Romanian Front

The Front had its roots in the second and third governments of Vaida-Voevod (1932 and 1933), which were characterized by growing levels of antisemitism and discussions regarding the possibility of barring Jews from a number of public posts (Jewish quotas).{{in lang|ro}} Adrian Niculescu, [http://www.observatorcultural.ro/O-lectie-a-istoriei-%28II%29*articleID_2044-articles_details.html "O lecție a istoriei (II)"], in Observator Cultural, Nr. 72, July 2001Final Report, p. 30; Ornea, pp. 273, 397, 416 As an ideologue shaped by the Transylvanian school of nationalism, Vaida-Voevod found inspiration in the work of economic antisemites and authoritarians such as Karl Lueger and Aurel Popovici.Berți, pp. 147–148; Heinen, pp. 85, 185 In the late 1920s, his views were shaped by eugenics and biopolitics, leading him to demand the state-managed preservation of a pure peasant stock, against "biological competition".Butaru, pp. 223, 224, 230–231 The antisemitic measures were taken to the background of agitation by another homegrown fascist movement, the Iron Guard, which Vaida-Voevod had initially protected and supported in his terms as Interior Minister (from 1928).Beza, pp. 44–45; Butaru, p. 169; Eaton, p. 43; Heinen, pp. 185–186, 238; Ornea, pp. 291, 293, 294–296; Veiga, pp. 117, 126, 138, 201–202 Specifically against the Guard and other violent organizations, Vaida-Voevod passed laws limiting political freedoms and establishing curfewsClark, pp. 113, 115; Heinen, pp. 146, 206–208, 218–219; Ornea, pp. 294–295, 297; Veiga, pp. 190–192; Webb, p. 145 (although he allowed the Transylvanian Saxons to form Sturmabteilung units which targeted Jews).

Vaida was in turn attacked by the Guardist press as a "Freemason", even though, Vaida claimed, his attachment to the Lodge was purely formal and instrumental.Ornea, pp. 243, 245 This issue had been highlighted during the 1920s by A. C. Cuza's National-Christian Defense League (LANC). According to its manifestos, "the Freemason Vaida" had acquiesced to the Minority Treaties, which "delivered us, arms tied, legs tied, to the Kikes".Alexandru Nicolaescu, "Alegerile parlamentare din 1926 reflectate în presa vremii", in Anuarul Institutului de Cercetări Socio-Umane Sibiu, Vol. XXV, 2018, p. 156 Another accusation brought up against Vaida was his partnership in Jewish-owned businesses, in particular the Marmorosch Blank Bank.Moldovan, pp. 232, 282, 321–322, 326–327 In defending himself and reclaiming a similar discourse, Vaida argued that his brief experience with the Lodge had cemented in him the belief that Masons were "Jewified"."Ardealul s'a încadrat pe linia națională. Intrunirea de la Dej", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 60/1936, pp. 1–2

Rival politicians regarded Vaida as a man who secretly cultivated the Guard, and who thus refrained from intensifying its persecution. This accusation was voiced by Gheorghe Beza,Beza, p. 44 Armand Călinescu,Călinescu & Savu, pp. 163, 189 Victor Iamandi"Un interesant expozeu al d-lui V. Iamandi. Ministrul ieșean a combătut haosul din concepția d-lui Vaida-Voevod", in Adevărul, May 20, 1936, p. 5 and Victor Moldovan.Moldovan, p. 257 At the time, Vaida had emerged as the leader of a distinct, radical-right, faction of the PNȚ. He backed the increasingly authoritarian King Carol II, while the moderates, under Iuliu Maniu, supported liberal democracy, calling the right-wing "extra-constitutional".Heinen, p. 146. See also Mezarescu, p. 37; Țepelea & Șimăndan, pp. 53–54 For his part, Vaida wanted the group purged of remnants from the old Peasants' Party. Party unity was maintained courtesy of Maniu's Transylvanian supporters, including a centrist group led by Zaharia Boilă and Corneliu Coposu.Țepelea & Șimăndan, pp. 53–54

Writing at the time, the left-wing radical journalist Petre Constantinescu-Iași claimed that the conflict also reflected differences in global orientation: Maniu's Francophile support base against Vaida's Anglo–Germanophilia. The latter, he proposed, was aiming for "the complete, vigorous and definitive, fascization" of Romania.Constantinescu-Iași, pp. 265–266 Vaida still viewed himself as a moderate Francophile, chiding other figures for being in complete "subservience to France"; he also rejected the League of Nations as a "spawn of the Jews". Overall, he declared his sympathy for André Tardieu and his French conservatism.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 298–299 His praise for a "Christian France" puzzled commentators, who noted that this political culture no longer existed in the form imagined by Vaida,Liviu P. Nasta, "Imperativele politicii noastre externe. Cu Franța sau cu Germania hitleristă?", in Adevărul, May 20, 1936, p. 1 or that it was reduced to the "invalid" Croix-de-Feu. Following the German election of March 1933, the Premier played down the Nazi Party's victory and its significance for antisemitic agitation in Romania. Addressing the Romanian public on May 10, he declared that Adolf Hitler's social program was less advanced than what the PNȚ had to offer. He also referred to the LANC as an older, "wiser", and more "adaptable" version of Hitler's movement.Isac Ludo, "Insemnări. Un curent 'adaptabil'", in Adam, Vol. V, Issue 60, June 1933, pp. 14–15

By November 1933, the two wings of the PNȚ were fighting each other out in the open, notably so at a riot in Sibiu.Moldovan, p. 322; Veiga, p. 197 The king encouraged such dissent, hoping to weaken his rivals, but also finding that Vaida-Voevod's politics were largely compatible with his own.Berți, pp. 144–147, 149; Butaru, pp. 304, 307; Heinen, pp. 220–221, 234–235, 242, 245; Veiga, pp. 129–131, 191–192 Nevertheless, the government found it hard to tackle the effects of the Great Depression, and was brutal in its handling of the Grivița workers' strike.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 92–94, 136–148; Heinen, pp. 146, 206, 221; Moldovan, pp. 257, 283–305; Veiga, pp. 140–141, 152, 156. See also Mezarescu, pp. 14, 30–31 The growing rift inside the government party, but also evidence of the Prime Minister's complicity with the Guard, caused additional dissatisfaction among sections of the electorate.Heinen, pp. 146–147, 218–221, 232, 234–235, 444; Mezarescu, p. 37 The cabinet ultimately fell when the PNȚ's left-wing published a pamphlet against the king, which the latter used as a pretext for demanding Vaida-Voevod's resignation.Veiga, p. 192

The National Liberal Party (PNL), imposing itself on the king with the threat of "civic resistance",Heinen, p. 220 was returned to power, and Ion G. Duca became prime minister. In late 1933, Duca, who organized a clampdown against the Guard and was assassinated by one of its death squads, and the cabinet came to be led by Gheorghe Tătărescu. In the wake of the killing, Vaida spoke favorably of Iron Guard men who were on trial for sedition.Clark, p. 119; Eaton, p. 28; Heinen, pp. 186, 238; Veiga, pp. 201–202 He also alleged that the murder was somehow tied to Duca's inner-party rivalry with Iamandi, an allegation that Iamadi dismissed as "incoherent and illogical". Vaida was presumed to be insincere when crediting such rumors: according to Beza's account, Codreanu distanced himself from the team of assassins only after Vaida advised him to do so.Beza, pp. 44–45

Vaida's dissidence was immediately useful for the king: it absorbed Maniu's attention and toned down PNȚ attempts to restore the constitutional order.Țurlea (2011), pp. 179–182 According to historian Petre Țurlea, Vaida was "supported by the king, though not as much as he would have liked".Țurlea (2011), p. 182 Increasingly marginalized by his party colleagues, in January 1934 Vaida announced that he would not resign, but "waited to be thrown out". He also threatened that his ouster would come with "fireworks".Călinescu & Savu, p. 243 His lead was followed by Viorel Tilea and Eduard Mirto, both of whom attacked Maniu in private conversations or in public speeches.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 241–243 During February, the various PNȚ factions made a final attempt at reconciliation, with their leaders meeting at Bistrița.Moldovan, pp. 306–307

Tătărescu returned at the helm of a new cabinet, despite Vaida's hopes that the king would prefer an alliance of the far-right parties, including his own faction.Berți, pp. 149–150; Bruja (2010), p. 83; Heinen, p. 274. See also Călinescu & Savu, p. 294 Over the following months, Vaida tested Maniu's resolve by instigating another conflict in Timiș-Torontal County. Supported by the PNȚ newspaper Țara, he fought for the local party presidency against Maniu's favorite, Sever Bocu.Munteanu, pp. 54, 79–80, 102–103, 105–106, 189–190 Vaida was able to win the seat in June, but, at a September summit in Sovata, the PNȚ decided to depose him.Munteanu, p. 105 Attempting to regain control of the electoral base, Vaida took up radicalism in the social sphere as well, promising peasants that he would bring about a new land reform.Călinescu & Savu, p. 244 These policies got him expelled from the PNȚ in early 1935, leaving that party to be controlled by left-wing agrarianists.Berți, p. 148–151; Boia, pp. 58, 85–86; Heinen, pp. 156–157, 242, 246, 273; Ornea, p. 273; Veiga, p. 215

The "xenophobic and antidemocratic",Berți, p. 144 "antisemitic radical right-wing",Iván T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II, p. 335. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. {{ISBN|0-520-22901-0}} Romanian Front was born from this split. It began to function in April 1935 (officially: on March 12), declaring itself ready to serve the king's wishes, and counting on support from traditional PNȚ voters to become the catch-all far-right group.Heinen, pp. 247–250, 273 By mid March, when his speech at Oradea drew in an "immense attendance", Vaida-Voevod had organized "separate Vaidist sections" in 60 counties."Conferințele d-lui Alex. Vaida-Voevod", in Renașterea. Organ Național-Bisericesc Săptămânal, Issue 12/1935, p. 4 The split exasperated other PNȚ wings, and resulted in more clashes: the National Peasantist paramilitary guard, or Voinici, staged an attack on Vaida's newspaper, Gazeta Transilvaniei.Veiga, p. 215 By 1937, the Front had set up another Transylvanian newspaper, called Ofensiva Română and published from Cluj."Fuzionează mihalachiștii cu vaidiștii? Șefii spun că nu – ziarele că da...", in Granița. Ziar Politic Național-Liberal, Issue 10/1937, p. 2 Vaidists took over the PNȚ newspaper of Constanța, Aurora Dobrogei, and founded their own regional organs: Basarabia Creștină (Chișinău), Biruința (Botoșani), and Chemarea Noastră (Ismail).Ileana-Stanca Desa, Elena Ioana Mălușanu, Cornelia Luminița Radu, Iuliana Sulică, Publicațiile periodice românești (ziare, gazete, reviste). Vol. V: Catalog alfabetic 1930–1935, pp. 77, 92, 106, 267. Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 2009. {{ISBN|978-973-27-1828-5}} At Piatra Neamț, N. Borș put out the affiliate paper Frontul Românesc Neamț."Frontul Românesc Neamț; Comerțul cu băuturi spirtoase (Glasul cifrelor)", in Avântul, Issue 133, April 26, 1935, p. 3

The new party included Vaida's two sons, Aurel and Mircea, alongside Tilea, Sever Dan, Virgil Potârcă, and Voicu Nițescu.Moldovan, pp. 231, 321. See also Călinescu & Savu, p. 250; Mezarescu, p. 37 Gheorghe Mironescu (himself a former PNȚ prime minister) became a founding member on March 15, 1935, when he published an open letter supporting Vaida. The PNȚ then shunned him as an enemy of "peasant democracy".Călinescu & Savu, p. 250 A while after, the FR registered in its ranks a prominent PNL defector, Constantin Angelescu.Politics and Political Parties..., p. 185; Berți, p. 152; Moldovan, p. 321. See also Beza, p. 45 A wave of disgruntled PNȚ cadres also signed up for the FR, including Mirto,Politics and Political Parties..., p. 489Ionuț Butoi, "'Tânăra generație' în haine de funcționar. Cazul Mircea Vulcănescu", in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie George Barițiu din Cluj-Napoca. Series Humanistica, Vol. XII, 2014, p. 10 Aurel Vlad, D. R. Ioanițescu, and Gheorghe Ionescu-Sisești.Berți, pp. 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152 The Orăștie chapter, organized by Vlad, included the nationalist priest Ioan Moța."Marea manifestație a Frontului românesc la Orăștie", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 41/1935, p. 1 Other PNȚ colleagues from Vaida's native Transylvania also joined the FR; major figures include Emil Hațieganu, Dionisie Roman, Gavril Iuga, and Teodor Bohățiel.{{in lang|ro}} Marin Pop, [https://web.archive.org/web/20150721100552/http://www.caietesilvane.ro/indexcs.php?cmd=articol&idart=2699 "Emil Hațieganu, deputat al circumscripției electorale Hida"], in Caiete Silvane, June 2015 The Front's branch in Brașov County, supervised by Nițescu, also had among its members Victor Braniște"Ratificarea acordului electoral cu guvernul. Intrunirea Delegației permanente a organizației 'Frontului Românesc'—Brașov", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 91/1937, p. 1 and Iosif Blaga."†Protopop Iosif Blaga", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 43/1937, p. 1

On April 20, 1935 the FR established its own group in the lower chamber. On that day, five deputies of the Peasants' Party–Lupu, including Ioan Modreanu of Someș, Mihai Isăcescu of Constanța, and Alex. D. Rotta of Cetatea Albă, affiliated with "Vaidism"."Din Parlament. Actualii deputați, foști 'lupiști', urmează politica d-lui Vaida", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 31/1931, p. 1 Other members of note were Savian Bădulescu (former Mayor of Bucharest), Coriolan Baltă, Ion Buzdugan, Romulus Cândea, and Ioan Gr. Periețeanu.Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 404, 405, 419, 420, 505 The Front's section in Dolj was established by a former PNȚ deputy, Nicolae C. Iovipale;Pătrașcu, p. 154 the one in neighboring Gorj, which is attested from October 1935, was run by Adrian Brudariu, who split his activity between Gorj and Timiș-Torontal.Vasile Cărăbiș, Publicații periodice din Gorj. Documentar, pp. 129–130. Târgu-Jiu: Gorj County Committee for Socialist Culture and Education, 1978 For the previous two years, Brudariu had led a minor, and nominally left-wing, Independent Peasantist Party.Florescu, pp. 213–214 The FR was soon joined by professors such as George Moroianu and Mihai Șerban,Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 491, 530 and had an active cell at the University of Iași, under Petre Dragomirescu.Nastasă, pp. 557, 563–564Dan, "Vaidiștii din Iași sprijină lista liberală. Dl. prof. P. Dragomirescu candidează la colegiul universitar", in Opinia, December 2, 1937, p. 3Al., "Atitudinea politică a 'Frontului Românesc'. Reorganizarea cadrelor. — Punctul de vedere al d-nui Vaida. Participarea la alegeri. Câteva lămuriri ale d-lui prof. P. Dragomirescu", in Opinia, February 1, 1938, p. 1 Author N. Porsenna was also a member by mid 1936."'Frontul Românesc' și part. naț.-creștin depun listă comună în alegerile județene din Ilfov", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 70/1936, p. 2

Estimates suggest that only some 10%Mezarescu, p. 37 or 15%Țepelea & Șimăndan, pp. 53 of PNȚ cadres followed Vaida. The group recruited among newcomers to politics: in late 1937, Tilea, as leader of the FR's Sibiu County branch, welcomed Generals Spiridon Mihăilescu and Ștefan Orescovici into its ranks."Tactica de luptă a 'Frontului românesc'. Motivele cari au dus la încheierea cartelului electoral cu guvernul. Declarațiile d-lui V. V. Tilea", in Curentul, December 8, 1937, p. 7 Overall, in the academic world, some 10 professionals rallied with the FR. This was ahead of the Guard, but well below other parties on the right.Boia, p. 99 The schism actually contributed to disciplining the National Peasantist elites: emerging as the new party president, but feeling threatened by Maniu's potential return, Ion Mihalache hinted that he would expel the entire Transylvanian wing at any sign of revolt.Mezarescu, pp. 37–38 The FR claimed that the "Masonic" establishment was also sabotaging its influence within both Romanian churches, Eastern Orthodox and Eastern Catholic. According to Vaida, Orthodox Patriarch Miron Cristea and Cluj Bishop Iuliu Hossu were both sympathizers of the Front.

{{Gallery|align=center

| title = Notable figures of the Front

| width = 120

| height = 160

|File:Vaida-Voevod.jpg|Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (1930s)

|File:Constantin Angelescu.jpg|Constantin Angelescu (ca. 1933)

|File:Buzdugan.png|Ion Buzdugan (1920s)

|File:Dimitrie R. Ioanițescu.02.jpg|D. R. Ioanițescu (1933)

|File:Mironescu.PNG|Gheorghe Mironescu (ca. 1932)

|File:Eduard Mirto, Gazeta Ilustrată, Oct 1932.jpg|Eduard Mirto (1932)

|File:Ioan Mota.jpg|Ioan Moța (ca. 1930)

|File:Voicu Nițescu, CTC mai 1933.png|Voicu Nițescu (1933)

}}

{{Fascism in Romania}}

The FR is often assumed to have been insincere or vague about its political radicalism—or, according to Iamandi, simply "chaotic". Analysts have dubbed it a "semi-fascist"Webb, p. 145 or "profascist"Volovici, p. 52 party, one undecided about whether to support a fully-fledged dictatorship or a milder "national democracy".Heinen, pp. 249, 276, 452. See also Berți, p. 150 One theory is that the FR was born from collusion between Vaida, Carol, and Police chief Gavrilă Marinescu, as an attempt to divide and subdue the extremist vote. The party program dictated that elections were the cause of Romania's political problems, and therefore operated on the "authoritative criterion", including the nomination of the party elite "by the supreme leader"; the cadres were only entrusted with "deepening the penetration of the ideology [...] among the masses".Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 179–180 Vaida, who declared publicly that he had in him "a spark from Hitler's soul", imitated Italian fascism, Nazism, and the Guard itself at a primarily visual and declarative level. The authoritarian party leader, saluted by his followers with chants of Ura Vaida ("Hurrah for Vaida"),"Frontul Românesc activează intens la Făgăraș", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 70/1936, p. 4 commanded over a network of watches, centuriae, and legions, with a political uniform consisting of black shirts.Heinen, p. 249 From June 1935, the Front's chapter in Constanța County also had a youth paramilitary wing, called Panduri (in honor of the 1821 Wallachian rebels)."Pandurii la Constanța", in Aurora Dobrogei, Issue 4/1935, p. 2

One of the main points of FR policy was Vaida-Voevod's idea of minority quotas, which he termed the numerus Valachicus: the share in economy and culture "in proportion to [the Romanians'] ethnic number."Eaton, p. 44 One left-wing columnist at Lupta suggested that some of Vaida's own followers were "stunned" by its discriminatory undertones, and had to accommodate it with their "personal obligation" toward Vaida;R. P., "Noua ofensivă a d-lui Vaida. — Cum se poate încurca un om politic", in Lupta, April 1, 1936, p. 1 another columnist argued that some of "Mr Vaida's partisans [had been] ardent and committed philosemites" until 1934.Deșcă, "Granate. Mai multă apropiere", in Lupta, June 17, 1936, p. 1 Shaped by such new imperatives, the FR program emphasized that "there must be no policy of hatred towards the minorities", adding: "an end must be put to the privileged situation resulting from the past."Politics and Political Parties..., p. 186 As noted in 1935 by the Bulgarian-Romanian paper Dobrudzhanski Glas, the proposal effectively meant that the FR could never recruit members from among the minorities."Les Bulgares de Roumanie et M. Vaida-Voevode", in Glasul Minorităților, Issue 4/1935, pp. 90–91 Reportedly, in mid 1935 the FR attempted a rapprochement with the Jewish Party, which was notoriously opposed to Jewish assimilation. An assimilationist Jewish leader, Wilhelm Filderman, Vaida was producing messages calling for "collaboration" with exponents of right-wing Zionism, while he "condemns the Regat's Jews for joining [mainstream Romanian] political parties."Wilhelm Filderman, "Criza in barouri", in Dimineața, June 2, 1935, p. 7

Numerus Valachicus replicated Guardist tactics, but did so in a positive discrimination manner, one not ostensibly antisemitic.Berți, pp. 144–145, 146, 147–148, 150, 152; Heinen, pp. 242, 249, 273, 298. See also Politics and Political Parties..., pp. 82, 181–186; Butaru, p. 293; Nastasă, pp. 92, 557; Sebastian, p. 7; Volovici, p. 52 However, Gazeta Transilvaniei put our numerous articles which concentrated on maligning Jewish "colonialists", claiming for instance that they controlled 80% of Romania's industry, with firms it described as "parasitical".Olteanu Voica, pp. 215–216 Calculations by the Front's press had it that Jews and Hungarians were overrepresented in the liquor business: although Romanians made up a majority of retailers, their suppliers were still largely non-Romanian. Overall, radical antisemites were reserved about Vaidist proposals. The Iron Guard's "Captain", Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, wrote that: "if Vaida was ever antisemitic, he was one of the old school".Berți, p. 148 During that interval, the Guard's intellectuals also gave mixed reactions to the FR's antisemitic program. Sociologist Traian Brăileanu cautiously commended the FR for wanting to break away from "kike imperialism" and "kike finance",Traian Brăileanu, Sociologia și arta guvernării. Articole politice, p. 99. Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1940 while philosopher Nae Ionescu referred to the numerus Valachicus as "a platform for agitation, not at all a political program."Sebastian, p. 7

Within the political mainstream, the numerus advocacy was seen as exaggerated, but not unworkable. As acknowledged by Vaida himself, Maniu was vexed by educational quotas, but favored curbing the influence of "foreigners" and adopting trust-busting legislation. Other figures were more skeptical of the program. Dante Gherman, a People's Party supporter, argued that the economic over-representation of minorities was not a matter to be addressed new laws, but simply required old laws being properly enforced.Dante Gherman, "Stat țărănesc, Numerus Valachicus, Front Constituțional", in Înainte, Issue 8/1935, p. 1 As noted at the time by Vaida's rival, Constantin Argetoianu, the issue of enforced discrimination was paradoxical, since minorities were largely absent from the state apparatus; introducing quotas would have meant "opening up such careers to a significant number of Jews." That practical matter did not dissuade the "scoundrels of our cities", "the Jew-eaters and extollers of racism", from campaigning around the concept.Pătrașcu, p. 149 However, Vaida viewed Argetoianu as a marginal ally. Within the FR itself, Potârcă also objected to Vaida's ideas on ethnic protection, viewing them as exaggerated.Rădulescu, p. 64 When bar associations began voting their own "Romanianization", the FR's Iovipale criticized a complete purge, proposing that up to 4% of the legal practices could still go to non-Romanians.

The group was otherwise compatible with the Iron Guard: both were seen by Guard sympathizer Petre Țuțea as exponents of the "revolutionary right", destined to blend together into "a single party or a state party."Boia, p. 58–59 As noted by his colleague Mihail Sebastian, Ionescu took part in agitating for Vaida, and argued that the Front's alliance with the Guard and their common victory over Tătărescu were still inevitable.Sebastian, pp. 7–8 Monarchist writer Ion Sân-Giorgiu claimed that Ionescu was sponsoring the FR with money that ultimately originated in Nazi Germany, and actively trying to create tensions between Vaida and Carol. Allegedly, Ionescu also intervened to save the FR's Mirto when the latter was found to be running a smuggling business.

In his speeches, Vaida declared that fascism was primarily a natural development of the "national-social ideas"; he claimed primordiality for Romanian nationalism, which, he believed, had been jolted into existence by the Transylvanian revolt of 1784."Declarațiile d-lui Vaida la Alba-Iulia", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 81/1937, pp. 1–2 The Front's spokesman, Ioan Alexandru Bran-Lemeny, declared the party to be pragmatic rather than ideological, noting that it did not deal in "abstraction"—and that Maniu's belief in the "peasant state" was a "hybrid, unworkable construct".Ioan Alexandru Bran-Lemeny, "Aventură?! Diversiune?!", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 59/1935, p. 4 Bran-Lemeny acknowledged instead that his group disapproved of "some methods employed by German national-socialism", but challenged his adversaries to view fascism and Nazism as more economically efficient than liberalism.Ioan Alexandru Bran-Lemeny, "Renaștere sau anchilozare!", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 31/1935, p. 4 Another such plea was issued by FR member C. I. Odor, who argued that "Romanian organization", modeled on Nazism, fascism, and the Estado Novo, would triumph against "alienism, above all [against] Judaism".C. I. Odor, "Să ne organizăm!", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 67/1937, p. 1 While he exercised supreme command within the FR, Vaida conceded that the state needed to be placed under the "proud king" with his sweeping powers; he chided Maniu for favoring a crowned republic.

Numerus Valachicus was thus seen by the FR's leader as a pathway to a reformed and regimented society. The party pledged that, if appointed Governor of the National Bank of Romania, Angelescu would be in a position to redirect credit only toward Romanian-dominated enterprises."In ceasul al doisprezecelea", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 19/1937, p. 1 Vaida claimed that he was merely fulfilling his old agenda, arguing that, in places such as the Banat Romanians could only find employment doing menial labor.Berți, p. 150 He then argued that the effects of his approach could be observed in the experiment of Leghia, where a Romanian entrepreneur, Mihail Manoilescu, had taken over control of a "Jewish" mine, then restaffed it with Romanian engineers."Vorbește d. dr. Al. Vaida-Voevod președ. 'Frontului Românesc'. Cuvintele animatorului redeșteptării românești", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 67/1937, p. 1 Proclaiming that "capital and labour must be subservient to the superior object of the Nation", the party program also looked to "the selection of the best elements among the children of the race" to take place within the school system.Politics and Political Parties..., p. 185

The process of instituting ethnic protectionism would contribute to the emergence of a "really (biologically) national state", the "national organic State" (which "must be a Constitutional Monarchy"), with "the abolition of all class war".Politics and Political Parties..., p. 184 One variant sketched out in FR circles was social corporatism, as popularized by Ioanițescu through his own magazine, Drum Nou. According to political scientist Victor Rizescu, this vision had been forged in left-liberal circles, before undergoing an appropriation by the nationalist right.Victor Rizescu, "Începuturile statului bunăstării pe filiera românească. Scurtă retrospectivă a etapelor unei reconceptualizări ", in Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. 18, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 42–43 Ioanițescu further proposed that mandatory spending and protective tariffs could be used to favor infant industries and model consumption."Țărănimea — victima trusturilor", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 19/1937, p. 1 This protectionism was not extended into debt relief for the peasantry: among FR members, Vlad stood out for opposing such measures, noting that they would incapacitate the credit unions of Transylvania.Ioachim Tolciu, "Legea Bancară și soartea {{sic}} băncilor românești din Ardeal și Banat", in Revista Economică, Vol. XXXVII, Issues 33–34, August 1935, pp. 245–250

File:Front Popular, Cuvântul Liber, 1935.png against fascism (including a peasant figure), in a Cuvântul Liber cartoon of 1935]]

Upon creating the FR, Vaida declared his opposition to agrarian socialism and the cooperative movement as ideals embraced by the PNȚ's left-wing. Speaking for this current, Țara de Mâine journal argued that he was committing "political suicide" by turning his back on the "peasant uplift"."Insemnări. Conducătorul 'Frontului românesc' despre Statul țărănesc", in Țara de Mâine, Vol. I, Issues 6–7, October–November 1935, p. 110 Cooperatist doctrinaire Victor Jinga additionally noted that the FR leader had shown his political incompetence by building himself a large manor in Olpret, while its "purely Romanian" villagers were living in "indescribable squalor".Victor Jinga, "Insemnări. In Olpretul d-lui Vaida", in Țara de Mâine, Vol. I, Issue 5, September 1935, pp. 88–89 The FR was similarly castigated by the left-wing essayist Constantin Prisnea, who argued that Guardism and Vaidism were "duping the youth with 'ideology', which is nothing other than the very demolition of Romanian cultural values"."Insemnări. Tineretul pe calea cea bună", in Țara de Mâine, Vol. I, Issues 3–4, July–August 1935, p. 65

Vaida also stated his radical anticommunism which, as historian Armin Heinen writes, "clashed bizarrely with the actual insignificance of the Communist Party."Heinen, p. 452 In at least one instance, he equated democracy itself with "the left [and] all its parade of revolutionary ideas, its free propaganda in favor of kolkhozes, its portraits of Stalin everywhere on display".Demostene Botez, "Democrația este democrație!", in Adevărul, May 21, 1937, p. 1 Ever since the 1910s, Gazeta Transilvaniei had endorsed the conspiracy theory of "Jewish Bolshevism", enhanced after 1935 by allegations that the Jewish community was entirely subordinate to the Comintern; it also claimed that mainstream Labor Zionist groups such as HeHalutz were in reality champions of communism.Olteanu Voica, p. 216 A series of articles in Basarabia Creștină argued that Bessarabia had been the original target for settlement by the Jewish Colonization Association, and was still being "undermined" by "agrarian kikes"."Opera de distrugere națională continuă în Basarabia", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 92/1935, pp. 1–2 FR papers expressed sympathy with the Arab Revolt, arguing that Zionists represented a nation that "is gleefully being expelled from all countries of the world."Iustin Stancovski, "Dezordinele din Palestina", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 54/1936, p. 2

In conjunction with this theory, Vaida circulated allegations that the PNȚ left, which was in contact with the Communist Party, was also financed by, and forever indebted to, the "Jewish minority". Communists such as Constantinescu-Iași reciprocated Vaida's sentiments, calling the FR part of the "black warmongers' bloc" and of "the fascist peril".Constantinescu-Iași, p. 348 Gazeta congratulated Craiova's prosecutors who obtained a conviction for communist Ana Pauker in 1936, citing this as a victory for "Romanian solidarity" against "foreign emissaries"."Verdictul dela Craiova", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 54/1936, p. 1 Nonetheless, Pauker's defense team included Mircea Lepădătescu, who was both a leading FR cadre and a contact for Dolj's Marxist study circles.Pătrașcu, p. 190

Despite official backing and circumstantial supporters, the Front failed to prosper, and was always a "frail party".Veiga, p. 248 As noted by Heinen: "Within just a few weeks, it became clear that Vaida could not fulfill the hopes invested in him [by the king]."Heinen, p. 242 On May 15, 1935, an FR meeting at Vox Hall in Bucharest gathered some 5,000 spectators, though, reportedly, many of them were delegated by the Iron Guard.Călinescu & Savu, p. 254 The first electoral test was a by-election in Prahova, where the FR only managed 6,000 votes, well below the PNL and PNȚ.Călinescu & Savu, p. 252 In the June by-elections for the Senate seat at Mehedinți, Vaida himself obtained less than 3,000 votes.Heinen, p. 273 One contributing factor was that Premier Tătărescu himself introduced some laws implicitly aimed against the Jewish community, whilst also seeking to deliberately contain the FR and other radical groups.Final Report, pp. 30–31; Heinen, p. 298 The FR could still boast a strong presence in Guardist-dominated regions such as Câmpulung Moldovenesc, where its senator, Dumitru Tinu, ran a successful consumer cooperative.Bruja (2010), p. 88

In early 1935, Vaida was interested in toning down the perception of his party as a Carlist puppet. For this reason, he negotiated a rapprochement with the anti-Carol Constitutional Front, formed by Gheorghe Brătianu and Alexandru Averescu. Reportedly, in April 1935 Vaida had asked that the king's influential mistress, Elena Lupescu, be forced into exile, although his colleague Mirto was still widely perceived as a member of Lupescu's camarilla.Țurlea (2011), pp. 184–185, 203 The National Agrarian Party (PNA), headed by Vaida's old rival Octavian Goga, also approached the Front with offers of alliance or merger. Reportedly, Goga offered to fuse his group into the FR, only demanding the position of Vice President; Vaida refused, since he had promised that role to Vlad.Netea, pp. 253–254. See also Mezarescu, p. 77

The FR's wish to create a "strong nationalist pole" also drove it into negotiations with Carlist supporters on the extreme right. Its first partners were the LANC, in particular its youth wing, and a more minor Iron Guard splinter group, the Crusade of Romanianism.Bruja (2010), p. 83 On May 16, it was rumored that the FR would absorb both the LANC and the PNA: "Vaida will be the president of the Romanian Front, Goga will be his vice president, and Cuza will be offered the honorary presidency.""Cuza lesz a Vaida alakulatának díszelnöke és Goga az alelnöke", in Keleti Ujság, May 18, 1935, p. 10 However, the FR and the LANC were irreconcilable over Vaida's numerus Valachicus doctrines. Cuza wrote at the time that Vaida's system of quotas, "instead of signifying the defense of Romanian elements, will bring about the complete extinction of [our] ideal, 'Romania for the Romanians'."Horia Bozdoghină, "Liga Apărării Naționale Creștine și problema minorităților în anii '30", in Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu (eds.), Partide politice și minorități naționale din România în secolul XX, Vol. IV, p. 147. Sibiu: TechnoMedia, 2009. {{ISBN|978-606-8030-53-1}} Around August 1935, the Front was reportedly negotiating a merger with Ion V. Emilian's "Fire Swastika", which had broken out of the LANC.Nichifor Crainic, "Corespondență Nichifor Crainic — A. C. Cuza. 'Ce-a fost cuzismul de când există...'", in Magazin Istoric, September 1995, p. 50 Vaida's antisemitic ideology also won him the endorsement from Colonel Ștefan Tătărescu, brother of the Premier and former leader of the Romanian National Socialists. They signed a pact, which allowed Vaida's followers focused on campaigning in Transylvania and the Banat; Col. Tătărescu was taking primacy in all other regions, as head of the Numerus Valachicus National Movement."Acordul dintre d-nii Vaida și Ștefan Tătărescu", in Dimineața, March 7, 1935, p. 7

Clashes with the PNȚ were still reported during that interval: in October 1935, the Sighet home of a Vaidist was reportedly attacked by a PNȚ crew under Ilie Lazăr. Shots were fired during the scuffle, leaving Lazăr wounded in the arm."Bubuie tunurile... Iar la noi un deputat cade împușcat pe fondul politicei de partid", in Isus Biruitorul. Foaie Săptămânală, Întocmită de Preotul Iosif Trifa, Issue 44/1935, p. 8 By then, the FR was negotiating an alliance with the more powerful National Christian Party (PNC), which had resulted, with Carol's blessing, from the LANC's merger with the PNA.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 275–277, 279–280, 287; Mezarescu, pp. 76–77; Veiga, p. 215 In August 1935, the new FR newspaper, also titled Frontul Românesc, announced that the two groups would only agree on a "minimal platform" for government, with fusion only occurring "naturally and automatically" at some point in the future; from the PNC side, Goga put out a similarly cautious message.Mezarescu, pp. 77–78

Together, the PNC and the FR established a Nationalist Bloc, the second-largest coalition in Parliament (after the PNL's). The PNC leader, Goga, welcomed Vaida as a fellow combatant "for the national cause."Berți, p. 151 Nevertheless, the alliance saw PNC activists such as Nichifor Crainic, whose radical ethnocratic program was rejected by Vaida-Voevod, leaving in protest.Ornea, pp. 246, 258 By November 1935, Maniu and the PNȚ had grown fearful of this rapprochement, noting that it could produce an electoral sweep by "the right".Călinescu & Savu, p. 270 The FR still discussed a merger with the PNC, but advanced talks exposed other fundamental disagreements between the two sides. Reportedly, Vaida was upset by the PNC's foreign policy, which openly celebrated revanchism and German re-armament.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 275–277, 279–280 Carol was enthusiastic about the promised merger, which he hoped would give him a "strong party of the right" to control.Călinescu & Savu, p. 287 In early January 1936, Vaida announced that fusion was no longer being sought, and also that the FR would not field candidates in any partial elections scheduled for that year; demoralized by what he saw as Carol's machinations, he declared his intention to withdraw from politics.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 279, 282 Despite renewed efforts by the king,Călinescu & Savu, pp. 279–28, 287 a complete merger between the two parties again failed to materialize, and, to the Guard's stated satisfaction, both the PNC and the FR experienced major internal dissension.Heinen, p. 283

File:Gazeta Transilvaniei with FR logo, June 14, 1936.png on June 14, 1936, with FR logo and a condemnation of the "Judaeo-communist" press, including Adevărul]]

At that stage, the FR moved closer to the Guard. Vaida was a guest of honor at the Guard's student congress, held at Târgu Mureș in March 1936.Țurlea (2011), pp. 193–195 In April, he made a stop at Iași, where an Aromanian man confronted him, "ask[ing] Mr Vaida that he spare no violence toward enacting his program." Vaida was upset by this take, replying: "I will never resort to violence in applying our program.""D. Al. Vaida și violența în politică", in Dimineața, May 7, 1936, p. 10 During May, he and Mironescu had private meetings with the Guard, hoping to persuade its leaders to renounce also violent methods.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 300–301 Contrarily, in his interviews with Carol, Vaida voiced his praise toward the Guard, while shunning the PNC. He and Carol agreed that the Guardists needed to be coaxed and kept away from reaching an understanding with Maniu.Călinescu & Savu, p. 299

Meanwhile, Vaida had caused a national controversy by visiting Timișoara and declaring a radical agenda in terms of foreign policy. This included demands that France "stay out of our internal politics", and unprecedented territorial claims on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (in respect to Vojvodina). He declared that the League of Nations was powerless against the "victorious discipline" of the Italian Empire and the Hitlerian "unity of sentiment and willpower"."Pentru o mai temeinică organizare și despre Liga Națiunilor", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 25/1936, p. 1 During that time, he increased his pressures on the party base, hoping to accelerate its paramilitary transformation. This effort sparked revolt among the FR sections in Brăila County, whose leaders Anastase Petrescu and Marin Panait handed in their resignations."Două demisii din organizația vaidistă la Brăila", in Adevărul, February 28, 1936, p. 3

A reshuffled Tătărescu government took over in mid-1936. The Front still held its large rallies, boasting that 20,000 affiliates heard Ioanițescu speaking at Galați in March. However, according to the regional journal Viața Ardealului, summer 1936 was a "period of stagnation" for the FR and "the nationalist current as a whole". The Front was still "sure of its destiny", but "organizing in depth" and keeping secret about it."Situația politică. Sincopa naționalistă", in Viața Ardealului, Vol. III, Issue 22, July 1936, p. 4 Vaida and Angelescu now advanced the notion of a PNȚ–FR reconciliation, arguing that it could successfully bring down the PNL cabinet.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 325–327, 328–329 By late August, rumors had emerged that the FR was considering an alliance with the PNC and Argetoianu's Agrarian Union Party. News of this reached the FR's former allies in the Crusade of Romanianism, who noted that such alliances were being engineered by the local Freemasonry; according to the Crusaders, Vaida's nationalism was in fact revealed to have been "driven by the international Masonic mafia."Toma Alexandrescu, "Naționalism, politicianism, românism", in Cruciada Românismului, Vol. II, Issue 91, October 25, 1936, p. 2 One other option, advanced by Carol and journalist Pamfil Șeicaru, was for the FR to join efforts with the breakaway Radical Peasants' Party (PRȚ).Călinescu & Savu, pp. 277, 325 The latter was at the time clarifying its anti-Vaidist position, calling out the FR squads as "criminal gangs"."Viața politică. Pericolul mișcărilor anarhice pentru țară. Cuvântarea d-lui deputat Vlad Dimitriu", in Dimineața, January 39, 1936, p. 9

Meanwhile, revelations about German re-armament, pushed the FR closer to Nazism. In June, following the Rhineland crisis, L'Humanité reported that the "racist parties" (the Front, the Iron Guard and the PNC) staged a march outside the French embassy in Bucharest, with chants of "Long live Hitler!""Du Monde entier. En Roumanie. Après l'échec raciste de Bucarest", in L'Humanité, June 1, 1936, p. 3 With this, Vaida declared that Germany was marching toward realizing the Anschluss, pleading for France to discard its Popular Front and rejoin the "nationalist" camp. In response, Lupta noted that Vaida was not up to date on French politics: the Popular Front had "proceeded to destroy all Jewish capitalists and bankers", whereas Vaida's personal idol, François de La Rocque, had attended at least one memorial service in a synagogue. Vaida's optimism was also castigated by Conservative Party leader Grigore Filipescu, who warned Vaida that his other idol, Benito Mussolini, was an opportunist, and that "Mussolinism has no Vaidist sympathies."Grigore Filipescu, "Viața politică. Ciudat", in Dimineața, August 8, 1936, p. 7

Speaking at Oradea in October, Vaida saluted both Axis powers. According to Vaida, the Locarno Treaties were naturally obsolete, and Germany was right to ignore them; however, he cautioned that the borders of Greater Romania needed to be guaranteed by both Germany and France."La Dernière heure. La politique extérieure roumaine. Un discours de M. Vaïda Voïvode", in Le Petit Parisien, October 19, 1936, p. 3 This stance was ridiculed by the PNȚ youth: in a September communique, it noted that Vaida, "that old fascist parrot", was silent on the issue of Italian support for Hungarian irredentism, though this would have entailed the loss of Transylvania to Hungary."Tineret al Ardealului! Tineret al țării întregi!", in Țara de Mâine, Vol. II, Issues 9–10, September–October 1936, pp. 235–236 From the PNȚ's left, Nicolae L. Lupu described the FR as stoking "racial [and] Germanophile violence"; in response, the FR played down such incidents as "the excesses of certain youths", while noting brawls started by the PNȚ's own Voinici."'Epurarea vieții politice a țării'", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 70/1936, p. 1 In November, as Mussolini expressed full support for a Hungarian expansion, Vaida joined other Romanian politicians in voicing his indignation. He and his party sought to tone down the "hysteria", informing their partisans that Mussolini would never risk going to war over Hungarian demands in Transylvania."Declarațiile d-lui dr. Al. Vaida Voevod" and "Să ne păstrăm calmul și liniștea. I", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 89/1936, pp. 1–2 Vaidists pledged themselves to combat propaganda by the Hungarian Unity Party, arguing that it "falsifies the most obvious truths"."Revizionismul maghiar. Cum să-i răspundem", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 70/1936, p. 1 The FR also noted that Mihalache's anti-revisionism was a diversion used by communist and Jewish infiltrators."Record de inconștiență", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 78/1936, p. 1

On September 4, the FR and PNC had agreed on another collaboration, and presented a single list for the local elections of that year. The PNȚ alleged that the two parties also unified their political militias. It described a case in Baia County, where two priests, Hreamătă and Dăscălescu, respectively led the Lăncieri and Vaidist "gangs", which coordinated with each other in assaulting their political opponents."Ultima Oră. Atacurile gogo-cuziste continuă", in Dreptatea, September 18, 1936, p. 4 Brătianu's Georgist Liberal Party also collaborated with the two parties in places such as Brașov; though invited to join this "purely Romanian list", the PNȚ declined."Chestiunea alegerilor municipale. Eșuarea tratativelor pentru fixarea unei liste comune românești", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 78/1936, p. 1 In Ilfov County, the two-party list was headed by Ioanițescu, with the PNC man Stan Ghițescu taking the second eligible seat. The Front's registered logo, "two concentric circles and a dot", doubled as the alliance symbol. Called "target" or "wheel" in party documents, this drawing symbolized Greater Romania as an outside circle, and, within, "the belt strap tightening around The Black Dot, namely the xenophile".Radu, p. 584 According to Gazeta Transilvaniei, the symbolism was poorly understood by illiterate sympathizers, who mistakenly voted with the PNȚ's circle (which had been intensely popularized by Ioanițescu before his defection).Radu, p. 577

File:Romanian Front electoral performance, county council elections of June 1937.svg]]

A November 1937 piece in Lupta noted that there was a simmering conflict opposing "centrists" such as Vaida and Angelescu to the PNC-aligned Ioanițescu and Nițescu.Rep., "'Frontul românesc' este partid de centru. D. Al. Vaida Voevod refuză colaborarea cu partidul național-creștin", in Lupta, November 4, 1936, p. 3 On New Year's Day 1937, Vaida sent a telegram to La Rocque and his French Social Party, which stated: "May God grant that our two countries can successfully fight for their shared ideals of peace, respect for family, and work, freely and honestly." La Roque replied, expressing his similar wishes for the "Romanian and French sister nations"; the FR celebrated this exchange as the inauguration of a direct relationship between "nationalist France" and "nationalist Romania"."Vaida Sándor és de la Rocque ezredes táviratváltása. Vaida táviratilag újévi üdvözletet küldött a francia fasiszták vezérének", in Új Kelet, January 12, 1937, p. 5 According to the Jewish magazine Új Kelet, Vaida was conspicuously the "great favorite" for the post of prime minister, and could afford to ignore offers of collaboration from the PNC."Iorga még mindig nem tudja elfelejteni volt társát, Argetoianut... Vajda a favorit, Gogának meg kell elégednie az egyetemi professzori címmel. A március 25-iki községi választásokon akarja megmutatni minden párt az erejét. Megkezdődött a csatározás a kormány örökségéért", in Új Kelet, January 30, 1937, p. 2

Over the following months, the FR was effectively marginalized: in March 1937, Tătărescu banned the FR's black insignia and uniforms, alongside those of other paramilitary movements (including the Guard and the PNC)."En Rumanía ya no se pueden usar más que camisas grises", in Acción, Issue 580/1937, p. 2; Clark, pp. 184–185 Early 1937 saw rumors of a tentative co-operation between Vaida and the PNȚ, which was still chaired by Mihalache. According to various outlets, Vaida had ordered his propagandists to only focus criticism on Maniu, while Tilea mediated between the two parties. The parties clashed again in February, during the international incident sparked by the Moța–Marin funeral. This event, celebrating Guardist participation in the Spanish Civil War, was attended by Axis diplomats, causing an uproar among mainstream politicians. Speaking for the FR, Ioanițescu criticized foreign meddling in Romanian affairs, but also alleged that the PNȚ had desecrated a "heroic sacrifice" by raising a political issue."Participarea unor diplomați streini la funeraliile legionarilor-eroi. Punctul de vedere al Frontului Românesc", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 15/1937, p. 1

According to left-wing journalist Emanoil Socor, the FR's response to this "defiance of stately prerogatives" was dictated by the PNC, but in fact contrasted with the moderation of regular party members.Emanoil Socor, "Culisele Camerei", in Adevărul, February 19, 1937, p. 3 Later that year, the Vaidists and the PNȚ's left were still irreconcilable, with FR venues again pressing for a nationalist–monarchist alliance. This approach became normative after April elections for council seats in Sibiu County: Vaidists and National Christians ran on separate lists, which diminished both parties' chances; the FR also discovered that, though Nazified, Saxon voters preferred Saxon moderates to Romanian nationalists.re., "Concentrarea forțelor naționaliste", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 30/1937, p. 1 Similarly, a local FR–Iron Guard alliance for the local council of Piatra Neamț failed to make an impact.Ioniță, pp. 794–795 In April, the Front and the PNC were ridiculed for their anti-PNȚ alliance in Deva, which also offered an eligible position on the municipal council to Mór Lőrincz, of the local Jewish community.Ion Dumbravă, "Caleidoscop. Goga și Sinagoga", in Patria, April 18, 1937, p. 1 During the May election at Chișinău, the FR ran its on list. It only gathered 249 votes, below the PNC's 652; the PNȚ list, meanwhile, took the majority with 3,736.Ioniță, p. 795

The PNȚ boasted several victories in the local elections of June. The National Peasantist press noted that victory came despite a "conspiracy" between government and "right-wing parties" (PNC and FR),"Victorii național-țărăniste în alegerile din Dolj, Ilfov, Argeș, Romanați și Dâmbovița", in Românul. Organ al Partidului Național-Țărănesc din Jud. Arad, Issue 1/1937, p. 3 and despite an "unhinged" propaganda campaign mounted by the extreme right "united under the Vaidist sign".Pop (2017), p. 144 Similar claims were advanced by a leftist daily, Dimineața, who noted that the Front had been defeated by Ilie Lazăr in Maramureș County, "although they fell back on the most outlandishly antisemitic propaganda ever witnessed in Maramureș, and despite all the benevolent support from the Liberals [and] from some propagandists of the Iron Guard"."Dimineața în Ardeal. Succesul național-țărăniștilor din Maramureș. Totala înfrângere a vaidiștilor: inexistența celorlalte partide", in Dimineața, July 30, 1937, p. 12 PNȚ activists were incensed by Tilea's claim that Maniu had turned republican, which they described as calumny; in reaction, they claimed that Tilea, the "kinglet of Vaidism", ran a forestry business financed by Jewish capital."Republicanii", in Românul. Organ al Partidului Național-Țărănesc din Jud. Arad, Issue 4/1937, p. 1

Vaida played down the election as "unimportant", arguing that the poor showing was a result of his party refusing to corrupt itself with sponsorships. At the end of this race, the FR's best result was a second place in Ilfov, with 13,505 of the votes cast, a 22% of the total.Ioniță, p. 796 This gave it 13 seats in the Bucharest–Ilfov Council."Constituirea consiliului județean. Tâlcul unei ședințe și viitorul guvern. Mai pot colabora vaidiștii cu național țărăniștii?", in Gazeta Municipală, Issue 279, June 1937, p. 6 During its campaign, the Front had promised to expropriate land all around Bucharest, to be used for affordable housing and a green belt."Un senzațional proect comunal al partidului Frontul Românesc", in Gazeta Municipală, Issue 280, June 1937, p. 6 The unusual success was also made possible by divisions within the PNL, which as a result took no seat. The FR representation, led by Ioanițescu, had an enduring ideological conflict with the PNȚ chapter under Virgil Madgearu, which only had a 4-man majority.

In July, the FR sought to revive itself in other regions by accepting pacts with the PNL and the PNC for the county elections in Putna.Ioniță, p. 798 With the PNȚ ready to assume power, but waiting on the royal prerogative, Carol II ordered it to accept Vaida-Voevod at Internal Affairs. As noted by Tilea, "Mr Ion Mihalache never even dared cross Mr Vaida's threshold", since doing so would have alienated him from its supposed sponsors, "the foreign bankers". By most accounts, Carol knew that this request would be ignored, and only hoped to create more rifts between the two currents within the PNȚ.Berți, p. 152; Butaru, p. 304; Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 237; Heinen, p. 391; Netea, pp. 233–234; Ornea, pp. 311–312; Pop (2017), p. 144; Scurtu, pp. 145–147 Carol also pressed on for a "cute" merger between the two parties, arguing that both Vaida and Mironescu were essentially Peasantists in their outlook.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 349–350, 354–359 This intervention renewed the tensions within that group: Armand Călinescu, who had served under Vaida and was close to the king, criticized the party leadership for not sealing a deal with the FR.Călinescu & Savu, pp. 344, 349–350, 365–371; Heinen, p. 324. See also Scurtu, p. 146 This pact was endorsed in October 1937 by Vaida and Tilea, who reportedly accepted the supremacy of "National-Peasantist ideology".Călinescu & Savu, p. 355 Maniu was also persuaded during secret meetings with Nițescu, describing his break with Vaida as a "temporary" matter.{{in lang|ro}} Andreea Vilcovschi, [https://web.archive.org/web/20170210041752/https://adevarul.ro/locale/zalau/iuliu-maniu-fost-urmarit-serviciul-secret-informatii-ordinul-regelui-carol-ii-lea-informatii-furniza-corpul-detectivilor-radiotelegrame-1_589b8a8e5ab6550cb8461d5f/index.html "Iuliu Maniu a fost urmărit de Serviciul Secret de Informații, la ordinul Regelui Carol al II-lea. Ce informații furniza Corpul Detectivilor în radiotelegrame"], in Adevărul (Zalău edition), February 10, 2017 However, during new talks in November, Vaida clarified that he still expected the PNȚ's left to be expelled, and only wanted to absorb the centrists.Călinescu & Savu, p. 359

Meanwhile, Vaida was collaborating with Carol on the old project of uniting right-wing monarchists into a single governing bloc. In November 1937, he participated in a secret gathering of Carlist figures, including Averescu, Brătianu, Cuza, Filipescu, the PRȚ's Grigore Iunian, and the Iron Guard's Zizi Cantacuzino. They discussed forging a "national union" from their respective parties.Mezarescu, p. 205. See also Scurtu, pp. 145–147 However, Filipescu also denounced such dealings and favored the PNȚ—who, he argued, "will take power without Vaida and without Iunian".Mihail Sevastos, "Aspecte politice", in Adevărul, October 26, 1937, p. 1 The FR preserved its nominal independence ahead of the new general election. According to diarist Liviu Rebreanu, this was after Mihalache had openly refused to accept Vaida; the latter was persuaded by "that foul man Tilea" into supporting a new Tătărescu administration. Rebreanu described the arrangement as Vaida's political destruction.Liviu Rebreanu (contributor: Nicolae Gheran), "Jurnal Liviu Rebreanu", in Vatra, Vol. XIV, Issue 165, December 1984, p. 11 In December, the FR registered for this with a new electoral symbol, comprising a rectangle split into solid-white and solid-black halves. The "target" was instead being reused by Al. Samoilă's group, the General Union of Small Industrialists.See list published alongside N. Papatansiu, "Războiul electoral", in Realitatea Ilustrată, Issue 569, December 1937, p. 6

Before the race, the PNȚ had signed its own "non-aggression pact", with the Iron Guard. The FR (having failed in its bid to coalesce with the Guard) ran as an ally of the PNL. Iunian provided a quick reaction to the news: "The Liberals, a party which claims to be democratic and opposed to the far-right, have found nothing better to do than to associate themselves with Mr Vaida. You are aware of his program: numerus Valachicus and other more or less serious pleasantries. [...] Had the electoral law been modified, we would not be witnessing this demeaning spectacle.""Arena politică. D. Gr. Iunian despre situația politică. Declarațiile facute la Cernăuți", in Curentul, December 3, 1937, p. 6 The pact was ridiculed by analyst Osvald Al. Teodoreanu as a "tiny monstrosity". Teodoreanu rejected claims that it was an attempt by the PNL to outdo its PNC competitors; he argued instead that Vaida had successfully duped his allies into assigning eligible positions to his clients.Osvald Al. Teodoreanu, "Discuții politice. Profitori și Profeți", in Opinia, December 7, 1937, pp. 1–2 As part of this understanding, the two parties shared a single lists, but no Vaidists were allowed to run in four counties of Western Moldavia—Botoșani, Fălciu, Iași and Roman.

FR propaganda explained that Vaida's ideas had "corrected" the PNL's stance on various topics, adjusting it to the "stringent necessities of life.""Frontul Românesc în Basarabia", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 7/1937, p. 4 Tilea reported to disgruntled FR members that the PNL was largely consonant with a "consolidation of Romanian forces", and that the alliance was aimed at defending Romania against encroachment by the Soviet Union, whose "tentacles extend like a spider's web over Europe in its entirety". As noted in its election manifesto, the FR had largely accepted PNL guidelines in foreign affairs: "The Romanian Front is determined to respect the directives of our traditional policy, meaning that it is committed to those countries who have contributed toward unifying the Romanian land [in 1918], and whose interests we share. But [it also] believes that we should maintain good relations with all states, refusing to meddle into their internal affairs, or to initiate any crusades for the victory of this and that ideology.""Ultima oră. Manifestul vaidiștilor", in Opinia, December 3, 1937, p. 4

Such re-positioning created a new set of tensions between the FR and the Guardists. In Putna, a local Vaidist was physically assaulted after referring to the Guardists as "thieves and criminals", reminding them about the Duca assassination.Gheorghe Miron, "Aspecte privind Mișcarea Legionară din Vrancea în perioada interbelică", in Cronica Vrancei, Vol. IV, 2003, p. 181 The PNC also publicly turned against the FR, punishing its apparent conciliation with the Carlist project. Goga's colleague Istrate Micescu published scathing attacks against Vaida, which were then popularized in Western media.Mezarescu, p. 211 The FR alliance was welcomed in Germany as a sign that the PNL was being Nazified from within.Mezarescu, p. 216 One tangible consequence was that the National Liberals stripped Jews from their electoral lists, on Vaida's request.Heinen, p. 322 As head of the PNL chapter in Roman County, Ion Manolescu-Strunga explained to his followers that the FR was right about "the Jews who have arrived in this country after 1919", as these "form a dangerous anti-state element, one which will also end up ruining the native Jewish element.""Intrunirea liberală din Roman", in Curentul, December 15, 1937, p. 14 At the time, the Front's own antisemitic discourse became more explicit, with Vaida asking that Romania be "deloused" of its Jews, slated for mass deportation to Mandatory Palestine.Volovici, p. 55 Also joining this pact was the Nazi-influenced German Party, brought into it by a separate understanding with Vaida. The two agreed to run on a "nationally oriented" platform, against communism.Mihai Adrian Panu, "Reprezentarea politică a minorității germane în Banatul interbelic", in Vasile Ciobanu, Sorin Radu (eds.), Partide politice și minorități naționale din România în secolul XX, Vol. V, p. 125. Sibiu: TechnoMedia, 2010. {{ISBN|978-606-8030-84-5}}

In some respects, the pact was a failure. Vaida himself explained to his colleagues that he would become Tătărescu's "staunchest opponent",A.B.C., "Ultima oră. O campanie electorală agitată. D. Maniu în polemică.—Intre d. Vaida și guvern", in Adevărul, December 18, 1937, p. 8 and that the FR agenda remained intact—although, as Argetoianu writes, the nationalist current was "in shambles".Argetoianu & Stănescu, p. 62 On the PNL side, Iamandi actively sabotaged the alliance, and was probably responsible for the exclusion of Vaidist candidacies at Iași; a similar move took place in Neamț County.Scurtu, pp. 147–148 In tandem, Glasul Bucovinei, as the PNL mouthpiece in Cernăuți County, noted that the local "Vaidist organizations" were not actively supporting the common effort."Intensificarea campaniei electorale în Bucovina. Intre trecutele și actualele alegeri.—Comunicatul Mitropoliei asupra atitudinii preoțimii.—Ce fac vaidiștii?", in Adevărul, December 7, 1937, p. 2 Hațieganu and other Transylvanians quit the Front, calling it a "mockery" and a "sold-over".Netea, p. 234 They maintained control over Frontul Românesc newspaper, which they reissued as Frontul."Ultima oră. D. Eduard Mirto a demisionat din 'Frontul Românesc'", in Patria, January 28, 1938, p. 4 Upon being reintegrated by the PNȚ's regional committee, Hațieganu declared Vaida to be a "great man, but one who errs".Pop (2017), pp. 146–147 The FR leadership retorted, alleging that Hațieganu, had been a "zealous protagonist" in FR–PNL talks. According to this source, Hațieganu was actually angered by the Front's refusal to sanction his electoral nepotism."Un comunicat al conducerii Fr. Românesc", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 91/1937, p. 4

The deal was only apparently lucrative for the PNL: the FR had registered significant gains in some by-elections, but the extra votes came from members of the Guard, as the latter had opted not to put up candidates of its own.Heinen, pp. 320, 331; Scurtu, pp. 158–160 Some of the FR's electorate refused to vote for the PNL, and Jewish National Liberal supporters were also largely alienated.Heinen, pp. 331–332, 384 Following indecisive results, Carol used his prerogative to call in a PNC minority government, under Goga. This act surprised Vaida, who was sure that no explicitly antisemitic party would ever be let into government by Carol.Butaru, pp. 270–271 Since he had been overlooked by Carol, he reportedly resumed his negotiations with Maniu, and proposed himself as chairman of the reunified PNȚ. In parallel, he agreed to collaborate with the PNC, but asked that he lead the coalition cabinet; this notion was rejected by Goga.Argetoianu & Stănescu, p. 70

Goga also courted the Guard, but was swiftly refused, which led to campaigns of violence on both sides.Clark, pp. 229–230; Heinen, pp. 335–345, 448–449; Mezarescu, pp. 292–309; Ornea, pp. 312–313 Vaida was horrified by this outcome, and spoke out publicly against Guardist agitation, ridiculing its slogans.Mezarescu, p. 297 During its brief period in government, the PNC modified the electoral law to limit representation for smaller parties, hoping to attract the FR into a merger; Vaida refused, but Ioanițescu agreed, bringing the entire Old Kingdom sections of the FR under Goga's control.Heinen, pp. 335–336. See also Mezarescu, pp. 239–240, 292–297; Netea, pp. 235, 257 The pact also created tensions within the PNC itself, since it required Goga's followers to also accept reconciliation with Potârcă. As a consequence, PNC radicals staged an anti-Potârcă riot in Craiova. In January 1938, the PNȚ newspaper Facla reported that "the Vaidist party" had lost all credit with the public, and was "morally supporting" the PNC. According to the same source, the FR's fripturiști ("parasites") were pressing Vaida to accept complete merger.Al. Gh. Savu, "Din cronica moravurilor politice trecute: fripturismul", in Magazin Istoric, August 1970, p. 83

Vaida's cooperation with Goga ended abruptly on January 15, when the former withdrew parliamentary support, noting that Goga "endangers the true nationalist principles.""Nouvelles breves. À l'étranger. Le Front roumain contre M. Goga", in L'Homme Libre, January 15, 1938, p. 2 Goga himself publicly celebrated Ioanițescu's induction, boasting that the PNC government had effected the desired fusion of right-wing groups. He referred to the cabinet as a "National-Christian, Peasantist, Romanian union".Mezarescu, p. 240 Serving Goga as Interior Minister, Călinescu prepared new electoral regulations for the national vote, scheduled for March 1. His system outlawed political symbols of any kind, and assigned the competing lists a number of dots (or "eyes"), depending purely on the order of applications received—the Vaidists had three."Viața politică. Ordinea depunerii listelor. Guvernul candidează cu titulatura 'Uniunea națională creștină și țărănească'", in Universul, January 21, 1938, p. 5; "Alegătorii nu sunt atât de proști...", in Patria, January 22, 1937, p. 1. See also Mezarescu, p. 296 The law was described by Mihalache as a "swindle" which borrowed and manipulated the electoral customs of Siam, and was intended to confuse voters;"Guvernul va ieși înfrânt din alegeri. Declarațiile dlui Ion Mihalache făcute la Câmpulung. Excrocheria {{sic}} electorală a guvernului", in Patria, January 28, 1937, p. 1 Maniu called on the Court of Cassation to overrule it, and asked for the FR to be cited as a witness.

File:FRN leaders (Vaida, Argetoianu, Călinescu, Iamandi, Slăvescu, Ghelmegeanu), Aniversarea Constituției, March 1939.png on Calea Victoriei, marking the first-year anniversary of the Carlist Constitution (February 1939). From the left: Vaida, Constantin Argetoianu, Armand Călinescu, Victor Iamandi, Victor Slăvescu, Mihail Ghelmegeanu]]

On January 24, the FR reached an agreement with the PNȚ and the Iron Guard, whereby the three groups would distribute their parliamentary seats on a parity basis."Ultima oră. Viața politică. Bilanț săptămânal. Un acord al opoziției. 'Totul pentru țară' se pregătește. Cresc încasările", in Cuvântul, January 31, 1938, p. 20 The Electoral Commission revised its decision on January 29, when it assigned three dots to the PNȚ, and four to the FR."Atribuirea numerelor de ordine și semnelor de puncte pentru alegerile generale. Au fost respinse cinci liste. Hotărârile Comisiunii Centrale Electorale de ori dimineață", in Cuvântul, January 31, 1938, p. 11 Vaida received visits from two PNȚ militants, Grigore Gafencu and Mihail Ghelmegeanu, who pushed for a reunification of the two groups. Patria, a PNȚ newspaper, reported that a fusion was planned to take place before February 1."Ultima oră. Vaidiștii și național-țărăniștii anunță reîntregirea partidului. Tineretul iunianist va cere revenirea în partidul național-țărănesc. Când se va produce fuziunea", in Patria, January 22, 1928, p. 8 On that day, Dragomirescu informed the public that the FR would continue as an independent group, in the process of reorganizing itself, and ready to collaborate with the PNC government. He reported that the Front was now divided into regional chapters. He himself was leader of the Western Moldavian chapters; Angelescu, Nițescu and Cândea respectively chaired over the Old-Kingdom (excluding Moldavia), Transylvania, and Bukovina sections. Patria reported that Argetoianu and his Agrarian Union Party had engaged the Vaidists in talks to form an electoral cartel."Evenimentele zilei. Cartelul electoral Vaida–Argetoianu", in Patria, January 29, 1937, p. 3 Mirto had resigned from the FR during the final days of January, citing as his reason "Mr Vaida's duplicitous policy toward the nationalist government which is presided upon by Mr Goga."

On February 10, after "sham consultations" with Vaida and other opposition leaders,Mezarescu, pp. 309–310 Carol toppled Goga and set up a government of his choice, under Patriarch Miron. Six former FR politicos, beginning with Ioanițescu, became ministers of that cabinet.Berți, p. 152. See also Moldovan, p. 328 The FR's strategists proposed to Carol that he outlaw all parties that were not explicitly monarchist; among their competitors, Călinescu proposed that these be merged into a single-party system. Vaida examined the option and remained a skeptic, since he believed Romanians were essentially unruly and too "Byzantine" to accept discipline and a unified command.Bruja (2004), p. 235 In one of its final manifestos, penned by Nițescu, the FR had noted that Germany could not be trusted to guarantee Romania's borders, and that the "old alliances and friendships", including the Little Entente, still worked best for Romania. Nițescu also noted that solving the "Jewish question" could be done without German intrusion, and that antisemitism was important to the FR only as a facet of its "anti-alienism".Voicu Nițescu, "Păstrarea țării e unica noastră grije {{sic}}. Politica noastră în afară", in Gazeta Transilvaniei, Issue 10/1938, pp. 1–2

Formal disestablishment came on March 30, 1938.Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 220; Țurlea (2006), p. 17 In the end, both the FR and PNC were officially subsumed by the National Renaissance Front (FRN) when Carol chose in favor of Călinescu's more dictatorial project.Bruja (2004), passim; Moldovan, pp. 328–329, 333, 349; Țurlea (2006), pp. 12–13, 17–18, 40–41; Veiga, pp. 247–248; Webb, pp. 152–153 This catch-all group emerged in December 1938, and had six FR men signed on among the 53 founding members.Țurlea (2006), p. 23 One of them was Vaida himself, who noted: "I have the greatest spiritual satisfaction that, having submitted to the legal requirement of dissolving the 'Romanian Front', I witness HRH Carol II's 'National Renaissance Front', a new Phoenix, emerging from its ashes and those of other patriotic and well-meaning entities.""'Frontul Renașterii Naționale' este o înfăptuire de valoare istorică", in Foaia Poporului, Issue 52/1938, p. 2 He became critical of his peers in January 1939, when he noted that the numerus policy had been proclaimed, but never enforced, and that a ban on the Jewish liquor trade was not fully imposed.Remizier, "Situația", in Revista Economică, Vol. XLI, Issue 4, January 1939, p. 24 With the FRN takeover, Tilea became Carol's ambassador in the United Kingdom, trying to salvage the British–Romanian alliance in the face of German encroachment. During an international incident of March 1939, he warned that Germany would invade and carve-up Romania.Denis Fabian, "România și inițiativa politică a Marii Britanii pentru crearea unui sistem de securitate colectivă în primăvara anului 1939", in Studia Universitatis Moldaviae, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 12–14; Mihail E. Ionescu, "De ce s-a risipit România Mare?", in Magazin Istoric, May 2021, pp. 34–36 Brudariu similarly accepted FRN offices, but expressed his dissidence, which was increasingly leftist and anti-fascist in tone.Florescu, pp. 214–215

Carol encouraged Vaida to hope that the FR and other groups would be reestablished as the loyal opposition to the FRN, but he eventually allowed Călinescu to veto any such proposals.Țurlea (2006), pp. 17–18 "Vaidists" were still acknowledged as an "intermediary group", or distinct FRN faction, during the sham elections of June 1939, though Călinescu took pains to prevent their interference with the electoral process.Florin Grecu, "'Campania electorală' din mai 1939; mecanisme, proceduri și comportament electoral", in Sfera Politicii, Vol. XX, Issue 3, May–June 2012, p. 137 One-time FR affiliates were the plurality of FRN leadership cadres in Cluj and Hunedoara counties.Țurlea (2006), pp. 103–104 Upon his electoral validation, Vaida became Chamber President through acclamation,Țurlea (2006), p. 118 subsequently helping to pass legislation that introduced protectionism and banned workers' strikes.Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 229 He took a conciliatory line in his discourse on minorities, arguing that these needed to be "kept on our side"; his stance was welcomed by the Hungarian deputy Ádám Teleki.Țurlea (2006), p. 130 Over that interval, Călinescu oversaw a repression of the Iron Guard, which resulted in him being assassinated by another Guardist death squad in September 1939. Immediately after, Vaida was considered for the position of Prime Minister ad interim, but lost to Gheorghe Argeșanu.Dov Lungu, "Ultima zi a lui Armand Călinescu", in Magazin Istoric, July 1975, p. 45 From January 1940, Vaida was also FRN Chairman.Gheorghe & Șerbu, p. 228; Moldovan, pp. 333, 349, 359–363; Țurlea (2006), p. 188 In private, he derided this arrangement, noting that "renaissance" was a misnomer: "all the old politicians are today eminences of the [National Renaissance] Front."Bruja (2004), p. 237

In contrast to Tilea, Vaida accepted Nazi demands and, in 1940, acknowledged the Nazi-imposed cession of Northern Transylvania to Hungary. Almost uniquely among Carol's advisers, he also recommended a population exchange.Netea, pp. 103, 106, 175 Attempting to steer Romania close to Germany, Carol was again considering Vaida, widely seen as a Nazi favorite, for the Romanian premiership.Țurlea (2006), pp. 235–236 The FR's former leadership took different paths during the later stages of World War II. In late 1940, the FRN regime was replaced by the Iron Guard's National Legionary State, which was aligned with Nazism. Tilea refused to return home, and organized a pro-Allied Romanian lobby in London, also reaching out to the PNȚ opposition.Dennis Deletant, "Iuliu Maniu și Marea Britanie", in Magazin Istoric, October 2018, pp. 15–18; Nicolae C. Rațiu, "Prefață", in Ion Rațiu, Jurnal. Volumul I: Începuturile unui exil îndelungat 1940—1954, pp. 14–17. Bucharest: Editura Corint, 2017. {{ISBN|978-606-793-118-1}}. See also Țepelea & Șimăndan, p. 46 Vaida remained in Romania during the interval. He was detained after the pro-Allied coup of 1944, and died in March 1950 while under house arrest in Sibiu. By then, Potârcă had emerged as a spokesman of the former FR, leading some of its members back into the PNȚ.Rădulescu, p. 65 In 1945–1946, former FR activist Hațieganu became the last-ever PNȚ man in government, serving as minister without portfolio under Petru Groza.Aurelian Chistol, "Elemente ale desfășurării campaniei electorale în armată în 1946", in Argessis, Studii și Comunicări. Seria Istorie, Vol. X, 2001, p. 421 In January 1945, communist Iosif Ardeleanu publicized his critique of Maniu as a man under "fascist influence", as shown by his cultivating Vaidists and Iron Guard defectors.Iosif Ardeleanu, "Primejdia influenței fasciste și Iuliu Maniu. II", in Scînteia, January 19, 1945, p. 1

Mirto was allowed back into the PNȚ, but defected again in May 1946, before the parliamentary election in November. He joined the Alexandrescu Peasantists and was allowed into the communist-run Bloc of Democratic Parties,"Mirto volt igazságügy miniszter kilépésével tovább bomlik Maniu pártja", in Világosság, May 23, 1946, p. 3. See also Răzvan Victor Pantelimon, "'Unitatea politică a clasei muncitoare': agitație și propagandă în Ialomița, 1944–1948", in Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, Vol. V, Issue 3, 2005, p. 701 while Potârcă became one of its prominent critics. After 1948, a communist regime proceeded to investigate and imprison various other figures associated with the FR. In 1950, a "screening" campaign at the Ministry of Metallurgy expelled from the Communist Party a certain Botez, who had been found to be a former magistrate and FR affiliate.Alesandru Duțu, Elena Istrățescu, Maria Ignat,Ioana Alexandra Negreanu, Vasile Popa, Alexandru Oșca, Nevian Tunăreanu (eds.), România — viața politică în documente. 1950, p. 94. Bucharest: National Archives of Romania, 2002. {{ISBN|973-8308-07-0}} After having returned into PNȚ ranks, Vlad was arrested and sent to Sighet prison, where he died in July 1953.{{in lang|ro}} Romulus Rusan, [https://web.archive.org/web/20170622094836/http://revista22.ro/5086/.html "Elitele Unirii exterminate în închisori"], in Revista 22, Nr. 977, November–December 2008Gheorghe & Șerbu, pp. 198, 200–201 Potârcă was tortured and died in similar circumstances the following year;Rădulescu, pp. 65–66 Hațieganu and Sever Dan were also held at Sighet, but both survived. Brudariu was initially accepted into Groza's Ploughmen's Front, but came under investigation in 1956. He was released from prison upon Groza's intervention in 1958, but died shortly after.Florescu, p. 215 While Buzdugan evaded arrest by going into hiding,C. D. Zeletin, "Taina poetului Ion Buzdugan", in Metaliteratură, Vol. 12, Issues 1–2, 2012, p. 41 Iovipale spent time in Pitești prison, and died while on probation in 1964. By contrast, his colleague Lepădătescu was promoted to high office within the Securitate, and helped to prosecute National Peasantist opponents of the regime.Pătrașcu, pp. 190–191

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• Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania. Iași: Polirom, 2004. {{ISBN|973-681-989-2}}
• Politics and Political Parties in Roumania. London: International Reference Library Publishers Co., 1936. {{OCLC|252801505}}
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• Victor Moldovan, Memoriile unui politician din perioada interbelică. Vol. I. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2016. {{ISBN|978-973-595-971-5}}
• Ioan Munteanu, Sever Bocu: 1874–1951 (Mvsevm Banaticvm Temesiense: Bibliotheca Historica et Archaeologica Banatica, XX). Timișoara: Editura Mirton, 1999. {{ISBN|973-578-760-1}}
• Lucian Nastasă, Antisemitismul universitar în România (1919–1939). Cluj-Napoca: Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităților Naționale, 2011. {{ISBN|978-6-06-927445-3}}
• Vasile Netea, Memorii. Târgu Mureș: Editura Nico, 2010. {{ISBN|978-606-546-049-2}}
• Carmen-Florentina Olteanu Voica, "Imaginea evreilor reflectatã în Gazeta Transilvaniei în perioada interbelicã", in Țara Bârsei, Vol. VII, Issue 7, 2008, pp. 213–218.
• Z. Ornea, Anii treizeci. Extrema dreaptă românească. Bucharest: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1995. {{ISBN|973-9155-43-X}}
• Șerban Pătrașcu, Istoria Baroului Dolj 1928–1948. Craiova: Editura Sitech, 2018. {{ISBN|978-606-11-6470-7}}
• Marin Pop, "Alegerile parlamentare din decembrie 1937 în județul Sălaj", in Anuarul Presei Sălăjene, 2017, pp. 143–149.
• Sorin Radu, "Semnele electorale ale partidelor politice în perioada interbelică", in Anuarul Apulum, Vol. XXXIX, 2002, pp. 574–586.
• Toma Rădulescu, "Virgil Potârcă (1888–1954) și Alexandru Vălimărescu (1899–1984) — reprezentanți de prestigiu ai Baroului Dolj", in Iustitia. Revista Baroului Dolj, Vol. V, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 62–68.
• I. Scurtu, "Lupta partidelor politice în alegerile parlamentare din decembrie 1937", in Studii. Revistă de Istorie, Vol. 20, Issue 1, 1967, pp. 145–162.
• Mihail Sebastian, Journal, 1935–1944. London: Random House, 2003. {{ISBN|0-7126-8388-7}}
• Gabriel Țepelea, Emil Șimăndan, Călătorie prin veac. Arad: Editura Fundației Ioan Slavici, 2000. {{ISBN|973-99000-2-X}}
• Petre Țurlea,
• Partidul unui rege: Frontul Renașterii Naționale. Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2006. {{ISBN|973-45-0543-2}}
• "România sub stăpânirea Camarilei Regale (1930–1940) (III)", in Analele Universității Creștine Dimitrie Cantemir. Seria Istorie, Vol. 2, Issues 1–2, 2011, pp. 161–205.
• Francisco Veiga, Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919–1941: Mistica ultranaționalismului. Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993. {{ISBN|973-28-0392-4}}
• Leon Volovici, Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism. The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s. Oxford etc.: Pergamon Press, 1991. {{ISBN|0-08-041024-3}}
• Adrian Webb, The Routledge Companion to Central and Eastern Europe since 1919. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. {{ISBN|0-203-92817-2}}

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{{Fascism}}

{{Historical Romanian political parties}}

Category:Defunct political parties in Romania

Category:Fascist parties in Romania

Category:Romanian nationalist parties

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Category:Political parties established in 1935

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Category:1935 establishments in Romania

Category:1938 disestablishments in Romania

Category:National Peasants' Party breakaway groups

Category:Political parties in the Kingdom of Romania