Talk:Metaphysics
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|dykentry = ... that a nihilist school of metaphysics contends that tables and chairs do not exist?
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On the rationalists
Several of these articles are well done and I'd like to invite these editors to edit the analytic philosophy page as well. That said, it seems to me Leibniz especially so, but Descartes also, follow a kind of idealism in their metaphysics. Thomas Reid calls Descartes to Kant i. e. modern philosophy "the way of ideas" for that reason, or for a representationalism entailing idealism. John Searle has the same attitude. The Cogito very much ushers in the age of idealism, by saying we are ultimately mind rather than our bodies. In other words, Cartesianism is a kind of idealism. It's not called "French idealism", but it could be, just as there is German idealism and British idealism after it. There are also idealists who happen to be German or British, but who fit more with the tradition of Leibniz, and so like him aren't classed with their countrymen, such as George Boole. More over, it's just a fact that the rationalism/empiricism dispute is an epistemological one, not a metaphysical one. Berkeley shows quite clearly how empiricism doesn't entail materialism, nor does rationalism entail idealism. "A rationalist system of metaphysics" sounds like a category error, and it certainly isn't wrong to say modern period = idealist metaphysics. Maybe replace "rationalist" with "Cartesian"? Then again, those like Berkeley aren't Cartesian or Hegelian, but certainly an idealist. And the lede might not want to explain "Cartesian". Cake (talk) 06:55, 28 April 2024 (UTC)
:Hello {{u|MisterCake}} and thanks for your help with this article and the suggestions. As I understand it, the issue is with the following sentence in the lead: {{tq|The modern period saw the emergence of many rationalist and idealist systems of metaphysics.}} The problem is whether it should mention the term "rationalist" or just talk about idealist systems of philosophy. The expression "idealists systems" was meant to refer primarily to German and British idealism in the 19th century while the expression "rationalist systems" was meant to refer primarily to earlier systems by Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza.
:Technically, I think the expression is correct. For instance, [https://books.google.com/books?id=FFM8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT79] has a whole section dedicted to "rationalist metaphysics" and explicitly links the term to Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza. For other examples, see [https://books.google.com/books?id=Eu7_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA35] and [https://books.google.com/books?id=34KENSpU2gkC&pg=PA6]. But just because the term is correct does not mean that we need to use it and maybe there is a way to avoid the connotations that you are concerned about. The problem I see with using just "idealist" is that it excludes Decartes, who is a dualist, and Spinoza. One alternative would be to instead use the sentence {{tq|In the modern period, rationalists and idealists developed comprehensive systems of metaphysics.}} By applying the term "rationalist" to the authors, we do not directly state that their systems are rationalist. Another alternative could be {{tq|The modern period saw the emergence of various comprehensive systems of metaphysics, many of which embraced idealism.}} This way, it's clear that not all of them were idealist. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:29, 28 April 2024 (UTC)
::If it's used in books then that seems to settle it. Talk of rationalist philosophers rather than rationalist metaphysics seems another way to do it. "Rationalist metaphysics" seems to me similar to saying "a priori metaphysics", which Kripke and others emphasize is a kind of confusing of epistemic and metaphysical. It reads as if rationalism and idealism are some contrasting dichotomy. Your own source (the page 35) notes the importance of Descartes for German idealism. While of course he is a dualist, he also seems to view mind as supreme over matter. It just seems to me French idealism was first, seen in the French influence on Leibniz and Hume, and is called Cartesianism rather than French idealism. So I do think {{tq|In the modern period, Cartesians and idealists developed comprehensive systems of metaphysics.}} would at least be accurate, and is what is meant by rationalist metaphysics. Though that reads weird as Cartesian is a kind of idealist, I submit. By idealist you mean Kantian idealist. Kant called Descartes a "problematic idealist." Hence I opted for the simpler {{tq|In the modern period, idealists...}} Cake (talk) 11:50, 28 April 2024 (UTC)
::Put another way, it wants to say {{tq|In the modern period, Cartesians and Kantians (or Hegelians) developed comprehensive systems of metaphysics.}} But nobody will understand the namedropping, so {{tq|In the modern period, problematic idealists and transcendental/absolute idealists developed comprehensive systems of metaphysics}} but that's too much complicated Kant jargon, so just {{tq|...idealists...}}Cake (talk) 12:19, 28 April 2024 (UTC)
:::Your last comment does a great job at highlighting the difficulty involved. I implemented one of the suggestions above; it seems to be closest to your idea of emphasizing idealism while avoiding the reference to rationalism. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:53, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
::::A little longwinded now but I appreciate the accuracy. Maybe one could add Russell and Moore's "revolt against idealism" to the article. Also, not sure where to put it, perhaps in the "particulars" section, but it seems the article could use a mention of P. F. Strawson and his distinction between "descriptive" and "revisionary" metaphysics. Cake (talk) 09:15, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
::::PS As well as the Aristotle quote "being qua being" or "being as such" there is also his quote from Book IV that metaphysics studies that which no "special science" studies, arguably as famous. Cake (talk) 09:25, 29 April 2024 (UTC)
:::::I found a way to mention Strawson and Moore. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:40, 30 April 2024 (UTC)
::::::Well done and thank you. I think my last suggestion would be some mention of Van Inwagen in the body, perhaps in the free will section. Quite a noteworthy metaphysician, as you must know from the article. To digress and while I don't want to go into "original research", Dummett for example seems to take the "revolt against idealism" to include Frege and Brentano. His Origins of Analytical Philosophy doesn't even touch on Anglo-American thinkers and has chapters like "Brentano" and "The Extrusion Of Thoughts From The Mind." Seems it was more than a "Russell and Moore" thing. I think if there was a known link with Bolzano, he would want to include him too. So it seems to me a characterization of early analytic philosophy, if not all of it. The Thought and On Denoting are both notable for being surrounded by idealist articles in their original publication. Cake (talk) 12:02, 30 April 2024 (UTC)
:::::::In any case, the revolt seems to have been successful given the prominence of physicalism today. By the way, I added a footnote to mention Inwagen's consequence argument. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:02, 1 May 2024 (UTC)
::::::::I find myself sympathetic to third avenues like platonism which seem to have been just as much a part of the revolt. I suppose that was my point, it's relegated to an idea of "idealism v. materialism" like Hegel v. Marx with the stereotype of Anglo empiricism when it should include Frege saying thoughts aren't ideas and Brentano says all mental acts have a real object. Not to mention mathematicians tend to be platonists, so it seems to me. And thank you, his consequence argument and his argument against the PSR are most influential. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBchW6GLBss Other times] he is slow going. Cake (talk) 13:58, 1 May 2024 (UTC)
{{Talk:Metaphysics/GA1}}
Did you know nomination
{{Template:Did you know nominations/Metaphysics}}
There was some additional discussion at Wikipedia talk:Did you know#Metaphysics. I'm copying it here for the record. Andrew🐉(talk) 07:39, 21 June 2024 (UTC)
=Metaphysics=
- ... that metaphysics may have received its name by a historical accident?
(nom page: Template:Did you know nominations/Metaphysics)
This seems to be not compliant with the guidelines at WP:DYKHOOK, which say that {{xt|"The hook should include a definite fact"}}. If it may have received its name thus, then it's not definite is it. Also, the line in the article saying {{xt|"it is often suggested that metaphysics got its name by a historical accident"}} is an unsupported attribution, we need to be saying who suggests this. And the next line saying {{xt|"his editor may have coined it"}} is also rather vague. I'd suggest we need a more thorough detailing in the prose as to what the issue with the name actually is, and reasons as to why it may or may not have been a historical accident, with quotes if appropriate. {{ping|Phlsph7|Generalissima|Launchballer}} Cheers — Amakuru (talk) 08:55, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
:Hello {{u|Amakuru}} and thanks for raising this concern. I'm not sure what the right interpretation of "definite fact" in WP:DYKHOOK is. If it means that we cannot state common opinions (in the academic discourse) as such, then it is not a definite fact. If it means that the claim is well supported by reliable sources and "unlikely to change", then it is a definite fact. My experience with this type of meta-discussions is that there is usually no simple way to resolve them so unless you find what I've said so far convincing, it might be best to save ourselves the trouble and go for ALT1 instead.
:As for the passage in the article, I don't think it's feasible or desirable to provide a representative list of all philosophers that have suggested this common opinion. I agree that vagueness should usually be avoided but there are cases where it is fitting and this may be one of them. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:48, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
:If we wanted, we could ascribe the view to Mumford 2012, who uses the exact term "historical accident". This might give the false impression that this is a view advanced by a single philosopher. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:55, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
::{{ec}} Hi {{ping|Phlsph7}} and thanks for your response. I'll leave it for DYK regulars here to comment on the issue of whether facts that may not be true but whose "possible" status is well-attested and frequently said are valid at DYK - I'd lean towards saying not myself, simply because there are many things that "may" be true, and if they're not necessarily true then such facts aren't generally going to be very remarkable. As for the second point, however, I think this definitely does need to be addressed before the hook goes live. Unsupported attributions are contrary to guidelines at WP:INTEXT and WP:WEASEL, and while I wouldn't expect you to list every philosopher who's ever said it, we need to provide enough information that readers can infer the state of research on this and the likelihood that it's true. This will need to be remedied before the hook goes live. Cheers — Amakuru (talk) 10:01, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
:::I reformulated the passage to include attribution. Does this change solve your concern? Phlsph7 (talk) 11:48, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
::::{{ping|Phlsph7}} yes, that's great now. Thanks — Amakuru (talk) 16:44, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
- There are multiple problems with this hook. Mumford's claim that this was an accident seems to be nonsense and, as discussion of the matter goes back millennia, reference to him would be WP:RECENTISM. The OED has an extensive etymology and the word "accident" does not appear in it. Here are some of its key points:
{{tqb|Asclepius in his commentary on the Metaphysics says that Aristotle thought that ontological philosophy should be taught after natural philosophy, and that this explains why the work is entitled μετὰ τὰ ϕυσικά ‘After the Physics’. Asclepius does not say who first gave the work that title; modern scholars sometimes assume that the title goes back to Eudemus of Rhodes (later 4th cent. B.C.), who, according to Asclepius, produced an edition of the work. The explanation which Asclepius offers for the title of the work receives support from the fact that, as Porphyry (3rd cent., in In Aristotelis Categorias Expositio) and some later writers make clear, Aristotle's Categories was sometimes called πρὸ τῶν τοπικῶν or πρὸ τῶν τόπων ‘Before the Topics’.
...
The title came to be used as the name for the branch of study treated in these books, and hence came to be interpreted as meaning ‘the science of things transcending what is physical or natural’.}}
So, the word has a likely origin while its later meaning is something of a false etymology or semantic change. Such shifts in meaning are a natural part of language. For example, "science" originally meant knowledge in a general sense from the Latin scientia but has developed over the centuries to its modern meaning of formal and systematic disciplines such as physics. This is not accidental; it's just a consequence of the way the word and the world have developed over time.
Anyway, as there seem to be different ways of presenting this and there's some conjecture involved, it's not a definite fact.
Andrew🐉(talk) 21:49, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
:Hello {{u|Andrew Davidson|Andrew}} and thanks for weighing in. I agree with your concerns about attributing this claim to Mumford. This was mainly done because of the repeated explicit requests above. Mumford 2012 is a high-quality reliable source, so I would be careful about dismissing it as nonsense. There are usually different ways to present or describe a passage of events. I don't think that anything in the text you quote contradicts that this passage of events can be accurately described as a historical accident.
:For more high-quality sources supporting this claim:
:*[https://books.google.com/books?id=dCWEDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT33]: {{green|"The use of the term 'metaphysics' to denote these topics is a historical accident"}}
:*[https://books.google.com/books?id=Las3AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA127]: {{green|"Indeed, it is largely just an historical accident that metaphysics is called what it is..."}}
:*[https://books.google.com/books?id=sv84Gi7C9jgC&pg=PA203]: {{green|"It is a historical accident that gave us the expression ta meta ta physika for certain writings of Aristotle..."}}
:These sources support a stronger claim than Mumford 2012. We could make the hook more "definite" by changing it to:
:* ALT0a: ... that metaphysics received its name by a historical accident?
:However, it's not my intention to get into a lengthy discussion on this. It seems that you two are convinced that this claim is inappropriate as a DYK hook. Would ALT1 be acceptable to you? Phlsph7 (talk) 06:48, 18 June 2024 (UTC)
::I agree that it would be good to consider alternatives. The current ALTs are:
::* ALT1: ... that 20th-century metaphysics started with a "revolt against idealism"?
::* ALT2: ... that according to some metaphysicians, everything in the world is predetermined, but humans are free nonetheless?
::My impression is that ALT1 is about a local development in British philosophy and that the division between that and continental philosophy is not adequately explained.
::ALT2 has a blatant weasel and so needs to be more specific.
::Browsing for ideas, I find a good aphorism that "There are arguments in metaphysics, not facts." An especially astounding example is given and that might make a good hook:
::*ALT3: ... that a nihilist school of metaphysics contends that tables and chairs do not exist?
::The article already mentions this in a couple of places and it's easy to find more sources such as [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254194 this] and [https://research.manchester.ac.uk/en/publications/nihilism-without-self-contradiction that].
::Andrew🐉(talk) 09:15, 18 June 2024 (UTC)
:::ALT3 is fine with me. Phlsph7 (talk) 07:25, 19 June 2024 (UTC)
=Post posting=
The ALT3 hook has now been posted on the main page and it's remarkable that it went through so easily. Kudos to {{u|Phlsph7}} for his easy-going acceptance of the suggestion.
It links to mereological nihilism which has a variety of clean-up tags including a request for an {{tl|expert}}. I'm thinking that this would be a good time to address these. Is {{u|Phlsph7}} such an expert? I was thinking of making a start by reference to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy but that seems to use other headings to discuss the concept such as [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/ Ordinary Objects] and [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/ Eliminitavism]. This makes it hard for us to cite as we can't be sure that these different words mean the same thing. This is the general problem with philosophy – it soon gets bogged down in difficulties of definition and exact language.
As an aside, it's amusing to consider Wikipedia as a metaphor for these difficulties. Our articles are not static or stable and so their shifting text, titles and categories are like the shifting and uncertain nature of reality.
Andrew🐉(talk) 08:01, 21 June 2024 (UTC)
:{{ping|Andrew Davidson}} Thanks for raising this point. On a first look, the article has a few "dubious – discuss" and "citation needed" tags with a few unreferenced paragraphs and a remark to check the talk page for a more in-depth discussion of these issues. It would take some time to get to the bottom of this and address the issues, possibly until after the DYK round ends. You are right that one has to be quite careful about terminology. For example, eliminativism as in eliminative materialism belongs to philosophy of mind and may not have a direct bearing on this issue. The faster solution would be to remove the wikilink from our hook. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:29, 21 June 2024 (UTC)
::I favour keeping the link for the following reasons:
:::* to identify the school of thought
:::* to give the reader an opportunity to follow-up and get its gist
:::* in the hope of attracting an expert who might take it further
::As for eliminativism, that's another example of how the jargon can confuse. It's the heading of section 1.2 in [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ordinary-objects/ Ordinary Objects] but I agree that the other article is rather different but our wikilink for the word goes to that topic. It might be amusing to generalise this. For example, see [https://www.amazon.co.uk/Eliminativism-Objects-Persons-Non-Existence-Metaphysics/dp/0367000210 Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons] in which the author defends the view that he doesn't exist!
::None of this is a big deal; it's mainly that it seems better to follow up and engage that just let topics lie fallow.
Aristotle who?
I was astonished to discover no mention of Aristotle, not even on the disambiguation page. I get that college courses in Philosophy are not a prerequisite to gather and merge related books, but methinks there should at least be a link to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle) on the disambiguation page.
Hpfeil (talk) 17:11, 23 July 2024 (UTC)
:Both Metaphysics and Metaphysics (disambiguation) have links to Metaphysics (Aristotle). Did you intend to post this to a different talk page? Phlsph7 (talk) 07:37, 25 July 2024 (UTC)
Incorrect topic linked in Hyperlink to "conceptual schemes"
If you click on the Text "conceptual schemes" then it takes the reader to incorrect topic page because the Hyperlinked wikipedia page shown is for the topic
"Conceptual Schema"
which is NOT Coneptual SchemE
it is Conceptual SchemA
Which is in fact a
"Database Schema" related article and not a Metaphysics related topic.
So, please correct the link if you have any existing correct article page on
"Conceptuual Scheme"
Else kindly remove the hyperlink. EssenTechIT (SJ) (talk) 21:32, 8 September 2024 (UTC)
:{{done}} Shapeyness (talk) 22:55, 8 September 2024 (UTC)
Francis Bacon
I appreciate the effort that's gone into the article and realize we have to avoid inserting everyone's personal favourites. Nevertheless, while empiricism and Hume are mentioned in the correct places as critics and as contributors (or pruners?) in the history section, the great critic of metaphysics who is often seen as the founder of that stream is not mentioned. I'd like to suggest that Bacon should probably be mentioned. I realize he is quoted less often in textbooks today, perhaps because his works are written in styles of less familiar genres, but for several critical centuries he was seen as a central figure in this story. In my mind he played a big role in switching most metaphysical thinking towards looking for "laws of nature", regularities in nature, giving up on more complex speculations, and aiming at being useful. Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:01, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
:Hello {{u|Andrew Lancaster}} and thanks for the suggestion. I found a way to mention Bacon via his influence on empiricism. I'm not sure that we should expand much on this since overviews of metaphysics often don't mention him. I'm also not sure that he was critical of metaphysics in general. As I understand it, Bacon thought that metaphysics is part of natural science. In his terminology, metaphysics is different from Aristotle's first philosophy. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:52, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
::Thanks. I agree that it can't be much in an article like this. Whether or not we use such information, I think he indeed had an affect on what the term "metaphysics" means, or should mean, which does seem to make him important. He also had a major impact on how and why people approached metaphysical questions. Just taking the Stanford website as an easily available example of a short university style treatment for us here on the talk page: [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/]
border=1 |
Forms are more general than the four Aristotelian causes and that is why Bacon's discussion of the forms of substances as the most general properties of matter is the last step for the human mind when investigating nature. Metaphysics is distinct from philosophia prima. The latter marks the position in the system where general categories of a general theory of science are treated as (1) universal categories of thought, (2) relevant for all disciplines. Final causes are discredited, since they lead to difficulties in science and tempt us to amalgamate theological and teleological points of doctrine. At the summit of Bacon's pyramid of knowledge are the laws of nature (the most general principles). At its base the pyramid starts with observations, moves on to invariant relations and then to more inclusive correlations until it reaches the stage of forms. The process of generalization ascends from natural history via physics towards metaphysics, whereas accidental correlations and relations are eliminated by the method of exclusion. It must be emphasized that metaphysics has a special meaning for Bacon. This concept (1) excludes the infinity of individual experience by generalization with a teleological focus and (2) opens our mind to generate more possibilities for the efficient application of general laws. |
[...] He rejects Aristotle's logic, which is based on his metaphysical theory, whereby the false doctrine is implied that the experience which comes to us by means of our senses (things as they appear) automatically presents to our understanding things as they are. Simultaneously Aristotle favors the application of general and abstract conceptual distinctions, which do not conform to things as they exist. Bacon, however, introduces his new conception of philosophia prima as a meta-level for all scientific disciplines." |
[...] Two kinds of axioms correspond to the following division of philosophy and the sciences: the investigation of forms or metaphysics; and the investigation of efficient cause and matter, which leads to the latent process and configuration in physics. Physics itself is split up by Bacon into Mechanics, i.e., the practical, and Magic, i.e., the metaphysical. |
--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 14:56, 10 November 2024 (UTC)