NewDES

{{Short description|Block cipher}}

{{Infobox block cipher

| name = NewDES

| designers = Robert Scott

| publish date = 1985

| derived from =

| derived to =

| related to =

| key size = 120 bits

| block size = 64 bits

| structure =

| rounds = 17

| cryptanalysis = A related-key attack succeeds with 232 known plaintexts

}}

In cryptography, NewDES is a symmetric key block cipher. It was created in 1984–1985 by Robert Scott as a potential DES replacement.

Despite its name, it is not derived from DES and has quite a different structure. Its intended niche as a DES replacement has now mostly been filled by AES. The algorithm was revised with a modified key schedule in 1996 to counter a related-key attack; this version is sometimes referred to as NewDES-96.

In 2004, Scott posted some comments on sci.crypt reflecting on the motivation behind NewDES's design and what he might have done differently so as to make the cipher more secure.{{cite newsgroup

| title = newdes

| author = Robert Scott

| date = 2004-10-28

| newsgroup = sci.crypt

| message-id = 418062d6.30341101@news.provide.net

| url = https://groups.google.com/d/msg/sci.crypt/f72Hos33cfA/oZ16sMgmCKkJ

| access-date = 2018-10-10

}}

Algorithm

NewDES, unlike DES, has no bit-level permutations, making it easy to implement in software. All operations are performed on whole bytes. It is a product cipher, consisting of 17 rounds performed on a 64-bit data block and makes use of a 120-bit key.

In each round, subkey material is XORed with the 1-byte sub-blocks of data, then fed through an S-box, the output of which is then XORed with another sub-block of data. In total, 8 XORs are performed in each round. The S-box is derived from the United States Declaration of Independence (used as a nothing-up-my-sleeve number).

Each set of two rounds uses seven 1-byte subkeys, which are derived by splitting 56 bits of the key into bytes. The key is then rotated 56 bits for use in the next two rounds.

Cryptanalysis

Only a small amount of cryptanalysis has been published on NewDES. The designer showed that NewDES exhibits the full avalanche effect after seven rounds: every ciphertext bit depends on every plaintext bit and key bit.

NewDES has the same complementation property that DES has: namely, that if

:E_K(P)=C,

then

:E_{\overline{K}}(\overline{P})=\overline{C},

where

:\overline{x}

is the bitwise complement of x. This means that the work factor for a brute force attack is reduced by a factor of 2. Eli Biham also noticed that changing a full byte in all the key and data bytes leads to another complementation property. This reduces the work factor by 28.

Biham's related-key attack can break NewDES with 233 chosen-key chosen plaintexts, meaning that NewDES is not as secure as DES.

John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, and David Wagner used related-key cryptanalysis to develop another attack on NewDES; it requires 232 known plaintexts and one related key.{{cite book |last1=Kelsey |first1=John |author-link1=John Kelsey (cryptanalyst) |last2=Schneier |first2=Bruce |author-link2=Bruce Schneier |last3=Wagner |first3=David |title=Information and Communications Security |chapter=Related-key cryptanalysis of 3-WAY, Biham-DES, CAST, DES-X, NewDES, RC2, and TEA |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |author-link3=David A. Wagner |editor1-last=Han |editor1-first=Y. |editor2-last=Okamoto |editor2-first=T. |editor3-last=Qing |editor3-first=S. |date=1997 |volume=1334 |pages=233–246 |doi=10.1007/BFb0028479 |url=https://www.schneier.com/academic/archives/1997/11/related-key_cryptana.html |access-date=2018-10-10 |isbn=978-3-540-63696-0 |citeseerx=10.1.1.35.8112 }}

References

{{reflist}}

  • {{cite journal |last1=Scott |first1=Robert |title=Wide Open Encryption Design Offers Flexible Implementations |journal=Cryptologia |date=January 1985 |volume=9 |issue=1 |pages=75–91 |doi=10.1080/0161-118591859799 }}
  • {{cite book

| last = Schneier

| first = Bruce

| author-link = Bruce Schneier

| title = Applied Cryptography, Second Edition

| publisher = John Wiley & Sons

| year = 1996

| pages = 306–308

| isbn = 978-0-471-11709-4 }}