constitutional law in Greece|date=2009|publisher=Kluwer Law International|others=Fortsakis, Théodore.|isbn=978-90-411-2878-2|location=Netherlands|oclc=383848443}}{{Citation|last=Campbell|first=John|title=The origins and development of the right to privacy|date=2020|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781788970594.00008|work=Comparative Privacy and Defamation|pages=9–23|publisher=Edward Elgar Publishing|doi=10.4337/9781788970594.00008 |isbn=978-1-78897-059-4|s2cid=225586361 |access-date=2020-10-24}}"Chapter X, Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, Article 128". [http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04.html#chap10 1936 Constitution of the USSR.] The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.Roxana Maria Roba. [https://old.upm.ro/facultati_departamente/ea/RePEc/curentul_juridic/rcj09/recjurid091_10F.pdf The Legal Protection of the Secrecy of Correspondence], Curentul "Juridic" ([https://web.archive.org/web/20150518070822/http://revcurentjur.ro/arhiva/attachments_200901/recjurid091_10F.pdf archived]), 2009, number 1, Tîrgu-Mureş, Romania.

In the United States, there is a limited constitutional guarantee on the privacy of telecommunications through the Fourth Amendment.{{cite court |litigants=Carpenter v. United States |vol=583 |reporter=U.S. |court=Supreme Court of the United States |date=22 June 2018 |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/16-402 |access-date=June 22, 2018 |quote=The Government's acquisition of Carpenter's cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search.}}{{cite court |litigants=Riley v. California |vol=573 |reporter=U.S. |court=Supreme Court of the United States |date=25 June 2014 |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/13-132 |access-date=June 23, 2018 |quote=Required a warrant to search mobile telecommunications devices.}}{{cite court |litigants=United States v. Jones |vol=565 |reporter=U.S. |opinion=400 |court=Supreme Court of the United States |date=23 January 2012 |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259 |access-date=June 23, 2018 |quote=Limited use of GPS devices [such as in a cell phone] to track movements.}}{{cite court |litigants=Katz v. United States |vol=389 |reporter=U.S. |opinion=347 |court=Supreme Court of the United States |date=18 December 18, 1967 |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347 |access-date=June 23, 2018 |quote=(a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (c) that an invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.}}{{cite court |litigants=Ex parte Jackson |vol=96 |reporter=U.S. |opinion=727 |court=Supreme Court of the United States |date=1878 |url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/96/727/case.html |access-date=June 23, 2018 |quote=Letters and sealed packages subject to letter postage in the mail can be opened and examined only under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household. The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.}} The use of location data is further limited by statutory,{{cite web |title=Stored Communications Act (18 U.S. Code § 2703(d) - Required disclosure of customer communications or records)|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2703 |quote=Requirements for Court Order.— A court order for disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case of a State governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if prohibited by the law of such State. A court issuing an order pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an undue burden on such provider.}} administrative,{{Cite web|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/47/part-0/subpart-E|title=47 CFR Subpart E - Privacy Act Regulations|website=LII / Legal Information Institute}} and case law.{{cite court |litigants=United States v. Karo |vol=468 |reporter=U.S. |opinion=705 |court=Supreme Court of the United States |date=3 July 1984 |url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/468/705 |access-date=June 22, 2018 |quote=the use of a beeper to conduct surveillance on Karo and his accomplices constituted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.}} Police access of seven days of a citizen's location data is unquestionably enough to be a fourth amendment search requiring both probable cause and a warrant.{{cite news |last1=Liptak |first1=Adam |author-link1=Adam Liptak |date=23 June 2018 |title=Warrant Required for Cellphone Tracking Data |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/us/politics/supreme-court-warrants-cell-phone-privacy.html |format=print |language=en |volume=CLXII |issue=58,002 |edition=National |work=The New York Times |pages=A1, A16 |access-date=23 June 2018 |quote=“We decline to grant the state unrestricted access to a wireless carrier's database of physical location information,” Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote for the majority. ... “Mapping a cellphone's location over the course of 127 days provides an all-encompassing record of the holder's whereabouts,” he wrote, going on to quote from an earlier opinion. “As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious and sexual associations.'” ... “cellphones and the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life' that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”}}

In November 2017, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Carpenter v. United States that the government violates the Fourth Amendment by accessing historical records containing the physical locations of cellphones without a search warrant.{{Cite journal|last=Keyaerts|first=K.|date=2018|title=United States ∙ Carpenter v US: Supreme Court Rules Police Need a Warrant to Obtain Cell-Site Location Information|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2018/4/17|journal=European Data Protection Law Review|volume=4|issue=4|pages=525–530|doi=10.21552/edpl/2018/4/17|issn=2364-2831}}

{{div col|colwidth=30em}}

• Carpenter v. United States
• Cellphone surveillance
• Geofence warrant
• Geolocation
• GLONASS Russian "Global Navigation Satellite System"
• Google Latitude
• GPS phone
• Indoor positioning
• Information privacy
• IMEI number
• Local positioning system
• Mass surveillance
• Mobile dating
• Mobile device forensics
• Mobile identification number
• Mobile security
• Positioning technology
• Phone surveillance
• Radio resource location services protocol
• Real-time locating system
• Riley v. California
• Satellite navigation
• Secure telephone
• Triggerfish (surveillance)
• United States v. Jones (2012)
• United States v. Karo
• Vehicle tracking system

{{div col end}}

{{Reflist}}

• {{cite journal|url=https://www.cs.umd.edu/~jonf/publications/Varshavsky_AreGSMPhonesTheSolutionForLocalization_WMCSA2006.pdf|title=Are GSM phones THE solution for localization?|journal=In 7th IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (HotMobile)|publisher=IEEE Computer Society|pages=20–28|first1=Alex|last1=Varshavsky|first2=Mikey|last2=Chen|first3=Jon|last3=Froehlich|first4=Dirk|last4=Haehnel|first5=Jeffrey|last5=Hightower|first6=Anthony|last6=Lamarca|first7=Fred|last7=Potter|first8=Timothy|last8=Sohn|first9=Karen|last9=Tang|first10=Ian|last10=Smith}}
• {{cite journal|url=https://arstechnica.com/business/2012/02/location-tracking-of-gsm-cellphones-now-easier-and-cheaper-than-ever/|title= Location tracking of GSM cellphones: now easier (and cheaper) than ever|author=Dan Goodin|date=17 February 2012|journal=Arstechnica|publisher=Conde Nast}}

{{Mobile phones}}

{{Positional tracking}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Mobile Phone Tracking}}

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