Afghan Army

{{See also|Military history of Afghanistan|List of wars involving Afghanistan}}

File:Afghan royal soldiers of the Durrani Empire.jpg royal soldiers of the Durrani Empire]]

Historically, Afghans have served in the army of the Ghaznavids (963–c.1187), Ghurids (1148–1215), Delhi Sultanate (1206–1527), and the Mughals (1526–1858).{{Cite book|title=E.J. Brill's first encyclopedia of Islam 1913–1936 |last1=Houtsma |first1=M. Th.|year=1993|publisher=BRILL |isbn=978-90-04-09796-4|pages=150–51 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GEl6N2tQeawC&pg=PA150 |access-date=2010-09-24}} The Afghan Army traces its origin to the early 18th century when the Hotak dynasty rose to power in Kandahar and defeated the Persian Safavid Empire at the Battle of Gulnabad in 1722.{{Cite web|url=http://persian.packhum.org/persian/pf?file=90001014&ct=30|title=AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF PERSIA DURING THE LAST TWO CENTURIES (A.D. 1722–1922)|pages=29–31|work=Edward G. Browne|publisher=Packard Humanities Institute|location=London|access-date=2010-09-24}}

When Ahmad Shah Durrani formed the Durrani Empire in 1747, in general, tribes were responsible for providing troops to the king. The only national army that existed during Ahmad Shah's time consisted of small groups that functioned as royal bodyguards.{{sfn|Nyrop|Seekins|1986|p=289}} The Afghan Army fought a number of battles in the Punjab region of India during the 19th century. One of the famous battles was the 1761 Battle of Panipat in which the Afghan army decisively defeated the Hindu Maratha Empire.{{sfn|Nyrop|Seekins|1986|p=17-18}} The Afghans then fought with the Sikh Empire, until finally, the Sikh Marshal Hari Singh Nalwa died and Sikh conquests stopped. In 1839, the British successfully invaded Afghanistan and installed the exiled Shah Shujah Durrani into power. Their occupation of Afghanistan was challenged after Dost Mohammad's son, Wazir Akbar Khan and the forces he led revolted against the occupying British. By October 1841 disaffected Afghan tribes were flocking to the support of Wazir Akbar Khan in Bamian.{{sfn|Nyrop|Seekins|1986|p=29}} The success of Akbar Khan's uprising led to the 1842 retreat from Kabul where the Afghan army decimated British forces, thanks to effective use of the rugged terrain and weapons such as the Jezail.{{citation needed|date=April 2024}}

File:Afghan infantry.jpg

At the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–80), Ali Ahmad Jalali cites sources saying that the regular army was about 50,000 strong and consisted of 62 infantry and 16 cavalry regiments, with 324 guns mostly organized in horse and mountain artillery batteries.{{sfn|Jalali|2002}} Jalali writes that '..although Emir Sher Ali Khan (1863–78) is widely credited for founding the modern Afghan Army, it was only under Abdur Rahman that it became a viable and effective institution.'{{sfn|Jalali|2002|p=76}} The Library of Congress Country Study for Afghanistan states that when Abdur Rahman came to the throne circa 1880:{{sfn|Nyrop|Seekins|1986|p=290–291}}

"..the army was virtually nonexistent. With the assistance of a liberal financial loan from the British, plus their aid in the form of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies, [Abdur Rahman] began a 20-year task of creating a respectable regular force by instituting measures that formed the long-term basis of the military system. These included increasing the equalization of military obligation by setting up a system known as the hasht nafari (whereby one man in every eight between the ages of 20 and 40 took his turn at military service); constructing an arsenal in Kabul to reduce dependence on foreign sources for small arms and other ordnance; introducing supervised training courses; organizing troops into divisions, brigades, and regiments, including battalions of artillery; developing pay schedules; and introducing an elementary (and harsh) disciplinary system.

File:1950s Afghanistan - Afghan Army soldiers on parade.jpg]]

Further improvements to the Army were made by King Amanullah Khan in the early 20th century just before the Third Anglo-Afghan War. King Amanullah fought against the British in 1919, resulting in Afghanistan becoming fully independent after the Treaty of Rawalpindi was signed. It appears from reports of Naib Sular Abdur Rahim's career that a Cavalry Division was in existence in the 1920s, with him being posted to the division in Herat Province in 1913 and Mazar-i-Sharif after 1927.Frank Clements, Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia, 2–3. A military academy was in existence by Amanullah's reign.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2016|p=9}} The Army fought the Soviet Union in the Urtatagai conflict (1925–1926) over a border island, following earlier fighting in 1913.{{Cite journal|last=Panin|first=Sergei Borisovich|date=1999-09-01|title=The Soviet‐Afghan conflict of 1925–26 over the Island of Urta‐Tugai|url=https://www.academia.edu/30075200|journal=The Journal of Slavic Military Studies|volume=12|issue=3|pages=122–133|doi=10.1080/13518049908430405|issn=1351-8046}} In 1927 Afghanistan invited Turkey to send a military advisory mission, resulting in a strengthening of Afghan divisions and brigades, "augmenting each echelon headquarters with supporting staff;" and "regularizing the officer corps".Samuel Chan, "Sentinels of Democracy: The Afghan National Army," Military Review, January–February 2009, p26, writes that this occurred from 1937. Giustozzi 2015, p9 says Turkish mission arrived in 1927. The Afghan Army was expanded during King Zahir Shah's reign, starting in 1933. In 1934, soldiers of the Royal Afghan Army were also taught the Japanese martial art of Jujutsu by His Excellency Abdullah Khan, at the royal army school.{{sfn|Azimi|2019|p=199}}

From 1949–1950 to 1961, Afghanistan-Pakistan skirmishes took place along the frontier, culminating in fighting in Bajaur Agency in September 1960.{{Cite journal |last1=Gartenstein-Ross |first1=Daveed |first2=Tara |last2=Vassefi |title=The forgotten history of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations |journal=Yale Journal of International Affairs |volume=7 |date=March 2012 |pages=38–45 |url=http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Article-Gartenstein_Ross-and-Vassefi.pdf |archive-date=2017-02-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170203000435/http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Article-Gartenstein_Ross-and-Vassefi.pdf |url-status=dead }} This led to a breakoff in diplomatic relations between the two countries in September 1961.Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, 2005, 36.

In 1953, Lieutenant General Mohammed Daoud Khan, cousin of the King who had previously served as Minister of Defence, was transferred from command of the Central Corps in Kabul to become Prime Minister of Afghanistan.{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|page=90}} The Central Corps was headquartered at Darul Aman Palace.{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|page=80}} On the opening day of Parliament in October 1965, a violent student demonstration among which Babrak Karmal was at the forefront forced Zahir Shah's new prime minister, Yusuf, to resign. Two students were killed when the new corps commander, General Abdul Wali, sent in troops to restore order.{{sfn|Tomsen|2011|page=102}}

File:Royal Afghan Army soldier photographed in 1969.jpg

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the Afghan Army received training and equipment mostly from the Soviet Union. More specifically, a $100,000,000 contract was awarded to Afghanistan which led to the Afghan Army being transformed, due to the arrival and new weaponry and armour in 1958. Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan, now emboldened by Soviet support, began making changes to the Afghan Army’s formations. The name of the Ministry of War was changed to the Ministry of Defence, with the Chief of Staff being given greater managerial and administrative powers. The most significant change included the addition of readiness categories known as “Type A” and “Type B”. The former being used to refer to units that were fully operational and combat-ready at all times, with complete personnel, full weaponry and combat equipment, and an active logistics system. Type B, on the other hand, was used to refer to units that weren’t fully active or operational during peacetime, being used for administration, training and as strategic reserve forces.{{sfn|Azimi|2019}}

The 1st Central Army Corps’ divisions were all “Type A”, such as the 7th, 8th and 11th Infantry Divisions. The 2nd Army Corps (Kandahar) was “Type B”, with only one operational unit known as the 100th Division, with two other unnamed divisions being used as reserves. The divisions of the 3rd Army Corps (Paktia) were all “Type B”, such as the 12th, 14th and 35th Infantry Divisions. Under the premiership of Daoud Khan, the personnel of the Afghan Army increased to 80,000, with “Type B” units being able to be deployed within 72 hours and act as “Type A” units.

The Royal Afghan Army were photographed wearing white “snegurochka” winter suits in snowy areas of the countryIn an official Afghan Army publication, the Afghan Army were photographed four times in white snow suits and stahlhelms. The publication name is “Da Ordu Mojella”, also known as the “Military Magazine” in English. and also had armored riverboats in their inventory, as seen in a parade in Kabul. In February–March 1957, the first group of Soviet military specialists (about 10, including interpreters) was sent to Kabul to train Afghan officers and non-commissioned officers.{{Cite web|url=http://www.xliby.ru/istorija/sekretnye_voiny_sovetskogo_soyuzan/p10.php|title=АФГАНИСТАН. 1919–1978 гг. / Секретные войны Советского Союза [Afghanistan 1919–1978]|website=www.xliby.ru}} At the time, there seems to have been significant Turkish influence in the Afghan Armed Forces, which waned quickly after the Soviet advisors arrived. By the late 1950s, Azimi describes three corps, each with a number of divisions, along the eastern border with Pakistan and several independent divisions.{{sfn|Azimi|2019}}

File:1961–1973_Royal_Afghan_Army_military_emblem.png

In a 1961 manual titled “Royalist Regulations” for the Royal Afghan Army, there were illustrations of numerous branch insignias, denoting the specialities and the role of the soldier wearing them.{{Cite web |title=VK.com {{!}} VK |url=https://m.vk.com/photo-166689869_457240790?list=photos-166689869 |access-date=2024-04-30 |website=m.vk.com}}{{Cite web |title=VK.com {{!}} VK |url=https://m.vk.com/photo-166689869_457240789?list=photos-166689869 |access-date=2024-04-30 |website=m.vk.com}} These include:

• “Academy” (اکادمی), worn by recruits who were still in a military academy
• “Infantry” (پیاده),{{Cite web |title=Voyage dans l'Afghanistan du début des années 60 {{!}} INA |url=https://www.ina.fr/ina-eclaire-actu/voyage-dans-l-afghanistan-du-debut-des-annees-60 |access-date=2024-04-30 |website=ina.fr |language=fr}}{{Cite web |last=Katju |first=Vivek |date=2023-08-10 |title=Coup, chaos, and Taliban: The turbulent history of modern Afghanistan |url=https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/coup-chaos-and-taliban-the-turbulent-history-of-modern-afghanistan/article67145161.ece |access-date=2024-04-30 |website=Frontline |language=en}}{{Cite web |title=Штурм дворца Амина: версия военного разведчика [Владимир Михайлович Кошелев] (fb2) картинки и рисунки |url=https://coollib.net/b/394213-vladimir-mihaylovich-koshelev-shturm-dvortsa-amina-versiya-voennogo-razvedchika/image |website=coollib.net |language=Ru}} the most common insignia, worn by most soldiers who have finished training and graduated from the academy
• “Cavalry” (سواری), worn by the Royal Afghan Army's cavalrymen on horseback
• “Artillery” (طومي), worn by artillery men
• “Tank”(تانک), worn by tank operators of the Royal Afghan Army's tank brigades
• “Fortification” (استحكام), worn by soldiers involved in the construction of defensive structures
• “Communications” (مخابره), worn by soldiers part of the army's signal regiments
• “Gendarmerie” (شاندارم), worn by the paramilitary police force
• “Vehicle” (نقلیه) worn by motorized/mechanized units
• “Logistics” (لفوازير), worn by units specializing in transportation and supply
• “Cartography” (خریطہ), worn by soldiers specializing in map-making and mapping
• “Judicial” (قضا), worn by members of the military court
• “Field Medic” (صحید), worn by soldiers who are qualified medics
• “Subfield Medic” ( پرسونال فرعی صحید), worn by soldiers who distributed medicine
• “Veterinary” (وترین), worn by veterinarians who specialized in animal care
• “Minor Personnel” (پرسونال فرعی و ریز), worn by support staff and soldiers with specialized technical skills
• “Instructor” (معلم), worn by personnel responsible for training recruits
• “Chemical Warfare” (کیمیای عربی), worn by units that specialize in the use of chemical agents
• “Engineer” (انجنیر), worn by soldiers who specialize in engineering
• “Ordnance” (وسله پالی), worn by soldiers managing equipment such as weapons, bombs and ammunition
• “Finance” (مالی), worn by the army's accountants who manage finances and budgeting
• “Music” (موزیک), worn by the military band of the Royal Afghan Army

File:Royal Afghan Army Band Flag.png

In the early 1970s, Soviet military assistance was increased. The number of Soviet military specialists increased from 1,500 in 1973 to 5,000 by April 1978.Брудерер Г. Афганская война. Frankfurt am Main. 1995. С. 43. The senior Soviet specialist at this time (from 29 November 1972 until 11 December 1975) was a Major General I.S. Bondarets (И.С. Бондарец), and from 1975 to 1978, the senior Soviet military adviser was Major General L.N. Gorelov. Before the Saur Revolution in 1978, according to Jacobs, the army included three armored divisions; infantry divisions averaging 4,500 to 8,000 men each; “two mountain infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, a guards regiment (for palace protection), three artillery regiments, two commando regiments, and a parachute battalion, which was largely grounded. All the formations were under the control of three corps level headquarters. All but three infantry divisions were facing Pakistan along a line from Bagram south to Kandahar."{{sfn|Nyrop|Seekins|1986|p=288–289}} The guards regiment additionally performed ceremonial duties. There were 570 medium tanks, plus more Soviet T-55 tanks on order. The Afghan Army was also referred to as the Afghan Republican Army, or simply the “Republican Army”, in a Kabul Times newspaper, a few days after the 1973 Afghan coup d'état.{{Cite web |first= |date=1973-07-21 |title=India, Czechoslovakia, FRG, Mongolia and GDR recognise Republic of Afghanistan. Kabul Times. (Kabul, Afghanistan), Volume 12; Number 97 |url=https://content.library.arizona.edu/digital/api/collection/p16127coll6/id/30507/page/0/inline/p16127coll6_30507_0}}

{{See also|Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan}}

File:SCUD 2.JPGs, a tactical ballistic missile, as seen in the footage in 2004.]]

On 27 April 1978 the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin overthrew the regime of Mohammad Daoud, who was killed the next day, along with most of his family.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2016|pages=28–29}} On 1 May, Taraki became President, Prime Minister and General Secretary of the PDPA. The country was then renamed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), and the PDPA government lasted until April 1992.

In 1980, under President Babrak Karmal, the Ministry of Defense drafted plans to form three Spetsnaz battalions for each of the army corps. A year later, in 1981, the 203rd Separate Spetsnaz Battalion was formed (alongside the 212th, 230th and 211th) under the 1st Central Army Corps in Kabul and subordinated to KhAD-e Nezami (military intelligence). The 203rd Battalion reportedly worked alongside the Spetsnaz GRU and the Soviet Border Troops, as well as with the Soviet Airborne Forces.{{Cite web |date=2022-04-15 |script-title=ru:«Пожарная команда» Кабула |url=https://warspot.ru/21620-pozharnaya-komanda-kabula |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221104032737/https://warspot.ru/21620-pozharnaya-komanda-kabula |archive-date=2022-11-04 |access-date=2024-09-01 |website=Warspot}}{{sfn|Urban|1988}}

The army lost much of its strength during the early stages of PDPA rule. One of the main reasons for the small size was that the Soviet military were afraid the Afghan army would defect en masse to the enemy if total personnel increased. There were several sympathisers of the mujahideen within the military.{{sfn|Isby|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=k86jifnA3oYC&pg=PA18 18]}} Even so, there were several elite units under the command of the Afghan army, for instance, the 26th Airborne Battalion, 444th, 37th and 38th Commando Brigades, all part of the Afghan Commando Forces. The 26th Airborne Battalion proved politically unreliable, and in 1979, they revolted against the PDPA government. As a result, the 26th Airborne Battalion was reformed and turned into the 37th Commando Battalion. In the same year, the 81st Artillery Regiment were given airborne training and converted into the 38th Commando Battalion.{{Cite book |last=Ken Conboy |url=http://archive.org/details/elite-forces-of-india-and-pakistan |title=Elite Forces of India and Pakistan |last2=Paul Hannon |date=1992}} The Commando Brigades were, in contrast, considered reliable and were used as mobile strike forces until they sustained excessive casualties. Insurgents ambushed and inflicted heavy casualties on the 38th Commando Brigade during the Second Battle of Zhawar in Paktika Province in May 1983.{{sfn|Grau|Jalali|2001}} After sustaining heavy casualties the commando brigades were turned into battalions.{{sfn|Isby|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=k86jifnA3oYC&pg=PA19 19]}}

Most soldiers were recruited for a three-year term, later extended to four-year terms in 1984.

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• Central Corps (Kabul)
• 7th Division (Kabul)
• 8th Division (Kabul)
• 4th and 15th Armoured Brigades
• Republican Guard Brigade
• 2nd Corps (Kandahar)
• 7th Armoured Brigade
• 15th Division (Kandahar){{Cite web|date=2017-01-22|title=THE AFGHAN ARMY: THE SOVIET MILITARY'S POOR STUDENT {{pipe}} CIA FOIA (foia.cia.gov)|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t00587r000100060007-6|access-date=2022-12-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170122090148/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t00587r000100060007-6 |archive-date=22 January 2017 }}
• 3rd Corps (Gardez)
• 9th Division (Chugha-Serai)
• 11th Division (Jalalabad)
• 12th Division (Gardez)
• 14th Division (Ghazni)
• 17th Division (Herat)
• 18th Division (Mazar-i-Sharif)
• 20th Division (Nahrin)
• 25th Division (Khost)

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After the PDPA seizure of power, desertions swept the force, affecting the loyalty and moral values of soldiers. There were purges on patriotic junior and senior officers, and upper class Afghan aristocrats in society. On 15 March 1979, the Herat uprising broke out. The 17th Division was detailed by the regime to put down the rebellion, but this proved a mistake, as there were few Khalqi faction soldiers in the division and instead it mutinied and joined the uprising.{{sfn|Urban|1988|p=30}} Forces from Kabul had to be dispatched to suppress the rebellion.

Gradually the Army's three armoured divisions and now sixteen infantry divisions dropped in size to on average around 2,500 strong, quarter strength, by 1985.{{sfn|Nyrop|Seekins|1986|p=326}} One of the first series of defections occurred in the 9th Division, which, Urban wrote, defected by brigades in response to the Soviet intervention. It lost its 5th Brigade at Asmar in August 1979 and its 30th Mountain Brigade in 1980.{{sfn|Urban|1988| p=55}} After Soviet advisors arrived in 1977, they inspired a number of adaptations and reorganisations.Olga Oliker, 'Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience,' RAND monograph MG1078A, 2011, p.38-39 In April 1982, the 7th Division was moved from the capital. The division, which was commanded by Khalqi Major General Zia-Ud-Din, had its depleted combat resources spread out along the Kabul-Kandahar highway.Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 4, 1985, p.1148. In 1984–1985, all infantry divisions were restructured to a common design. In 1985 Army units were relieved of security duties, making more available for combat operations.

File:Roundel of Afghanistan (1980–1987) – Army.svg

During the 1980s Soviet–Afghan War, the Army fought against the mujahideen rebel groups. Deserters or defectors became a severe problem. The Afghan Army's casualties were as high as 50–60,000 soldiers and another 50,000 soldiers deserted the Army. The Afghan Army's defection rate was about 10,000 soldiers per year between 1980 and 1989; the average deserters left the Afghan Army after the first five months.{{sfn|Amtstutz|1986|p=180}}

Local militias were also important to the Najibullah regime's security efforts. From 1988 several new divisions were formed from former Regional Forces/militias' formations: the 53rd Infantry Division – the "Jowzyani militia" of Abdul Rashid Dostum raised from Sheberghan, the 55th, 80th, 93rd, 94th, 95th, and 96th, plus, possibly, a division in Lashkar Gah.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2000|page=220}}{{sfn|Davis|1993}}{{sfn|Davis|1994}}

File:Afghan_Army_shoulder_patch_1980.png]]

As compensation for the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the USSR agreed to deliver sophisticated weapons to the government, among which were large quantities of Scud surface-to-surface missiles.{{sfn|Janes|2001}} The first 500 were transferred during the early months of 1989, and soon proved to be extremely useful, a critical asset. During the mujahideen attack against Jalalabad, between March and June 1989, three firing batteries manned by Afghan crews advised by Soviets fired approximately 438 missiles.{{sfn|Zaloga|2006|page=39}} Soon Scuds were in use in all the heavily contested areas of Afghanistan. After January 1992, the Soviet advisors were withdrawn, reducing the Afghan Army's ability to use their ballistic missiles. On 24 April 1992, the mujahideen forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud captured the main Scud stockpile at Afshar, Kabul, belonging to the 99th Missile Brigade. Shia Hazara groups, such as Harakat-e Islami, additionally gained Scud missile launchers.{{Cite book |last=Müller |first=Lukas |url=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Wings-over-Hindu-Kush-Afghanistan/dp/1913118665 |title=Wings over the Hindu Kush: Air Forces, Aircraft and Air Warfare of Afghanistan, 1989-2001 |date=2020-09-02 |publisher=Helion and Company |isbn=978-1-913118-66-2 |language=English}} As the government collapsed, the few remaining Scuds and their transporter erector launchers were divided among the rival factions fighting for power. However, the missile operators managed to successfully flee and a lack of trained personnel prevented a sustained use of such weapons, and, between April 1992 and 1996, only 44 Scuds were fired in Afghanistan.{{sfn|Zaloga|2006|page=39}}{{Cite book |last=Müller |first=Lukas |url=https://www.amazon.co.uk/Wings-over-Hindu-Kush-Afghanistan/dp/1913118665 |title=Wings over the Hindu Kush: Air Forces, Aircraft and Air Warfare of Afghanistan, 1989-2001 |date=2020-09-02 |publisher=Helion and Company |isbn=978-1-913118-66-2 |language=English}}

In spring 1992, the Afghan Army consisted of five corps – 1st Corps at Jalalabad, 2nd at Kandahar, 3rd Corps at Gardez,3rd Corps, by the AMF period, 'theoretically incorporated 14th Division, 30th Division, 822nd Brigade, Border Brigades, and approximately 800.. in the Governor's Force in Paktya, Ghazni, Paktika, and Khost Provinces. Bhatia and Sedra 2008, 209. 4th Corps at Herat, and 6th Corps at Kunduz – as well as five smaller operations groups, including one at Charikar, which had been 5th Corps until it was reduced in status. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps, and the operations groups at Sarobi and Khost, nearly completely disintegrated in 1992.{{sfn|Davis|1993}}{{sfn|Davis|1994|pages=323–5}} Formations in and around Kabul joined different mujahideen militias while forces in the north and west remained intact for a longer period. Forces in the north and west were taken over by three major commanders: Ismael Khan, Ahmed Shah Masoud, and Abdul Rashid Dostam.

On 18 April 1992, the PDPA garrison at Kunduz surrendered to local mujahideen commanders.Nils Wormer, 'The Networks of Kunduz: A History of Conflict and their actors from 1992 to 2001,' Afghan Analysts Network, August 2012, 10. The 54th Division base at Kunduz was handed over to the overall military leader of Ittehad in the area, Amir Chughay. Dostum and commanders loyal to him formed Junbesh I-Melli, the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2004}} The NIM grouped the former regime's 18th, 20th, 53rd, 54th, and 80th Divisions, plus several brigades.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2004|p=2}} By mid-1994 there were two parallel 6th Corps operating in the north. Dostum's 6th Corps was based at Pul-i-Khumri and had three divisions. The Defence Ministry of the Kabul government's 6th Corps was based at Kunduz and also had three divisions, two sharing numbers with formations in Dostum's corps.{{sfn|Davis|1994}} By 1995 Masoud controlled three corps commands: the Central Corps at Kabul, the best organised with a strength of 15–20,000, the 5th Corps at Herat covering the west, and the 6th Corps at Kunduz covering the northeast.Davies, 1995, p.317, cited in Fontini Christia, 'Alliance Formation in Civil Wars,' Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.68. See also p.257.{{sfn|Davis|1993}}

By 1996 the Taliban Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan seized the country, aiming to control it by Islamic Sharia law. The Taliban's army and commanders placed emphasis on simplicity;{{sfn|Giustozzi|2016|p=121}} some were secretly trained by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence and Pakistani Armed Forces around the Durand Line.

After the removal of the Taliban government through the United States invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, private armies loyal to warlords gained more and more influence. In mid-2001, Ali Ahmed Jalali wrote:{{sfn|Jalali|2001|pages=85–98}}

The army (as a state institution, organized, armed, and commanded by the state) does not exist in Afghanistan today. Neither the Taliban-led "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" nor the "Islamic State of Afghanistan" headed by the ousted President Rabbani has the political legitimacy or administrative efficiency of a state. The militia formations they command are composed of odd assortments of armed groups with varying level of loyalties, political commitment, professional skills, and organizational integrity. Many of them feel free to switch sides, shift loyalties, and join or leave the group spontaneously. The country suffers from the absence of a top political layer capable of controlling individual and group violence. ... Although both sides identify their units with military formations of the old regime, there is hardly any organizational or professional continuity from the past. But these units really exist in name only ... [i]n fact only their military bases still exist, accommodating and supporting an assortment of militia groups.

Formations in existence by the end of 2002 included the 1st Army Corps (Nangarhar), 2nd Army Corps (Kandahar, dominated by Gul Agha Sherzai), 3rd Army Corps (Paktia, where the US allegedly attempted to impose Atiqullah Ludin as commander), 4th Army Corps (Herat, dominated by Ismail Khan), 6th Army Corps at Kunduz, 7th Army Corps (under Atta Muhammad Nur at Balkh[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/639a42fe70c4d0ca49256f1f0007f3b6 ReliefWeb ť Document ť Army develops despite militia disarmament issues] {{webarchive |url=https://archive.today/20110211182853/http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/AllDocsByUNID/639a42fe70c4d0ca49256f1f0007f3b6 |date=11 February 2011 }} and Mukhopadhyay, Dipali. "Disguised warlordism and combatanthood in Balkh: the persistence of informal power in the formal Afghan state." Conflict, Security & Development 9, no. 4 (2009): 535–564.), 8th Army Corps (at Jowzjan, dominated by Dostum's National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) and the Central Army Corps around Kabul.Antonio Giustozzi, 'Military Reform in Afghanistan,' in Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemmas, Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Brief 28, September 2003, pp. 23–31. See Jalali 2002 notes 20–25.{{sfn|Jalali|2002}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/militia-fac-list.htm|title=Afghanistan – Militia Facilities|website=www.globalsecurity.org}} In addition, there were divisions with strong links to the centre in Kabul. These included the 1st in Kabul, 27th in Qalat, 31st in Kabul, 34th in Bamiyan (4th Corps),{{sfn|Bhatia|Sedra|2008|p=283}} 36th in Logar, 41st in Ghor, 42nd in Wardak, 71st in Farah, and 100th in Laghman.{{Cite web|title=Afghan Military Forces [AMF]|url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/amf.htm|access-date=2022-12-24|website=www.globalsecurity.org}}

The International Crisis Group wrote:ICG, "Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan," Asia Report N°65, 30 September 2003, p.3, citing Antonio Giustozzi, "Re-building the Afghan Army", paper presented during a joint seminar on "State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan" of the Centre for Development Research, University of Bonn, and the Crisis States Program, Development Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 30 May-1 June 2003, Bonn.

New divisions and even army corps were created to recognise factional realities or undermine the power base of individual commanders, often without regard to the troop levels normally associated with such units. For example, the ministry in July 2002 recognised a 25th Division in Khost province, formed by the Karzai-appointed governor, Hakim Taniwal, to unseat a local warlord, Padshah Khan Zadran, who was then occupying the governor's residence. At its inception, however, the division had only 700 men – the size of a battalion.

The 93rd Division of the AMF, which Malkasian's The American War in Afghanistan (2021) describes as "1,200 strong" was later reported in southern Helmand.

Even by December 2004 Human Rights Watch was still saying in an open letter to Karzai that: "Abdul Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf, the head of the Ittihad-i Islami faction and the Daw'at-e Islami party [should be curbed]. Sayyaf has no government post but has used his power over the Supreme Court and other courts across the country to curtail the rights of journalists, civic society activists, and even political candidates. He also controls militias, including forces recognized as the 10th Division of the Afghan army, which intimidate and abuse Afghans even inside Kabul. We ask that you express public opposition to Sayyaf's activities, explicitly state your opposition to such misuse of unofficial authority, and move expeditiously to disarm and demobilize armed forces associated with Ittihad-i Islami and other unofficial forces."{{Cite web|url=https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-open-letter-president-hamid-karzai|title=Afghanistan: An open letter to president Hamid Karzai – Afghanistan|website=ReliefWeb|date=3 December 2004 }}{{Cite web |url=https://jfcbs.nato.int/rsm/newsroom/2019/national-military-academy-of-afghanistan-graduates-513-cadets |title=NATO Resolute Support {{pipe}} National Military Academy of Afghanistan Graduates 513 Cadets |access-date=2021-05-05 |archive-date=2021-05-05 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210505014538/https://jfcbs.nato.int/rsm/newsroom/2019/national-military-academy-of-afghanistan-graduates-513-cadets |url-status=dead }}

File:Roundel of Afghanistan (2002–2021).svg

{{Update section|reason=The latest information is from 2014|date=November 2019}}

{{Main|History of the Afghan Armed Forces (2002–2021)}}

File:First ANA graduates in 2002.jpg

During the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in early December 2001, President Hamid Karzai issued a decree reestablishing a unified army, the Afghan National Army.{{sfn|Sedra|2016|p=172}} The decree set a size target of 70,000 (by 2009) and laid out the planned army structure. There had been significant disagreement over the size of the army that was needed. A Ministry of Defense-issued paper said that at least 200,000 active troops were needed.{{Cite web|title=The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security (A/56/875-S/2002/278)|url=https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%252F56%252F875&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False|date=2002-03-18|access-date=2022-12-24|website=documents.un.org}} The Afghan Ministry of Defence loudly objected to the smaller, volunteer, nature of the new army, a change from the previous usage of conscripts.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2007|p=46}} The US also blocked the new government from using the army to pressure Pakistan.

The first new Afghan kandak (battalion) was trained by British Army personnel of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), becoming 1st Battalion, Afghan National Guard.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2007|p=48}} Yet while the British troops provided high quality training, they were few in number. After some consideration, it was decided that the United States might be able to provide the training. Thus follow-on kandaks were recruited and trained by 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group.{{sfn|Kelly|Bensahel|Oliker|2011|page=22}} 3rd SFG built the training facilities and ranges for early use, using a Soviet built facility on the eastern side of Kabul, near the then ISAF headquarters.

Recruiting and training began in May 2002, with a difficult but successful recruitment process of bringing hundreds of new recruits in from all parts of Afghanistan.{{sfn|Giustozzi|2016|p=148}} Training was initially done in Pashto and Dari (Persian dialect) and some Arabic due to the very diverse ethnicities. The original US target in April 2002 was that of 12,000 men trained by April 2003, but it was quickly realised that this was too ambitious, and the requirement reduced to only 9,000, to be ready by November 2003. The first female Afghan parachutist Khatol Mohammadzai, trained during the 1980s, became the first female general in the Afghan National Army in August 2002.{{Cite web|author=Haseena Sullaiman|title=Woman Skydiver Leaps Ahead |url=https://iwpr.net/global-voices/woman-skydiver-leaps-ahead|publisher=Institute for War and Peace Reporting|date=2 March 2005}}

The National Military Academy of Afghanistan, a West Point analogue and part of the Marshal Fahim National Defense University based in Qargha Garrison, was also established to produce officers. The NMAA administered a four-year military and civil training programme with the aim of preparing the prospective officer for the long-term. The NMAA taught four major foreign languages, vital to developing the relationship between the ANA and foreign armies.

The U.S. Army's major objectives for the ANA in October 2002 were:Jason Howk, [https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2037.pdf Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan], Strategic Studies Institute, 16.

• Ensure activation of Central Corps headquarters and its three Brigades by 1 October 2003
• Develop and begin implementation of Afghan MoD/General Staff reform plan
• Establish ANA institutional support systems including officer and NCO schools, ANA training and doctrine directorate, and garrison support elements
• Design and build Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) ..consisting of US/Coalition military, contractor, and Afghan civilian and military personnel capable of managing the ANA building program as it increases in scope and complexity
• Increase international and Afghan domestic support for and confidence in ANA through the maintenance of quality within the force and the conduct of effective information operations.

The first deployment outside Kabul was made by 3rd Kandak ANA to Paktika Province, including Orgun, in January 2003.{{Cite news|author=Carlotta Gall |title=An Afghan Army Evolves From Fantasy to Slightly Ragged Reality |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/25/international/asia/25AFGH.html |work=The New York Times |date=25 January 2003}} By January 2003 just over 1,700 soldiers in five Kandaks (battalions) had completed the 10-week training course, and by mid-2003 a total of 4,000 troops had been trained. Approximately 1,000 ANA soldiers were deployed in the US-led Operation Warrior Sweep, marking the first major combat operation for Afghan troops. Initial recruiting problems lay in the lack of cooperation from regional warlords and inconsistent international support. The problem of desertion dogged the force from the outset: in the summer of 2003, the desertion rate was estimated to be 10% and in mid-March 2004, an estimate suggested that 3,000 soldiers had deserted. Some recruits were under 18 years of age and many could not read or write. Recruits who only spoke the Pashto language experienced difficulty because instruction was usually given through interpreters who spoke Dari.

The Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was launched on 6 April 2003 and begin disarmament of former Army personnel in October 2003.{{sfn|Bhatia|Sedra|2008|p=122-127}} In March 2004, fighting between two local militias took place in the western Afghan city of Herat. It was reported that Mirwais Sadiq (son of warlord Ismail Khan) was assassinated in unclear circumstances. Thereafter a bigger conflict began that resulted in the death of up to 100 people. The battle was between troops of Ismail Khan and Abdul Zahir Nayebzada, a senior local military commander blamed for the death of Sadiq.{{Cite news |title = Afghan aviation minister assassinated Slaying sparks factional fighting in western city |url = https://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2004/03/22/afghan_aviation_minister_assassinated/ |date = 22 March 2004 |access-date = 2013-06-29 |work = The Boston Globe }} and {{Cite news |title = Afghan minister killed in Herat |url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3555257.stm |date = 21 March 2004 |access-date = 2013-06-29 |work = BBC News }} and {{Cite news |title = Afghan Aviation Minister Shot Dead |url = https://www.foxnews.com/story/afghan-aviation-minister-shot-dead/ |date = 21 March 2004 |publisher = FOX News |access-date = 2013-06-29 |agency = Associated Press |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131206110926/http://www.foxnews.com/story/2004/03/21/afghan-aviation-minister-shot-dead/ |archive-date = 6 December 2013 |url-status = live |df = mdy-all }} Nayebzada commanded the 17th Herat Division of the Afghan Militia Forces' 4th Corps. In response to the fighting, about 1,500 newly trained ANA soldiers were sent to Herat in order to bring the situation under control.

File:Construction of ANA base in Herat.jpg (2005)]]

In addition to the fighting units, establishment of regional structures began when four of the five planned corps commanders and some of their staff were appointed on 1 September 2004. The first regional command was established in Kandahar on 19 September; the second at Gardez on 22 September, with commands at Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat planned.{{Cite web|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/id/25226/|title=Defense.gov News Article: Afghan National Army Activates Second Regional Command|date=30 August 2010|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100830065614/http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25226|archive-date=2010-08-30}} The Gardez command, also referred to in the AFPS story as the 203 Corps, was to have an initial force of 200 soldiers. Kandahar's command was the first activated, followed by Gardez and Mazar-e-Sharif. The Herat command was seemingly activated on 28 September. The next year, the ANA's numbers grew to around 20,000 soldiers, most of which were trained by the United States Army. In the meantime, the United States Army Corps of Engineers started building new military camps for the fast-growing army.

In 2003, the United States issued guidelines to ensure the army's ethnic balance.{{Cite web|title=POLITICS: Tajik Grip on Afghan Army Signals New Ethnic War|url=http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/11/politics-tajik-grip-on-afghan-army-signals-new-ethnic-war/|publisher=Inter Press Service (IPS) |date=28 November 2009|access-date=1 September 2010}} By late 2012, the ANA was composed of 43% Pashtuns, 32% Tajiks, 12% Hazaras, 8% Uzbeks, and the rest were smaller ethnic groups of Afghanistan.{{Cite web|title=The Afghan national army|url=http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-afghan-national-army-in-2014|publisher=smallwarsjournal.com|date=4 December 2012|access-date=15 January 2014}} However, the army did not track the actual ethnic composition of the officer corps. There were no quotas for the enlisted soldiers.{{Cite news|url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghan-army-struggles-with-ethnic-divisions/|title=Afghan Army Struggles With Ethnic Divisions|access-date=26 July 2010|work=CBS News}} See Antonio Giustozzi, "The Army of Afghanistan," Hurst, 2015, pp136-144 for discussion of ethnic quotas and composition.

By March 2011, a National Military Command Center had been established in Kabul, which was being mentored by personnel from the Virginia Army National Guard.{{Cite web|url=https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/590370/virginia-national-guards-29th-infantry-division-mentors-making-a-difference-in/|title=Virginia National Guard's 29th Infantry Division mentors making a diff|website=National Guard}}

Under the US–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, the United States designated Afghanistan as a major non-NATO ally and agreed to fund the ANA until at least 2024. This included soldiers' salaries, providing training and weapons, and all other military costs.

Soldiers in the Army initially received $30 a month during training and $50 a month upon graduation, though the basic pay for trained soldiers later rose to $165. This starting salary increased to $230 a month in an area with moderate security issues and to $240 in those provinces where there was heavy fighting.[http://www.defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/20100218hogg_transcipt.pdf Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Major General David Hogg, Deputy Commander-Army NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110301031500/http://www.defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/20100218hogg_transcipt.pdf |date=2011-03-01 }}. U.S. Navy, Office of the Secretary of Defence for Public Affairs, FEBRUARY 18, 2010. (PDF). Retrieved on 2011-12-27. About 95% of the men and women who served in the military were paid by electronic funds transfer.[http://www.defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/20100517_Umberg_transcript.pdf Department of Defence Bloggers Roundtable with Army Colonel Colonel Thomas Umberg] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110301031502/http://www.defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/20100517_Umberg_transcript.pdf |date=2011-03-01 }}. 17 May 2010. (PDF). Retrieved on 2011-12-27. Special biometrics were used during the registration of each soldier.{{Citation|last=NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan|title=111128-F-HS721-086|date=2011-11-28|url=https://www.flickr.com/photos/ntm-a_cstc-a/6459373331/|access-date=2022-12-24}}

File:New NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan commander visits Afghan training center (4699891288).jpg

File:Non Commissioned Officers of the Afghan National Army.jpg.]]

Task Force Phoenix was the initial U.S. and allied force training organisation in 2002. This program was formalized in April 2003, based near the Kabul Military Training Center. Coalition efforts were initially overseen by OMC-A, then Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan, then from 2006 to 2009, by the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a three-star level multi-national command headquartered in downtown Kabul.{{sfn|Sedra|2016|p=172}} On the Afghan side, by 2011 all training and education in the Army was run by Afghan National Army Training Command, a two-star command which reported directly to the Chief of the General Staff. All training centers and military schools were under this command.

Individual basic training was conducted primarily by Afghan instructors and staff at the Kabul Military Training Center, situated on the eastern edge of Kabul. The United States Department of Defense assisted in basic and advanced training of enlisted recruits, and also ran the Drill Instructor School which ran basic training courses for training NCOs. Basic training had been expanded to include required literacy courses for illiterate recruits. A French Army advisory team oversaw the training of officers for staff and platoon or toli (company) command in a combined commissioning/infantry officer training unit called the Officer Training Brigade (OTB). OTB candidates in the platoon and company command courses were usually former militia and mujaheddin leaders with various levels of military experience. The United Kingdom also conducted initial infantry officer training and commissioning at the Officer Candidate School (OCS). OCS candidates were young men with little or no military experience. The British Army also conducted initial and advanced Non-Commissioned Officer training as well in a separate NCO Training Brigade.

The Canadian Forces supervised the Combined Training Exercise portion of initial military training, where trainee soldiers, NCOs, and officers were brought together in field training exercises at the platoon, toli (company) and kandak (battalion) levels to certify them ready for field operations. In the Regional Corps, Coalition Embedded Training Teams continued to mentor the kandak's leadership, and advised them in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics.

During the ISAF era, advisers in the US Embedded Training Teams and NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams acted as liaisons between the Afghan Army and coalition forces. The teams coordinated planning and ensured that ANA units received U.S./Coalition support.{{Cite web|url=http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/omlt.html |title=Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) Programme |access-date=2007-12-09 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090404031750/http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/factsheets/omlt.html |archive-date=2009-04-04 }}. Nato.int. September 2007

Formal education and professional development was conducted at two main ANATC schools, both in Kabul. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan, located near the Kabul International Airport, was a four-year military university which produced degree second lieutenants in a variety of military professions. NMAA's first cadet class entered its second academic year in spring 2006. A contingent of US and Turkish instructors jointly mentored the NMAA faculty and staff. The Command and General Staff College, located in southern Kabul, prepared mid-level ANA officers to serve on brigade and corps staffs. France established the CGSC in early 2004, and a cadre of French Army instructors continued to oversee operations at the school.

Sizable numbers of Afghan National Army Officers were sent to be trained in India either at the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun, the National Defence Academy near Pune or the Officers Training Academy in Chennai. The Indian Military Academy which had been in existence since 1932, provided a four-year degree to ANA army officers, while the National Defence Academy provided a 3-year degree after which officers underwent a one-year specialization in their respective service colleges. The Officers Training Academy provided a 49-week course to Graduate officer candidates. In 2014 the number of Afghan officers in training in India was nearly 1100.{{Cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-afghanistan-arms-idUSBREA3T0J320140430|title=India turns to Russia to help supply arms to Afghan forces|newspaper=Reuters|access-date=11 May 2015|date=2014-04-30}}

In October 2007, ANA international partners said they had seen progress and were pleased with Afghan performance in recent exercises. Colonel Thomas McGrath estimated that the ANA would be capable of carrying out independent brigade-size operations by the spring of 2008.{{Cite web|title=Afghan, Coalition Forces Battle Taliban, Narcotics, Emphasize Training|url=https://www.army.mil/article/5663/afghan_coalition_forces_battle_taliban_narcotics_emphasize_training|access-date=2022-12-24|website=www.army.mil|date=19 October 2007 |language=en}} Despite high hopes, four years after McGrath's estimated date for independent brigade-sized operations, not a single one of the ANA's 180 kandaks could carry out independent operations, much less an entire brigade.{{Cite magazine|last=Ackerman|first=Spencer|title=Not A Single Afghan Battalion Fights Without U.S. Help|language=en-US|magazine=Wired|url=https://www.wired.com/2011/09/not-a-single-afghan-battalion-fights-without-u-s-help/|access-date=2022-12-24|issn=1059-1028}} On 30 July 2013, US Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Lavoy told reporters in Washington, D.C., according to Jane's Defence Weekly, that '... a residual [US] force would be needed to help the ANSF complete more mundane tasks such as logistics, ensuring soldiers get their paychecks, procuring food, awarding fuel contracts, and more.'Daniel Wasserbly, 'Pentagon: ANSF would still require 'substantial' help after 2014,' Jane's Defence Weekly{{Cite web|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/|title=Transcript|website=www.defense.gov}} Lavoy noted that the Afghans were still developing those skills and it would be "well beyond the 2014 date" before they were expected to be capable.

An increasing number of female soldiers joined. By early 2013, reports stated that there were 200,000 ANA troops. However, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction said in January 2013 that "Determining ANSF strength is fraught with challenges. US and coalition forces rely on the Afghan forces to report their own personnel strength numbers. ..[T]he Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.. noted that.. there is "no viable method of validating [the ANA's] personnel numbers."SIGAR Report to Congress, 30 January 2013, pp. 73–74, cited in Cordesman, The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition – Volume III Security and the ANSF, working draft, 28 March 2013, 58. It was reported in 2016 that the Afghan National Army had close to 1,000 officers with the rank of general, more than the number of generals in the United States Army.{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/what-in-the-world/being-an-afghan-general-is-nice-work-if-you-can-get-it-and-many-do.html|title=Being an Afghan General Is Nice Work if You Can Get It. And Many Do.|date=19 December 2016|work=The New York Times|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191007064822/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/what-in-the-world/being-an-afghan-general-is-nice-work-if-you-can-get-it-and-many-do.html|archive-date=7 October 2019|url-status=live}}

File:Afghan National Army (ANA) soldier with PSL rifle.JPG rifle]]

The ANA was plagued by poor cohesion, illiteracy, corruption and abuse. A quarter of ANA troops were reported to have deserted in 2009 with many troops hiding in the heat of battle rather than engaging the enemy.{{Cite web |url=http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/12/09/US-trainers-bemoan-Afghan-corruption/UPI-51821260383357/ |title=US trainers bemoan Afghan corruption |publisher=UPI.com |date=9 December 2009 |access-date=9 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091220033840/http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/12/09/US-trainers-bemoan-Afghan-corruption/UPI-51821260383357/ |archive-date=20 December 2009 |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |url=http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/11/politics-afghan-army-turnover-rate-threatens-us-war-plans/ |title=POLITICS: Afghan Army Turnover Rate Threatens US War Plans |date=24 November 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160126214239/http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/11/politics-afghan-army-turnover-rate-threatens-us-war-plans/ |url-status=dead |archive-date=26 January 2016 |access-date=28 December 2009 }} It was reported that approximately 90% of ANA troops were illiterate and there were widespread instances of corruption with the ANA manpower consisting a high percentage of ghost battalions.{{Cite news |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34290420 |title=US surge is big, Afghan army is crucial |agency=Associated Press |publisher=MSNBC |date=5 December 2009 |access-date=9 February 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091212151323/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34290420/ |archive-date=12 December 2009 |url-status=live }}{{Cite news |url=http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/09/ap_afghan_army_illiteracy_091409/ |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120721223757/http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/09/ap_afghan_army_illiteracy_091409/ |url-status=dead |archive-date=21 July 2012 |title=Illiteracy undermines Afghan army |work=Air Force Times |date=14 September 2009 |access-date=9 February 2010 }} Another significant problem for the ANA was a high level of drug abuse amongst its soldiers. The Special Investigator General for Afghan Reconstruction reported the number of ANA soldiers using drugs was "at least 50 percent" and might have been as high as 75 percent, according to some reports."Drug problem adding to challenge in Afghanistan," Chicago Tribune, 31 January 2012.

Many officers held loyalties with particular political factions. The endemic corruption of those officers eroded the army's morale.{{Cite news |last1=Tollast |first1=Robert |title=How Afghanistan's Army was pulled apart by corruption and backroom deals |url=https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/2021/08/16/afghan-armys-collapse-was-years-in-the-making-say-experts/ |access-date=21 August 2021 |work=The National News}}

Theft and a lack of discipline plagued many elements of the ANA. US trainers reported missing vehicles, weapons and other military equipment, and outright theft of fuel provided by the US to the ANA.{{Cite web|title=Troops fear corruption outweighs progress of Afghan forces|url=https://www.stripes.com/news/troops-fear-corruption-outweighs-progress-of-afghan-forces-1.97195|access-date=2022-12-24|website=Stars and Stripes|language=en}} Death threats had been leveled against some US officers who tried to stop Afghan soldiers from stealing. Some Afghan soldiers often found improvised explosive devices and snipped the command wires instead of marking them and waiting for US forces to come to detonate them. The practice allowed insurgents to return and reconnect them. US trainers frequently had to remove the cell phones from Afghan soldiers hours before a mission for fear that the operation would be compromised by bragging, gossip and reciprocal warnings.{{Cite web|title=Training Afghanistan troops gets tough for U.S. troops as trust issues worsen|url=https://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/training-afghanistan-troops-tough-u-s-troops-trust-issues-worsen-article-1.432761|access-date=2022-12-24|website=New York Daily News|date=12 December 2009 }}

At times ANA troops attacked their own troops and foreign troops of ISAF.{{Cite web |last1=Sara |first1=Sally |title=Afghan soldier shoots 3 diggers |url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-11-09/soldiers-shot/3653744 |website=ABC News|date=8 November 2011 }} Fragging had worsened enough to the point where two decrees were issued by the Department of Defense in the summer of 2012 stating that all American personnel serving in Afghanistan were told to carry a magazine with their weapon at all times, and that when a group of American troops were present and on duty with ANA forces, one American serviceman had to stand apart on guard with a loaded weapon ready.{{Cite web|url=https://www.msn.com/|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130104051833/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/48622484%23.UOZmE33LdRw|archive-date=4 January 2013|url-status=dead|title=MSN News|website=www.msn.com|access-date=17 April 2020}} In addition to fragging, a report by a US inspector general revealed 5,753 cases of "gross human rights abuses by Afghan forces", including "routine enslavement and rape of underage boys (Bacha bazi) by Afghan commanders".{{sfn|Jacobsen|2019|page=411}} The ineffectiveness of the ANA became most apparent during the 2021 Taliban offensive; thousands of ANA troops surrendered to the Taliban en masse, with many cities falling to the Taliban unopposed.{{Cite web |last1=WILKINSON |first1=TRACY |last2=BULOS |first2=NABIH |title=U.S. troops' return to Afghanistan has ominous parallel to recent history in Iraq |url=https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-08-13/u-s-troops-returning-to-afghanistan-for-rescue-operation |website=Los Angeles Times |date=13 August 2021 |quote=Government soldiers have surrendered en masse, bequeathing the militants thousands of trucks, dozens of armored vehicles, antiaircraft guns, artillery and mortars, seven helicopters (seven others were destroyed) and a number of ScanEagle drones. |access-date=16 August 2021 |archive-date=16 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210816070406/https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-08-13/u-s-troops-returning-to-afghanistan-for-rescue-operation |url-status=live }}

President Ashraf Ghani was also accused of replacing officers with people who supported his ideas, leading to declining morale among Afghan soldiers and officers.{{cite web |author1=Jonathan Schroden |title=Who Is to Blame for the Collapse of Afghanistan's Security Forces? |url=https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/who-is-to-blame-for-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-security-forces/ |website=War on the Rocks |access-date=7 June 2024 |date=24 May 2022}}

{{Main|List of Afghan Armed Forces installations}}

A January 2011 NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan information paper described the ANA as being led by the Chief of General Staff, supervising the Vice Chief of the General Staff, the Vice Chief of the Armed Forces (an Air Force officer), the Director of the General Staff, himself supervising the General Staff itself, and seven major commands.{{Cite web|author=NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan|title=Information Paper: Ministry of Defence: A Year in Review|url=https://silo.tips/download/information-paper-ministry-of-defense-a-year-in-review-23-january-2011|date=23 January 2011}} The ANA Ground Force Command, under a lieutenant general, directed the regional ground forces corps and the 111th Capital Division. Amongst support facilities were two National Ammunition Depots, at Khairabad, and at Chimtallah National Ammunition Depot, both in the environs of the capital, plus four corps-level Ammunition Supply Points.{{Cite web|url=https://www.dvidshub.net/news/94864/afghan-national-army-takes-over-operations-chimtallah-national-ammunition-depot|title=Afghan National Army takes over operations at Chimtallah National Ammunition Depot|website=DVIDS}}{{sfn|Bhatia|Sedra|2008|page=149}}

File:ANA soldiers in northern Afghanistan-2011.jpg in Balkh Province]]

File:Soldiers of 215th Corps in 2010.jpg in Helmand Province]]

At its largest the Afghan National Army had seven corps; each corps was responsible for an area of the country. Establishment of the corps started when four regional commands were established with some staff in September 2004. The Afghan National Army Air Corps later renamed the Afghan Air Force also formed part of the army.{{sfn|United States. Department of Defense|2010|p=31}} Each corps had three to four subordinate brigades, and each brigade had four infantry Kandaks (battalions) as basic fighting units. Each kandak was assigned a specific area for which it is responsible for; its mission was to secure its area from internal and external threats.

Originally, the four outlying corps were assigned one or two brigades, with the majority of the manpower of the Army based in Kabul's 201st Corps. This was superseded by a buildup in which each corps added extra brigades. Originally, the 2008 Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan size target was for a total of 14 brigades: 13 infantry, one mechanized, and one commando.

In 2019–2021 the regionally focused corps were as follows:

• 201st Corps (Kabul) – 1st Brigade was based at the Presidential Palace. 3rd Brigade, at Pol-e-Chakri, was to be a mechanised formation including M-113sDefendAmerica.mil, [http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/apr2005/a042805la2.html Afghan Army gets armored personnel carriers] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081216023829/http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/apr2005/a042805la2.html |date=2008-12-16 }}, 25 April 2005 and Soviet-built main battle tanks (T-62s).{{Cite web|url=http://austinbay.net/blog/?p=400 |title=Bagram-Kabul-Bagram |access-date=2008-03-24 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061019204847/http://austinbay.net/blog/?p=400 |archive-date=2006-10-19 }}. Austin Bay Blog. 21 June 2005 In early 2008 LongWarJournal.org placed most of the 3rd Brigade at Jalalabad, 2nd Brigade at Pol-e-Charkhi, and only a single kandak of 1st Brigade at the Presidential Palace.{{Cite web|author=C.J. Radin|title=Afghan National Security Forces Order of Battle (2008.01.06)|url=https://longwarjournal.org/multimedia/ANSF_OOBpage4_-_ANA_(2008.01.06_cjr).pdf|website=Long War Journal|access-date=2022-02-13}} The corps area of responsibility included Eastern Afghanistan, including Kabul, Logar, Kapisa, Konar, and Laghman provinces. This included Kabul as well as vital routes running north and south, and valleys leading from the Pakistani border into Afghanistan.
• 203rd Corps (Gardez) The original Gardez Regional Command was established on 23 September 2004.{{Cite web|title=News Archive|url=https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/|access-date=2022-12-24|website=U.S. Department of Defense|language=en-US}} As of 2009, First Brigade, Khost, Second Brigade, Forward Operating Base Rushmore, Sharana, Paktika Province, Third Brigade, Ghazni. On 19 Oct 2006, as part of Operation Mountain Fury, two ETTs (Embedded Training Teams) mentored and advised a D30 artillery section from Fourth Kandak, Second Brigade, 203rd Corps, to conduct the first artillery missions during combat operations with harassment and indirect fires.(First to Fire, "FA Journal", Jan/Feb 2007) Three days later, they successfully conducted counterfire (with assistance from a US Q-36 radar) that resulted in a reported ten enemy casualties.{{Citation needed|date=August 2007}} The corps is supported by the Gardez Regional Support Squadron of the AAF, equipped with 8 helicopters: 4 transport to support the corps' commando kandak, two attack, and two medical transport.{{Cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/afghan_national_army.php|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100912090312/http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/afghan_national_army.php|url-status=dead|title=Afghan National Army Air Corps: February 2009 Update – FDD's Long War Journal|date=20 February 2009|archive-date=12 September 2010|website=www.longwarjournal.org}}
• 205th Corps (Kandahar) – oversaw the provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, and 4th Brigade Urozgan under Brigadier General Zafar Khan's control.Northshorejournal.org, {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20090211001343/http://northshorejournal.org/status-report-from-the-afghan-south Status Report from the Afghan South]}}, December 2008 It consisted of four brigades, a commando kandak and three garrisons. The corps had integrated artillery and airlift capacity, supplied by a growing Kandahar Wing of the Afghan Air Force.Phoenix Legacy Vol 1 Issue 2, Task Force Phoenix, 31 January 2009
• 207th Corps (Herat) – 1st Brigade at Herat, 2nd Brigade at Farah, and elements at Shindand (including commandos).Anthony Cordesman, 'Winning in Afghanistan: Afghan Force Development,' Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 December 2006 The corps was supported by the Herat Regional Support Squadron of the AAF, equipped with eight helicopters: four transport to support the corps' commando kandak, two attack, and two medical transport aircraft.
• 209th Corps (Mazar-i-Sharif) – Worked closely with the German-led Regional Command North, and had 1st Brigade at Mazar-i-Sharif and, it appears, a Second Brigade forming at Kunduz. An Army Corps of Engineers solicitation for Kunduz headquarters facilities for the Second Brigade was issued in March 2008.{{Cite web|title=FBO.gov has moved|url=https://fbohome.sam.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=458c63fbfcbd7153893336cf7d4cac9d&tab=core&_cview=1&cck=1&au=&ck=|access-date=2022-12-24|website=fbohome.sam.gov}} The corps was supported by the Mazar-i-Sharif Regional Support Squadron of the AAF, equipped with eight helicopters: four transport to support the Corps' commando kandak, two attack, and two medical transport helicopters. In October 2015, as a response to the fall of Kunduz, reports came that a new division would be formed in the area.{{Cite journal |last=Marty |first=Franz J. |date=10 February 2016 |title= Isolated Outposts: Badakhshan sitrep |journal= Jane's Defence Weekly |volume=53 |issue=6 |issn=0265-3818 }}
• 215th Corps (Lashkar Gah) – In 2010, the Afghan government approved a sixth corps of the Afghan National Army – Corps 215 Maiwand – to be based in the Helmand capital of Lashkar Gah. The 215th was developed specifically to partner with the Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Helmand.{{Cite web|date=2010-01-29|title=Amazingly capable|url=https://cperce.wordpress.com/2010/01/30/amazingly-capable/|access-date=2022-12-24|website=Your experience may vary|language=en}} On 28 January 2010, Xinhua reported that General Sayed Mallok would command the new corps.{{Cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-01/28/c_13154926.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100203212302/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-01/28/c_13154926.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=3 February 2010|title=Military Corps formed to strengthen security in Taliban hotbed}} The corps will cover all parts of Helmand, half of Farah and most parts of southwestern Nimroz province. The corps was formally established on 1 April 2010. 1st Bde, 215th Corps, is at Garmsir, partnered with a USMC Regimental Combat Team.{{Cite web|title=Afghan leaders recognize {{as written|mil|tary [sic]}} progress in Helmand|url=https://www.dvidshub.net/news/69989/afghan-leaders-recognize-miltary-progress-helmand|access-date=2022-12-24|website=DVIDS|language=en}} Elements of 2nd Brigade, 215th Corps, had been reported at Forward Operating Base Delaram, Farah Province. 3rd Bde, 215th Corps, partnered with the UK Task Force Helmand is at Camp Shorabak.{{Cite web|title=News & Events|url=http://www.army.mod.uk/news/21897.aspx|access-date=2022-12-24|website=www.army.mod.uk|language=en-GB}}
• 217th Corps (Headquarters Kunduz) In 2019, the 20th Division, which was formerly part of the 209th Corps, became the 217th Corps. The corps was given responsibility for Kunduz Province, Takhar, Baghlan, and Badakhshan provinces.{{sfn|Lead Inspector General|2019|page=27}} In August 2021, the Taliban seized control of the corps headquarters and Kunduz as part of the 2021 Taliban offensive.{{Cite web|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/08/taliban-seizes-afghan-army-corps-headquarters-2-northern-airports.php|title=Taliban seizes Afghan Army corps headquarters, 2 northern airports {{pipe}} FDD's Long War Journal|date=12 August 2021|website=www.longwarjournal.org}}
• 111th Capital Division – in late 2008 it was announced that the 201st Corps' former area of responsibility would be divided, with a Capital Division being formed in Kabul and the corps concentrating its effort further forward along the border. The new division, designated the 111th Capital Division, became operational in April 2009.{{Cite web|title=Change of Command at Camp Phoenix|url=https://www.dvidshub.net/news/34332/change-command-camp-phoenix|access-date=2022-12-24|website=DVIDS|language=en}} It had a First Brigade and Second Brigade (both forming) as well as a Headquarters Special Security Brigade.

Most of the corps were retained, with their existing numerical designations, but renamed, in November 2021, after the Taliban seized power.{{sfn|Lalzoy|2021}}

Other commands included:

• ANA Special Operations Command – from mid-2011, the ANA began establishing a Special Operations Command to control the Commando Brigade and the ANA Special Forces. Its headquarters was established at Camp Moorehead in Wardak Province, {{convert|6|mi|km|0|abbr=off|spell=on|order=flip}} south of Kabul.{{Cite web|date=2011-05-09|title=Afghan National Army update, May 2011 {{pipe}} FDD's Long War Journal|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/afghan_national_army_4.php|access-date=2022-12-24|website=www.longwarjournal.org|language=en-US}}{{Cite web|title=U.S. Department of Defense|url=https://www.defense.gov/|access-date=2022-12-24|website=U.S. Department of Defense|language=en-US}} In July 2007 the ANA graduated its first commandos. The commandos underwent a grueling three-month course being trained by American special forces. They were fully equipped with US equipment and had received specialized light infantry training with the capability to conduct raids, direct action, and reconnaissance in support of counterinsurgency operations; they also provided a strategic response capability for the Afghan government.
• Army Support Command, the ANA Recruiting Command, the Headquarters Security and Support Brigade (HSSB), and the Detainee Guard Force (as of 2011).
• The ANA Ground Force Command was active {{circa|2009 to 2015}}. Under a lieutenant general it directed the regional ground forces corps and the 111th Capital Division. The Inspector General of the Department of Defense expressed concerns with the ANA Ground Force Command in these terms in March 2013, as the U.S. and allies:{{Cite web |url=https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=734408 |title=Assessment of U.S. Efforts to Develop the Afghan National Security Forces Command, Control, and Coordination System |access-date=2021-09-21 |archive-date=2020-11-21 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201121065506/https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=734408 |url-status=dead }} "began developing the Ground Forces Command in April 2009 and it is scheduled to achieve full operational capability for command and control of ANA forces by October 2012. However, it may take longer for the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and some Corps Commanders to embrace this new organization. Several ANSF stakeholders expressed their belief that GFC was an unnecessary, intermediate layer of bureaucracy. A number of Afghan security officials conveyed doubts about the long-term existence of the GFC HQ after 2014." .."General Staff reluctance to identify and divest authorities and responsibilities to the GFC inhibited the timely development of the Ground Forces Command. Afghan and Coalition officers also reported widespread, lukewarm support among senior level Ministry of Defense and General Staff officers for the establishment of the GFC. Operationally, some Afghan Corps commanders and staff members considered the GFC unnecessary and a redundant headquarters." The command was eventually disbanded in 2015; it was seen "by many as a redundant and unnecessary bureaucratic layer" between the General Staff and the regional corps.{{Cite web|title=Afghan National Army |url=https://www.afghanwarnews.info/army/ana.htm |publisher=Afghan War News|access-date=10 October 2021}}

The basic Afghan National Army unit was the kandak (battalion), consisting of 600 troops.{{Citation needed|date=August 2022}} Kandaks were made up of four companies (toli).Tim Mahon. [http://www.tsjonline.com/story.php?F=4446331 Basic steps: Afghan Army and police trainers and trainees see progress] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110717110331/http://www.tsjonline.com/story.php?F=4446331 |date=2011-07-17 }}. Training and Simulation Journal. 1 February 2010 Although the vast majority of kandaks were infantry, at least one mechanized and one tank kandak had been formed. Every ANA Corps was assigned commando kandaks.

Seven Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) kandaks were created in 2012–13, one kandak for each of the ANA's corps and divisions. They were created by converting existing infantry kandaks into QRF kandaks at the NMAA Armour Branch School. The QRF kandaks were trained and fielded in 2012 and 2013. The QRF kandaks were the first major ANA users of armoured vehicles.{{Cite web|date=2011-07-21|title=Afghan National Army update: July 2011 {{pipe}} FDD's Long War Journal|url=https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/07/afghan_national_army_update_ju.php|access-date=2022-12-24|website=www.longwarjournal.org|language=en-US}}

As the ANA grew, the focus changed to further developing the force so that it could become self-sustaining. Development of Combat Support Kandaks [Battalions] (CSK) was vital to any self-sustainability. The CSK role includes motor fleet maintenance, specialized communications, scouting, engineering, and long range artillery units. While most ANA brigades had a CSK, they were underdeveloped and did not fit the requirements of a growing army. Eventually one fully developed CSK was planned to be assigned to each of the 24 army combat brigades. Each CSK included an Intelligence toli (company) called a Cashf Tolai. Each company was responsible for collecting information about the surrounding area and Taliban activities.{{Cite web|title=Afghan National Army connects, surveys, secures in Sangin|url=https://www.dvidshub.net/news/80529/afghan-national-army-connects-surveys-secures-sangin|access-date=2022-12-24|website=DVIDS|language=en}} The members of the unit interacted closely with the local residents in an effort to deny the enemy control over the surrounding area.{{Cite web|title=Afghan National Army hosts Sangin residents, promotes security|url=https://www.dvidshub.net/news/80530/afghan-national-army-hosts-sangin-residents-promotes-security|access-date=2022-12-24|website=DVIDS|language=en}}

Combat service support was not an initial U.S. development priority, as U.S. arrangements could be drawn upon. But in order for the ANA to be self-sufficient, a Corps Logistics Kandak was to be formed which was to be responsible for providing equipment to the 90 infantry kandaks. The CLK was responsible for the maintenance of the new heavier equipment including APCs. In the 215th Corps area, the US Marine Combat Logistics Battalion 1 announced in January 2010 that the training of the ANA 5th Kandak, 1st Brigade, 215th ANA Corps Logistics Kandak has gone very well and that the unit was capable of undertaking the majority of day-to-day activities on their own.[http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/external/1stmlg/clr1/clb1/news/news_2011_11_15abc.jsp Combat Logistics Battalion 1] {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120802224627/http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/external/1stmlg/clr1/clb1/news/news_2011_11_15abc.jsp |date=2012-08-02 }}. I-mef.usmc.mil (2010-01-30). Retrieved on 2011-12-27. The ANA never achieved self-sufficiency and after losing logistical and air support from the U.S., the ANA fell apart during the 2021 Taliban offensive, making a series of negotiated surrenders.{{sfn|Lieven|2021}}

The Afghan Border Force (ABF) was responsible for the security of Afghanistan's border area with neighboring countries extending up to {{convert|30|mi|km|-1|order=flip}} into the interior.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2020|pages=38, 40}} In December 2017, most of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) personnel of the Afghan National Police were transferred to the Afghan National Army to form the ABF.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2018|pages=67,78,103}}| The Afghan National Police retained 4,000 ABP personnel for customs operations at border crossings and international airports.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2018|p=38}} The ABF consisted of seven brigades.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2018|p=67}}

The Afghan National Civil Order Force (ANCOF) was responsible for civil order and counterinsurgency.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2020|pp=38,40}} In March 2018, most of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) personnel of the Afghan National Police were transferred to the Afghan National Army to form the ANCOF with their role remaining the same.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2018|p=42,67,71}} The remaining 2,550 ANCOP personnel in the Afghan National Police formed the Public Security Police (PSP).{{sfn|Department of Defense|2018|p=67}} The ANCOF consisted of eight brigades.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2018|p=78}} In June 2020, the ANCOF brigades began to be disbanded with personnel to be integrated into the Afghan National Army.{{sfn|Department of Defense|2020|pp=38,40}}

{{Main|2021 Taliban offensive}}

United States and other remaining NATO troops withdrew from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021. Couple with a rapid offensive conducted by the Taliban, the Afghan National Army then largely disintegrated, with large numbers of ANA soldiers abandoning their posts or surrendering en masse to the Taliban.{{cite web |author1=Abdul Basit |title=Why did the Afghan army disintegrate so quickly? |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/17/why-did-the-afghan-army-disintegrate-so-quickly/ |website=AlJazeera |access-date=20 April 2024 |date=17 August 2021}}{{Cite web|last=Robertson|first=Nic|title=Afghanistan is disintegrating fast as Biden's troop withdrawal continues|url=https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/24/asia/afghanistan-taliban-offensive-intl-cmd/index.html|access-date=2021-08-15|website=CNN|date=24 June 2021 }}{{sfn|Lieven|2021}} This allowed the Taliban to capture large quantities of US-provided military equipment, vehicles and aircraft.{{Cite news|last1=Chaturvedi|first1=Amit|title=Choppers, rifles, humvees: What Taliban captured during Afghanistan blitzkrieg|work=Hindustan Times|url=https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/choppers-rifles-humvees-what-taliban-captured-during-afghanistan-blitzkrieg-101629262331061.html|access-date=18 August 2021}}

The reasons for the collapse were closely connected with the devastating Afghan soldiers' low morale and massive corruption.{{cite web |title=The U.S. Set Up the Afghan Army to Fail |url=https://theintercept.com/2023/03/01/us-afghanistan-war-vietnam/ |website=The Intercept |access-date=7 June 2024 |date=1 March 2023}}

In August 2021, after the Taliban captured the Afghan capital Kabul and other major cities, US President Joe Biden stated that the "Afghan military collapsed, sometimes without trying to fight," and that "we [the United States of America] gave them every tool they could need."{{cite speech |author=US President Joe Biden |title=Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan |url=https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/16/remarks-by-president-biden-on-afghanistan/ |location=The White House |access-date=30 April 2024 |date=16 August 2021}}{{Cite web |last=Bennett |first=John T. |date=2021-08-16 |title=Biden defends Afghan withdrawal, says country’s military ‘refused to fight’ |url=https://rollcall.com/2021/08/16/defiant-biden-defends-afghan-withdrawal-says-countrys-military-refused-to-fight/ |access-date=2024-04-28 |website=rollcall.com |language=en-US}} In an Al Jazeera editorial Abdul Basit wrote that the forces "preferred to save their lives by surrendering to the Taliban under its amnesty offers".{{Cite web |last=Basit |first=Abdul |title=Why did the Afghan army disintegrate so quickly? |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/17/why-did-the-afghan-army-disintegrate-so-quickly |access-date=2024-04-28 |website=Al Jazeera |date=17 August 2021|language=en}} NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that Afghan government forces "fought bravely," but "ultimately, the Afghan political leadership failed to stand up to the Taliban and to achieve the peaceful solution that Afghans desperately wanted."{{Cite web|title=NATO's Stoltenberg blames Afghan leadership for military collapse|url=https://apnews.com/article/nato-jens-stoltenberg-afghan-military-collapse|website=AP News|date=2021|access-date=2025-02-19}} International Security Assistance Force trainers additionally called the Afghan military "incompetent and unmotivated."{{Cite web|title=Unguarded nation|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-army-police/|website=The Washington Post|date=2019|access-date=2025-02-19}}

Soon, all the regional forces of the ANA had dissolved, with the exception of the 201st Corps and the 111th Capital Division, both of which were headquartered in Kabul, which had been surrounded by the Taliban. On 15 August 2021, the Taliban entered the outskirts of Kabul from multiple directions, beginning the fall of Kabul. On the same day, President Ashraf Ghani fled the country to Dubai.{{Cite web |author1=Natasha Turak |author2=Amanda Macias |author3=Emma Graham|title=Ousted Afghan President Ashraf Ghani resurfaces in UAE after fleeing Kabul, Emirati government says|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/18/afghan-president-ashraf-ghani-is-in-uae-after-fleeing-afghanistan.html|website=cnbc.com|date=18 August 2021|access-date=18 August 2021}} It was reported that ANA soldiers were fleeing to neighbouring countries in droves, some on foot and others onboard Afghan Air Force aircraft. At 8:55 pm local time, Taliban forces seized the Arg and raised their flag, soon afterwards declaring the restoration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

Following the fall of Kabul, the remaining forces of the ANA either deserted their posts or surrendered to the Taliban.{{Cite news|last1=Sanger|first1=David E.|last2=Cooper|first2=Helene|date=2021-08-14|title=Taliban Sweep in Afghanistan Follows Years of U.S. Miscalculations|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/14/us/afghanistan-biden.html|access-date=|issn=0362-4331}}; {{Cite web|url=https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-afghan-army-collapsed-under-talibans-pressure|title=How the Afghan Army Collapsed Under the Taliban's Pressure|website=Council on Foreign Relations}} Some remnants of the ANA regrouped in the Panjshir Valley, where they joined the anti-Taliban National Resistance Front of Afghanistan. Around 500–600 remaining Afghan troops, made up mostly of Afghan Commandos, were reported to have refused to surrender to the Taliban in Kabul, and instead joined up with US forces in at Kabul International Airport, helping them secure the outer perimeter of the airport during the evacuation in August 2021. According to Pentagon spokesman John Kirby, the US will evacuate these remaining Afghan troops to safety if they wish to leave Afghanistan when the evacuation operation ends.{{Cite web|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/24/g7-to-meet-on-afghanistan-withdrawal-deadline-live-news|title=Biden keeps to August 31 deadline for Kabul airlift|first=Tamila Varshalomidze,Usaid Siddiqui,Ted|last=Regencia|website=www.aljazeera.com|date=25 August 2021 }}

Since the Taliban took control, there has been more than 200 former Afghan security forces who either disappeared, or were extrajudicially executed.{{Cite news |title=Dozens of Former Afghan Security Forces Dead or Missing Under Taliban, Report Says |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/30/world/asia/taliban-revenge-killings-afghanistan.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur |last=Hassan |first=Sharif |date=30 November 2021 |newspaper=The New York Times |access-date=4 December 2021}} These figures only cover four provinces, meaning the real number of former Afghan security forces disappearing or being executed may be much higher.{{cite web |last1=Gul |first1=Ayaz |title=UN Accuses Taliban of Killing 200 Ex-Afghan Officials, Security Personnel |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/un-says-over-200-former-afghan-military-officials-killed-since-taliban-takeover/7234984.html |website=Voice of America |access-date=6 February 2024 |date=22 August 2023}} Taliban soldiers have hunted down former Afghan security forces in the aftermath of the withdrawal.

{{As of|2021|10}} the Islamic Emirate Army is subdivided into eight corps, mostly superseding the previous corps of the Afghan National Army. They are listed below.{{Cite web|title=Islamic Emirate Introduces New Members of Caretaker Cabinet|url=https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-174918|date=2021-10-05|website=TOLOnews|language=en}} In November 2021 Mullah Yaqoob, Acting Minister of Defense, announced the new names of the corps.{{sfn|Lalzoy|2021}}

File:Fourteen ANA women marching during their graduation ceremony.jpg]]

A table of the size of the Afghan army over time is listed below.{{Cite web|title=AFGHANISTAN: Transition Without End: An Analytical Narrative on State-making|last=Giustozzi|first=Antonio|series=Working Paper 40 Development as State Making|publisher=London School of Economics|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22938/1/wp40.2.pdf|s2cid=54592886|date=November 2008|page=12}}

{{main|Military ranks of Afghanistan}}

Following the return of the Taliban into power, the Islamic Emirate Armed Forces continue to use the rank insignia of the Afghan National Army, although updated insignias have been photographed.{{Cite web |title=Taliban Releases Defence Minister’s Picture In Army Uniform |url=https://www.afintl.com/en/202403182475 |access-date=2024-05-11 |website=Afghanistan International |language=en}}

;Commissioned officer ranks

The rank insignia of commissioned officers.

;Other ranks

The rank insignia of non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.

{{Main|List of equipment of the Afghan Armed Forces}}

File:An Afghan National Army vehicle leads a security patrol.jpgs of the ANA]]

The Afghan Army was equipped with the Soviet AK-47 as its main service rifle from the 1970s, with the 444th Commando Battalion being the only unit with access to the rifle in 1968. As a major non-NATO ally of the United States, Afghanistan continued to receive billions of dollars in military assistance and the American M16 rifle joined the AK-47 as the service rifle. In addition, various U.S. rifles, bulletproof vests, night vision goggles, trucks and Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles entered service. The ANA previously had a contract with International Trucks that would provide a fleet of 2,781 trucks which could be used for transporting personnel, water, petroleum and as a recovery vehicle.

Besides NATO, Afghanistan had increasingly turned to its regional allies, India and Russia for military aid and supplies. Both countries supported the Northern Alliance, with funding, training, supplies and medical treatment of wounded fighters, against the Taliban for years prior to the US-led intervention in 2001.

After the removal of the Taliban government in late 2001, India invested several billion dollars in infrastructure development projects in Afghanistan, besides the training of Afghan officers in India. But India was unwilling to provide military aid unless under an UN-authorised peacekeeping mission. In 2014, India signed an agreement with Russia and Afghanistan where it would pay Russia for all the heavy equipment requested by Afghanistan instead of directly supplying them. The deal also includes the refurbishment of heavy weapons left behind since the Soviet war.{{Cite web|url=http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-to-pay-russia-for-arms-ammo-it-sells-to-afghanistan/|title=India to pay Russia for arms, ammo it sells to Afghanistan|date=18 April 2014|work=The Indian Express|access-date=11 May 2015}} Following the end of the 2021 Taliban offensive, much of the Afghan National Army's arsenal, including much of its U.S. military hardware, ended up in the hands of the Taliban.{{Cite news |last1=Keller |first1=Jared |title=Here's all the US military equipment that likely ended up in Taliban hands |url=https://taskandpurpose.com/news/taliban-weapons-afghanistan/ |access-date=19 August 2021 |work=Task & Purpose}}

{{Reflist}}

• {{Cite book |last = Amtstutz |first = J. Bruce |title = Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation |url = http://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf |publisher = National Defense University |place = Washington, DC. |date = 1986 |access-date = 2015-02-08 |archive-date = 2015-02-08 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150208023539/http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a187795.pdf |url-status = live }}
• {{Cite book |last=Azimi |first=Nabi |title= The Army and Politics: Afghanistan: 1963–1993 |publisher=AuthorHouse (English edition)|date=2019 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M5aSDwAAQBAJ |isbn=978-1-7283-8701-7}} Self published English version of originally "Persian" work; see translator's note.
• {{Cite book |last1=Bhatia |first1=Michael |last2=Sedra |first2=Mark |date=2008 |title=Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed groups, disarmament, and security in a postwar society |location=Abingdon |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-415-47734-5}}
• {{Cite journal|last=Davis|first=Anthony|title=The Battlegrounds of Northern Afghanistan|journal=Jane's Intelligence Review|issue=July 1994|date=1994}} (pages 323 onwards)
• {{Cite journal|last=Davis|first=Anthony|title=The Afghan Army|journal=Jane's Intelligence Review|issue=March 1993|date=1993}}
• {{Cite book |author=United States. Department of Defense|title=Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan |date=December 2020|url=https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/23/2002626546/-1/-1/0/ENHANCING-SECURITY-AND-STABILITY-IN-AFGHANISTAN.PDF |id=7-653B15D|ref={{SfnRef|Department of Defense|2020}}|access-date=28 August 2021}}
• {{Cite book |author=United States. Department of Defense|title=Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan |date=June 2018|url=https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jul/03/2001938620/-1/-1/1/1225-REPORT-JUNE-2018-FINAL-UNCLASS-BASE.pdf|id=D-F54BED1|ref={{SfnRef|Department of Defense|2018}}|access-date=28 August 2021}}
• {{Cite book|ref={{harvid|Giustozzi|2016}}|author=Antonio Giustozzi|title=The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile Institution|place=London|publisher=C. Hurst & Co.|date=2016|isbn=978-1-84904-481-3}} 288 pp.; £35.00. Due to its 'simplicity, which matched low technology and basic organization found among the human resources available' the Taliban's army from 1996 to 2001 was perhaps the most successful national army for Afghanistan (p. 121).
• {{Cite journal|last=Giustozzi|first=Antonio|title=Auxiliary Force or National Army: Afghanistan 'ANA' and the COIN Effort 2002–2006|journal= Small Wars and Insurgencies|volume=18|number=1|date=March 2007|doi=10.1080/09592310601173220|s2cid=143669542}}
• {{Cite journal|last=Giustozzi|first=Antonio|title=The Demodernisation of an Army: Northern Afghanistan, 1992–2001|journal=Small Wars & Insurgencies|volume=15|number=1|date=Spring 2004 |pages=1–18|doi=10.1080/09592310410001676970|s2cid=143469209}}
• {{Cite book|last=Giustozzi|first=Antonio|title=War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan|publisher=Hurst|date=2000|isbn=978-1-85065-396-7}}
• {{Cite journal|last1=Grau |first1=Lester W. |last2=Jalali|first2=Ahmad |title=The Campaign for the Caves:The battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan war|journal=Journal of Slavic Military Studies |volume=14 |issue=3 |date=2001 |pages=69–92|doi=10.1080/13518040108430488 |s2cid=144936749}}
• {{Cite news|url=https://www.khaama.com/taliban-retitles-all-military-corps-in-afghanistan-45747/|title = Taliban retitles all military corps in Afghanistan|newspaper = The Khaama Press News Agency|date = 8 November 2021|last1 = Lalzoy|first1 = Najibullah}}
• {{Cite web|author=Lead Inspector General|title=Operation Freedom's Sentinel: Lead Inspector General Report to the United States Congress, April 1, 2019 – June 30, 2019|url=https://media.defense.gov/2019/Aug/21/2002173538/-1/-1/1/Q3FY2019_LEADIG_OFS_REPORT.PDF|website=Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General|date=2019-08-20|access-date=12 October 2019}}
• {{Cite book|author=Isby, David|title=Russia's War in Afghanistan|publisher=Osprey Publishing|year=1986|isbn=978-0-85045-691-2|ref=CITEREFIsby1986}}
• {{Cite book|last=Jacobsen |first=Annie |title=Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins |place=New York |publisher=Little, Brown and Company|date=2019}}
• {{Cite journal|last=Jalali|first=Ali A.|title=Rebuilding Afghanistan's National Army|journal=Parameters|publisher=U.S. Army|volume=32|issue=3|date=2002|pages=}}
• {{Cite journal|last=Jalali|first=Ali A.|title=Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict|url=http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/01spring/jalali.htm|journal=Parameters|publisher=U.S. Army|issue=Spring 2001|date=2001|pages=85–98|access-date=7 February 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161210224452/http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/01spring/jalali.htm|archive-date=10 December 2016|url-status=dead|df=dmy-all}}
• {{Cite web|author=Janes|url=http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/sws_scud010426.shtml |title=SS-1 'Scud' (R-11/8K11, R-11FM (SS-N-1B) and R-17/8K14) |access-date=2008-02-12 |date=2001-04-26 |publisher=Jane's Information Group |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071215141138/http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/misc/sws_scud010426.shtml |archive-date=2007-12-15 |url-status=live }}
• {{Cite book|last1=Kelly|first1=Terrence K.|last2=Bensahel |last3=Oliker |first3=Olga|title=Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts|publisher=RAND Corporation|date=2011}}
• {{Cite web|last=Lieven |first=Anatol |title= Opinion: Why Afghan Forces So Quickly Laid Down Their Arms |website= Politico |url= https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/08/16/afghanistan-history-taliban-collapse-504977 |date= 16 August 2021}}
• {{Cite book|last1=Nyrop |first1=Richard F. |first2=Donald M. |last2=Seekins|title=Area Handbook Series: Afghanistan: A Country Study|place=Fort Belvoir, VA|publisher=Defense Technical Information Center|date=January 1986}}
• {{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cjVuDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT282|title=Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Evolution of a Model|last=Sedra|first=Mark|date=2016-11-03|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-317-39080-0}}
• {{Cite book|last=Tomsen |first=Peter |title=The Wars of Afghanistan|publisher=Public Affairs|year=2011}}
• {{cite web|author=United States. Department of Defense|title=Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan |date=November 2010|url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2010/afghanistan-security-stability_201011.pdf|oclc=769299266 |access-date=31 March 2024}}
• {{Cite book|title=War in Afghanistan|last=Urban |first=Mark |author-link=Mark Urban| year=1988 |publisher=Macmillan Press |location=Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire |isbn=978-0-333-43263-1 |pages=12–14}}
• {{Cite book |last=Zaloga |first=Steven |author-link=Steven Zaloga |others=Illustrated by Jim Laurier and Lee Ray |title=Scud Ballistic Missile Launch Systems 1955–2005 |year=2006 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=1-84176-947-9}}

• Kenneth Conboy, 'Elite Forces of India and Pakistan,' – also covers Afghanistan, including post 1978 coup creation of 26th Parachute Regiment from two previous commando units.
• Yuri V. Gankovskii, Istoriia Vooruzhennykh Sil Afganistana: 1747–1977, Moscow: Nauka (also reported as Institut Vostokovedeniya), 1985.
• Antonio Giustozzi, 'Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan,' Chap. 11 in Tim Donnais (ed.) 'Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform,' DCAF/Lit Verlag, Zurich/Berlin, 2008 'Local Ownership.' Portrays a varying level of vested interest/warlord subversion of reform among the various security agencies; little local ownership at the MOD/ANA despite several attempts to seize more local control and subvert the foreign process by not proving enough personnel, imposing different officers, and wanting a conscript force. The army is financially unsustainable even at 70,000 strong and not being trained for combat in small units.
• Antonio Giustozzi, War, politics and society in Afghanistan, 1978–1992
• James Hardy, 'British MP urges changes to Afghan forces,' Jane's Defence Weekly, v.48, no.35, 31 August 2011, p. 15 ({{ISSN|0265-3818}}).
• Lieutenant Colonel Gavin Keating, [https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/aaj_2011_3.pdf 'Living in the Twilight Zone: Advising the Afghan National Army at the Corps Level'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190805055118/https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/aaj_2011_3.pdf |date=2019-08-05 }}, Australian Army Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 3, Summer 2011.
• Maloney, Sean M. (2005), Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, {{ISBN|1-57488-953-2}}
• {{cite book |last=Nikitenko |first=E.G. |title=Афганистан: От войны 80-х до прогноза новых войн |date=2004 |publisher=Астрель |isbn=5-271-07363-7 |edition={{nowrap|10000 экз}} |location=Балашиха |page=130 |url=http://militera.lib.ru/research/nikitenko_eg01/index.html |chapter= |chapter-url= |via=под ред. Захаровой Л.}} Никитенко Е. Г.
• Edward A Olsen, Stephen Jurika, The Armed Forces In Contemporary Asian Societies, Taylor and Francis, 2020.
• {{Cite journal|author=Robinson, Colin D.|title=What explains the failure of U.S. army reconstruction in Afghanistan? |journal=Defence and Security Analysis |year=2018 | volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=249–266 |doi=10.1080/14751798.2018.1500756 |s2cid=158846498 }}
• U.S. Army Area Handbook: Afghanistan, 1969, revised 1973
• 'US seeks to halve ANSF funds by 2014,' Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 October 2011. Reporting comments by Lt Gen Caldwell, Commander NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), 26 September 2011.

{{Commons category-inline}}

• {{Official website|http://mod.gov.af/en }}
• US Department of Defense, [https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jul/03/2001938620/-1/-1/1/1225-REPORT-JUNE-2018-FINAL-UNCLASS-BASE.PDF June 2018 'Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan' report]

{{Afghan security forces}}

{{Authority control}}

Category:Army of Afghanistan

Category:Military units and formations established in the 1970s

Category:Military units and formations of the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)

A