interservice rivalry

People's Armed Police Provincial corps often engage in competition against other provincial corps, resulting in inter-corps rivalries.{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OEZ-X-JygxE&ab_channel=%E5%86%9B%E8%BF%B7%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B |title=中国武警超豪华装备！直击新型防暴装甲车测试现场 车载重机枪行进间射击火力十足！轻松突破防线 势如破竹！ |date=2024-01-19 |type=Television production |language=zh |publisher=CCTV-7}}{{Cite AV media |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEsC1xEOQVQ&ab_channel=%E5%86%9B%E8%BF%B7%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B |title=砺剑天山：第一次直升机训练武警特战队状况频出 他们能否通过考核？ |type=Video |language=zh |publisher=CCTV-7 |year=2019}}

One of the main reasons for the creation of the China Coast Guard in 2013 was due to inter-service rivalries caused by overlapping duties between the China Maritime Safety Administration, China Marine Surveillance, {{Ill|Border Defense Corps Coast Guard (China)|lt=Border Defense Coast Guard|zh|中國公安邊防海警部隊}} and {{Ill|General Directorate of Customs Anti-Smuggling Bureau|lt=Customs Anti-Smuggling Bureau|zh|海关总署缉私局}} maritime elements, resulting in inefficiency; the creation of the China Coast Guard solved this by merging the latter 4 agencies.{{cite book |last1=Martinson |first1=Ryan D. |url=https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/creation-china-coast-guard.pdf |title=China as a "Maritime Power" |date=2015 |publisher=CNA |chapter=From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China Coast Guard}}

{{Main article|Chengguan (agency)#Criticism}}

Local Chengguan agencies in China often clash with standard police when police respond to emergency calls regarding Chengguan Brutality.{{Cite news |date=November 4, 2011 |script-title=zh:河南遂平城管围攻警察 称警察干预城管执法 |trans-title=Chengguan agents in Suiping, Henan province attacked police officers, claiming the police interfered with chengguan's law enforcement activity |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2011-11/04/c_111144601.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111108075454/http://news.xinhuanet.com:80/society/2011-11/04/c_111144601.htm |archive-date=2011-11-08 |work=Xinhua News |language=zh}}{{Cite web |date=2011-11-02 |title=遂平城管围攻民警并押公安局“理论” 三人被拘 |url=https://news.cntv.cn/china/20111102/115044.shtml |website=CCTV}}

In November 3, 2011, while responding to a call of Chengguan agents committing acts of abuse, Suiping County Public Security Bureau police officer {{Ill|2011 Chengguan Incident|lt=Zhang Ka was assaulted by 20 Chengguan agents|zh|河南城管殴打民警事件}} after which he was kidnapped by the Chengguan agents and brought to the local police station for "Negotiations". 16 Chengguan were arrested with 3 being charged with assault of a government employee.{{Cite news |date=November 4, 2011 |script-title=zh:河南遂平城管围攻警察 称警察干预城管执法 |trans-title=Chengguan agents in Suiping, Henan province attacked police officers, claiming the police interfered with chengguan's law enforcement activity |url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/society/2011-11/04/c_111144601.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111108075454/http://news.xinhuanet.com:80/society/2011-11/04/c_111144601.htm |archive-date=2011-11-08 |work=Xinhua News |language=zh}}{{Cite web |date=2011-11-02 |title=遂平城管围攻民警并押公安局“理论” 三人被拘 |url=https://news.cntv.cn/china/20111102/115044.shtml |website=CCTV}}

In July 23, 2013, Xining Municipal PSB Chengbei Division police officer Ren Jie, probationary officer Zhou Jiacai and a third probationary officer who responded to a emergency call reporting Chengguan brutality were beat up by 30 Chengguan agents and demolition workers, with Ren's bodycam and Type 64 pistol being stolen by the attackers.{{Cite web |date=2013-07-26 |title=城管﹑拆遷人員暴打執法民警 |url=https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/chengguan-07262013093409.html |website=Radio Free Asia}}{{Cite web |date=2013-07-26 |title=青海西宁城管围殴民警续：当事人系城建人员 |url=https://www.guancha.cn/society/2013_07_26_161400.shtml |website=Guancha}}

In April 8, 2015, clashes erupted between Shangqiu Police and Chengguan after 8 Shangqiu police officers attempted to stop Chengguan personnel from conducting an illegal demolition, resulting in Shangqiu SWAT being deployed along with 8 Police officers and 1 Chengguan getting injured.{{Cite web |date=2018-04-10 |title=疑不滿拆遷行動被拍攝 河南逾百城管圍毆8警 |url=https://hk.news.yahoo.com/%E7%96%91%E4%B8%8D%E6%BB%BF%E6%8B%86%E9%81%B7%E8%A1%8C%E5%8B%95%E8%A2%AB%E6%8B%8D%E6%94%9D-%E6%B2%B3%E5%8D%97%E9%80%BE%E7%99%BE%E5%9F%8E%E7%AE%A1%E5%9C%8D%E6%AF%868%E8%AD%A6-105500254.html |website=Sing Tao Daily}}{{Cite web |title=商丘一拆迁现场城管和警察冲突多人受伤，当地成立工作组调查 |url=https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2067421 |website=The Paper}}{{Cite news |date=2018-04-12 |title=城管与警察冲突是容不得监督的心态在作怪 |url=http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2018-04/12/nw.D110000zgqnb_20180412_2-02.htm |access-date=2025-05-13 |work=China Youth Daily |edition=2}}

Many military analysts consider the Wehrmacht, Nazi Germany's armed forces, as the pioneers of "jointness" (German: integrierter Kriegführung), pointing out that blitzkrieg, the war-fighting style that brought the Wehrmacht stunning victories between 1939 and 1941, depended upon the close integration of ground and air (and sometimes naval) forces and that even after the blitzkrieg campaigns gave way to a drawn-out war of attrition, the Wehrmacht routinely conducted operations in a way that would today be called "joint". That is, elements of two or more services participated in close cooperation with mutually agreed goals, relatively little interservice rivalry, and a command structure that, at least at the "sharp end" of operations, promoted, rather than inhibited, a spirit of jointness. Consequently, analysts assert, the Wehrmacht enhanced its capabilities and improved its combat effectiveness.{{Citation

| last = Hayward

| first = Joel

| title = A Case Study in Early Joint Warfare: An Analysis of the Wehrmacht's Crimean Campaign of 1942

| date = December 1999

| publisher = The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4

| pages = 103–130

}}

Adolf Hitler understood the value of integrating his land, sea, and air forces and placing them under a unified command, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (first under Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg's command; later his own). He also saw the benefit of placing them under operational commanders who possessed at least a rudimentary understanding of the tactics, techniques, needs, capabilities, and limitations of each of the services functioning in their combat zone.{{Citation

| last = Hayward

| first = Joel

| title = Adolf Hitler and Joint Warfare

| date = 2000

| publisher = Military Studies Institute

| pages =4–13

| isbn = 9780478114515

}}

Hitler was thus innovative and several years ahead of his peers in the West, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Yet, largely because of Hitler's unusual and autocratic command style and difficulties with delegation, the Wehrmacht lacked elements that today's theorists consider essential to the attainment of truly productive jointness (a single joint commander or Joint Chief of Staff, a proper joint staff, a joint planning process, and an absence of inter-service rivalry) and that, as a result, it often suffered needless difficulties in combat.

The rivalries shaped between security organisations in Iran are as follows:

• Persian Cossack Brigade and Gendarmerie (1912–1921){{cite book|last1=Cronin|first1=Stephanie|title=The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1921-1926|date=1997|publisher=I.B.Tauris|isbn=978-1860641053|pages=62–64}}
• Second Bureau of Imperial Iranian Army, SAVAK, and Shahrbani (1957–1979){{cite book|last1=Milani|first1=Abbas|title=Eminent Persians: The Men and Women who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979|volume=1|date=2008|publisher=Syracuse University Press|location=Syracuse, N.Y.|isbn=978-0815609070|pages=290}}
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Islamic Revolutionary Committees, and Shahrbani (1979–1991){{Citation|author=John Simpson|title=Behind Iranian Lines|publisher=Robson Books|year=1988|isbn=9780860514787|pages=[https://archive.org/details/behindiranianlin00john/page/81 81]|url=https://archive.org/details/behindiranianlin00john/page/81}}
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Basij (1979–1981){{Citation|editor=Robin B. Wright|title= The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy|publisher=US Institute of Peace Press|year=2010|isbn=978-1601270849|pages=62–65}}
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Islamic Republic of Iran Army (1979–present){{citation|title=Eternal Rivals? The Artesh and the IRGC|url=https://www.mei.edu/content/eternal-rivals-artesh-and-irgc|author= Ali Alfoneh|date=15 November 2011|work=Middle East Institute|access-date=5 September 2017}}
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence (intensified since 2009){{citation|title=Iran's Intelligence Services Compete For Glory|url=https://mei.edu/content/io/iran-s-intelligence-services-compete-glory|author=Alex Vatanka|date=27 February 2017|work=Middle East Institute|access-date=5 September 2017}}{{citation|title=Iran's Widening Crackdown Pressures Rouhani|url=http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-widening-crackdown-pressures-rouhani|type=Policy Watch|number=2527|author=Nima Gerami|date=25 November 2015|work=The Washington Institute for Near East Policy|access-date=5 September 2017}}

Infighting between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force over armed helicopters came to light during the Kargil War in 1999.{{Cite news|url=http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/army-set-to-get-11-apache-helicopters/article18526987.ece|title=Army set to get 11 Apache helicopters|last=Peri|first=Dinakar|work=The Hindu|access-date=2017-05-23|language=en}} This dispute erupted again in 2012 when the two branches fought over the allocation of AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters.[https://web.archive.org/web/20130404175505/http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-02/india/38217610_1_22-heavy-duty-apache-helicopters-22-apache-helicopters-attack-helicopters IAF, not Army, will get Apache attack helicopters]: Govt - Times Of India In 2013, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, who faced off against the Army for the helicopter issue, said that the AH-64Ds would be kept in the Air Force.{{lang|en|[http://indianmilitarynews.wordpress.com/tag/inter-services-rivalry/ Army Chief contests IAF’s claims over Apache helicopters Inter Services Rivalry] }}

{{Unreferenced section|date=August 2016}}

The long-term discord between the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy was one of the most notorious examples of interservice rivalry. The situation, with its origin traced back to the Meiji period, came with both geopolitical and military consequences leading to Japan's involvement in World War II. The IJA/IJN rivalry expressed itself in the early 1930s as the "strike north" (Hokushin-ron) and "strike south" (Nanshin-ron) factions. The goal of both factions was to seize territories which possessed the raw materials, especially petroleum, which Japan needed to sustain its growth and economy, but which it did not possess itself. The strike north faction advocated the taking of the natural resources of Siberia, by way of Manchuria, a scenario in which the prime role would be taken by the Army, while the strike south faction advocated the taking of the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, a scenario in which the Navy would predominate.

In order to further their own faction, relatively junior officers resorted to the assassinations of members of the rival faction and their supporters in government. With both factions being opposed to the peace faction, this period has become known as the era of "government by assassination". Insubordination by the Kwantung Army led first to the occupation of Manchuria, and later the Second Sino-Japanese War following the Marco Polo Bridge incident. However, at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, any farther expansion northwards into Siberia was shown to be impossible given the Soviet superiority in numbers and armour.

With the loss of Army prestige that followed the failure of the Soviet–Japanese border conflicts, the Navy faction gained the ascendency, supported by a number of the powerful industrial zaibatsu, that were convinced that their interests would be best served fulfilling the needs of the Navy, thus paving the way to the Pacific War.

The rivalry between the IJA and IJN also saw both services developing air arms; the Army creating its own amphibious infantry units and running ships and submarines, including submarine chasers and aircraft carriers; and the Navy creating its own infantry and marine paratroopers.

Significant examples of this rivalry include the Navy taking several weeks to inform the Army of the disastrous results of the Battle of Midway, and dysfunction between the IJA and IJN during the Guadalcanal campaign.

The Pakistani Armed Forces used to fight over a number of issues. One in particular was predominantly between the Navy and the Army over budget distribution. A key point of friction was the induction of the cruiser PNS Babur. This was resolved when Pakistani think tanks realised the need for interservice harmony and established the Joint Services Headquarters, which reduces friction between the services.{{Citation needed|date=July 2016}}

The U.S. Department of Defense was originally created to provide overall coordination for the various branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, whose infighting, particularly between the Army and Navy, was seen as detrimental to military effectiveness during World War II.{{Citation needed|date=July 2016}}

File:130604-A-HU462-056 (8961381156).jpg position, the highest-ranking position within the U.S. Armed Forces, and several important command positions, such as unified combatant commands, have been mostly dominated by U.S. Army generals. ]]

File:USMC-120914-M-PE262-001.jpg and sailors competing in a strongman competition|222x222px]]

The rivalries are also based on services' individual philosophies for rules and behavior. An author wrote in 2012 about the differing cultures of the US Air Force's pilots and the US Navy's aviators:{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M101vgAACAAJ | title=Red Eagles: America's Secret Migs | publisher=Osprey Publishing | author=Davies, Steve | year=2012 | pages=205 | isbn=9781846033780 }}

{{Quote|There was some truth in the old saying that the Air Force had a book for all the things you were allowed to do in the air, and anything not specifically written down was prohibited; whereas the Navy's rule book contained all the things you were not allowed to do, and anything not written down was perfectly legal.{{r|davies2012}}}}

Various mechanisms are used to manage or curb interservice rivalry. In the U.S. Armed Forces, for example, an officer must complete at least one joint tour{{cite web |url=https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130019p.pdf |title=DoD Instruction 1300.19 : DoD Joint Officer Management Program |publisher=United States Department of Defense|date=3 April 2018 |website=Washington Headquarters Services |access-date=22 July 2023}} in another service to reach the level of flag or general officer.{{cite web |url=https://officerassignments.com/general-flag-officer-promotions/ |title=General and Flag Officer Promotions |date=2023 |website=OfficerAssignments|access-date=22 July 2023}} Such officers may be described as being "purple,"{{cite web|last=Oriez|first=R.J. |url=https://www.wpafb.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1797032/as-purple-as-it-gets/|title=As Purple As It Gets|date=27 March 2019 |website=WPAFB.mil|publisher=Wright-Patterson Air Force Base|access-date=22 July 2023}} a reference to the combination of the symbolic colors of each branch: red (Marines), green (Army), and blue (Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard).See Military colours, standards and guidons

One well-known encounter, the Revolt of the Admirals, took place after the end of World War II. The newly-created U.S. Air Force sought to create a doctrine which relied heavily on strategic long-range bombing and the Army a large number of reservist troops. Both the Air Force and the Army claimed that the future of warfare depended on the issue of nuclear deterrence, and as such the use of naval gunfire support, as well as the amphibious assault doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps, was outdated and would never be used again. Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson proceeded to strip the Navy of funds on its first supercarrier, the United States. This cancellation caused multiple high ranking Navy personnel to resign. The aftermath backfired against the Navy, and caused Congress to review, and after investigation enabled the implementation of the creation of a Strategic Air Force supporting a nuclear mission.

Previously, during the presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position rotated between different service branches. However, in 1962, when President John F. Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor to replace the incumbent, General Lyman Lemnitzer who had been the Chairman since 1960, the rotation between the Air Force, Navy, Marines, and Army was broken as both Taylor and Lemnitzer served in the Army. When General Earle Wheeler was appointed as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman by President Lyndon Johnson in 1964, it resulted in Army generals holding the Chairman position for three consecutive terms, from 1960 to 1970.{{Cite book|last=McMaster, H. R. |title=Dereliction of duty : Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam |date=1997 |publisher=HarperCollins |isbn=0-06-018795-6 |edition=1st |location=New York |page=22 |oclc=36207626}}{{Cite book|last=Rearden|first=Steven L.|title=Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991|publisher=CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform|date=January 6, 2013|isbn=978-1481911665|pages=}}{{Cite book|last=Perry|first=Mark|title=Four Stars: The Inside Story of The Forty-Year Battle Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and America's Civilian Leaders.|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=1989|isbn=978-0395429235}} Army generals again served as Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman for three consecutive terms from 1989 to 2001, when President George H.W. Bush appointed Army general Colin Powell as Chairman in 1989, and when Powell retired in 1993 he was replaced by another Army general, John Shalikashvili, who was appointed by President Bill Clinton, and when Shalikashvili retired in 1997 he was again replaced by an Army general, Hugh Shelton, until finally, when Shelton retired in 2001, he was replaced by non-army officer, Air Force general Richard B. Myers, who succeeded Shelton as Chairman in October 2001.{{Cite book|last=Perry|first=Mark|title=The Pentagon's Wars: The Military's Undeclared War Against America's Presidents|publisher=Basic Books |date=2017 |isbn=978-0465079711|location=New York}}

In December 2018, with the incumbent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford scheduled to retire the following year, Secretary of Defense James Mattis recommended to President Donald Trump that he pick incumbent Air Force Chief of Staff General David L. Goldfein to be Dunford's successor. Dunford agreed with the choice of Mattis as his successor, especially since no Air Force Generals had been Chairman since General Myers retired in 2005.{{Cite web|title=Trump chooses new Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, against Mattis wishes|url=https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/trump-chooses-new-joint-chiefs-of-staff-chairman-against-mattis-wishes/1436403|access-date=7 July 2021|website=Outlook}}{{Cite web|date=30 September 2019|title=Gen. Milley faces challenges as next Joint Chiefs chairman|url=https://apnews.com/article/58a1cfe95c50432e9e0964f7f075211d|access-date=7 July 2021|website=Associated Press|language=en}}{{Cite web|last=Hirsh|first=Michael|title=Mattis Quits Over Differences With Trump|url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/20/mattis-quits-over-differences-with-trump-defense-secretary/|access-date=7 July 2017|website=Foreign Policy|language=en-US}}{{Cite web|date=2018-12-09|title=Trump chooses new Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, against Mattis wishes|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2177081/trump-chooses-new-joint-chiefs-staff-chairman|access-date=2021-07-07|website=South China Morning Post|language=en}} However due to Trump's recent conflict with Dunford and Mattis, instead of taking their recommendation, Trump selected Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley to be Dunford's successor. The nomination sparked controversy due to previous Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman before Dunford. General Martin Dempsey was from the Army and if Goldfein had been selected, he would have been the Air Force's first chairman since 2005.{{Cite book|last1=Rucker|first1=Philip|title=A very stable genius : Donald J. Trump's testing of America|date=2020|first2=Carol|last2=Leonnig|isbn=978-1-9848-7749-9|location=New York|publisher=Penguin Press|oclc=1135358000}}{{Cite web|last=Macias|first=Amanda|date=2019-09-30|title=Trump oversees swearing-in of Gen. Mark Milley as the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/30/trump-watches-as-gen-mark-milley-becomes-chairman-of-joint-chiefs.html|access-date=2021-07-07|website=CNBC|language=en}} Many believed that Trump picked Milley due to a close and personal friendship between the two since early in Trump's presidency.{{Cite news|last1=Cooper|first1=Helene|last2=Schmitt|first2=Eric|last3=Gibbons-Neff|first3=Thomas|date=2020-06-05|title=Milley, America's Top General, Walks Into a Political Battle|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/politics/protests-milley-trump.html|access-date=2021-07-07|issn=0362-4331}}{{Cite web|last=Chait|first=Jonathan|date=2018-07-09|title='Populist' Trump Turns Up Nose at Public University Graduates|url=https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/07/trumps-supreme-court-pick-cant-be-public-school-graduate.html|access-date=2021-07-07|website=Intelligencer|language=en-us}} By the time Milley assumed the position in October 2019, exactly half of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman—10 out of 20—had been filled by Army generals.{{Cite web|last=Gould|first=Aaron Mehta, Joe|date=2019-07-25|title=Senate confirms Milley as chairman of the Joint Chiefs|url=https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2019/07/25/milley-confirmation/|access-date=2021-07-07|website=Defense News|language=en-US}}

The United States unified combatant command was also dominated by Army officers. One combatant command, Indo-Pacific Command (previously known as Pacific Command), was historically led by Navy officers and has never been led by officers from any other branch. There was an attempt to place other than Navy officers to lead the Indo-Pacific Command, but the attempt eventually failed.{{Cite book|last=McMaster|first=Herbert Raymond|title=Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam|publisher=Harper Perennial|date=May 8, 1998|isbn=978-0060929084|location=|pages=}} Air Force officers rarely get the position as combatant command commanders and other important specific commands.{{Cite web|title=Why Airmen Don't Command|url=https://www.airforcemag.com/article/0308command/|access-date=2021-02-04|website=Air Force Magazine|language=en-US}}

Interservice rivalries are often played out at divisional or regimental level or between special forces that are part of different services. The rivalry between special-forces units led to the creation of United Kingdom Special Forces in the United Kingdom, and SOCOM in the United States, to put them all under a unified command, putting an end to the "rice-bowl" doctrine which created absurd situations in Iran, Grenada, and Panama in the 1980s. In the UK, it has put an end to members of the Special Boat Service being recruited solely from the Royal Marines, and it is now a tri-service branch.{{Citation needed|date=July 2016}}

Special forces can also have rivalries with regular military units. For example, British special forces have rivalries with regular infantry units due to the latter being taught close-quarters combat, which the former was historically responsible for; this rivalry also relates to budgets, as infantry units requiring CQC training also require costly equipment and training facilities, thus using up money that could otherwise be spent on special forces or other purposes.{{Cite journal |last=King |first=Anthony C. |date=2015-06-25 |title=Close Quarters Battle: Urban Combat and 'Special Forcification' |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x15588292 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=276–300 |doi=10.1177/0095327x15588292 |hdl=10871/17093 |s2cid=146961496 |issn=0095-327X|hdl-access=free }}

• Essence of Decision
• Goldwater–Nichols Act
• Joint warfare
• National Security Act of 1947
• Revolt of the Admirals

{{Reflist}}

{{Authority control}}

Category:Military branches

Category:Rivalry

Category:Military sociology