Talk:Emergence#RfC

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Un-notified Litigation by Fourdee against Psychohistorian

There is a discussion about "un-notified litigation" available at Talk:Emergence/Litigation which was moved because it does not directly relate to the content of the article.

Emergence is not that complicated

About the mathematical proof of the emergence.

can not any closed figure be used as a simpler proof??

I mean, you can make a circle of bend lines, and only when all the lines are put into place the emergence shows.

References

missing topic connection

This article should reference the Wikipedia article on Ramsey Theory. Kontribuanto (talk) 16:31, 6 May 2025 (UTC)

Emergence isn't associated with Reductionism

The whole point behind the phenomenon of emergence is that some traits, things, or phenomenon cannot be reduced and understood by their component parts and that runs counter to the claim of reductionism that they can be simply understood and broken down in such a manner. 47.5.66.54 (talk) 06:55, 15 May 2025 (UTC)

A new definition of "strong emergence" is needed

The simple definition of emergence, in which a system exhibits a different - emergent - behaviour than each of its constituent parts, regularly raises questions. For example, it is certainly not the case that emergent behaviour is reserved for large numbers of components (such as a school of fish or starlings). For example: a molecule has different properties than its constituent atoms, properties that are often not predictable from the properties of those atoms. The emergent behaviour of a molecule requires consideration of the entire molecular system, in which only the outermost electron configurations of the constituent atoms are involved and no knowledge of deeper properties of the atoms is required. Reductionism is therefore only applicable to a very limited extent.

The same applies to artefacts. Each artefact was preceded by an invention or discovery, in which chance often played a major role. Take, for example, a hammer, consisting of a handle and a head. The combination of the two produces a new, emergent property: namely the functionality of the hammer. For that functionality, only the stiffness of the stem, the mass and the shape of the head and how the whole is connected to each other are important, but no deeper properties at micro level. Through downward causation, we, humans, can then make continuous improvements to the design, which improves the functionality. A special feature here is that this type of emergence is scale-dependent and can only be subjectively recognized as functional. In other words, it is emergent within a certain cultural context.

In nature, almost the same thing happens: in the course of evolution, inventions regularly take place through "trial and error" through mutations in the genes. The principle of "survival of the fittest" works here as downward causation on the chance of survival of such a mutation, in which the ecosystem in which such a living being must try to survive plays a major role (just like the cultural context with artefacts).

In both cases, artefacts and living beings, it is impossible to predict how such a new composition of parts and/or genes will influence the end result. However, you can examine reductionistically how such an emergent phenomenon came into being. In this case, the properties of the emergent (functional) phenomenon supervene on certain components. For example, a small error in one component can have dramatic consequences for the whole, such as a "bug" in a software program, or a missing genetic code.

It is obvious to link the concept of "strong emergence" to the previous, if it were not for the fact that in philosophy a completely different meaning is given to this: namely, an ontologically different phenomenon that has no connection whatsoever with already existing physical phenomena (see f.i. Bedau, Mark A. (1997). [http://people.reed.edu/~mab/papers/weak.emergence.pdf "Weak Emergence"](PDF). Philosophical Perspectives. 11: 375–399]].. Weak emergence is then reserved for emergent phenomena, in which the constituent components retain their independence (i.e. a temporary phenomenon, such as a flight of starlings or a whirlpool in the water). It would be much more logical to link the concept of strong emergence to systems, in which the constituent components have lost their independence and are part of a sustainable, permanent combination such as a molecule.

How do we think about this? Ypan1944 (talk) 12:53, 3 June 2025 (UTC)