Thing v. La Chusa

John Thing, a minor and son of plaintiff Maria Thing, was injured when he was struck by a car driven by James La Chusa. The plaintiff was close by, but did not see or hear the accident. The plaintiff's daughter informed her of the accident, and when the plaintiff arrived on the scene, she saw her bloody and unconscious son and suffered emotional distress as a result. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed.

In an effort to limit a potential runaway tort and to avoid the burdensome case-by-case analysis warned of in Dillon v. Legg, the court refined the necessary elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress first enunciated in Dillon into a bright-line rule:Henderson, J.A. et al. The Torts Process, Seventh Edition. Aspen Publishers, New York, NY: 2007, pp. 310-311

• The plaintiff must be closely related to the injury victim,
• The plaintiff must be present at the scene at the time of the injury, and must be aware that the victim is being injured, and
• The plaintiff must suffer emotional distress as a result

Based on the strict formulation of the second element, the court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover because she was not present at the scene and not aware of the injury at the time of the accident.Henderson, et al. p. 312

Justice Kaufman's concurrence criticized both the rigid rules of the majority opinion and the flexible guidelines advocated by Justice Broussard's dissent. Kaufman bemoaned the guidelines of Dillon v. Legg as hopelessly arbitrary, and advocated a return to the zone of danger rule as enunciated in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 676 (1989)

Justice Mosk's dissent voiced substantial agreement with Broussard's dissent, but also made a point of criticizing the majority's perspective on precedent. Mosk noted that a long list of California cases, including Archibald v. Braverman, Krouse v. Graham, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and State Rubbish Association v. Siliznoff evidenced an enduring theme of expanding tort liability for emotional distress.Thing, 48 Cal.3d at 677-80

Justice Broussard's dissent criticized the rigid rules imposed by the majority decision as arbitrary and something that can inevitably lead to under-compensation for real emotional distress injuries. Instead of bright-line rules, Broussard advocated that liability be determined by the application of well-developed tort principles of foreseeability and duty.Thing, 48 Cal.3d at 680-88

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Category:United States negligence case law

Category:1989 in United States case law

Category:Supreme Court of California case law

Category:1989 in California