nuclear sharing

{{short description|Concept in NATO's nuclear deterrence policy}}

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Nuclear sharing is a concept in NATO and Russia's policies of nuclear deterrence, which allows member countries without nuclear weapons of their own to participate in the planning, training, and, in extremis, the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, it provides for involvement of the armed forces of those countries in the nuclear sharing arrangements for delivering nuclear weapons in the event of the authorization for their use by the head of state of the nuclear possessor country.

As part of nuclear sharing, the participating countries carry out consultations and make common decisions on nuclear weapons policy, training, and deployment, and maintain technical equipment (notably nuclear-capable airplanes) required for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Some of these states also allow the nuclear weapon state to store nuclear weapons on their territory. In case of war, the United States publicly stated (and the negotiating parties agreed) that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would no longer be controlling.{{cite book |last1=Shaker |first1=Mohamed |title=The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, Volume II |date=1980 |publisher=Oceana Publications |location=London |pages=497,864,865 |url=https://nonproliferation.org/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-origins-and-implementation-1959-1979/ |access-date=29 April 2025}}

NATO

class="wikitable sortable" align="right" border="1" \|+ Weapons provided for nuclear sharing in NATO by the United States{{cite Q\|Q105699219\|quote="About 100 of these (versions −3 and −4) are thought to be deployed at six bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. This number has declined since 2009 partly due to reduction of operational storage capacity at Aviano and Incirlik (Kristensen 2015, 2019c). ... Concerns were raised about the security of the nuclear weapons at the Incirlik base during the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Europe stated in September 2020 that “our presence, quite honestly, in Turkey is certainly threatened,” and further noted that “we don’t know what’s going to happen to Incirlik” (Gehrke 2020). Despite rumors in late 2017 that the weapons had been “quietly removed” (Hammond 2017), reports in 2019 that US officials had reviewed emergency nuclear weapons evacuation plans (Sanger 2019) indicated that that there were still weapons present at the base. The numbers appear to have been reduced, however, from up to 50 to approximately 20."}} ! Country	Base	Estimated
{{BEL}}	Kleine Brogel	20
{{DEU}}	Büchel	20
rowspan="2" \| {{ITA}}	Aviano	20-30
Ghedi	10-15
{{NLD}}	Volkel	20
{{TUR}}	Incirlik	20

Of the three nuclear powers in NATO (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), only the United States is known to have provided weapons for nuclear sharing. However, the UK also deployed, stationed, or tested nuclear weapons on the territory of other states, and France tested nuclear weapons on the territory of Algeria, then a colony. The United States began moving weapons to Europe in 1954, first to the UK, and then to West Germany. The US negotiated agreements with the Allied countries where US nuclear weapons would be stored, including Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act, and a national stockpile agreement. It also negotiated additional agreements with France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, and the UK for the use of nuclear weapons stored and controlled by US forces in West Germany. These arrangements included delivery of short-range nuclear weapons - including landmines, rockets, and artillery, as well as nuclear armed depth charges and anti-aircraft missiles. The US also negotiated a separate agreement with Canada to provide nuclear-armed anti-air and anti-ship weapons to defend North America. The US deployed nuclear forces in Greenland (Danish territory) and Iceland - as well as extensively in the Pacific theater, but these were solely for delivery by US troops.{{cite web |last1=Sorg |first1=Alexander |title=Understanding Foreign Deployed Nuclear Weapons |url=https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/5086/file/Dissertation_Sorg.pdf |website=Hertie School |access-date=29 April 2025}}

{{As of|2009|11}}, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey have been hosting U.S. nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy.{{Citation|url=http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf|title=NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma|first1=Malcolm|last1=Chalmers|first2=Simon|last2=Lunn|date=March 2010|publisher=Royal United Services Institute|access-date=16 March 2010|url-status=dead|archive-date=29 May 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120529205033/http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf}}{{Cite news |url=http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,618550,00.html |title=Der Spiegel: Foreign Minister Wants US Nukes out of Germany (2009-04-10) |newspaper=Der Spiegel |date=10 April 2009 |access-date=4 September 2021 |archive-date=14 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120214122303/http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0%2C1518%2C618550%2C00.html |url-status=live }} Canada hosted weapons under the control of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), rather than NATO, until 1984, and Greece until 2001.{{citation|page=26|url=http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf|title=U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe|author=Hans M. Kristensen|date=February 2005|publisher=Natural Resources Defense Council|access-date=2 April 2009|author-link=Hans M. Kristensen|archive-date=23 July 2014|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140723003003/http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf|url-status=live}}{{cite web |last1=Micallef |first1=Joseph |title=Is It Time to Withdraw US Nuclear Weapons from Incirlik? |url=https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html |website=Military.com |access-date=November 14, 2019 |date=November 14, 2019 |archive-date=15 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191115040723/https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html |url-status=live }} The United Kingdom also received U.S. tactical nuclear weapons such as nuclear artillery and Lance missiles until 1992, even though the UK is a nuclear-weapon state in its own right; these were mainly deployed in Germany.{{cite journal|title=The British nuclear stockpile, 1953-2013|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0096340213493260|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|first1=Robert S|last1=Norris|first2=Hans M|last2=Kristensen|year=2013|volume=69|issue=4|pages=69-75}}

In peacetime, the nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear countries are guarded by United States Air Force (USAF) personnel and previously, some nuclear artillery and missile systems were guarded by United States Army (USA) personnel; the Permissive Action Link codes required for arming them remain under American control. In case of war, the weapons are to be mounted on the participating countries' warplanes. The weapons are under custody and control of USAF Munitions Support Squadrons co-located on NATO main operating bases who work together with the host nation forces.

File:B61 nuclear bomb - inert training version.jpg to store weapons for delivery by Royal Netherlands Air Force F-16s]]

{{As of|2021}}, 100 tactical B61 nuclear bombs are believed to be deployed in Europe under the nuclear sharing arrangement. The weapons are stored within a vault in hardened aircraft shelters, using the USAF WS3 Weapon Storage and Security System. The delivery warplanes used are General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons (F-16s) and Panavia Tornados.{{cite web |url=http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/Brief_Italy2007.pdf |title=U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe After the Cold War |author=Hans M. Kristensen |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |date=5 October 2007 |access-date=10 August 2013 |archive-date=22 March 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160322154058/http://nukestrat.com/pubs/Brief_Italy2007.pdf |url-status=live }}

File:CF-101B firing Genie 1982.jpeg assigned to NORAD, firing an inert version of the AIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air missile in 1982]]

Historically, the shared nuclear weapon delivery systems were not restricted to bombs. Greece used Nike-Hercules Missiles as well as A-7 Corsair II attack aircraft. Canada had Bomarc nuclear-armed anti-aircraft missiles, Honest John surface-to-surface missiles and the AIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket, as well as tactical nuclear bombs for the CF-104 fighter.{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/canadiannuclearw0000clea|url-access=registration|title=Canadian Nuclear Weapons: The Untold Story of Canada's Cold War Arsenal|pages=[https://archive.org/details/canadiannuclearw0000clea/page/91 91]–116|author=John Clearwater|year=1998|publisher=Dundurn Press|isbn=1-55002-299-7|access-date=10 November 2008}} PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles were shared with Italian air force units and Turkish units with U.S. dual key systems to enable the warheads.{{cite web |url=http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/systems/jupiter/chapter1.html |title=History of the JUPITER Missile System |access-date=3 June 2004 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040603144659/http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/systems/jupiter/chapter1.html |archive-date=3 June 2004 }} PGM-17 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles were forward deployed to the UK with RAF crews.{{cite web|title=Douglas SM-75/PGM-17A Thor|url=https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196751/douglas-sm-75pgm-17a-thor/|website=National Museum of the United States Air Force|access-date=2025-03-17|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250312130124/https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196751/douglas-sm-75pgm-17a-thor/|archive-date=2025-03-12}} An extended version of nuclear sharing, the NATO Multilateral Force was a plan to equip NATO surface ships of the member states with UGM-27 Polaris missiles, but the UK ended up purchasing the Polaris missiles and using its own warheads, and the plan to equip NATO surface ships was abandoned.{{cite web |url=http://www.stormingmedia.us/15/1575/A157573.html |title=The Multilateral Force: America's Nuclear Solution for NATO (1960-1965) - Storming Media |access-date=22 April 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120506162710/http://www.stormingmedia.us/15/1575/A157573.html |archive-date=6 May 2012 }}

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the nuclear weapon types shared within NATO were reduced to tactical nuclear bombs deployed by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA). According to the press, Eastern European Member States of NATO have resisted the withdrawal of the shared nuclear bombs from Europe, fearing it would show a weakening of U.S. commitment to defend Europe against Russia.{{cite web |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/21/obama-accused-nuclear-guided-weapons-plan |title=Obama accused of nuclear U-turn as guided weapons plan emerges |last1=Borger |first1=Julian |date=21 April 2013 |work=The Guardian |access-date=11 June 2013 |archive-date=4 November 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131104140851/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/21/obama-accused-nuclear-guided-weapons-plan |url-status=live }}

=Italy=

In Italy, B61 bombs are stored at the Ghedi Air Base and at the Aviano Air Base. According to the former Italian President Francesco Cossiga, Italy's role in a planned retaliation consisted in striking with those nuclear weapons Czechoslovakia and Hungary had the Warsaw Pact waged nuclear war against NATO.Interview to Cossiga on Blu notte – Misteri italiani, episode "OSS, CIA, GLADIO, i Rapporti Segreti tra America e Italia" of 2005{{cite web |url=https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2018/01/17/anche-litalia-coinvolta-nel-riarmo-nucleare-da-noi-settanta-testate14.html |title=Anche l'Italia coinvolta nel riarmo nucleare Da noi settanta testate |last=Di Feo |first=Gianluca |date=17 January 2018 |website= |publisher= |access-date=30 July 2021 |quote= |archive-date=29 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210729142912/https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2018/01/17/anche-litalia-coinvolta-nel-riarmo-nucleare-da-noi-settanta-testate14.html |url-status=live }} He acknowledged the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy, and speculated about the possible presence of British and French nuclear weapons.{{cite web |url=http://notizie.tiscali.it/articoli/politica/08/22/cossiga_atomica_in_italia_123.html |title=Cossiga: "In Italia ci sono bombe atomiche Usa" |language=it |publisher=Tiscali |access-date=18 September 2015 |archive-date=28 September 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150928225725/http://notizie.tiscali.it/articoli/politica/08/22/cossiga_atomica_in_italia_123.html |url-status=live }}

=Germany=

The only German nuclear base is located in Büchel Air Base, near the border with Luxembourg. The base has 11 Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) equipped with WS3 Vaults for storage of nuclear weapons, each with a maximum capacity of 44 B61 nuclear bombs. There are 20 B61 bombs stored on the base for delivery by German PA-200 Tornado IDS bombers of the JaBoG 33 squadron. The Tornado IDS aircraft were due to be retired by the end of 2024; while 2010 and 2018 assessments questioned what nuclear sharing role, if any, Germany would then retain,{{cite web |first1=Claudia |last1=Major |title = Germany's Dangerous Nuclear Sleepwalking | date = 25 January 2018 |publisher=Carnegie Europe |url = http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75351 | access-date = 31 January 2018 | archive-date = 30 January 2018 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180130221243/http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75351 | url-status = live }} in 2020 Germany announced that it would buy 30 Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to replace the Tornado in its nuclear-capable role.{{Cite web|url=https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/germany-picks-super-hornet-and-more-eurofighters-for-tornado-replacement/138003.article|title=Germany picks Super Hornet and more Eurofighters for Tornado replacement|first=Dominic|last=Perry |date=21 April 2020 |website=Flight Global}} The Super Hornet was not yet certified for the B61 bomb, but Dan Gillian, head of Boeing's Super Hornet program, had previously stated his optimism about achieving this certification in a timely manner.{{cite web |last1=Trevithick |first1=Joseph |title=Here's Where Boeing Aims To Take The Super Hornet In The Decades To Come |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27272/heres-where-boeing-aims-to-take-the-super-hornet-in-the-decades-to-come |website=The War Zone |access-date=31 March 2020 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20190710054444/https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27272/heres-where-boeing-aims-to-take-the-super-hornet-in-the-decades-to-come |archive-date=10 July 2019 |date=3 April 2019 |url-status=live|quote=Neither Super Hornet nor Typhoon is presently nuclear certified, which could lead to a pause in Germany’s participation in the nuclear sharing deal. "We certainly think that we, working with the U.S. government, can meet the German requirements there on the [German’s] timeline," [Dan] Gillian said regarding this issue.}} In 2022, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Super Hornet order was cancelled and Germany instead chose to order 35 Lockheed Martin F-35 jets for nuclear sharing use.{{Cite news |date=2022-03-14 |title=Germany to buy 35 Lockheed F-35 fighter jets from U.S. amid Ukraine crisis |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-decides-principle-buy-f-35-fighter-jet-government-source-2022-03-14/ |access-date=2022-04-24}}{{cite web |title=Tornado-Nachfolger: Neue Kampfflugzeuge für die Truppe |periodical= |publisher= |url=https://www.bmvg.de/de/tornado-nachfolger-beschaffung-neue-kampfflugzeuge-fuer-truppe |format= |access-date=2022-03-14 |last= |date= |year= |language=de |pages= |quote=}}

=Netherlands=

On 10 June 2013, former Dutch prime minister Ruud Lubbers confirmed the existence of 22 shared nuclear bombs at Volkel Air Base.{{cite web | author = | title = US nuclear bombs based in Netherlands – ex-Dutch PM Lubbers | work = BBC News | date = 10 June 2013 | url = https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22840880 | access-date = 19 October 2019 | archive-date = 4 March 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200304040843/https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22840880 | url-status = live }} This was inadvertently confirmed again in June 2019 when a public draft report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly was discovered to reference the existence of US nuclear weapons at Volkel, as well as locations in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Turkey. A new version of the report was released on 11 July 2019 without reference to the locations of the weapons.{{cite news |author= |title=Nato assembly document confirms US nuclear bombs are in NL |url=https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/07/nato-document-confirms-us-nuclear-bombs-are-in-the-netherlands/ |publisher=Dutch News |date=16 July 2019 |access-date=19 October 2019 |archive-date=22 August 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190822123508/https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/07/nato-document-confirms-us-nuclear-bombs-are-in-the-netherlands/ |url-status=live }}

=Turkey=

In 2017 due to an increasingly unstable relationship between the United States and Turkey it was suggested that the United States consider removing 50 tactical nuclear weapons stored under American control at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.{{cite web|title=Let's get our nuclear weapons out of Turkey|url=http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-andreasen-nuclear-weapons-turkey-20160811-snap-story.html|work=Los Angeles Times|access-date=12 March 2017|date=11 August 2016|archive-date=13 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170313213603/http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-andreasen-nuclear-weapons-turkey-20160811-snap-story.html|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=Why the U.S. should move nukes out of Turkey|url=http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/07/25/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-move-nukes-turkey/|work=The Japan Times|date=25 July 2016|access-date=12 March 2017|archive-date=13 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170313124957/http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/07/25/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-move-nukes-turkey/|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=Should the U.S. Pull Its Nuclear Weapons From Turkey?|url=https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/20/should-the-us-pull-its-nuclear-weapons-from-turkey|work=The New York Times|access-date=12 March 2017|archive-date=13 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170313131616/http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/20/should-the-us-pull-its-nuclear-weapons-from-turkey|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=How safe are US nukes in Turkey?|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/19/politics/us-nuclear-weapons-turkey-attempted-coup/|publisher=CNN|access-date=12 March 2017|archive-date=13 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170313124656/http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/19/politics/us-nuclear-weapons-turkey-attempted-coup/|url-status=live}}{{cite news|title=The U.S. stores nuclear weapons in Turkey. Is that such a good idea?|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/19/an-old-nuclear-weapons-deal-raises-new-questions-about-u-s-bombs-in-turkey/|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=12 March 2017|archive-date=17 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170217100333/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/19/an-old-nuclear-weapons-deal-raises-new-questions-about-u-s-bombs-in-turkey/|url-status=live}}{{cite web|last1=Borger|first1=Julian|title=Turkey coup attempt raises fears over safety of US nuclear stockpile|url=https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/17/turkey-coup-attempt-raises-fears-over-safety-of-us-nuclear-stockpile|work=The Guardian|access-date=12 March 2017|date=17 July 2016|archive-date=25 February 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170225102409/https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/17/turkey-coup-attempt-raises-fears-over-safety-of-us-nuclear-stockpile|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=Should the US remove its nuclear bombs from Turkey? {{!}} News {{!}} DW.COM {{!}} 16 August 2016|url=http://www.dw.com/en/should-the-us-remove-its-nuclear-bombs-from-turkey/a-19478491|publisher=Deutsche Welle|access-date=12 March 2017|language=en|archive-date=13 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170313140619/http://www.dw.com/en/should-the-us-remove-its-nuclear-bombs-from-turkey/a-19478491|url-status=live}} The presence of US nuclear weapons in Turkey gained increased public attention in October 2019 with the deterioration of relations between the two nations after the Turkish military incursion into Syria.{{cite news |last=Sanger |first=David |date=14 October 2019 |title=Trump Followed His Gut on Syria. Calamity Came Fast |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/trump-turkey-syria.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share |work=New York Times |access-date=19 October 2019 |archive-date=20 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191020153450/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/world/middleeast/trump-turkey-syria.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share |url-status=live }}{{cite web|title=US nuclear bombs at Turkish airbase complicate rift over Syria invasion|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/us-bombs-at-turkish-airbase-complicate-rift-over-syria-invasion|work=The Guardian|date=14 October 2019|access-date=15 October 2019|archive-date=30 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210430080832/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/us-bombs-at-turkish-airbase-complicate-rift-over-syria-invasion|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=With Turkey's invasion of Syria, concerns mount over nukes at Incirlik|url=https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/10/14/with-turkeys-invasion-of-syria-concerns-mount-over-nukes-at-incirlik|work=The Air Force Times|date=14 October 2019|access-date=15 October 2019|archive-date=4 September 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210904154542/https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2019/10/14/with-turkeys-invasion-of-syria-concerns-mount-over-nukes-at-incirlik/|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=Amid rising tensions, US said considering plan to remove nukes from Turkish base|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/amid-rising-tensions-us-said-considering-plan-to-remove-nukes-from-turkish-base|publisher=The Times of Israel|date=14 October 2019|access-date=15 October 2019|archive-date=15 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191015055414/https://www.timesofisrael.com/amid-rising-tensions-us-said-considering-plan-to-remove-nukes-from-turkish-base/|url-status=live}}{{cite web|title=Turkey fired on U.S. special forces in Syria. It's absurd that it still has U.S. nukes|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/turkey-fired-u-s-special-forces-syria-it-s-absurd-ncna1068361|work=NBC News|date=18 October 2019|access-date=18 October 2019|archive-date=19 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191019052217/https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/turkey-fired-u-s-special-forces-syria-it-s-absurd-ncna1068361|url-status=live}}

=Polish aspirations=

In 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, reports appeared about the possible inclusion of Poland in the nuclear sharing policy, with president Andrzej Duda calling the country's lack of nuclear weapons a "problem" and saying that it was in talks with the United States about the possibility of nuclear sharing.{{Cite news |title=Poland might join Nato's Nuclear Sharing, says Duda |url=https://www.pap.pl/en/news/news%2C1443860%2Cpoland-might-join-natos-nuclear-sharing-says-duda.html |access-date=2022-10-06 |website=Polska Agencja Prasowa SA |language=en|date=5 October 2022}} In June 2023, then-prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared Poland's interest in hosting nuclear weapons under the policy, citing the reported deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad region and Belarus, while National Security Bureau head Jacek Siewiera said the country was interested in certifying its upcoming F-35A fleet as being capable of delivering B61 bombs.{{cite web |title=Poland’s bid to participate in NATO nuclear sharing |url=https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2023/polands-bid-to-participate-in-nato-nuclear-sharing/ |website=iiss.org |publisher=International Institute for Strategic Studies |access-date=28 April 2024 |date=September 2023}} In April 2024, president Duda said that Poland was "ready" to host nuclear weapons and had been discussing the matter with the United States government for "some time".{{cite web |last1=Chiappa |first1=Claudia |title=Poland: We’re ready to host nuclear weapons |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-ready-host-nuclear-weapons-andrzej-duda-nato/ |website=Politico |access-date=28 April 2024 |date=22 April 2024}} The current Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, said that he wanted to speak with Duda to understand the intention behind the statement and that he wanted Poland to "be safe and well-armed, but [he] would also like any initiatives to be very well prepared by the people responsible for them and for all [Poles] to be convinced that this is what [they] want."{{cite web |last1=Tilles |first1=Daniel |title=“Poland ready to host nuclear weapons,” declares president, prompting response from Moscow |url=https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/04/22/poland-ready-to-host-nuclear-weapons-declares-president-prompting-response-from-moscow/ |website=Notes from Poland |access-date=28 April 2024 |date=22 April 2024}} In May 2024, foreign minister Radosław Sikorski accused president Duda of failing to consult with him on this and other major foreign policy announcements and said that he had "asked the president privately and publicly not to discuss such delicate and secret matters in public, because it [did] not help Poland"; he also said that the previous Polish government had been told that the idea of Poland being involved with nuclear sharing was "not on the table".{{cite web |last1=Tilles |first1=Daniel |title=Foreign minister criticises president for declaring Poland’s willingness to host US nuclear weapons |url=https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/05/06/foreign-minister-criticises-president-for-declaring-polands-willingness-to-host-us-nuclear-weapons/ |website=Notes from Poland |access-date=6 May 2024 |date=6 May 2024}} After the announcement in March 2025 that France was considering the extension of its nuclear deterrence to other European countries (see next section), Duda welcomed this development{{cite web |last1=Tilles |first1=Daniel |title=Poland declares interest in French nuclear deterrent – or even developing its own |url=https://notesfrompoland.com/2025/03/10/poland-declares-interest-in-french-nuclear-deterrent-or-even-developing-its-own/ |website=Notes from Poland |access-date=13 March 2025 |date=10 March 2025}} while simultaneously renewing his call for American weapons to be based in Poland.{{cite web |last1=Minder |first1=Raphael |title=Poland’s president urges US to move nuclear warheads to Polish territory |url=https://www.ft.com/content/f9e5f2a9-5d81-4557-af6d-ed3a33eecf1a |website=Financial Times |access-date=13 March 2025 |date=13 March 2025}}{{cite web |last1=Bowen |first1=Jeremy |author1-link=Jeremy Bowen |title=Duda: US nuclear weapons in Poland would be 'deterrent' for Russia |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ce98ym8k89do |website=BBC News |access-date=14 March 2025 |date=13 March 2025}}

=Sharing of non-US weapons=

In March 2025, amid European concerns over whether the United States could continue to be relied on as an ally, the French president Emmanuel Macron said that his country would consider the possibility of extending the protection offered by its nuclear arsenal to other European states. Both Macron and defence minister Sébastien Lecornu stressed that ultimate control over the weapons would be retained by France, and claims that the potential decision amounted to a plan for nuclear sharing were explicitly denied.{{cite web |last1=Ataman |first1=Joseph |last2=Yeung |first2=Jessie |title=France to consider protecting European allies with its nuclear arsenal, Macron says |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2025/03/05/europe/macron-france-nuclear-arsenal-ukraine-intl-hnk/index.html |website=CNN |access-date=13 March 2025 |date=6 March 2025}}{{cite web |last1=Schofield |first1=Hugh |author1-link=Hugh Schofield |title=France has a nuclear umbrella. Could its European allies fit under it? |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c871e41751yo |website=BBC News |access-date=13 March 2025 |date=6 March 2025}} Friedrich Merz said that discussions on nuclear sharing should be held with France and Britain (which also has nuclear weapons) but warned that European weapons could only ever be a supplement to the existing American arrangement.{{cite web |last1=Connolly |first1=Kate |title=Germany to reach out to France and UK over sharing of nuclear weapons |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/09/germany-to-reach-out-to-france-and-uk-over-sharing-of-nuclear-weapons |website=The Guardian |access-date=13 March 2025 |date=9 March 2025}}

=List of Weapons Shared by the US with Allies from 1954-present=

Current:
B61 nuclear bomb (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey)
Former:
AIR-2 Genie (Canada)
B57 nuclear bomb (Canada, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
B28 nuclear bomb (Canada, and the United Kingdom)
B43 nuclear bomb (Canada, United Kingdom)
B61 nuclear bomb (Greece)
BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
CIM-10 Bomarc (Canada)
Mark 7 nuclear bomb (United Kingdom)
Mk 101 Lulu (Netherlands and the United Kingdom)
MGR-1 Honest John (Belgium, Canada, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
MGM-1 Matador (West Germany)
MGM-5 Corporal (United Kingdom)
MGM-29 Sergeant (West Germany)
MGM-52 Lance (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
MIM-14 Nike Hercules (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and West Germany)
Pershing 1 (West Germany)
Pershing 1a (West Germany)
PGM-17 Thor (United Kingdom)
PGM-19 Jupiter (Italy and Turkey)
UGM-27 Polaris (Italy)
W33 and W48 Artillery Shells (Canada, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and West Germany)

Non-NATO

=USSR=

The Soviet Union practiced nuclear sharing with East Germany, as early as 1959,{{cite book |last1=Uhl |first1=Matthias |title=Atomraketern Für Die NVA? Zur Erstausstattung Der Nationalen Volksarmee Der DDR Mit Kernwafeenseinsatzmitteln |date=2004 |publisher=Internationale Tagung Militärgeschichte des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes |location=Berlin |pages=187-204}} and nuclear sharing arrangements similar to the NATO arrangements were also made with Hungary,{{cite book |last1=Becz |first1=Laszlo |title=OKSNAR: Fully assembled state. Soviet nuclear weapons in Hungary 1961-1991 |date=2019 |isbn=9786150053974 |url=https://sites.google.com/view/nuclear-weapons-in-hungary/home |access-date=29 April 2025}} and Poland.{{cite journal |last1=Piotorowski |first1=Paul |title=Operation "Vistula". Nuclear weapons on the territory of Poland |journal=Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy |date=2017 |volume=259 |issue=1 |pages=67-88 |url=https://www.academia.edu/48854400/_Operacja_Wis%C5%82a_Bro%C5%84_j%C4%85drowa_na_terytorium_Polski_Przegl%C4%85d_Historyczno_Wojskowy_Nr_1_259_z_2017_r_s_67_88}} It is possible that similar arrangements were made with Bulgaria, but no sources have been found to date.

=Potential nuclear sharing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia=

It is common belief among foreign officials that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have an understanding in which Pakistan would supply Saudi Arabia with warheads if security in the Persian Gulf was threatened. A Western official told The Times that Saudi Arabia could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of days of approaching Pakistan. Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Muhammed Naeem Khan, was quoted as saying, "Pakistan considers the security of Saudi Arabia not just as a diplomatic or an internal matter but as a personal matter." Naeem also said that the Saudi leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be one country and that any threat to Saudi Arabia is also a threat to Pakistan.{{cite news |url=http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/10/10369793-report-saudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb |title=Report: Saudi Arabia to buy nukes if Iran tests A-bomb |website=msnbc.com |date=10 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120213030211/http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/10/10369793-report-saudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb |archive-date=13 February 2012}} Other vendors were also likely to enter into a bidding war if Riyadh indicated that it was seeking nuclear warheads. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have denied the existence of any such agreement.{{cite news | url=https://www.foxnews.com/world/saudi-arabia-threatens-to-go-nuclear-if-iran-does/ | work=Fox News | title=Saudi Arabia threatens to go nuclear if Iran does | date=10 February 2012 | access-date=4 September 2021 | archive-date=16 February 2012 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120216122207/http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/02/10/saudi-arabia-threatens-to-go-nuclear-if-iran-does/ | url-status=live }} Western intelligence sources have told The Guardian that "the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the Pakistani nuclear programme, and in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal ('five to six warheads') off the shelf".{{cite news | url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/may/11/pakistan-saudiarabia | location=London | work=The Guardian | first=Julian | last=Borger | title=Pakistan's bomb and Saudi Arabia | date=11 May 2010 | access-date=4 September 2021 | archive-date=5 April 2013 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130405022634/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2010/may/11/pakistan-saudiarabia | url-status=live }} Saudi Arabia has potential dual-purpose delivery infrastructure, including Tornado IDS and F-15S fighter bombers and improved Chinese CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles with accuracy sufficient for nuclear warheads but delivered with high explosive warheads.de Borchgrave, Arnaud, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/031022-pakistan_saudi-arabia.htm "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact: Islamabad trades weapons technology for oil"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180204001402/https://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2003/031022-pakistan_saudi-arabia.htm |date=4 February 2018 }}, The Washington Times, 22 October 2003.[http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/ "Saudi Arabia Special Weapons"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180622010445/https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/ |date=22 June 2018 }}, globalsecurity.org.

In November 2013, a variety of sources told BBC Newsnight that Saudi Arabia was able to obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan at will. The new-report further stated, according to western experts, it was alleged that Pakistan's defense sector, including its missile and defense labs, had received plentiful financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.{{Cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24823846|title=Saudi nuclear weapons 'on order' from Pakistan|last=Urban|first=Mark|date=6 November 2013|work=BBC News|access-date=14 August 2018|language=en-GB|archive-date=1 May 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190501053448/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24823846|url-status=live}} Gary Samore, an adviser to Barack Obama, said, "I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan." Amos Yadlin, formerly head of Israeli military intelligence, said "They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring."{{cite news |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24823846 |title=Saudi nuclear weapons 'on order' from Pakistan |author=Mark Urban |publisher=BBC |date=6 November 2013 |access-date=7 November 2013 |archive-date=7 November 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131107025033/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24823846 |url-status=live }}

According to the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies think-thank, the BBC's report on possible Pakistani-Saudi nuclear sharing was partially incorrect. There was no indication of the validity or credibility of the BBC's sources, and the article failed to expand on what was essentially an unverified lead. Furthermore, if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear warheads onto Saudi soil, it was highly unlikely that either nation would face any international repercussions if NATO-esque guidelines were followed.Deming, Kyle, [http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/no-price-is-right-why-the-bbc-is-incorrect-about-a-saudi-arabia-p "No Price is Right: Why the BBC is Incorrect about a Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Deal"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714205353/http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/no-price-is-right-why-the-bbc-is-incorrect-about-a-saudi-arabia-p |date=14 July 2014 }}, Project on Nuclear Weapons, 13 November 2013. A research paper produced by the British House of Commons Defence Select Committee states that as long as current NATO nuclear sharing arrangements remain in place, the NATO states would have few valid grounds for complaint if such a transfer were to occur.{{cite report |page=Ev 80 |url=https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/111/111.pdf#page=208 |title=The future of NATO and European defence |work=Defence Select Committee |publisher=UK Parliament |id=HC 111 |isbn=9780215514165 |date=4 March 2008 |access-date=2 April 2015 |archive-date=8 February 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150208040212/http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmdfence/111/111.pdf#page=208 |url-status=live }}

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty considerations

Some members of the Non-Aligned Movement have raised concerns about NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements and their compatability with the NPT, going so far as to accuse NATO allies of violating Article I of the NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).{{cite web |title=Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/614911/files/NPT_CONF.2010_PC.I_SR.4-EN.pdf |website=United Nations Digital Library System |access-date=29 April 2025 |ref=Para 41}} In 2015, Russia accused the US of violating the NPT,{{cite web |title=Statement by M. Uliyanov, Acting Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, at the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Debate), Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations in New York, NY, 27 April, 2015 |url=https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/statements/pdf/RU_ru.pdf |website=United Nations |access-date=29 April 2025}} but since Russia resumed its own nuclear sharing arrangements, now with Belarus, it no longer makes this assertion. However, China accused the US of violating the NPT at a side event to the NPT review process in Geneva in July 2024.{{cite web |title=Analysis of the Incompatibility of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |url=https://www.cinis.com.cn/zhzlghyjzy/yjbg/1446912/2024072914514738359.pdf |website=China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy |access-date=29 April 2025}}

At the time the NPT was being negotiated, the NATO nuclear sharing agreements were well known and discussed publicly in the United Nations at the NPT negotiations in Geneva,{{cite web |title=The verbatim records of the ENDC meetings |url=https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=endc |website=University of Michigan Library Digital Collections |access-date=29 April 2025}} national parliaments,{{cite web |title=Hansard for 16 May 1966, Volume 728, No. 54, “Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee” |url=https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1966-05-16/debates/3edc8328-fa11-49ab-9fa0-abbd0fc518b6/Eighteen-NationDisarmamentCommittee |website=UK Parliament, House of Commons |access-date=29 April 2025}}{{cite web |title=Transcript of the debate in the Canadian Parliament as broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation on 4 June 1963 |url=https://www.lipad.ca/full/1963/06/04/12/ |website=Canadian Hansard Linked Parliamentary Data Website |access-date=29 April 2025}} NATO{{cite web |title=Partial Briefing of the Press by the President on the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting |url=https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf/200305-50Years_NPG.pdf |website=NATO Archives |access-date=29 April 2024}} and government press releases,{{cite web |title=United States and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear Weapons |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d444 |website=www.nato.int |publisher=Department of State Press Release |access-date=29 April 2025}} and in the news media.{{cite web |title=We Are Already Sharing the Bomb |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1965/11/28/archives/we-are-already-sharing-the-bomb.html |website=New York Times |access-date=29 April 2025}} The US and USSR discussed the wording of Articles I and II at length bilaterally and negotiated the wording to ensure that they were compatible with the NPT during an especially intense negotiation from 22-30 October 1966 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.{{cite book |title=Negotiations of Articles I and II of the NPT: Selected Documents Vol. 2 (1966-1968) |date=19 October 2018 |publisher=NATO Archives |location=Brussels |pages=5-34 |url=https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf/200305-NPT_Book_VOL2.pdf |access-date=29 April 2025}} While some have erroneously claimed that such arrangements were secret or unknown, and that some signatories not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time,{{citation|url=http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/gtz13.pdf|title=NATO nuclear burden sharing and NPT obligations|date=23 April 2009|author=Laura Spagnuolo|publisher=British American Security Information Council|access-date=7 August 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120317052018/http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/gtz13.pdf|archive-date=17 March 2012|url-status=dead}} these claims have been thoroughly debunked.{{cite web |last1=Hayashi |first1=Mika |title=NATO Nuclear Sharing Arrangements in the Light of the NPT and the TPNW |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krab015 |website=Journal of Conflict and Security Law |access-date=29 April 2025}}{{cite web |title=Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT Vol. 1 (1961-1966) |url=https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf/200305-NPT_Book_VOL1.pdf |website=www.nato.int |publisher=NATO Archives |access-date=29 April 2025}}

References

External links

[https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf/200305-NPT_Book_VOL1.pdf Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT Vol. 1 (1961-1966) ], NATO Archives, Brussels
[https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/3/pdf/200305-NPT_Book_VOL2.pdf Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT Vol. 2 (1966-1969) ], NATO Archives, Brussels
Mohamed Shaker, [https://nonproliferation.org/the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-origins-and-implementation-1959-1979/ The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, Volumes I-III],, Oceana Publications, London 1980
[https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/org-explains-5-nato-nuclear-sharing NATO Nuclear Sharing], Tim Street, Oxford Research Group, ORG Explains No. 5, June 2018
[http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe], Hans M. Kristensen, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005
[https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/240709-Nuclear-Non-Proliferation_Disarma.pdf NATO and Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament], NATO, July 2024
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_174104.htm North Atlantic Council Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], NATO Headquarters, 5 March 2020
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/agency/usafe-munss.htm United States Air Forces in Europe – Munitions Support Squadron], GlobalSecurity.org
[https://books.google.com/books?id=2pEQpx8CB7oC A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963] (Chapter 5: Eisenhower and Nuclear Sharing), Marc Trachtenberg, 1999, Princeton University Press, {{ISBN|0-691-00273-8}}
[https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR190/ Commitment to purpose : how alliance partnership won the cold war], Richard L. Kugler, RAND, MC-190-RC/FF, 1993, {{ISBN|0-8330-1385-8}}
[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/nuclear-history-documents/ The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project] or NPIHP is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources.
[https://sites.google.com/view/nuclear-weapons-in-hungary/ Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Hungary 1961–1991]

Category:Nuclear weapons policy

Category:Politics of NATO

Category:Sharing