Document Number Nine

The document has been described as a communiqué{{cite web|title=Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation|url=http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation|website=ChinaFile|date=8 November 2013|access-date=6 May 2015|archive-date=6 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150906003050/http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation|url-status=live}} or circular.{{cite news |date=24 June 2013 |title=Tilting backwards |newspaper=The Economist |url=https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/06/political-rebalancing |url-access=subscription |access-date=6 May 2015 |issn=0013-0613 |archive-date=1 July 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170701181823/http://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/06/political-rebalancing |url-status=live }} The name of the document (Document Number Nine), as it came to be commonly referred in Western English-language press, comes from the fact that it was the ninth such document issued that year in China.

The document is highly critical of what can be broadly described as "Western values" (the document itself uses terms such as "Western values", "Western principles", "Western standards", "Western ideas", and more precisely, "Western constitutional democracy" (its first item){{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/books/article/2024/jul/21/anne-applebaum-autocracy-inc-donald-trump-vladimir-putin-gaza-european-elections-propaganda-keir-starmer|newspaper=The Observer|last=Adams|first=Tim|date=21 July 2024|title=Pulitzer-winning author Anne Applebaum: 'Often, for autocrats, the second time in power is worse'}} and "Western-style theories of governance", as well as making references to "Western anti-China forces"). The document is critical of "extremely malicious" ideals spreading in the Chinese society, such as ideas of (Western) constitutional democracy, civil society, universal values (freedom, democracy, and human rights), neo-liberalism, and freedom of the press (described as the "Western news values"). The document warns that such subjects undermine the CCP's control over Chinese society. The document also promotes ways of dealing with these problems, which include "Unwavering adherence to the principle of the Party's control of media."

The prelude to this document references a previous article of 2012{{Cite web |date=2012-10-31 |title=(Mandarin Chinese only) 当前我国意识形态建设面临的六大挑战--理论--人民网 |url=http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/0703/c83855-18430666.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121031235702/http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2012/0703/c83855-18430666.html |archive-date=2012-10-31 |access-date=2020-04-11 |website=Qiushi}} and raises six challenges faced by the CCP in asserting control over its ideology, while also identifying various routes by which Western hostile forces might subvert CCP ideology.

1. The cultural penetration of Western hostile forces threatens the security of our ideology. There are three main ways of cultural penetration:
2. * The first is direct cultural propaganda, that is, the use of modern media for long-term ideological penetration.
3. * The second is to use cultural commodities as a carrier to infiltrate the various values of the West into the public. (Cultural commodities refers to movies, novels, commercial goods, and other commodities which might be subverted by Western hostile forces.)
4. * The third is to infiltrate Western values into social elites such as high-level scholars and intellectuals under the cover of educational and academic exchanges.
5. Various social thoughts aim to hinder or subvert the authoritative identification of China's mainstream ideology.
6. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe have undermined belief in China's mainstream ideology.
7. The theme of development and the goal of modernization have played down the opposition between ideologies. (i.e. opposition between the Western system of liberal democracy and the Chinese system of "socialism with Chinese characteristics", which by implication are irrevocably opposed.)
8. Diverse value orientations have a negative impact on China's mainstream ideology.
9. Information networking poses a challenge to the control of our ideology.

{{Quotebox

| quote = "They [Critics/Reformers/Dissidents] attack the Party's leaders for placing themselves above the constitution, saying China "has a constitution but no constitutional government." Some people still use the phrase "constitutional dream" to distort the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, saying things like "constitutional democracy is the only way out" and "China should catch up with the rest of the world's trend toward constitutional governance." The point of publicly proclaiming Western constitutional democracy's key points is to oppose the party's leadership and implementation of its constitution and laws. Their goal is to use Western constitutional democracy to undermine the Party's leadership, abolish the People's Democracy, negate our country's constitution as well as our established system and principles, and bring about a change of allegiance by bringing Western political systems to China."

"Western anti-China forces and internal "dissidents" are still actively trying to infiltrate China's ideological sphere and challenge our mainstream ideology.Some of their latest major efforts include: Some people have disseminated open letters and declarations and have organized petition-signings to vocalize requests for political reforms, improvement of human rights, release of "political prisoners," "reversing the verdict on '6/4'[the Tiananmen Massacre]," and other such political demands; they have made a fuss over asset disclosure by officials, fighting corruption with the Internet, media supervision of government, and other sensitive hot-button issues, all of which stoke dissatisfaction with the Party and government.

... "Some of them are working together with Western anti-China forces, echoing each other and relying on each other's support. This clearly indicates that the contest between infiltration and anti-infiltration efforts in the ideological sphere is as severe as ever, and so long as we persist in Communist Party of China's leadership and socialism with Chinese characteristics, the position of Western anti-China forces to pressure for urgent reform won't change, and they will continue to point the spearhead of Westernizing, splitting, and "Color Revolutions" at China. In the face of these threats, we must not let down our guard or decrease our vigilance."

| author = — Communique on the Current State of our Ideological Sphere, Notice from the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, April 22, 2013

| align = center

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The document specifically addresses the following issues that were seen as problems.{{cite web|title= Document 9|date= 8 November 2013|url= http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation|access-date= 6 May 2015|archive-date= 6 September 2015|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20150906003050/http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation|url-status= live}} These are the terms used in the document itself:

1. Promoting Western Constitutional Democracy: An attempt to undermine the current leadership and the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" system of governance. (Including the separation of powers, multi-party system, general elections, and independent judiciaries.)
2. Promoting "universal values" in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party's leadership. (That "the West's values are the prevailing norm for all human civilization", that "only when China accepts Western values will it have a future".)
3. Promoting civil society in an attempt to dismantle the ruling party's social foundation. (i.e. that individual rights are paramount and ought to be immune to obstruction by the state.)
4. Promoting neoliberalism, attempting to change China's basic economic system. (i.e. "unrestrained economic liberalization, complete privatization, and total marketization".)
5. Promoting the West's idea of journalism, challenging China's principle that the media and publishing system should be subject to Party discipline.
6. Promoting historical nihilism, trying to undermine the history of the CCP and of New China. (For example to deny the scientific and guiding value of Mao Zedong thought.)
7. Questioning Reform and Opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. (For example, saying "We have deviated from our Socialist orientation.")

The contents of the memo became known when accounts of presenting it to cadre in the Liaoyuan municipal government were published in the local paper.[http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/shishiyaowen/jishiyaowen/xinwenkuaixun/html/715/2013-05-13/content-748603.html 市委组织部迅速贯彻落实《关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报》及《吉林：创新领航催振兴》通讯精神] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140413143308/http://www.mzyfz.com/cms/shishiyaowen/jishiyaowen/xinwenkuaixun/html/715/2013-05-13/content-748603.html |date=13 April 2014 }}，Liaoyuan Daily, 10 May 2013[http://epaper.cnwest.com/xyrb/html/2013-05/21/content_4786102.htm 市委召开常委（扩大）会议 专题学习当前意识形态领域情况通报] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304062813/http://epaper.cnwest.com/xyrb/html/2013-05/21/content_4786102.htm|date=4 March 2016}}，Xianyang Daily, 21 May 2013，See also：[http://www.xianyang.gov.cn/dwgk/2013/0521/76801.html] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130921055804/http://www.xianyang.gov.cn/dwgk/2013/0521/76801.html|date=21 September 2013}} In May 2013, cadre at the Chongqing Party Committee for Urban and Rural Construction studied the material,[http://www.ccc.gov.cn/xygl/djgz/djzx/2013-05-09-2909359.html 高举旗帜坚定信心 坚决同党中央保持高度一致] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303132341/http://www.ccc.gov.cn/xygl/djgz/djzx/2013-05-09-2909359.html|date=3 March 2016}}，重庆市城乡建设委员会, 9 May 2013，See also：[http://news.stnn.cc/china/201305/t20130513_1891025.html] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131020113122/http://news.stnn.cc/china/201305/t20130513_1891025.html|date=20 October 2013}} as did cadre in Anyang.[https://web.archive.org/web/20150723062123/http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2013-05/1605728.html 安阳政协学习《当前意识形态领域情况的通报》的通知], Ta Kung Pao, 13 May 2013. archived from [http://News.Takungpao.Com/mainland/focus/2013-05/1605728.Html the original] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150723062123/http://news.takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2013-05/1605728.Html|date=23 July 2015}} on 23 July 2015

In April 2015, The Wall Street Journal's Josh Chin reported a 71-year-old Chinese journalist was convicted for releasing Document 9. Journalist Gao Yu was sentenced to seven years in prison by Beijing's Third Intermediate People's Court after being found guilty in a closed trial of leaking state secrets to foreign media. Ms Gao was accused by the court of leaking an internal CCP directive to an overseas Chinese news site in 2013, according to her lawyer, Mo Shaoping. Historically, it is rare for Chinese authorities to detain or jail elderly critics, who were traditionally given quiet warnings when they crossed political red lines. The article suggests that the charge is a pretext for aggressive action against political dissent and cites other examples of elderly publishers and journalists being prosecuted.{{Cite news |last=Chin |first=Josh |date=2015-04-17 |title=China Sentences 71-Year-Old Journalist to 7 Years |language=en-US |work=The Wall Street Journal |url=http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-sentences-71-year-old-journalist-to-jail-1429254633 |url-access=subscription |access-date=2023-06-27 |issn=0099-9660 |archive-date=13 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230413195453/https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-sentences-71-year-old-journalist-to-jail-1429254633 |url-status=live }}

According to an analysis by a reporter at The New York Times, the emphasis on political discipline was also intended to forestall leftist, or Maoist, opposition to needed economic reforms, thus avoiding the split which resulted in the Soviet Union during Gorbachev's reform efforts when media freedom resulted in publishing of a great deal of critical historical material and alienation of the mass of party workers.

• Silent Contest

{{reflist}}

• {{cite web |title=The political economy of Document Number Nine |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/the-political-economy-of-document-number-nine/ |work=Foreign Policy |date=20 August 2013 |access-date=6 May 2015}}

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