framing effect (psychology)

The rational actor model is a theoretical framework used by economists to understand human decision-making at the individual level. It assumes that people act in rational ways that optimize their interests. The model includes several core assumptions: rational actors have stable preferences, access to all relevant information, the capability to analyze all possible options and outcomes, and are unbiased and unemotional. This model has been influential in many social science disciplines, including economics and political science{{Citation |last=Scott |first=John |title=Rational Choice Theory |date=2000 |work=Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories of the Present |pages=126–138 |url=https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218310.n9 |access-date=2025-04-01 |place=1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road, London EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom |publisher=SAGE Publications Ltd|doi=10.4135/9781446218310.n9 |isbn=978-0-7619-5926-7 }}

Psychologists have criticized the rational actor model by arguing that its assumptions do not accurately reflect real-world human decision-making behavior. They point out that the time and cognitive resources available to individuals are insufficient for deliberate analysis of every situation. In practice, decision-making is often affected by emotion, social context, and Heuristic {{Citation |last=Dunning |first=David |title=Judgment and Decision Making |date=2012 |work=The SAGE Handbook of Social Cognition |pages=251–272 |url=https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446247631.n13 |access-date=2025-04-01 |place=1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road, London EC1Y 1SP United Kingdom |publisher=SAGE Publications Ltd|doi=10.4135/9781446247631.n13 |isbn=978-0-85702-481-7 }} Since then, psychologists have conducted extensive research on the systematic biases and errors that influence human judgment and decision-making.

Tversky and Kahneman proposed a new theoretical frame to understand decision-making in their 1981 paper, "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice." They are major contributors in the domain of the psychology of decision-making. They proposed prospect theory, which, unlike traditional economic theories that assume people make rational choices by calculating risks and benefits, recognizes that people make biased or inconsistent decisions in real life based on how options are presented—or, in other words, framed.

In the same paper, they conducted and experiment to test participants with the classic question, the Asian disease problem: participants were asked to choose between two treatments. The researchers manipulated two independent variables: framing of options (positive vs. negative) and certainty of outcomes (certain vs. risky)

Participants were asked to choose between two treatments for 600 people affected by a deadly disease. Treatment A was predicted to result in 400 deaths, whereas treatment B had a 33% chance that no one would die but a 66% chance that everyone would die. This choice was then presented to participants either with positive framing, i.e. how many people would live, or with negative framing, i.e. how many people would die.

Treatment A was chosen by 72% of participants when it was presented with positive framing ("saves 200 lives"). When the question was negatively framed, the result reversed, and 78% of participants chose Treatment B.

In the paper they coauthored later in 1984, Kahneman and Tversky made two addition to their original theory. First, they discussed how people reason about probability. They pointed out that people do not treat probability logically, instead tending to overestimate the likelihood of low-probability events (like winning the lottery) while underestimating events with moderate to high probability. They also introduced the concept of mental accounting—for example, people treat losing a $10 bill differently from losing a $10 movie ticket, even though the monetary loss is the same.{{Cite journal |last1=Kahneman |first1=Daniel |last2=Tversky |first2=Amos |date=April 1984 |title=Choices, values, and frames. |url=https://doi.apa.org/doi/10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341 |journal=American Psychologist |language=en |volume=39 |issue=4 |pages=341–350 |doi=10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.341 |issn=1935-990X}}

In his later work, Kahneman further developed the theoretical framework of decision-making by introducing the concept of dual systems. In his 2011 book Thinking, Fast and Slow, he described two modes of thinking: one system is automatic, intuitive, and emotional, operating effortlessly and responsible for generating quick judgments and impressions. The other system is logical, deliberate, and effortful, responsible for complex tasks and self-control. People are more vulnerable to framing effects when relying on the intuitive system, as it is more susceptible to contextual cues and surface-level presentation.{{Cite book |last=Kahneman |first=daniel |title=Thinking, fast and slow. |publisher=Toronto : Doubleday Canada. |year=2011 |isbn=9780385676519}}

In logic, extensionality requires "two formulas which have the same truth-value under any truth-assignments to be mutually substitutable salva veritate in a sentence that contains one of these formulas."{{cite journal |last1=Bourgeois-Gironde |first1=Sacha |last2=Giraud |first2=Raphaël |year=2009 |title=Framing effects as violations of extensionality |url=https://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00432662/file/FE_bourgeois-gironde_giraud.pdf |journal=Theory and Decision |volume=67 |issue=4 |pages=385–404 |doi=10.1007/s11238-009-9133-7 |issn=0040-5833 |s2cid=17963795}} Put simply, objects that have the same external properties are equal. This principle, applied to decision making, suggests that making a decision in a problem should not be affected by how the problem is described. For example, varied descriptions of the same decision problem should not give rise to different decisions, due to the extensionality principle. If judgments are made on the basis of irrelevant information as described, that is called an extensionality violation. Addressing extensionality violations entails cultivating awareness of how different descriptions of a problem may inadvertently influence decisions, and as a result developing strategies to mitigate such deviations. In doing so, decision-makers can aim to uphold the extensionality principle as a guide in navigating the complexity of choice, focusing on decisions that are more in tune to the inherent properties of the problem rather than its descriptions.

Framing effects have powerful real-world influences. They shape decision-making across a broad range of domains and contexts—for example, in public health, education, politics, law, and economics. Even when options are logically identical, subtle shifts in wording—such as presenting outcomes as gains or losses—can reverse preferences.

In a 2021 study on the framing effect in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, researchers found that the framing effect was larger in this context than under normal circumstances, indicating that individuals were more influenced by how options were presented during the pandemic. There was a positive association between the framing effect and perceived stress and concerns related to coronavirus, indicating that these factors are influential when it comes to decision-making. However, they were not related to risk aversion.{{Cite journal |last1=Rachev |first1=Nikolay R. |last2=Han |first2=Hyemin |last3=Lacko |first3=David |last4=Gelpí |first4=Rebekah |last5=Yamada |first5=Yuki |last6=Lieberoth |first6=Andreas |date=2021-09-10 |title=Replicating the Disease framing problem during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic: A study of stress, worry, trust, and choice under risk |journal=PLOS ONE |language=en |volume=16 |issue=9 |pages=e0257151 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0257151 |issn=1932-6203 |pmc=8432807 |pmid=34506543 |bibcode=2021PLoSO..1657151R |doi-access=free }}

This effect has been shown in other contexts:

• 93% of PhD students registered early when a penalty fee for late registration was emphasized, but only 67% did so when this was presented as a discount for earlier registration.{{harvnb|Gächter|Orzen|Renner|Stamer|2009}}
• 62% of people disagreed with allowing "public condemnation of democracy", but only 46% of people agreed that it was right to "forbid public condemnation of democracy".Rugg, as cited in {{harvnb|Plous|1993}}
• More people will support an economic policy if the employment rate is emphasized than when the associated unemployment rate is highlighted.
• It has been argued that pretrial detention may increase a defendant's willingness to accept a plea bargain, since imprisonment, rather than freedom, will be their baseline, and pleading guilty will be viewed as an event that will cause their earlier release rather than as an event that will put them in prison.{{cite journal |title=Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial |first=Stephanos |last=Bibas |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=117 |issue=8 |year=2004 |pages=2463–47 |jstor=4093404 |ssrn= 464880 |doi=10.2307/4093404 |url=https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1923&context=faculty_scholarship }}

The framing effect has consistently been shown to be one of the largest biases in decision making.{{Cite journal | last1 = Thomas | first1 = A. K. | last2 = Millar | first2 = P. R. | doi = 10.1093/geronb/gbr076 | title = Reducing the Framing Effect in Older and Younger Adults by Encouraging Analytic Processing | journal = The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences | volume = 67B | issue = 2 | pages = 139–49 | year = 2011 | pmid = 21964668| hdl = 10.1093/geronb/gbr076 | hdl-access = free }} In general, susceptibility to framing effects increases with age. Age difference factors are particularly important when considering health care{{cite book | last1 = Erber | first1 = Joan | title = Aging and Older Adulthood | edition = 3 | publisher = John Wiley & Sons | year = 2013 | page = 218 | isbn = 978-0-470-67341-6 | url = http://wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-EHEP002803.html | access-date = 2014-11-03 | archive-date = 2017-08-10 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170810052802/http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-EHEP002803.html | url-status = dead }}{{cite book | last1 = Peters | first1 = Ellen | last2 = Finucane | first2 = Melissa | last3 = MacGregor | first3 = Donald | last4 = Slovic | first4 = Paul | title = The aging mind: opportunities in cognitive research | chapter = The Bearable Lightness of Aging: Judgment and Decision Processes in Older Adults |editor= Paul C. Stern |editor2=Laura L. Carstensen | publisher = National Academy Press | year = 2000 | location = Washington, D.C. | chapter-url = https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK44833/pdf/TOC.pdf | isbn = 978-0-309-06940-3}}{{cite journal | title = Can Limiting Choice Increase Social Welfare? The Elderly and Health Insurance | journal = The Milbank Quarterly | year = 2006 | first = Yaniv | last = Hanoch |author2=Thomas Rice | volume = 84 | issue = 1 | pages = 37–73 | jstor=25098107 | doi=10.1111/j.1468-0009.2006.00438.x| pmid = 16529568 | pmc = 2690155 }} and financial decisions. The susceptibility to framing can influence how older individuals perceive and in turn respond to information, potentially leading to less optimal choices that can have lasting consequences. In healthcare, for instance, where decisions profoundly affect well-being, the framing effect can sway older individuals towards or away from certain treatment options based on the way in which the medical information is presented. Likewise, in financial decision-making, the framing of retirement planning or investment risks may have significant impacts on the choices individuals make, potentially impacting their financial security and state in the later stages of their lives.{{Cite journal | last1 = Carpenter | first1 = S. M. | last2 = Yoon | first2 = C. | doi = 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06390.x | title = Aging and consumer decision making | journal = Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences | volume = 1235 | issue = 1 | pages = E1–12 | year = 2011 | pmid = 22360794| pmc = 3799963| bibcode = 2011NYASA1235E...1C }}

However, the framing effect seems to diminish when encountered in a foreign (non-native) language.{{cite book|author=Zuckermann, Ghil'ad|author-link=Ghil'ad Zuckermann|title=Revivalistics: From the Genesis of Israeli to Language Reclamation in Australia and Beyond|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|year=2020|isbn=9780199812790}} {{ISBN|9780199812776}}{{rp|246}}{{cite journal|last1=Keysar|first1=B.|last2=Hayakawa|first2=S. L.|last3=An|first3=S. G.|s2cid=1397617|title=The Foreign-Language Effect: Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision Biases|journal=Psychological Science|volume=23|issue=6|year=2012|pages=661–68|issn=0956-7976|doi=10.1177/0956797611432178|pmid=22517192}} One explanation of this disappearance is that a non-native language provides greater cognitive and emotional distance than one's native tongue.{{cite journal|last1=Keysar|first1=Boaz|last2=Hayakawa|first2=Sayuri|last3=An|first3=Sun Gyu|title=The Foreign-Language Effect : Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision Biases|volume=23|issue=6|pages=661–8|url=http://psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/foreignLanguaeEffect.pdf|journal=Psychological Science|access-date=3 December 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151123130427/http://psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/foreignLanguaeEffect.pdf|archive-date=23 November 2015|url-status=dead|pmid=22517192|year=2012|doi=10.1177/0956797611432178|s2cid=1397617}} A foreign language is also processed less automatically than a native tongue. This leads to more deliberation, which can affect decision making, resulting in decisions that are more systematic.{{cite journal|last1=Keysar|first1=Boaz|last2=Hayakawa|first2=Sayuri|last3=An|first3=Sun Gyu|title=The Foreign-Language Effect : Thinking in a Foreign Tongue Reduces Decision Biases|volume=23|issue=6|pages=661–8|url=http://psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/foreignLanguaeEffect.pdf|journal=Psychological Science|access-date=3 December 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151123130427/http://psychology.uchicago.edu/people/faculty/foreignLanguaeEffect.pdf|archive-date=23 November 2015|url-status=dead|pmid=22517192|year=2012|doi=10.1177/0956797611432178|s2cid=1397617}}

Framing effects in decision-making become stronger as children age.{{Cite journal | last1 = Reyna | first1 = V. F. | last2 = Farley | first2 = F. | s2cid = 16591695 | doi = 10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x | title = Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy | journal = Psychological Science in the Public Interest | volume = 7 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–44 | year = 2006 | pmid = 26158695| doi-access = free }}{{Cite journal | last1 = Albert | first1 = D. | last2 = Steinberg | first2 = L. | doi = 10.1111/j.1532-7795.2010.00724.x | title = Judgment and Decision Making in Adolescence | journal = Journal of Research on Adolescence | volume = 21 | page = 211 | year = 2011 | url = https://repository.brynmawr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1053&context=psych_pubs }}{{Cite journal | last1 = Strough | first1 = J. | last2 = Karns | first2 = T. E. | last3 = Schlosnagle | first3 = L. | title = Decision-making heuristics and biases across the life span | doi = 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06208.x | journal = Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences | volume = 1235 | issue = 1 | pages = 57–74 | year = 2011 | pmid = 22023568| pmc = 3755606| bibcode = 2011NYASA1235...57S }} This is partially because qualitative reasoning increases with age. While preschoolers are more likely to make decisions based on quantitative properties, such as probability of an outcome, elementary schoolers and adolescents become progressively more likely to reason qualitatively, opting for a sure option in a gain frame and a risky option in a loss frame regardless of probabilities. The increase in qualitative thinking is related to an increase in "gist based" thinking that occurs over a lifetime.{{Cite journal | last1 = Reyna | first1 = V. F. | title = A Theory of Medical Decision Making and Health: Fuzzy Trace Theory | doi = 10.1177/0272989X08327066 | journal = Medical Decision Making | volume = 28 | issue = 6 | pages = 850–65 | year = 2008 | pmid = 19015287| pmc =2617718 }}

However, qualitative reasoning, and thus susceptibility to framing effects, is still not as strong in adolescents as in adults, and adolescents are more likely than adults to choose the risky option under both the gain and loss frames of a given scenario. One explanation for adolescent tendencies toward risky choices is that they lack real-world experience with negative consequences, and thus over-rely on conscious evaluation of risks and benefits, focusing on specific information and details or quantitative analysis.{{Cite journal | last1 = Schlottmann | first1 = A. | last2 = Tring | first2 = J. | doi = 10.1024/1421-0185.64.3.153 | title = How Children Reason about Gains and Losses: Framing Effects in Judgement and Choice | journal = Swiss Journal of Psychology | volume = 64 | issue = 3 | page = 153 | year = 2005 }} This reduces influence of framing effects and leads to greater consistency across frames of a given scenario. Children between the ages of 10 and 12 are more likely to take risks and show framing effects, while younger children only considered the quantitative differences between the two options presented.{{Cite journal | last1 = Boyer | first1 = T. | title = The development of risk-taking: A multi-perspective review | doi = 10.1016/j.dr.2006.05.002 | journal = Developmental Review | volume = 26 | issue = 3 | pages = 291–345 | year = 2006 }}

Younger adults are more likely than older adults to be enticed by risk-taking when presented with loss frame trials. This is a noteworthy phenomenon that underscores the complex interplay between age and decision-making tendencies.

In multiple studies of undergraduate students, researchers have found that students are more likely to prefer options framed positively. This could be attributed to a variety of factors such as an inclination for novelty-seeking, a more optimistic outlook on outcomes, or even a reduced aversion to risk which is inherent in youth.{{cite book|title=Cognition: Theory and Practice|last1=Revlin|first1=Russell|publisher=Worth Publishers|year=2012|isbn=978-0716756675|location=New York, New York|chapter=Chapter 11: Solving Problems}} For example, they are more likely to enjoy meat labeled 75% lean meat as opposed to 25% fat, or use condoms advertised as being 95% effective as opposed to having a 5% risk of failure.

Young adults are especially susceptible to framing effects when presented with an ill-defined problem in which there is no correct answer and individuals must arbitrarily determine what information they consider relevant. For example, undergraduate students are more willing to purchase an item such as a movie ticket after losing an amount equivalent to the item's cost than after losing the item itself. This susceptibility underscores the importance of considering psychological factors in the context of decision-making. Recognizing this vulnerability emphasizes the need for decision-makers to be aware of cognitive biases when navigating decision-making in which there isn't a clear answer so that they can take a more informed approach.

The framing effect is claimed to be greater in older adults than in younger adults or adolescents.{{Cite journal |last=Xu |first=Lance |date=2024-02-06 |title=Advanced age predicts increased susceptibility to attribute, goal, and risky-choice framing in negative frame valences |journal=Humanities and Social Sciences Communications |language=en |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=1–10 |doi=10.1057/s41599-024-02658-6 |issn=2662-9992|doi-access=free }} This claim may be a result of enhanced negativity bias, though some sources claim that the negativity bias actually decreases with age.

In particular, this increased susceptibility to the framing effect manifested itself mainly in response to negative frames. Positive framings were not found to have a significant effect on the framing effect in older adults. This may be due in part to socioemotional selectivity theory, where the increased age shifts the focus of adults from risk taking to maximizing their emotional experiences in the present, hence the increased framing in the negative frame. The dual process theory may also play a role as negative framings evoke less heightened responses, leading to the deployment of the implicit processes. The implicit process is found to be frame-sensitive, and thus may be the reason why framing is pronounced in negative frames for older adults.{{Cite journal |last1=Roberts |first1=Ian D. |last2=Teoh |first2=Yi Yang |last3=Hutcherson |first3=Cendri A. |date=January 2022 |title=Time to Pay Attention? Information Search Explains Amplified Framing Effects Under Time Pressure |journal=Psychological Science |language=en |volume=33 |issue=1 |pages=90–104 |doi=10.1177/09567976211026983 |issn=0956-7976 |pmc=8985223 |pmid=34860637}}

Another possible cause is that older adults have fewer cognitive resources available to them and are more likely to default to less cognitively demanding strategies when faced with a decision. They tend to rely on easily accessible information, or frames, regardless of whether that information is relevant to making the decision in question. Several studies have shown that younger adults will make less biased decisions than older adults because they base their choices on interpretations of patterns of events and can better employ decision making strategies that require cognitive resources like working-memory skills. Older adults, on the other hand, make choices based on immediate reactions to gains and losses.

Older adults' lack of cognitive resources, such as flexibility in decision making strategies, may cause older adults to be influenced by emotional frames more so than younger adults or adolescents.{{Cite journal | last1 = Watanabe | first1 = S. | last2 = Shibutani | first2 = H. | doi = 10.1111/j.1468-5884.2010.00432.x | title = Aging and decision making: Differences in susceptibility to the risky-choice framing effect between older and younger adults in Japan | journal = Japanese Psychological Research | volume = 52 | issue = 3 | page = 163 | year = 2010 | doi-access = }} In addition, as individuals age, they make decisions more quickly than their younger counterparts. It is significant that, when prompted to do so, older adults will often make a less biased decision with reevaluation of their original choice.

The increase in framing effects among older adults has important implications, especially in medical contexts. Older adults are influenced heavily by the inclusion or exclusion of extraneous details, meaning they are likely to make serious medical decisions based on how doctors frame the two options rather than the qualitative differences between the options, causing older adults to inappropriately form their choices.

When considering cancer treatments, framing can shift older adults' focus from short- to long-term survival under a negative and positive frame, respectively. When presented with treatment descriptions described in positive, negative, or neutral terms, older adults are significantly more likely to agree to a treatment when it is positively described than they are to agree to the same treatment when it is described neutrally or negatively. Additionally, framing often leads to inconsistency in choice: a change in description qualities after an initial choice is made can cause older adults to revoke their initial decision in favor of an alternative option. Older adults also remember positively framed statements more accurately than negatively framed statements.{{Cite journal | last1 = Löckenhoff | first1 = C. E. |author1-link = Corinna Löckenhoff | doi = 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06209.x | title = Age, time, and decision making: From processing speed to global time horizons | journal = Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences | volume = 1235 | issue = 1 | pages = 44–56 | year = 2011 | pmid = 22023567| pmc = 3757097| bibcode = 2011NYASA1235...44L }} This has been demonstrated by evaluating older adults' recall of statements in pamphlets about health care issues.

{{div col|colwidth=20em}}

• Choice architecture
• Context effect
• Fuzzy-trace theory
• Is the glass half empty or half full?
• List of cognitive biases
• Mental accounting
• Metaphorical framing
• Motivated reasoning
• Overton window
• Prospect theory
• Status quo bias
• Thinking, Fast and Slow

{{div col end}}

{{Reflist}}

{{refbegin}}

• {{ cite book | last1=Clark | first1=D | year=2009 | title=Framing effects exposed | publisher=Pearson Education}}
• {{Cite journal |author1-link=James N. Druckman | last1 = Druckman | first1 = J. N. | year = 2001a | title = Evaluating framing effects | journal = Journal of Economic Psychology | volume = 22 | pages = 96–101 | doi=10.1016/S0167-4870(00)00032-5}}
• {{Cite journal | doi = 10.1093/jleo/17.1.62 | last1 = Druckman | first1 = J. N. | s2cid = 1640037 | year = 2001b | title = Using credible advice to overcome framing effects | journal = Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization | volume = 17 | pages = 62–82}}
• {{ cite journal | last1 = Gächter | first1 = S. | last2 = Orzen | first2 = H. | last3 = Renner | first3 = E. | last4 = Stamer |first4 = C. | year=2009 | title = Are experimental economists prone to framing effects? A natural field experiment | journal = Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2007.11.003| volume=70 | issue = 3 | pages=443–46| citeseerx = 10.1.1.180.1674 }}
• {{ cite book | last1=Plous | first1=Scott | year=1993 | title=The psychology of judgment and decision making | publisher=McGraw-Hill | isbn=978-0-07-050477-6 }}
• {{Cite journal | doi = 10.1126/science.7455683 | last1 = Tversky | first1 = Amos | last2 = Kahneman | first2 = Daniel | s2cid = 5643902 | year = 1981 | title = The Framing of decisions and the psychology of choice | journal = Science | volume = 211 | issue = 4481| pages = 453–58 | pmid = 7455683| bibcode = 1981Sci...211..453T }}

{{refend}}

• {{Cite journal|last=Kühberger|first=Anton|author2=Tanner, Carmen|title=Risky choice framing: Task versions and a comparison of prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory|journal=Journal of Behavioral Decision Making|year=2010|volume=23|issue=3|pages=314–29|doi=10.1002/bdm.656}}

• [https://www.psychvarsity.com/The-Framing-Effect The Framing Effect - It's not what you say but how you say it]

{{Biases}}

Category:Cognitive biases

Category:Prospect theory