political fragmentation

Scholars, journalists, and politicians have theorized about a number of potential effects of political fragmentation. For example, it has been argued that higher fragmentation allows voters to better represent their political spectrum of political positions. The length of government coalition formation has also been argued to increase with number of parties and decreases with preexisting political groups.{{cite journal |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000539 |doi=10.1017/S0007123417000539 |title=Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies |date=2020 |last1=Ecker |first1=Alejandro |last2=Meyer |first2=Thomas M. |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=50 |pages=261–280 |s2cid=158378332 |url-access=subscription }} The strength of these effects has been hypothesized to depend on whether it is the government or the opposition that are fragmented.{{cite journal |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2021.2015086 |doi=10.1080/13569775.2021.2015086 |title=How much opposition? Political fragmentation and changes in democracy |date=2022 |last1=Meka |first1=Eltion |journal=Contemporary Politics |volume=28 |issue=5 |pages=517–538 |s2cid=245459910 |url-access=subscription }} However, the political fragmentation of parliaments has little causal effect on a number of dimensions of the quality of democracy.{{cite journal |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/does-partysystem-fragmentation-affect-the-quality-of-democracy/202A72173869E4CAA583822FB6518672 |doi=10.1017/S0007123423000157 |title=Does Party-System Fragmentation Affect the Quality of Democracy? |date=2024 |last1=Valentim |first1=Vicente |last2=Dinas |first2=Elias |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=54 |pages=152–178 |s2cid=236793765 |url-access=subscription }} The veto player theory predicts that higher fragmentation relates to gridlock,{{cite book |url=https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691099897/veto-players |last= Tsebelis |first=G. |title=Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work |date=15 September 2002 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=9780691099897 }} but other literature does not observe increased gridlock.{{cite journal |url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463883 |doi=10.1177/0010414012463883 |title=The Calculus of Consensus Democracy |date=2013 |last1=McGann |first1=Anthony J. |last2=Latner |first2=Michael |journal=Comparative Political Studies |volume=46 |issue=7 |pages=823–850 |s2cid=154367801 |url-access=subscription }}

While one-party states are authoritarian, dominant-party systems can be democratic.{{cite journal | last=Butler | first=Anthony | title=Considerations On The Erosion Of One-Party Dominance | journal=Representation | volume=45 | issue=2 | date=2009 | issn=0034-4893 | doi=10.1080/00344890902945681 | pages=159–171}}

The political fragmentation, represented by effective number of parties, is roughly estimated with the seat product model,Taagepera, Rein (2007). "Predicting Party Sizes". Oxford University Press{{cite journal |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.10.011 |doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2015.10.011 |title=The Seat Product Model of the effective number of parties: A case for applied political science |date=2016 |last1=Li |first1=Yuhui |last2=Shugart |first2=Matthew S. |journal=Electoral Studies |volume=41 |pages=23–34 |url-access=subscription }} and increases with district magnitude and assembly size. The political fragmentation tends to move towards an equilibrium, depending on the voting system.{{cite journal |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01101895 |doi=10.1007/BF01101895 |title=Dynamics in the fragmentation of political party systems |date=1995 |last1=Coleman |first1=Stephen |journal=Quality & Quantity |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=141–155 |s2cid=153425524 |url-access=subscription }} Duverger's law predicts majoritarian elections with district magnitude of one favor a two-party system and proportional representation increases the number of parties. In proportional representation, higher electoral thresholds tend to reduce the number of parties since voters voting for smaller parties have a higher risk of having their votes wasted.{{cite journal | last1=Reuchamps | first1=Min | last2=Onclin | first2=François | last3=Caluwaerts | first3=Didier | last4=Baudewyns | first4=Pierre | title=Raising the Threshold, Fighting Fragmentation? Mechanical and Psychological Effects of the Legal Electoral Threshold in Belgium | journal=West European Politics | volume=37 | issue=5 | date=3 September 2014 | issn=0140-2382 | doi=10.1080/01402382.2014.925736 | pages=1087–1107}}

Strong autocrats can prefer a fragmented political system, while weaker autocrats can prefer a low level of party fragmentation.{{cite journal | last=Golosov | first=Grigorii V. | title=The five shades of grey: party systems and authoritarian institutions in post-Soviet Central Asian states | journal=Central Asian Survey | volume=39 | issue=3 | date=2 July 2020 | issn=0263-4937 | doi=10.1080/02634937.2018.1500442 | pages=285–302}}

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• {{cite book|last=Pildes|first=Richard H.|chapter=Political Fragmentation and the Decline of Effective Government|title=Constitutionalism and a Right to Effective Government|series=Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy|doi=10.2139/ssrn.3868421 | chapter-url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3868421 | publisher=Cambridge University Press|pages=235–246|year=2022|ssrn=3868421 |editor1-first=V.C.|editor1-last=Jackson|editor2-first=Y.|editor2-last=Dawood }}

Category:Voting theory