Tripwire force

A tripwire force is a military force significantly smaller than the forces of a potential adversary.{{cite news|last1=Chamberlain|first1=Dianne|title=NATO's Baltic Tripwire Forces Won't Stop Russia|url=http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/natos-baltic-tripwire-forces-wont-stop-russia-17074|access-date=January 19, 2018|work=The National Interest|date=July 21, 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180119175540/http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/natos-baltic-tripwire-forces-wont-stop-russia-17074|archive-date=January 19, 2018}}{{cite news|title=Trip-wire deterrence|url=https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21701515-ageing-alliance-hopes-russia-will-get-message-it-serious-trip-wire-deterrence|access-date=January 18, 2018|newspaper=The Economist|date=July 2, 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180119235254/https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21701515-ageing-alliance-hopes-russia-will-get-message-it-serious-trip-wire-deterrence|archive-date=January 19, 2018}} The tripwire force helps deter aggression through the demonstration of the defending side's commitment to militarily counter an armed attack, even if the tripwire force cannot mount a sustained resistance itself. In the event an attack occurs, it helps defend against the aggressor by slowing the advance of the aggressor's forces to allow the defender time to marshal additional resources. The tripwire force can, in some instances, also be useful in deterring salami attacks.{{cite book|last1=George|first1=Alexander|title=Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice|url=https://archive.org/details/deterrenceinamer0000geor|url-access=registration|date=1974|publisher=Columbia University|isbn=0-231-03837-2|page=[https://archive.org/details/deterrenceinamer0000geor/page/393 393]}}

Because the tripwire force is too small, by itself, to present an offensive threat, it can be deployed without triggering the security dilemma.{{cite web|last1=Milevski|first1=Lukas|title=The Strategic Implications for the Baltic States of the NATO Warsaw Summit|url=https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/08/strategic-implications-baltic-states-nato-warsaw-summit/|website=fpri.org|publisher=Foreign Policy Research Institute|access-date=January 19, 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180119175558/https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/08/strategic-implications-baltic-states-nato-warsaw-summit/|archive-date=January 19, 2018}}

The term "glass plate" has been used as a synonym for tripwire force; an attack against the force metaphorically shatters the "glass" between peace and war.{{cite web|last1=Slantchev|first1=Branislav|title=Deterrence and Compellence|url=http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/ps12/08-deterrence-and-compellence.pdf|website=ucsd.edu|publisher=University of California at San Diego|access-date=January 18, 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180209125507/http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/ps12/08-deterrence-and-compellence.pdf|archive-date=February 9, 2018}}

The credibility of a tripwire force is tied to the "force having relevant combat capabilities and being of sufficient size that an adversary could neither sidestep nor capture the force" as well as to the potential of the defender to actually mobilize reserves robust enough to launch a counter-attack in a timely manner.{{cite book|last1=Samp|first1=Lisa|title=Recalibrating U.S. Strategy toward Russia: A New Time for Choosing|date=2017|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6sQpDwAAQBAJ|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield|isbn=9781442280069|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180209125507/https://books.google.com/books?id=6sQpDwAAQBAJ|archive-date=2018-02-09}}

File:Soviet tanks in Berlin 1961.jpg during the Cold War to deter the Soviet Union, whose tanks are pictured here during the Berlin Crisis of 1961.]]

United States Army Berlin, a U.S. Army formation posted to West Berlin during the Cold War, has been referred to as a tripwire force.{{cite news|title=The real reasons for positioning US forces here|url=https://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/editorial/the-real-reasons-for-positioning-us-forces-here-20111124-1v1ik.html|access-date=January 19, 2018|work=Sydney Morning Herald|date=November 24, 2011|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180120002401/http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/editorial/the-real-reasons-for-positioning-us-forces-here-20111124-1v1ik.html|archive-date=January 20, 2018}} Because a limited Soviet incursion into West Berlin, which resulted in no American casualties, might cause the sitting United States President to hesitate in mounting a counter-offensive, the Soviet Union – it was felt by western military planners – would have a strategic incentive to take such an action. By stationing American forces in West Berlin, U.S. casualties would be guaranteed during any future Soviet attack. In this way the United States would deny itself the political ability to abandon the conflict which would, in turn, guarantee a U.S. response up to – and including – the battlefield deployment of nuclear weapons.{{cite book|last1=Smith|first1=Derek|title=Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction|date=2004|publisher=University of Oxford|page=25}} Realizing this, the Soviet Union would not take offensive action against West Berlin even though it might be militarily capable of doing so.

File:SuHo_Lightening_Combined_Training_Exercise.jpg (pictured here in 2017) have been described as a tripwire force.]]

NATOs stance in the larger European theatre were also seen largely as a tripwire, whose primary purpose was to trigger the release of nuclear attacks on the Warsaw Pact.{{cite tech report |url=http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/69597/1/21813746_White_thesis.pdf |title=British Defence Planning and Britain's NATO commitment, 1979–1985 |date=October 2016 |first=Kenton |last=White |publisher=University of Reading}} The British 1957 Defence White Paper was based on a detailed look at the British Army of the Rhine's part as a tripwire and concluded it was larger than it needed to be to serve this function. If the force's primary purpose was to simply delay an advance until it became overwhelming and thus indicated a "real war", presumably being destroyed in the process, then a smaller force would work just as well. Accordingly, the BAOR was reduced from 77,000 to 64,000 over the next year.{{cite tech report |url=http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-129-86-c-57-84-34.pdf |title=Statement On Defence, 1957: Outline of Future Policy |date=1 April 1957}}

The deployment, in the mid 1970s, of a Soviet brigade to Cuba was at the time perceived by some to represent the introduction of a tripwire force onto the island – a method of deterring aggression against Cuba from "potential attackers who would not want to engage" the full Soviet Army.{{cite news|title=Cuba|url=https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/219308176/|access-date=January 19, 2018|work=News-Press|date=September 1, 1979|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180119235021/https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/219308176/|archive-date=January 19, 2018}}

British military forces in the Falkland Islands (Isles Malvinas) prior to the Falklands War were intended to serve as a tripwire force, though were ultimately an ineffective one as they were so small and lightly armed that they didn't represent a credible signal to Argentina of UK military commitment to the islands.{{cite news|title=Falklands can be defended with pre-1914 rifles, said MoD|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1506530/Falklands-can-be-defended-with-pre-1914-rifles-said-MoD.html|access-date=January 19, 2018|work=The Daily Telegraph|date=December 29, 2005|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180120065636/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1506530/Falklands-can-be-defended-with-pre-1914-rifles-said-MoD.html|archive-date=January 20, 2018}}{{cite book|last1=González|first1=Martín|title=The Genesis of the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict|date=2013|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-1137354235|page=167}} The Argentine invasion force had been given orders to overcome resistance without inflicting British casualties, and during the initial invasion successfully managed to bypass or capture all British units without resorting to deadly force.{{cite book|last1=Gustafson|first1=Lowell|title=The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands|date=1988|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=0195364724|page=131|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ip-9_W7efbAC|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140627022859/http://books.google.com/books?id=Ip-9_W7efbAC|archive-date=2014-06-27}}{{cite web|title=Falkland Islands War|url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Falkland-Islands-War|website=britannica.com|publisher=Encyclopædia Britannica |access-date=January 19, 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160804055019/https://www.britannica.com/event/Falkland-Islands-War|archive-date=August 4, 2016}}{{cite web|title=Argentina invades Falklands|url=http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/argentina-invades-falklands|website=history.com|publisher=History Channel|access-date=January 19, 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170728001128/http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/argentina-invades-falklands|archive-date=July 28, 2017}}

United States Forces Korea have also been referred to as a tripwire force due to the perception that they are too diminutive to singularly repel an attack by the Korean People's Army.{{cite web|title=Trip Wire: NATO's Russia Dilemma|url=https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/trip-wire-natos-russia-dilemma/|website=carnegie.org|publisher=Carnegie Corporation|access-date=January 1, 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180119234944/https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/trip-wire-natos-russia-dilemma/|archive-date=January 19, 2018}} Rather, they serve to convey "the certainty of American involvement should the North Koreans be tempted to invade".{{cite news|title=An Overly Costly 'Trip Wire' in Korea|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/21/opinion/an-overly-costly-trip-wire-in-korea.html|access-date=January 19, 2018|work=The New York Times|date=July 21, 1989|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180119175651/http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/21/opinion/an-overly-costly-trip-wire-in-korea.html|archive-date=January 19, 2018}}

Since 2014, several members of NATO deployed forces to the Baltic states as a stated tripwire against possible Russian actions.{{cite web |url=https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2017/10/the-royal-welsh-arrive-in-estonia/ |title= The Royal Welsh arrive in Estonia |date= 30 October 2017}}{{cite web |url=https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-reassurance.html |title= Operation Reassurance |date= May 2014}}

Paul K. Davis and John Arquilla have argued that the United States should have placed a tripwire force in Kuwait prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a method of signaling to Iraq the commitment of the U.S. to an armed response.{{cite web|title=US Regional Deterrence Strategies|url=http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a286795.pdf|website=dtic.mil|publisher=RAND Corporation|access-date=January 19, 2018|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170220011701/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a286795.pdf|archive-date=February 20, 2017}} In this way, they state, the Gulf War might have been avoided.

In 2014 Saudi Arabia reportedly requested the deployment of Pakistani military units to Yemen to act as a tripwire force in the event of an attack against the kingdom by Iran via Yemen.{{cite book|last1=Ahmed|first1=Khaled|title=Sleepwalking to Surrender: Dealing with Terrorism in Pakistan|date=2016|publisher=Penguin|isbn=978-9386057624}}

In 2015 Michael E. O'Hanlon theorized that a United States tripwire force could continue to be deployed in a hypothetically reunified Korea to meet American security guarantees to the region while avoiding provocation of China.{{cite book|last1=O'Hanlon|first1=Michael|title=The Future of Land Warfare|date=2015|publisher=Brookings Institution|isbn=978-0815726906|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3JIqCgAAQBAJ|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180209125508/https://books.google.com/books?id=3JIqCgAAQBAJ|archive-date=2018-02-09}} According to O'Hanlon, a small enough U.S. military deployment in Korea, posted at a sufficient distance from the Chinese border, would not present an offensive threat to the PRC but would ensure the likelihood of American casualties in the event of a land invasion of the Korean Peninsula, thereby guaranteeing future American military commitment to any realized conflict.

• Dissuasion du faible au fort

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Category:International relations terminology

Category:Military strategy