Moral authority
{{Short description|Authority premised on principles, or fundamental truths}}
Moral authority is authority premised on principles, or fundamental truths, which are independent of written, or positive laws. As such, moral authority necessitates the existence of and adherence to truth. Because truth does not change the principles of moral authority are immutable or unchangeable, although as applied to individual circumstances the dictates of moral authority for action may vary due to the exigencies of human life. These principles, which can be of metaphysical or religious nature, are considered normative for behavior, whether they are or are not also embodied in written laws,[http://definitions.uslegal.com/m/moral-authority/ Legal Definitions: Moral Authority] and even if the community is ignoring or violating them.[https://books.google.com/books?id=oqYtU5iObYYC&pg=PA86 Richard Norris, Timothy F. Sedgwick, The Business of All Believers: Reflections on Leadership] (Church Publishing, Inc. 2009 {{ISBN|978-1-59627119-7}}), p. 86 Therefore, the authoritativeness or force of moral authority is applied to the conscience of each individual, who is free to act according to or against its dictates. Moral authority has thus also been defined as the "fundamental assumptions that guide our perceptions of the world".James Davison Hunter, [https://books.google.com/books?id=KTiTxl-rY9AC&pg=PA119 Culture Wars] (Basic Books 1992 {{ISBN|978-0-46501534-4}}), p. 119
An individual or a body of people who are seen as communicators of such principles but which does not have the physical power to enforce them on the unwilling are also spoken of as having or being a moral authority. An example is the Catholic Church.[https://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html Full text of Veritas Splendor], English Translation. John Paul II. August 6, 1993
In the latter sense, moral authority has also been defined as "the capacity to convince others how the world should be", as opposed to epistemic authority, "the capacity to convince others of how the world is".{{cite magazine |last=Labinger |first=Jay A. |date=2009 |title=Individual or Institutional Authority in Science? |url=http://polanyisociety.org/TAD%20WEB%20ARCHIVE/TAD36-3/TAD36-3-fnl-pg17-30-pdf.pdf |publisher=The Polanyi Society |volume=46 |issue=3 |magazine=Tradition & Discovery}}
The phrase has also been used in Australia to describe the situation when the head of a Royal commission expands the subjects being investigated, beyond the narrow focus of the commissions terms of reference.
Changing focuses
Since the Age of Enlightenment, traditional sources of moral authority such as church or state have been viewed with increasing suspicion in Western culture:{{Cite book|title=The Routledge companion to Postmodernism|date=2011|publisher=Routledge|editor-last=Sim|editor-first=Stuart|isbn=978-0-203-81320-1|edition=3rd|location=London|page=219}} perhaps indeed all claims to moral authority.{{Cite book|title=Theoretical Psychology: critical contributions|date=2003|publisher=Captus University Publications|editor-last1=Stephenson|editor-first1=Niamh|editor-first2=H. Lorraine |editor-last2=Radtke|editor-first3=R.|editor-last3=Jorna|editor-first4=H. J.|editor-last4=Stam|isbn=1-55322-055-2|location=Concord, Canada|page=5}} Instead of guides, entertainers; in place of ideals, stimulation.{{Cite book|editor-first=Ivo|editor-last=Mosley|title=Dumbing down: culture, politics, and the mass media|date=2000|publisher=Imprint Academic|isbn=0-907845-65-7|location=Thorverton, UK|page=107}}
Expertise, or alternatively what Emmanuel Levinas called the tyranny of opinion,Stephenson, p. 9 or else an appeal to science,{{Cite book|last=Brown|first=Theodore L.|title=Imperfect Oracle: The Epistemic and Moral Authority of Science.|date=2009|publisher=Pennsylvania State University Press|isbn=978-0271035352|page=7}} may be looked to for alternative sources of moral authority; or there may be a postmodern revulsion from all grand narratives which might ground such narratives Sim, p. 253 in favour of moral relativism.
Talking of the poet, O'Donoghue argued in 2009 that Seamus Heaney still wielded some degree of moral authority, attributed in large part to his modernist reticence, lack of dogma, and capacity for self-doubt{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9781139002325/type/book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Seamus Heaney|series=Cambridge Companions to Literature |date=2009|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-83882-5|editor-last=O'Donoghue|editor-first=Bernard|edition=1|doi=10.1017/ccol9780521838825|pages=11, 69}} – as opposed for example to the unchallenged moral authority for centuries attributed to Virgil as a norma vivendi, i.e. a norm of living.{{Cite book|last=Tudeau-Clayton|first=Margaret|title=Jonson, Shakespeare, and early modern Virgil|date=1998|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=0-521-58079-X|pages=72–7}}
In reaction to the erosion of sources of moral authority, Late Modernity has also seen the appearance of various forms of fundamentalism, from a range of religious types to market fundamentalism.Sim, p. 272
See also
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