Normalization of deviance

{{Use mdy dates|date=March 2023}}

{{short description|Sociological phenomenon}}

Normalization of deviance, according to American sociologist Diane Vaughan, is the process in which deviance from correct or proper behavior or rule becomes culturally normalized.{{Cite web|url=https://sma.nasa.gov/docs/default-source/safety-messages/safetymessage-normalizationofdeviance-2014-11-03b.pdf|title=The Cost of Silence: Normalization of Deviance and Groupthink|last1=Wilcutt|first1=Terry|last2=Bell|first2=Hal|date=November 3, 2014|website= |archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=February 7, 2020}}

Vaughan defines the process where a clearly unsafe practice becomes considered normal if it does not immediately cause a catastrophe: "a long incubation period [before a final disaster] with early warning signs that were either misinterpreted, ignored or missed completely".{{cite journal|last1=Banja|first1=John|title=The normalization of deviance in healthcare delivery|journal=Business Horizons|date=March 2010|volume=53|issue=2|pages=139–148|doi=10.1016/j.bushor.2009.10.006|pmc=2821100|pmid=20161685}}{{cite book|first=Diane |last=Vaughan |title=The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, Enlarged Edition|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=erYjCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT30|date=January 4, 2016|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-34696-0|pages=30–1}}

The original example cited by Vaughan is the events leading to the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, but the concept has also been applied to aviation safety,{{Cite web|url=https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/normalization-of-deviance/|title=Normalization of Deviance|last=Rosenkrans|first=Wayne|date=June 8, 2015|website=Flight Safety Foundation|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=February 7, 2020}}{{Cite web|url=https://my.bridgew.edu/departments/Aviation/SiteAssets/SitePages/SAFETY%20LINK/Normalization%20of%20Deviance.pdf|title=Normalization of Deviance - SOPs are not a suggestion|last=Albright|first=James|date=January 2017|website=BSU Aviation|orig-year= |archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=}} clinical practice in medicine,{{Cite journal|last1=Price|first1=Mary R.|last2=Williams|first2=Teresa C.|date=March 2018|title=When Doing Wrong Feels So Right: Normalization of Deviance|journal=Journal of Patient Safety|volume=14|issue=1|pages=1–2|doi=10.1097/PTS.0000000000000157|issn=1549-8425|pmid=25742063|s2cid=3443064 }} and the public's deviance from health measures aimed to stop the COVID-19 pandemic.{{Cite journal|last=Petruzzelli|first=Emily|date=2020|title=Normalization of Deviance in the Time of COVID-19|url=https://www.aiche.org/resources/publications/cep/2020/august/editorial-normalization-deviance-time-covid-19|journal=Chemical Engineering Progress|language=en|pages=3}}

Normalization of deviance can exist in conjunction with corporate omerta where deviation from rules is held up by a code of silence surrounding the deviations or an unspoken agreement on rhetoric within a group of executives. One of the reasons Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed was normalization of deviance based on a criticism of corporate omerta with a "culture of silence".Robison, P., Flying Blind, Doubleday, New York, 2021.