Electronic voting in Estonia#Criticism

The term Power voting (or e-voting) can refer to both fixed voting locations (as in voting booths) and remote (as in over the Internet) electronic voting. To reduce confusion between the two, electronic voting is known as i-Voting in Estonia. The security model is modeled after the way in which advance voting and postal voting is handled.{{Cite web |url=http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/Internet_Voting_in_Estonia.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=2010-01-07 |archive-url=http://veebiarhiiv.digar.ee/a/20101118111444/http%3A//www.vvk.ee/public/dok/Internet_Voting_in_Estonia.pdf |archive-date=2010-11-18 |url-status=dead}}

{{see also|Estonian ID card}}

The Estonian internet voting system builds on the Estonian ID card. The card is a regular and mandatory{{Cite web | url=https://www.riigiteataja.ee/ert/act.jsp?id=1042877 |title = Isikut tõendavate dokumentide seadus – Riigi Teataja}} national identity document as well as a smart card, allowing for both secure remote authentication and legally binding digital signatures using the Estonian state supported public key infrastructure.[http://www.pass.ee/index.php/pass/eng/id_card What is the ID card?] As of March 2007, over 1.08 million cards have been issued (out of the Estonian population of 1.32 million).{{Cite web|url=https://www.id.ee/?lang=en|title=Avaleht|website=ID.ee}}

File:VVK-kettad.jpg Internet voting is available during an early voting period (four to six days prior to Election Day). Voters can change their electronic votes an unlimited number of times, with the final vote being tabulated. Anyone who votes using the Internet can vote at a polling station during the early voting period, invalidating their Internet vote. It is possible to change the electronic vote on Election Day since 2021.{{Cite web |url=https://news.err.ee/1608359610/e-votes-can-be-canceled-by-voting-at-polling-stations-on-election-day |title=E-votes can be canceled by voting at polling stations on election day |date=5 October 2021 }} Votes are counted on Election Day after polling stations are closed and storage media containing the votes are physically destroyed after all election complaints are resolved at least one month after elections.

A cost-efficiency comparison of the different voting channels offered in the Estonian Municipal Elections (2017) concluded that Internet voting is the most cost-efficient voting channel offered by the Estonian electoral system.{{Citation|last1=Krimmer|first1=Robert|title=How Much Does an e-Vote Cost? Cost Comparison per Vote in Multichannel Elections in Estonia|date=2018|work=Electronic Voting|volume=11143|pages=117–131|editor-last=Krimmer|editor-first=Robert|publisher=Springer International Publishing|doi=10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_8|isbn=9783030004187|last2=Duenas-Cid|first2=David|last3=Krivonosova|first3=Iuliia|last4=Vinkel|first4=Priit|last5=Koitmae|first5=Arne|series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |editor2-last=Volkamer|editor2-first=Melanie|editor3-last=Cortier|editor3-first=Véronique|editor3-link= Véronique Cortier |editor4-last=Goré|editor4-first=Rajeev}}

The principle of "one person, one vote" is maintained, as the voter is able to cast more than one ballot, but only one vote is ultimately recorded. This assertion was challenged in August 2005 by Arnold Rüütel, then President of Estonia, who saw the new e-voting provisions in the Local Government Council Election Act as a breach of the principle of equality of voting. The President petitioned against the e-voting provisions to the Supreme Court of Estonia but lost.{{Cite web |url=http://www.nc.ee/?id=381 |title=Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, Case No. 3-4-1-13-05 |access-date=2007-01-15 |archive-date=2011-07-20 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110720125506/http://www.nc.ee/?id=381 |url-status=dead }}

According to the recommendations of OSCE/ODIHR election observers, and because of a voting client hacking case brought to the Supreme Court in 2011, Estonia implemented vote verification for individual voters in 2013. Voters verify their ballots by using a smartphone application which uses a QR code displayed by the desktop voting client to display the candidate for whom the vote was cast. Individual verification verifies that the vote cast was stored on the vote collection server for not more than either 30 or 60 minutes, depending on the election. The voter cannot directly verify that the vote was also tallied as cast.

The voting system's serverside source code was published in June 2013 because of social pressure initiated by Tanel Tammet, a computer scientist who coauthored research papers from 2001 on electronic voting requirements. The source code was published on GitHub and has been available for all subsequent elections. Neither the voting client's source code nor the reference code have been published, as election officials have determined that this would allow malicious actors to build fake voting clients. Because the voting protocol is public, anyone can build a voting client.

In 2015, extensive reports from OSCE/ODIHR election observers and an independent observing team led by J. Alex Halderman in 2015, as well as public pressure from local activists, motivated the implementation of universal vote tally verifiability in 2017. Tally verification is done by mixnet, making use of homomorphic properties and ElGamal encryption provided by Douglas Wikström. Universal tally verification is not a mandatory part of the process, and is conducted by a dedicated data auditor. Tallying the votes with mixnet is done in parallel with plain text extraction of the votes from encrypted envelopes, which are decrypted using the voting commission's secret key and from which the digital signatures of voters are removed.

Although a white paper on Estonia's 2017-2019 implementation of its electronic voting system claims that the system permits end-to-end verifiability, this has been denied by independent researchers.{{Cite web|title=A framework for comparing the security of voting schemes|url=https://www.attejuvonen.fi/thesis-voting-security-2019-10-01.pdf|last=Juvonen|first=Atte|date=October 1, 2019|website=Blog of Atte Juvonen|page=79|access-date=May 28, 2020}} A working group was formed by Minister of Foreign Trade and Information Technology Kert Kingo in order to assess the "verifiability, security and transparency" of electronic voting. The group produced a report consisting of 25 improvement proposals, of which proposals 11, 13 and 25 pertain to the system's problems with verifiability.{{Cite web|title=E-valimiste turvalisuse töörühma koondaruanne|url=https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/e-valimiste_tooruhma_koondaruanne_12.12.2019.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200929070006/https://www.mkm.ee/sites/default/files/e-valimiste_tooruhma_koondaruanne_12.12.2019.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 29, 2020|date=December 12, 2019|website=Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications|access-date=May 28, 2020}} The government coalition agreement also asserts the need for independent international auditing of the system.

After 2023 parliamentary elections OSCE/ODIHR observers as well as local observers still claim that neither individual nor universal verifiability is consistently provided Estonian e-voting, which makes the system not end-to-end verifiable, despite the claims of the authorities.https://news.err.ee/1609262472/osce-recommends-estonia-boost-public-confidence-in-e-votinghttps://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/en/posts/perils-of-electronic-voting/ The same assessment has been echoed in reports commissioned by government institutions of Norway and Ukraine.https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/f7c349a901bf49598a4f28cbbe4a8d5c/knowledge-acquisition-on-electronic-and-internet-based-solutions-for-voting.pdf, pg 25https://ifesukraine.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/IFES-Ukraine-Feasibility-Study-on-the-Introduction-of-New-Elections-Technology-for-Ukraine-v1-2020-02-13-Eng.pdf, pg 11-12

Despite praise from Estonian election officials, computer security experts from outside the country who have reviewed the system have criticized it, warning that any voting system that transmits ballots electronically cannot be secure."Report on the Estonian Internet voting system," Sept. 3, 2011. https://www.verifiedvoting.org/report-on-the-estonian-internet-voting-system-2/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161008211328/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/report-on-the-estonian-internet-voting-system-2/ |date=2016-10-08 }} This criticism was underscored in May 2014, when a team of international computer security experts released their examination of the system, claiming they could breach the system, change votes and vote totals, and erase all evidence of their actions if they were to install malware on Estonian election servers."Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia," https://estoniaevoting.org/ The team advised the Estonian government to halt all online voting because of the potential threats that it posed to their government.

The Estonian National Electoral Committee reviewed the concerns and published a response, saying that the claims "give us no reason to suspend online balloting". The purported vulnerabilities were said to be either infeasible in reality or already accounted for in the design of the e-voting system.{{Cite web|url=http://vvk.ee/valimiste-korraldamine/vvk-uudised/vabariigi-valimiskomisjoni-vastulause-the-guardianis-ilmunud-artiklile|title=Valimised|website=vvk.ee}} The Estonian Information System Authority also responded to the claims, describing them as a political, rather than technical, attack on the e-voting system, and criticizing the method of disclosure.{{Cite web|url=https://www.ria.ee/en/e-voting-is-too-secure.html|title=E-voting is (too) secure|website=ShowTime}} The researchers' connection to the Estonian Centre Party, which has long been critical of e-voting, has also been a common speculation among Estonian state officials and has been even suggested by a prime minister.{{Cite web|url=https://estonianworld.com/security/attacks-estonias-e-voting-political-rather-technical/|title=Attacks on Estonia’s e-voting are political rather than technical|first=Karoliina|last=Raudsepp|date=June 23, 2014}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JY_pHvhE4os&t=46m41s|title=- YouTube|website=www.youtube.com}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.baltictimes.com/estonia_e-votes_despite_cyber_security_concerns/|title=Estonia E-votes Despite Cyber Security Concerns|website=www.baltictimes.com}}

The main author of a white paper on Estonian electronic voting from 2001, {{Interlanguage link|Helger Lipmaa|et}},{{Cite web |url=http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/lipmaamyrk.pdf |title=E-valimiste realiseerimisvõimaluste analüüs |access-date=2016-09-30 |archive-date=2015-06-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150629200701/http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/lipmaamyrk.pdf |url-status=dead }} criticized the system, and wrote in a 2011 blog post that he used paper ballot on that year's election.{{Cite web |url=https://helger.wordpress.com/2011/03/05/paper-voted-and-why-i-did-so/ |title=Paper-voted (and why I did so) |date=2011-03-05 |access-date=2025-02-04}} The main author of the second white paper on Estonian electronic voting from 2001, Tanel Tammet,{{Cite web |url=http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/evalimisteanalyys24okt.doc |title=E-valimised Eesti Vabariigis: võimaluste analüüs |access-date=2016-09-30 |archive-date=2015-06-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150629224127/http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/evalimisteanalyys24okt.doc |url-status=dead }} has been campaigning for the opening of the system's source code and for the implementation of independent parallel systems to guarantee trust in the e-voting system.{{Cite web|url=http://www.praxis.ee/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2003-E-valimiste-voimalikud-tehnoloogilised-platvormid.pdf|title=E-valimiste võimalikud tehnoloogilised platvormid}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.facebook.com/evalimised/about/|title=E-valimised}} The serverside code was published under the Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license on GitHub as a result of those efforts in July 2013.[http://news.err.ee/v/news/scitech/940d2015-ffe1-4c9f-98e8-6fc60935fa0c/release-of-e-election-software-code-did-not-go-far-enough Release of E-Election Software Code 'Did Not Go Far Enough']

The OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission has voiced concerns about Estonian e-voting during every parliament election, initially proposing in 2007 that e-voting be suspended if its problems remain unaddressed,{{Cite web|url=https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/estonia/25925|title=Estonia, Parliamentary Elections, 4 March 2007: Final Report|website=www.osce.org}} then suggesting in 2011 that the election commission should create an inclusive working group for improving e-voting and that cryptographic measures should be implemented to ensure that voting is observable{{Cite web|url=https://www.osce.org/odihr/77557|title=Estonia, Parliamentary Elections, 6 March 2011: Final Report|website=www.osce.org}}{{Cite journal|last1=Heiberg|first1=Sven|last2=Willemson|first2=Jan|year=2014|title=Verifiable internet voting in Estonia|url=http://research.cyber.ee/~jan/publ/mobileverification-ieee.pdf|journal=IEEE Conference Publications|volume=2014 6th International Conference on Electronic Voting: Verifying the Vote (EVOTE)|pages=1–8}} and noting that the verification features implemented for the 2015 elections only partially address their previous recommendations.{{Cite web|url=https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/estonia/160131|title=Estonia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 March 2015: Final Report|website=www.osce.org}}

In a 2012 overview of international e-voting implementations, IFES independent researchers found that, although insofar successful, in situation of "emerging international electoral standards with respect to Internet voting" Estonian voting system faces necessary improvements for "better legislation, a transparent policy and formalized procedures" as well as "broader democratic goals, such as enhancing civic e-participation" need to be considered.[https://www.parliament.uk/documents/speaker/digital-democracy/IFESIVreport.pdf International Experience with E-Voting]

In 2013 Free Software Foundation Europe criticized partial publishing of the source code of e-voting system and for using non-software licenses for publication. FSFE also suggests researching into solutions that lessen reliance on system administrators and instead build the system on cryptographic models of trust. Since the weakest part of voting infrastructure is voter's computer, FSFE suggests Estonia should mitigate the risks of unnoticed subversion of votes in compromised client machines and "publicise the dangers as widely as possible, along with instructions to minimise the risk and rectify the situation should a risk realise".{{Cite web |url=https://fsfe.org/ee/i-voting/2013-07-26_Open_Letter_to_NEC.html |title=Open Letter on Freedom and Internet Voting to Estonia's National Electoral Committee |access-date=2016-09-30 |archive-date=2016-10-02 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161002112847/https://fsfe.org/ee/i-voting/2013-07-26_Open_Letter_to_NEC.html |url-status=dead }}

There have been also attempts to expose problems of voting system by proofs of concept. In 2011 Paavo Pihelgas created a trojan that was theoretically able to change voter's choice without user noticing. He used this as basis for filing an election complaint and demanded that Supreme Court invalidates election results. The court dismissed the case because Pihelgas's "voter's rights had not been infringed as long as he had knowingly put himself into the situation".{{Cite web|url=https://edri.org/our-work/edrigramnumber9-11e-voting-osce-estonia/|title=OSCE findings on Estonian e-voting|website=European Digital Rights (EDRi)}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.riigikohus.ee/en/constitutional-judgment-3-4-1-4-11|title=Constitutional judgment 3-4-1-4-11 | The Estonian Supreme Court|website=www.riigikohus.ee}}

In 2015, an activist from the Estonian Pirate Party, Märt Põder, took credit for casting an invalid ballot "using a GNU debugger to locate the breakpoint in Linux IVCA where the candidate number is stored and replace it with an invalid candidate number".{{Cite journal|last1=Heiberg|first1=Sven|last2=Parsovs|first2=Arnis|last3=Willemson|first3=Jan|date=2015|title=Log Analysis of Estonian Internet Voting 2013--2015, section 5.24.1|url=https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1211|quote=An activist from the Estonian Pirate Party took credit for casting the spoiled ballot [18]. The technique employed involved using a GNU debugger to locate the breakpoint in Linux IVCA where the candidate number is stored and replace it with an invalid candidate number}} Being only one among 176,491 e-voters to do it, the activist explained to the media that client application source code should be opened up and taught as part of general education in public schools to make people trust e-voting.{{Cite web |url=https://boamaod.github.io/blog/2015/03/02/minu-evalimised/ |title=Kuidas ma e-valimisi otsast natuke häkkisin |access-date=2017-09-20 |archive-date=2016-07-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160714103726/http://boamaod.github.io/blog/2015/03/02/minu-evalimised/ |url-status=dead }} Later negotiating with electoral commission, an activist went on to stress that end-to-end verifiability is a prerequisite for reliable e-voting, and that the whole process of planning, procuring and implementing e-voting should be conducted in English as well, which opens up to the international community for proper scrutiny.{{Cite web|url=https://www.facebook.com/boamaod/posts/10200428572913123|title=Märt Põder}}{{Cite web |url=https://boamaod.github.io/blog/2015/03/30/rohkem-kryptot-v2hem-usaldust/ |title=Vaadeldamatu e-hääletus pole usaldusväärne |access-date=2017-09-20 |archive-date=2016-02-16 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160216094709/http://boamaod.github.io/blog/2015/03/30/rohkem-kryptot-v2hem-usaldust/ |url-status=dead }}

In 2016, computer scientists at the University of Oxford, while acknowledging relative success of conducting e-voting, they claimed that e-voting system officials "have relied since the system's inception on building trust through interpersonal relations," and that "may work well for a close-knit society such as that of Estonia". However, "informal processes (including lessons learned) should be further clarified and formally documented".{{Cite web |url=https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/publications/15483/workingpaperno6nurse.pdf |title=An Independent Assessment of the Procedural Components of the Estonian Internet Voting System |access-date=2017-04-29 |archive-date=2016-10-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161011122854/http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/publications/15483/workingpaperno6nurse.pdf |url-status=dead }}

In beginning of June 2019, Kert Kingo, Minister of Foreign Trade and Information Technology of the newly elected government created an inclusive working group to assess the "verifiability, security and transparency"{{Cite web|url=https://www.mkm.ee/et/uudised/valiskaubandus-ja-it-minister-kutsub-kokku-elektroonilise-valimissusteemi-ja-elektroonilise|title=Kinnitati e-valimiste töörühma koosseis|date=21 June 2019|website=Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications|access-date=27 June 2019|archive-date=27 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190627133420/https://www.mkm.ee/et/uudised/valiskaubandus-ja-it-minister-kutsub-kokku-elektroonilise-valimissusteemi-ja-elektroonilise|url-status=dead}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.mkm.ee/et/uudised/valiskaubandus-ja-it-minister-kutsub-kokku-elektroonilise-valimissusteemi-ja-elektroonilise|title=Väliskaubandus- ja IT-minister kutsub kokku elektroonilise valimissüsteemi ja elektroonilise hääletamise töörühma|date=7 June 2019|website=Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications|access-date=27 June 2019|archive-date=27 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190627133420/https://www.mkm.ee/et/uudised/valiskaubandus-ja-it-minister-kutsub-kokku-elektroonilise-valimissusteemi-ja-elektroonilise|url-status=dead}} of the Estonian electronic voting system. The working group consisted of state officials, representatives from universities and research institutes, critics, and creators of the system.{{Cite web|url=https://news.postimees.ee/6715816/e-voting-creator-the-system-is-bulletproof|title=E-voting creator: the system is bulletproof|last=Punamäe|first=Sander|date=26 June 2019|website=Postimees}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.baltictimes.com/estonian_e-voting_creator_deems_formation_of_working_group_political_statement/|title=Estonian e-voting creator deems formation of working group political statement|date=2019-06-26|website=The Baltic Times}} In December 2019 they presented results of the six-month investigation, with 25 proposals for improving the core infrastructure of the Estonian e-voting system.{{cite web |title=E-voting task force finishes report including 25 proposals for improving system |url=https://news.postimees.ee/6849632/e-voting-task-force-finishes-report-including-25-proposals-for-improving-system |website=Postimees |publisher=Baltic News Service |access-date=2 May 2020 |language=en |date=13 December 2019}}

After contested 2023 parliamentary elections the distrust in e-voting reached 40% of the population and parliamentary filibuster that lasted until 2024.https://www.akadeemia.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/piret-ehin-mihkel-solvak.-17.10.2023.pdf, slide 23https://news.err.ee/1609316562/coalition-breaks-riigikogu-filibuster-for-first-time After series election complaints the Supreme Court repeated their 2019 prescription to stipulate important parts of e-voting in law.https://news.err.ee/924034/supreme-court-e-voting-regulations-need-legal-act-clarificationhttps://news.err.ee/1608932273/supreme-court-dismisses-all-election-complaints Estonian election observers demanded rendering e-voting observable, but although the parliament passed changes to electoral law just before 2024 European Parliament elections, the proposals of election observers were dismissed.https://ausadvalimised.ee/en/docs/yhisavaldus2023/https://news.err.ee/1609335000/riigikogu-passes-changes-to-e-voting-regulation Anti-Corruption Select Committee of the parliament discussed e-voting two times, which lead to plenary discussion of online elections as a matter of significant national importance.https://www.riigikogu.ee/pressiteated/korruptsioonivastane-erikomisjon-kasitleb-e-valimisi-avalikul-istungil/ In the discussion under the title "Online elections – a threat to democracy" attorney-at-law Paul Keres proposed election complaints in defense of public interest should be introduced and election observer Märt Põder presented his findings, first published at Chaos Communication Congress in 2023.https://www.riigikogu.ee/en/sitting-reviews/the-riigikogu-discussed-online-elections-as-a-matter-of-significant-national-importance/https://gafgaf.infoaed.ee/files/votes-without-ballots_findings_2023.pdfhttps://fahrplan.events.ccc.de/congress/2023/fahrplan/events/12298.htmlhttps://media.ccc.de/v/37c3-12298-should_e-voting_experience_of_estonia_be_copied

The discussions lead to public demand to find solutions for the problems with e-voting and in 2024, after OSCE/ODIHR had been visiting in Estonia to present their findings.https://news.postimees.ee/7976534/martin-ehala-history-has-given-its-verdict-on-e-votinghttps://news.err.ee/1609262472/osce-recommends-estonia-boost-public-confidence-in-e-voting In Autumn Conservative People's Party initiated an address to Venice Commission to assess Estonian e-voting, which although initially blocked at the parliament committee, was instead on behalf of vice president of the parliament Arvo Aller submitted to OSCE/ODIHR based on their request.https://eerk.ee/vice-president-of-estonian-parliament-requests-an-opinion-from-osce-in-cooperation-with-the-estonian-nationalists-and-conservatives/https://news.postimees.ee/8180696/andres-aule-ja-jaak-valge-an-external-assessment-of-e-elections-is-in-the-interest-of-all-of-estoniahttps://www.riigikogu.ee/tegevus/eelnoud/eelnou/27f21d5c-f652-4017-a973-f7c05e33143a/riigikogu-poordumine-eesti-vabariigi-riigikogu-poordumine-euroopa-noukogu-komisjoni-demokraatia-oiguse-kaudu-poole-arvamuse-saamiseks-eestis-kasutatava-elektroonilise-valimissusteemi-kohta/ In his 2024 thesis Kristjan Düüna, the student at TalTech on the basis of OSCE/ODIHR report experimentally showed how in 2023 elections Electoral Committee could have manipulated the results without detection.https://news.postimees.ee/8186651/editorial-e-voting-requires-verification After the findings were presented in Estonian media in early 2025, the supervisor of the student with the authorities engaged in media campaign to claim that manipulation was outruled by manual checks.https://news.err.ee/1609596905/ria-says-e-voting-system-is-secure-and-transparenthttps://arvamus.postimees.ee/8187023/mart-raudsaar-niisiis-e-valimisi-voib-kritiseerida-konstruktiivselt

In October 2024 the Standing Committee on Cybersecurity of the Academy of Sciences introduced its risk analysis for Estonian voting technologies, where they presented six risk scenarios, two of which reiterated the lack of auditability of electronic voting as brought up by election observers in 2023, two risks were related to misinformation campaigns and criticism of e-voting, one underlined the problems of auditability in case of mobile devices and one risk was related to connectivity to Internet.https://www.akadeemia.ee/en/events/conference-on-trust-and-reliability-2024/ Neutrality of the findings was contested in media, because of the conflicts of interests as the committee was led by Dan Bogdanov, CSO of vendor of Estonian e-voting system Cybernetica with participation of their current and previous partners as well as specialists from Electoral Committee and governmental institutions.https://forte.delfi.ee/artikkel/120329322/teaduste-akadeemia-korraldas-uuringu-mille-kohal-lasub-selge-huvide-konflikt

File:2019 Estonian parliamentary election by counties.svg}} {{Legend inline|#007557|Centre}} {{Legend inline|#0077BD|Conservative People's}}]]

File:2019 Estonian parliamentary election electronic votes by electoral districts.svg}} {{Legend inline|#007557|Centre}}]]

With 312,181 electronic votes, these were the first elections in history where more than half of the votes (51.1%) were cast online.{{Cite web |date=6 March 2023 |title=Online votes make up two-thirds of Reform, less than third of EKRE votes |url=https://news.err.ee/1608906014/online-votes-make-up-two-thirds-of-reform-less-than-third-of-ekre-votes |access-date=6 March 2023 |website=Eesti Rahvusringhääling |language=en }}

After the publication of the e-vote results, Martin Helme, the leader of EKRE, stated that "he does not trust the e-vote results" and demanded a recount.{{Cite web |date=5 March 2023 |title=Riigikogu valimistel on hääle andnud rekordarv inimesi |url=https://www.postimees.ee/7725235/valimisblogi-riigikogu-valimistel-on-haale-andnud-rekordarv-inimesi |access-date=5 March 2023 |website=Postimees |language=et |archive-date=5 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230305233505/https://www.postimees.ee/7725235/valimisblogi-riigikogu-valimistel-voidutses-reformierakond |url-status=live }}

In the 2019 parliamentary elections, 247,232 people, or 43.8% of all participants, voted over the Internet.

In the [[2019 European Parliament election| European Parliament

elections]], 155,521 people voted over the Internet. This means that roughly 46.7% of participating voters gave their vote over the Internet.{{Cite web|url=https://ep2019.valimised.ee/en/voting-result/index.html|title=Voting results in detail|website=ep2019.valimised.ee}}

In the 2017 local municipal elections, 186,034 people voted over the Internet. This means that roughly 31.7% of participating voters gave their vote over the Internet.{{Cite web | url=https://kov2017.valimised.ee/valimistulemus-vald.html |title = Valimistulemus valdades ja linnades}}

In the 2015 parliamentary elections, 176,491 people, 30.5% of all participants, voted over the Internet.{{Cite web|url=http://www.vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics|title=Valimised|website=www.vvk.ee}}

In the European Parliament elections, 103,151 people voted over the Internet. This means that roughly 31.3% of participating voters gave their vote over the Internet.

In the 2013 local municipal elections, 133,808 people voted over the Internet.{{Cite web|url=http://vvk.ee/voting-methods-in-estonia/engindex/statistics|title=Valimised|website=vvk.ee}} This means that roughly 21.2% of participating voters gave their vote over the Internet.

It was also the first election where vote verification with mobile device was implemented.

"Verifiable Internet Voting in Estonia" http://research.cyber.ee/~jan/publ/mobileverification-ieee.pdf

In the 2011 parliamentary elections, 140,846 people voted over the Internet. This means that roughly 15.4% of the persons with the right to vote and 24.3% of participating voters gave their vote over the Internet. It was also the first election to allow for voting through chip-secure mobile phones, following a law approved by Parliament in 2008.{{cite news|url = https://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2008-12-12-estonia-mobile_N.htm|title = Estonia to vote by mobile phone in 2011|newspaper = USA Today|date = 2008-12-12 |author = Jari Tanner, Associated Press}}

In the 2009 local municipal elections, 104,415 people voted over the Internet.{{cite web|url=http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/480270|title=E-hääletanute arv tõusis üle 100 000|access-date=2009-10-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091017112220/http://www.epl.ee/artikkel/480270|archive-date=2009-10-17|url-status=dead}} This means that roughly 9.5% of the persons with the right to vote gave their vote over the Internet.{{Cite web|url=https://www.valimised.ee/?id=11178|title=| Valimised Eestis|website=www.valimised.ee}}

In the [[2009 European Parliament election| European Parliament

elections]], 58,669 people voted over the Internet. This means that roughly 14.7% of participating voters gave their vote over the Internet.

In 2007 Estonia held its and the world's first general elections with Internet voting available from February 26 to 28. A total of 30,275 citizens used Internet voting (3.4%), which means for every 30 eligible voters one of them voted through the Internet.[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6407269.stm Estonia claims new e-voting first], BBC March 1, 2007

In 2005 Estonia became the first country to offer Internet voting nationally in local elections.[https://archive.today/20120713045721/http://news.com.com/Estonia+pulls+off+nationwide+Net+voting/2100-1028_3-5898115.html Estonia pulls off nationwide Net voting], News.com, October 17, 2005 9,317 people voted online (1.9%).

{{reflist}}

• [http://www.vvk.ee/index.php?id=11178 Internet Voting in Estonia: Statistics and Methodology]
• [http://www.coe.int/t/e/integrated_projects/democracy/02_Activities/02_e-voting/00_E-voting_news/FinalReportEvotingEstoniaCoE6_3_06.asp#TopOfPage E-Voting in the 2005 local elections in Estonia] by Fabian Breuer and Alexander H. Trechsel, European University Institute, Report for the Council of Europe
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20100722071804/http://db.e-voting.cc/ee E-Voting Uses in Elections in Estonia] Entry on Estonia in the International E-Voting Database hosted by E-Voting.CC
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20070509150925/http://triinu.net/e-voting/master%20thesis%20e-voting%20security.pdf Practical Security Analysis of E-voting Systems] by Triinu Mägi, a master thesis studying the security of the Estonian e-voting system and Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE)
• [http://www.ega.ee/?id=27240 E-Voting Conference: Lessons learnt and future challenges] Agenda and presentations of the Oct 2006 Tallinn conference, hosted by the [http://www.ega.ee/?lang=en e-Governance Academy] (an Estonian e-governance and e-democracy NGO, organiser of the event)
• [http://www.e-voting.cc/topics/Conference 2nd International Workshop on Electronic Voting 2006] in Bregenz, Austria.
• [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rHIH9ZBFrW0 An interview on YouTube about the trust-aspect of i-voting in Estonia] with Thad Hall from the University of Utah who was observing the elections in Estonia. Skip to 01:30 for the actual interview.
• [https://www.wired.com/news/politics/evote/0,72846-0.html?tw=wn_index_24 "Online Voting Clicks in Estonia"] An article in Wired News on e-voting in Estonia that is also mentioned at the beginning of the interview with Thad Hall.
• [https://tivi.io/tivi/ "Centre of Excellence for Internet Voting"] Based in Estonia, network of engineers that specialise in the implementation of Internet voting in Government elections.

{{DEFAULTSORT:Electronic Voting In Estonia}}

Estonia

Category:Politics of Estonia