Richard Foley (philosopher)

Foley is known for defending foundationalism as a theory of justified belief, but his version is more subjective than traditional versions.Feldman, Richard (1 September 1989). "Foley's Subjective Foundationalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 149–58. https://doi1.org/10.2037/2108116{{Dead link|date=June 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} He develops his theory as an instance of a general conception of rationality that is instrumentalist.Kelly, Thomas (29 May 2003). "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 612–40. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00281.x      Our actions, decisions, intentions, plans, strategies, etc. are rational insofar as we would regard them as effective means to valuable goals were we to be ideally reflective. Analogously, beliefs are justified to the degree that on ideal reflection we would regard them as adequately promoting a distinctly intellectual goal, that of now having accurate beliefs.Alston, William (1 September 1989). "Foley's Theory of Epistemic Rationality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 135–47.  https://doi.org/10.2307/2108115 In his latest book, Foley argues that practical, ethical, and political values are also relevant for determining when we are justified in adopting new beliefs or revising existing ones. On this view, issues in epistemology are not isolated from practical, ethical, and political issues.Foley, Richard (10 May 2024).  Epistemology with a Broad and Long View, Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197772812.001.0001

Foley is also known for his arguments against coherentism and reliabilism as theories of justified belief.Swain, Marshall (1 September 1989).  "On Richard Foley's Theory of Epistemic Rationality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 159–68.  https://doi.org/10.2307/2108117 Against coherentism, he draws upon the lottery paradox and the preface paradox to argue that it's possible for obviously inconsistent beliefs to be justified. Against reliabilism, he maintains that one's current evidence about the reliability of the processes leading to one's beliefs is relevant to whether they are justified, but this evidence, like most other evidence, is fallible. The actual reliability of the processes is thus not a strictly necessary condition of justified belief.

In his work on the relationship between belief and probabilistic degrees of confidence (or credences), Foley introduced a thesis that he named the "Lockean Thesis." It asserts that belief is a matter of having a sufficiently high degree of confidence, and rational belief is rationally having a degree of confidence above the threshold required for belief. The Lockean Thesis has important and widely discussed implications for the logic of belief.{{Cite journal |last=Demey |first=Lorenz |date=2013-11-01 |title=Contemporary Epistemic Logic and the Lockean Thesis |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-012-9292-9 |journal=Foundations of Science |language=en |volume=18 |issue=4 |pages=599–610 |doi=10.1007/s10699-012-9292-9 |issn=1572-8471}} {{Citation |last=Hawthorne |first=James |title=The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief |date=2009 |work=Degrees of Belief |series=Synthese Library |volume=342 |pages=49–74 |editor-last=Huber |editor-first=Franz |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_3 |access-date=2025-06-08 |place=Dordrecht |publisher=Springer Netherlands |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_3 |isbn=978-1-4020-9198-8 |editor2-last=Schmidt-Petri |editor2-first=Christoph}}{{Cite journal |last1=Hawthorne |first1=J |last2=Bovens |first2=L |date=1999-04-01 |title=The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/108.430.241 |journal=Mind |volume=108 |issue=430 |pages=241–264 |doi=10.1093/mind/108.430.241 |issn=0026-4423}}{{Cite journal |last=Shaffer |first=Michael J. |date=2018 |title=Foley's Threshold View of Belief and The Safety Condition on Knowledge |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/meta.12312 |journal=Metaphilosophy |language=en |volume=49 |issue=4 |pages=589–594 |doi=10.1111/meta.12312 |issn=1467-9973}}

Foley's contributions to the theory of knowledge challenge standard solutions to the Gettier Problem. Edmund Gettier's counterexamples against justified true belief accounts of knowledge{{Cite journal |last=Gettier |first=Edmund L. |date=June 1963 |title=Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3326922 |journal=Analysis |volume=23 |issue=6 |pages=121–123 |doi=10.2307/3326922|jstor=3326922 }} prompted numerous proposals about a fourth condition that when added to justification, truth, and belief avoids Gettier problems.{{Cite book |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/gettier-problem/34835111D609F198CDB7DCCCD89EEACF |title=The Gettier Problem |date=2018 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-17884-7 |editor-last=Hetherington |editor-first=Stephen |series=Classic Philosophical Arguments |location=Cambridge|doi=10.1017/9781316827413 }} Foley, by contrast, maintains that the problems can be avoided by detaching the theory of knowledge from the theory of justified belief. We know something if we believe it, it is true, and we don't lack important information about it.{{Cite journal |last=Booth |first=Anthony Robert |date=2011-07-01 |title=The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9264-9 |journal=Erkenntnis |language=en |volume=75 |issue=1 |pages=37–43 |doi=10.1007/s10670-010-9264-9 |issn=1572-8420}}{{Cite journal |last=Hannon |first=Michael |date=2014-10-01 |title=Is Knowledge True Belief Plus Adequate Information? |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9593-6 |journal=Erkenntnis |language=en |volume=79 |issue=5 |pages=1069–1076 |doi=10.1007/s10670-013-9593-6 |issn=1572-8420}} {{Cite journal |last=Warenski |first=L. |date=2014-07-01 |title=When Is True Belief Knowledge? by Richard Foley. |url=https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/mind/fzu103 |journal=Mind |language=en |volume=123 |issue=491 |pages=894–898 |doi=10.1093/mind/fzu103 |issn=0026-4423}}

Foley has held a number of university administrative posts. From 2000 to 2009, he was the Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science at New York University and from 2010 to 2016 the Vice-Chancellor for Strategic Planning. Prior to NYU, he was Executive Dean of Arts and Science, Dean of the Graduate School, and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University, and prior to Rutgers, he was Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.{{Cite web |last=Communications |first=NYU Web |title=Academic Leadership Team Named |url=https://www.nyu.edu/about/news-publications/news/2002/april/academic_leadership_team_named.html |access-date=2025-03-05 |website=www.nyu.edu |language=en}} After stepping away from administration, Foley drew upon on his work in epistemology and his experiences in overseeing science, social science, and  humanities departments to author a book on the differences between the intellectual aims of the sciences and those of humanities.{{Cite journal |last=Waage |first=Philip |date=2019-05-02 |title=Richard Foley: The Geography of Insight: The Sciences, the Humanities, How They Differ, Why They Matter |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-019-09455-9 |journal=Journal for General Philosophy of Science |volume=50 |issue=4 |pages=599–602 |doi=10.1007/s10838-019-09455-9 |issn=0925-4560}}

• Epistemology with a Broad and Long View, Oxford University Press, 2024. [https://doi.org/10.1093/9780197772812.001.0001 Epistemology with a Broad and Long View]

• The Geography of Insight: The Humanities, The Sciences, How They Differ, Why They Matter, Oxford University Press, 2018. [https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190865122.001.0001 The Geography of Insight]

• When Is True Belief Knowledge?, Princeton University Press, 2012. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7scvt When Is True Belief Knowledge?]

• Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, Cambridge University Press, 2001. [https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498923 Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others]

• Working without a Net, Oxford University Press, 1993. [https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195076998.001.0001 Working Without a Net]

• The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Harvard University Press, 1987. [https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674334236 The Theory of Epistemic Rationality]

{{Reflist}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Foley, Richard}}

Category:1947 births

Category:Living people

Category:21st-century American philosophers

Category:20th-century American philosophers

Category:Analytic philosophers

Category:Brown University alumni

Category:Epistemologists

Category:Miami University alumni

Category:New York University faculty