genocidal intent
{{Short description|Concept in international law}}
{{redirect|Intent to destroy|the film|Intent to Destroy}}
Genocidal intent is the specific mental element, or {{lang|la|mens rea}}, required to classify an act as genocide under international law,{{cite book |first=Thomas W. |last=Simon |title=Genocide, Torture and Terrorism: Ranking International Crimes and Justifying Humanitarian Intervention |year=2016 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |isbn=978-1-349-56169-8 |page=17}} particularly the 1948 Genocide Convention.Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide File:Wikisource-logo.svg art. 2, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 – via Wikisource. ("In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy [emphasis added], in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such{{nbsp}}...") [{{smaller|wikisource:Index:Genocide Convention.pdf{{!}}scan}} File:Wikisource-logo.svg] To establish genocide, perpetrators must be shown to have had the dolus specialis, or specific intent, to destroy a particular national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part. Unlike broader war crimes or crimes against humanity, genocidal intent necessitates a deliberate aim to eliminate the targeted group rather than merely displace or harm its members.{{sfn|Ochab|Alton|2022|p=28}}{{sfn|Bachman|2022|p=57}}
The concept of genocidal intent is complex and has spurred significant legal debate, primarily due to the challenge of proving an individual’s intent to destroy a group without direct evidence.{{sfn|Kiernan|Madley|Taylor|2023|pp=4, 9}}{{sfn|Ochab|Alton|2022|pp=28, 30}} International criminal tribunals, such as those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, have relied on circumstantial evidence to infer intent, considering the scale, systematic nature, and targeting patterns of atrocities. Legal standards for genocidal intent have varied, with some rulings demanding dolus directus (direct intent to cause harm) and others allowing for dolus indirectus (foreseeable consequences accepted by the perpetrator). This discrepancy has influenced judicial outcomes, as seen in the acquittal of certain defendants under stringent intent requirements, leading some scholars to advocate for a knowledge-based standard to better facilitate genocide convictions.{{cite book |last1=Rodenhäuser |first1=Tilman |title=Organizing Rebellion: Non-state Armed Groups Under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=United Kingdom |page=284}}
The debate surrounding genocidal intent also intersects with state accountability.{{sfn|Bachman|2022|p=47}}{{vague|date=March 2025}} The rigorous evidentiary standards for genocidal intent remain a point of contention, as critics argue they hinder genocide prevention by setting a high threshold for intervention and prosecution.{{cite book |editor1-last=Bloxham |editor1-first=Donald |editor1-link=Donald Bloxham |editor2-last=Moses |editor2-first=A. Dirk |editor2-link=A. Dirk Moses |title=Genocide: Key Themes |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-286526-7 |chapter=Genocide and War |first=Michelle |last=Moyd |year=2022 |page=227}} A more fundamental criticism is that requiring genocidal intent for killings to be criminal privileges the intention of states over the loss suffered by civilian victims, which could hinder efforts to prevent civilian killing where genocidal intent is not present.{{cite book |last1=Moses |first1=A. Dirk |title=The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression |date=2021 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-10358-0 |page=2 |language=en}}
Definition and legal standards
For an act to be classified as genocide (under the Genocide Convention), it is essential to demonstrate that the perpetrators had a deliberate and specific aim ({{lang|la|dolus specialis}}) to physically destroy the group based on its real or perceived nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Intention to destroy the group's culture or intending to scatter the group does not suffice.{{Cite web |title=United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect |url=https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition |access-date=22 November 2024 |website=United Nations |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240807031734/https://www.un.org/en/genocide-prevention/definition |archive-date=7 August 2024}}
In 2019, Canada's National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women argued that when it comes to state responsibility for genocide, "a state's specific intent to destroy a protected group can only be proved by the existence of a genocidal policy or manifest pattern of conduct."{{sfn|National Inquiry into MMIWG|2019|p=20}} The MMIWG inquiry used a broader definition of genocide from the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act which encompasses "not only acts of commission, but 'omission' as well."{{sfn|National Inquiry into MMIWG|2019|p=}}{{pn|date=February 2024}} The inquiry described the traditional legal definition of genocide as "narrow" and based on the Holocaust.{{sfn|National Inquiry into MMIWG|2019|p=}}{{pn|date=February 2024}}
Judicial interpretations
= International Criminal Tribunals =
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and International Court of Justice have ruled that, in the absence of a confession, genocidal intent can be proven with circumstantial evidence, especially "the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups."{{bulleted list|
|{{cite book |last1=Lattanzi |first1=Flavia |author-link=Flavia Lattanzi |title=The Armenian Massacres of 1915–1916 a Hundred Years Later: Open Questions and Tentative Answers in International Law |date=2018 |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-319-78169-3 |pages=27–104 [65–66] |language=en |chapter=The Armenian Massacres as the Murder of a Nation?}}
|{{cite book |last1=Smith |first1=Roger W. |title=Studies in Comparative Genocide |date=1999 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |isbn=978-1-349-27348-5 |pages=3–14 |language=en |chapter=State Power and Genocidal Intent: On the Uses of Genocide in the Twentieth Century}}
|{{cite book |last1=Campbell |first1=Jason J. |title=On the Nature of Genocidal Intent |date=2012 |publisher=Lexington Books |isbn=978-0-7391-7847-8 |language=en}}
|{{cite book |last1=Kim |first1=Sangkul |title=A Collective Theory of Genocidal Intent |date=2016 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-94-6265-123-4 |language=en}}
|{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Janine Natalya |date=2015 |title=Elucidating the Dolus Specialis: An Analysis of ICTY Jurisprudence on Genocidal Intent |journal=Criminal Law Forum |volume=26 |issue=3–4 |pages=497–531 |doi=10.1007/s10609-015-9260-5 |s2cid=143072669}}
|{{cite journal |date=2008 |title=Three Responses to 'Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Commit Genocide?' |journal=Journal of Genocide Research |volume=10 |issue=1 |pages=111–133 |doi=10.1080/14623520701850955 |s2cid=216136915}}
|{{cite journal |last1=Aydin |first1=Devrim |date=2014 |title=The Interpretation of Genocidal Intent under the Genocide Convention and the Jurisprudence of International Courts |journal=The Journal of Criminal Law |volume=78 |issue=5 |pages=423–441 |doi=10.1350/jcla.2014.78.5.943 |s2cid=144141503}}
|{{cite journal |last1=Behrens |first1=Paul |date=2015 |title=Between Abstract Event and Individualized Crime: Genocidal Intent in the Case of Croatia |journal=Leiden Journal of International Law |volume=28 |issue=4 |pages=923–935 |doi=10.1017/S0922156515000503 |s2cid=152124051}}
|{{cite journal |last1=Singleterry |first1=Douglas |date=2010 |title="Ethnic Cleansing" and Genocidal Intent: A Failure of Judicial Interpretation? |url=https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol5/iss1/4 |journal=Genocide Studies and Prevention |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=39–67 |doi=10.3138/gsp.5.1.39|url-access=subscription }}
|{{cite journal |last1=Dojčinović |first1=Predrag |date=2016 |title=The chameleon of mens rea and the shifting guises of culture-specific genocidal intent in international criminal proceedings |journal=Journal of Human Rights |volume=15 |issue=4 |pages=454–476 |doi=10.1080/14754835.2015.1127139 |s2cid=148074049}}
|{{cite journal |last1=Ambos |first1=Kai |date=2009 |title=What does 'intent to destroy' in genocide mean? |journal=International Review of the Red Cross |volume=91 |issue=876 |pages=833–858 |doi=10.1017/S1816383110000056 |doi-access=free}}
}}
= Standards of intent =
It is non-controversial that proving {{lang|la|dolus directus}} would meet the Genocide Convention's intent requirement; the weaker standard of {{lang|la|dolus indirectus}} (indirect intent, meaning that the perpetrator did not desire the harm but foresaw it as a certain result of their actions and committed the act with this knowledge) is less clear.
Some scholars argue that a knowledge standard would make it easier to obtain convictions. Some of the existing international tribunal cases like Akayesu and Jelisić have rejected the knowledge standard.{{cite journal |last1=Nersessian |first1=David L. |title=The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals |journal=Texas International Law Journal |date=2002 |volume=37 |pages=231}}
The acquittal of Jelisić under the more onerous standard was controversial, and one scholar opined that Nazis would have been allowed to go free under the ICTY's ruling. When Radislav Krstić became the first Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard, the Krstić court explained that its decision did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.
= Recent developments =
In 2010, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal referred to the precedent of the ICTR in discussing the role of genocidal intent.{{cite journal |last1=Park |first1=Ryan |title=Proving Genocidal Intent: International Precedent and ECCC Case 002 |journal=Rutgers Law Review |date=2010 |volume=63 |pages=129 |url=http://d.dccam.org/Tribunal/Analysis/pdf/Proving_Genocidal_Intent-Ryan_Park.pdf}}
Debate
In the 2004 United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the War in Darfur, Claus Kress argued that the ICTY and ICTR were incorrect in their view of the genocidal intent of individuals.{{cite journal |last1=Kress |first1=Claus |title=The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent |journal=Journal of International Criminal Justice |date=2005 |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=562–578 |doi=10.1093/jicj/mqi054}} Hans Vest argued for the interlinked roles of an individual's intent and the individual's expectation of contributing to a collective action.{{cite journal |last1=Vest |first1=H. |title=A Structure-Based Concept of Genocidal Intent |journal=Journal of International Criminal Justice |date=2007 |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=781–797 |doi=10.1093/jicj/mqm036}} Kjell Anderson discussed ways of separating out the roles of collective policies and their interaction with individual intent.{{cite journal |last1=Anderson |first1=Kjell |title=Judicial Inference of the 'Intent to Destroy' |journal=Journal of International Criminal Justice |date=2019 |volume=17 |issue=1 |pages=125–150 |doi=10.1093/jicj/mqz025}} Olaf Jenssen disagreed with the lack of sentencing Goran Jelisić for genocidal intent, arguing that legal consistency would imply that some of the perpetrators of the Holocaust would not have been convicted for genocide.{{cite journal |last1=Jensen |first1=Olaf |title=Evaluating genocidal intent: the inconsistent perpetrator and the dynamics of killing |journal=Journal of Genocide Research |date=2013 |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=1–19 |doi=10.1080/14623528.2012.759396 |s2cid=146191450}}
Cases
- Akayesu: The court rejected the knowledge standard.
- Jelisić: Acquittal under the more onerous standard, controversial for its implications.
- Krstić: First Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard; did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.
References
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Sources
- {{Cite report |date=29 May 2019 |title=A Legal Analysis of Genocide: Supplementary Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls |url=https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Supplementary-Report_Genocide.pdf |access-date=26 January 2024 |publisher=National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240330003310/https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Supplementary-Report_Genocide.pdf |archive-date=30 March 2024 |language=en |ref={{harvid|National Inquiry into MMIWG|2019}} }}
- {{cite book |last1=Bachman |first1=Jeffrey S. |title=The Politics of Genocide: From the Genocide Convention to the Responsibility to Protect |date=2022 |publisher=Rutgers University Press |isbn=978-1-9788-2147-7 |language=en}}
- {{cite book |editor1-last=Blackhawk |editor1-first=Ned |editor1-link=Ned Blackhawk |editor2-last=Kiernan |editor2-first=Ben |editor2-link=Ben Kiernan |editor3-last=Madley |editor3-first=Benjamin |editor4-last=Taylor |editor4-first=Rebe |editor4-link=Rebe Taylor |title=The Cambridge World History of Genocide |volume=II: Genocide in the Indigenous, Early Modern and Imperial Worlds, from c.1535 to World War One |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=2023 |isbn=978-1-108-76548-0 |doi=10.1017/9781108765480}}
- {{harvc |last1=Kiernan |first1=Ben |author1-link=Ben Kiernan |last2=Madley |first2=Benjamin |last3=Taylor |first3=Rebe |author3-link=Rebe Taylor |chapter=Introduction to Volume II |pp=1–20 |in1=Blackhawk |in2=Kiernan |in3=Madley |in4=Taylor |year=2023}}
- {{cite book |last1=Ochab |first1=Ewelina U. |last2=Alton |first2=David |title=State Responses to Crimes of Genocide: What Went Wrong and How to Change It |date=2022 |publisher=Springer International Publishing |isbn=978-3-030-99162-3}}
{{International criminal law}}