animalism (philosophy)
{{short description|Philosophical theory that humans are animals}}
{{Distinguish|animism|Animal Farm}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2020}}
{{Use Oxford spelling|date=December 2020}}
{{missing information|the philosophical theory of animalism|date=July 2018}}
{{Philosophy sidebar}}
In the philosophical subdiscipline of ontology, animalism is a theory of personal identity that asserts that humans are animals.{{sfn|Olson|2007|loc=sec. 2.1}} The concept of animalism is advocated by philosophers Eric T. Olson, Peter van Inwagen, Paul Snowdon, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov and David Wiggins.{{sfnm |1a1=Blatti |1a2=Snowdon |1y=2016 |2a1=Garrett |2y=1998 |3a1=Snowdon |3y=2017}}{{page needed|date=December 2020}} The view stands in contrast to positions such as John Locke's psychological criterion for personal identity or various forms of mind–body dualism, such as Richard Swinburne's account.
Thinking-animal argument
A common argument for animalism is known as the thinking-animal argument. It asserts the following:{{Cite journal |last=Olson |first=Eric |date=2003 |title=An Argument for Animalism |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220313160449/https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101685!/file/animalism.pdf |journal=Personal Identity |pages=318–34}}
- A person that occupies a given space also has a Homo sapiens animal occupying the same space.
- The Homo sapiens animal is thinking.
- The person occupying the space is thinking.
- Therefore, a human person is also a human animal.
Use of term in ethics
A less common, but perhaps increasing, use of the term animalism is to refer to the ethical view that all or most animals are worthy of moral consideration.{{cite web |author=The Animalist |title=What Is Animalism? |url=https://medium.com/@TheAnimalist/what-is-animalism-dc1bb9f9f822 |website=Medium |access-date=29 March 2019}} It may be similar, though not necessarily, to sentientism.
See also
References
= Footnotes =
{{reflist|22em}}
= Bibliography =
{{refbegin|35em|indent=yes}}
- {{cite book
|year=2016
|editor1-last=Blatti
|editor1-first=Stephan
|editor2-last=Snowdon
|editor2-first=Paul
|title=Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, & Identity
|publisher=Oxford University Press
}}
- {{cite book
|last=Garrett
|first=Brian
|year=1998
|title=Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness
|location=London
|publisher=Routledge
|isbn=978-0-415-16573-0
}}
- {{cite book
|last=Olson
|first=Eric T.
|author-link=Eric T. Olson (philosopher)
|year=2007
|title=What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology
|publisher=Oxford University Press
}}
- {{cite book
|last=Snowdon
|first=Paul
|year=2017
|title=Persons, Animals, Ourselves
|publisher=Oxford University Press
}}
{{refend}}
Further reading
{{refbegin|35em|indent=yes}}
- {{cite book
|last=Baker
|first=Lynne Rudder
|author-link=Lynne Rudder Baker
|year=2005
|chapter=When Does a Person Begin?
|editor1-last=Paul
|editor1-first=Ellen Frankel
|editor2-last=Miller
|editor2-first=Fred D. Jr.
|editor2-link=Fred Miller (philosopher)
|editor3-last=Paul
|editor3-first=Jeffrey
|title=Personal Identity
|location=Cambridge, England
|publisher=Cambridge University Press
|pages=25–48
|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511759345.003
|isbn=978-0-511-75934-5
}}
- {{cite encyclopedia
|last=Blatti
|first=Stephan
|year=2020
|title=Animalism
|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/animalism/
|editor-last=Zalta
|editor-first=Edward N.
|editor-link=Edward N. Zalta
|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|edition=Fall 2020
|location=Stanford, California
|publisher=Stanford University
|issn=1095-5054
|access-date=30 November 2020
}}
{{refend}}
Category:Metaphysical theories
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