failing badly

{{short description|Fails with a catastrophic result or without warning}}

Failing badly and failing well are concepts in systems security and network security (and engineering in general) describing how a system reacts to failure. The terms have been popularized by Bruce Schneier, a cryptographer and security consultant.[http://charlesmann.org/articles/Homeland-Insecurity-Atlantic.pdf Homeland Insecurity] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110928002928/http://charlesmann.org/articles/Homeland-Insecurity-Atlantic.pdf |date=2011-09-28 }}, Atlantic Monthly, September 2002{{cite book |author=David Hillson |date=29 March 2011 |title=The Failure Files: Perspectives on Failure |publisher=Triarchy Press |page=146 |isbn=9781908009302 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mz4z4diInBgC&q=%22failing%20badly%22%20schneier&pg=PA146 }}

Failing badly

A system that fails badly is one that has a catastrophic result when failure occurs. A single point of failure can thus bring down the whole system. Examples include:

Failing well

A system that fails well is one that compartmentalizes or contains its failure. Examples include:

  • Compartmentalized hulls in watercraft, ensuring that a hull breach in one compartment will not flood the entire vessel.
  • Databases that do not allow downloads of all data in one attempt, limiting the amount of compromised data.
  • Structurally redundant buildings conceived to resist loads beyond those expected under normal circumstances, or resist loads when the structure is damaged.
  • Computer systems that restart or proceed to a stopped state when an invalid operation occurs.
  • Access control systems that are locked when power is cut to the unit.{{cite web|author=Eric Vanderburg|title=Fail Secure – The right way to fail|url=http://www.pcsecurityworld.com/313/fail-secure-the-right-way-to-fail.html|website=PC Security World|date=February 18, 2013|author-link=Eric Vanderburg|access-date=November 11, 2014|archive-date=October 27, 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141027212841/http://www.pcsecurityworld.com/313/fail-secure-the-right-way-to-fail.html|url-status=dead}}
  • Concrete structures which show fractures long before breaking under load, thus giving early warning.
  • Armoured cockpit doors on airplanes, which confine a potential hijacker within the cabin even if they are able to bypass airport security checks.
  • Internet connectivity provided by more than one vendor or discrete path, known as multihoming.
  • Star or mesh networks, which can continue to operate when a node or connection has failed (though for a star network, failure of the central hub will still cause the network to fail).
  • Ductile materials, such as "under-reinforced concrete", when overloaded, fail gradually – they yield and stretch, giving some warning before ultimate failure.
  • Making a backup copy of all important data and storing it in a separate place. That data can be recovered from the other location when either place is damaged.

Designing a system to 'fail well' has also been alleged to be a better use of limited security funds than the typical quest to eliminate all potential sources of errors and failure.[http://www.apogee.co.nz/docs/FailingWell.pdf Failing Well with Information Security] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081014044940/http://apogee.co.nz/docs/FailingWell.pdf |date=2008-10-14 }} - Young, William; Apogee Ltd Consulting, 2003

See also

  • {{annotated link|Fail-safe}}
  • {{annotated link|Fault tolerance}}
  • {{annotated link|Fail-deadly}}
  • {{annotated link|Resilience (network)}}
  • {{annotated link|Resilience (engineering and construction)}}

References