Melbourne–Voyager collision#First Royal Commission

{{Short description|1964 collision between two Royal Australian Navy warships in Jervis Bay, Australia}}

{{Infobox

| above = Melbourne–Voyager collision

| abovestyle =

| headerstyle =

| label2 = Date

| data2 = 10 February 1964

| label3 = Place

| data3 = Jervis Bay, Australia

| label4 = Vessels involved

| data4 = {{plainlist|

{{HMAS|Melbourne|R21|6}}
{{HMAS|Voyager|D04|6}}

}}

| label5 = Cause

| data5 = Navigational error resulting in collision

| label6 = Result

| data6 =

Voyager sunk
14 officers, 67 sailors, and 1 civilian aboard Voyager killed
Melbourne damaged

}}

The Melbourne–Voyager collision, also known as the Melbourne–Voyager incident or simply the Voyager incident, was a collision between two warships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN); the aircraft carrier {{HMAS|Melbourne|R21|6}} and the destroyer {{HMAS|Voyager|D04|6}}.

On the evening of 10 February 1964, the two ships were performing manoeuvres off Jervis Bay. Melbourne{{'s}} aircraft were performing flying exercises, and Voyager had been given the task of plane guard, and was positioned behind and to port (left) of the carrier in order to rescue the crew of any ditching or crashing aircraft. After a series of turns effected to reverse the courses of the two ships, Voyager ended up ahead and to starboard (right) of the carrier. The destroyer was ordered to resume plane guard position, which would involve turning to starboard, away from the carrier, then looping around behind. Instead, Voyager began a starboard turn, but then came around to port. The bridge crew on Melbourne correctly assumed that Voyager was zig-zagging to let the carrier overtake her, and would then assume her correct position behind Melbourne. It has been written that Senior personnel on Voyager were not paying attention to the manoeuvre, however recent investigations have shown that an order to take up station had likely been given and that Voyager's officer of the watch was zig-zagging to get into station. Voyager remained parallel to Melbourne until about 1 minute before the collision after which she turned too early to port and collision stations. Her move to port was so sudden that Melbourne gave the alert at about 40 seconds, but by then a collision was inevitable.{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me the HMAS Voyager Tragedy |date=2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publishers |location=Melbourne Vic Australia |isbn=9781922958518 |page=154 |edition=1 |quote="Voyager had become in very few seconds in a dangerous position so I ran into the bridge and ordered "full astern both engines."}}{{cite web |website=National Archives Australia |title=Royal Commission into the Statement of Lt Cdr Cabban |url= http://www.naa.gov.au |access-date= |ref=P 687-688, 5489, 5520-5521, 5842-5849}}

Melbourne struck Voyager at 20:56, with the carrier's bow striking just behind the bridge and cutting the destroyer in two. Of the 314 aboard Voyager, 82 were killed, most of whom died immediately or were trapped in the heavy bow section, which sank after 10 minutes. The rest of the ship sank after midnight. Melbourne, although damaged, suffered no fatalities, and was able to sail to Sydney the next morning with most of the Voyager survivors aboard – the rest had been taken to the naval base {{HMAS|Creswell}}.

The RAN proposed a board of inquiry to investigate the collision, but a series of incidents during the 1950s and 1960s had led to a public mistrust of Navy-run investigations, and as proposals for an inquiry supervised by a federal judge were not acted upon, a full royal commission became the only avenue for an externally supervised inquiry. The four-month Royal Commission, headed by Sir John Spicer,Sir John Spicer was the Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Industrial Court. concluded that Voyager was primarily at fault for failing to maintain effective situational awareness, but also criticised Melbourne{{'s}} captain, John Robertson, and his officers for not alerting the destroyer to the danger they were in. Despite extensive evidence to the contrary, both crews of Melbourne and Voyager were unfairly criticised at this first enquiry and Robertson was posted to a shore base; he resigned soon afterwards. Due to Sir John Spicer's rejection of witness evidence, in 1967 Mr Samuels QC likened Spicer's 1964 {{cite web |last1=Samuels QC |first1=Gordon |title=Royal Commission into the Statement of Lt Cdr Cabban |url=http://www.awm.gov.au |website=AWM179, A22 and A23 |publisher=Australian War Memorial |access-date=June 22, 2023 |ref=P 5842-5849}} report on the collision and royal commission as "a wrongful rejection of evidence leading to a miscarriage of justice." John Jess (MHR 1960-1972) who was one of the few Parliamentarians to speak out against the injustice of the royal commission described the handling of the enquiry and criticism of both crews as "a tragic situation." At the Censure Motion in 1964 in the Parliament he said, "at no time does it appear to me that an apology was ever made to the navy personnel for the treatment to which they have been subjected.{{sfn|McCarthy|2023|pp=21, 49, 91 & 114 |postscript=. "(There) is no evidence to suggest the crews were doing anything other than their jobs correctly on the night of the collision...no blame can realistically be placed on the crews because there is no evidence whatsoever of fault or neglect."}}

Increasing pressure over the results of the first Royal Commission, along with allegations by former Voyager executive officer Peter Cabban that Captain Duncan Stevens was unfit for command, prompted a second Royal Commission in 1967: the only time in Australian history that two Royal Commissions have been held to investigate the same incident. Although Cabban's claims revolved primarily around Stevens' drinking to excess, the second Royal Commission found that Stevens was unfit to command for medical reasons. Consequently, it was argued the findings of the first Royal Commission were based on incorrect assumptions, and Robertson and his officers were not to blame for the collision. Despite this assertion the two crews continued to experience responsibility for the collision based on false assumptions made by John Spicer in the face of legitimate evidence at both royal commissions that the collision was a freak accident, the reason for which had not been determined.{{harvnb|McCarthy|2023|p=91}}: "Justice Spicer's report had far reaching effects and the crews of both Melbourne and Voyager have been assigned responsibility for the collision for the last sixty years."

Ships

File:HMAS Melbourne (R21), HMAS Voyager (D04) and HMAS Vendetta (D08) underway, circa in 1959 (AWM 301014).jpg

= HMAS ''Melbourne'' =

HMAS Melbourne was the lead ship of the Majestic-class of light fleet aircraft carriers.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Melbourne (II)}} She was laid down for the Royal Navy on 15 April 1943 at Vickers-Armstrongs' Naval Construction Yard in Barrow-in-Furness, England, and launched on 28 February 1945.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Melbourne (II)}}{{sfn|Hobbs, HMAS Melbourne (II) – 25 Years On|page=5}} Work was suspended at the end of World War II, and did not resume until the Australian government purchased her and sister ship {{HMAS|Sydney|R17|6}} in 1947.{{sfn|Hobbs, HMAS Melbourne (II) – 25 Years On|page=5}} Melbourne was heavily upgraded to operate jet aircraft, and was only the third aircraft carrier in the world to be constructed with an angled flight deck.{{sfn|Hobbs, HMAS Melbourne (II) – 25 Years On|page=6}} The carrier was commissioned into the RAN on 28 October 1955.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Melbourne (II)}}

The carrier was {{convert|701|ft|5|in}} long, had a displacement of 15,740 tons, and could reach a speed of {{convert|24|kn}}.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Melbourne (II)}} The carrier's air group consisted of de Havilland Sea Venom fighter-bombers, Fairey Gannet anti-submarine aircraft, and Westland Wessex helicopters.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Melbourne (II)}}{{sfn|Hobbs, HMAS Melbourne (II) – 25 Years On|page=6}} Melbourne underwent her annual refit from 16 September 1963 to 20 January 1964, with command handed over to Captain John Robertson in early January.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=8, 10}}

= HMAS ''Voyager'' =

HMAS Voyager was the first of three Australian-built {{sclass|Daring|destroyer (1949)|0}} destroyers.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}} The first all-welded ship built in Australia, Voyager was laid down by Cockatoo Island Dockyard in Sydney on 10 October 1949, launched on 1 May 1952, and commissioned into the RAN on 12 February 1957.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}}

At {{convert|390|ft|m}} in length, Voyager displaced 2,800 tons (standard), and had a maximum speed of {{convert|33|kn|km/h|abbr=on}}.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}} After returning to Australia in August 1963, after a deployment to the Far East Strategic Reserve, Voyager was sent to Williamstown Naval Dockyard for refitting.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}} Captain Duncan Stevens was appointed commanding officer at the end of that year.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}} The refit was completed in late January 1964.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}}

Collision

On 9 February 1964, both ships arrived at Jervis Bay for post-refit trials.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}} During the day of 10 February the ships operated independently, or exercised with the British submarine {{HMS|Tabard|P342|6}}.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}} That evening, while {{convert|20|nmi}} south-east of Jervis Bay, Melbourne was performing night flying exercises, while Voyager was acting as the carrier's plane guard escort; tasked with rescuing the crew from any aircraft that crashed or ditched.{{sfn|Sea Power Centre, HMAS Voyager (II)}}{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=123}} This required Voyager to maintain a position astern of and to port of Melbourne at a distance of {{convert|1500|to|2000|yd|m}}.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=11}} As aircraft carriers head into the wind to provide maximum assistance for takeoffs, their course can vary widely and on short notice; bridge teams aboard escorting destroyers must thus remain alert at all times.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|pages=123–4}}

During the early part of the evening, when both ships were manoeuvring together, Voyager had no difficulty maintaining her position.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=11}} After the series of course changes which began at 20:40, intended to reverse the courses of both ships onto a northerly heading of 020° for flight operations, Voyager ended up ahead and to starboard of Melbourne.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=11}}{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=5}}

At 20:52, Voyager was ordered to resume her plane guard station.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=12}} According to "Melbourne's" ship log the order to resume plane guard, sent as Foxtrot Corpen 020 was sent at 20.54.{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me the HMAS Voyager Tragedy |date=2023 |publisher=Sid Harta |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=21–47 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au}}Voyager acknowledged the order and began turning a minute later.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=23}} It was expected that Voyager would turn away from Melbourne, make a large circle, cross the carrier's stern, then advance towards Melbourne on her port side.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=12}} Voyager did turn to starboard, away from Melbourne, but then unexpectedly turned to port.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=121}} It was initially assumed by Melbourne{{'s}} bridge crew that Voyager was "fishtailing", conducting a series of zig-zag turns to slow the ship before swinging behind Melbourne, but Voyager did not alter course again.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=13}} Recent investigations have demonstrated "Melbourne's" bridge crew correctly interpreted "Voyager's" action as a fishtail manoeuvre.{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me the HMAS Voyager Tragedy |date=2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publishers |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=51–89 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au}}

Due to Justice Spicers report in 1964 it has been written that on Voyager{{'s}} bridge, the officer of the watch and the navigator had become distracted, and Stevens was reading navigational charts, impairing his night vision.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|pages=125–6}} Recent investigations challenge this opinion by providing direct testimony of the three survivors from "Voyager's" bridge who gave evidence at the first royal commission. There was no such distraction; the officer of the watch and navigator on "Voyager" were manoeuvring "Voyager" into position. The officer of the watch remained at the pelorus from the first to the last four signals and was watching "Melbourne" through the entire exercise with his binoculars. Captain Stevens was also seen by one witness to come out from the chart area at 20.54, several minutes before the collision, and was seen to return to his chair or near his chair before suddenly moving and giving the order "full ahead, hard astarboard" 20 seconds before the collision.{{cite news |last1=The Australian |title=Crew knew Cabban was in charge |url=http://www.theaustralian.com.au |date=7 October 1967}}{{sfn|McCarthy|2023|pp=119, 127, 128, 129}}

The port bridge lookout had come on duty while Voyager was turning to starboard, and raised the alarm when the swing back to port brought Melbourne back into view around 20:55.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|pages=125–6}} Melbourne{{'s}} navigation officer ordered the carrier's engines to half speed astern around the same time, which Captain Robertson increased to full astern a few seconds later.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=13}} At the same time, Stevens gave the order "Full ahead both engines. Hard a-starboard," before instructing the destroyer's quartermaster to announce that a collision was imminent.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=13}} Both ships' measures were too late; at 54 seconds from impact, the ships were less than {{convert|600|m}} apart and in extremis –physically unable to alter their speed or course enough to avoid a collision.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=14–15}}{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|pages=126–27}}

Recent investigations have asserted the time of alert for both ships was 40 seconds. Captain Robertson himself was adamant that Voyager appeared to be doing a legitimate manoeuvre by fishtailing to get into station, that the arrival of danger was sudden and irreversible, and that "Melbourne's" bridge crew did not see "Voyager's" port light till 20 seconds before the collision. {{sfn|McCarthy|2023|pp=88, 89, 154, 157}}{{cite web |last1=Samuels QC |first1=Gordon |title=Royal Commission into the Loss of HMAS Voyager |url=http://www.naa.gov.au |website=National Archives Australia |access-date=June 22, 2023 |ref=P 687-688 and 5489, 5870}}

File:HMAS Melbourne damage.jpg

Melbourne struck Voyager at 20:56, with the carrier's bow cutting into the forward superstructure of the destroyer just aft of the bridge and operations room.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=14–15}}{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=127}} The senior officers on the bridge were killed on impact.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|pages=127–8}} The mass of the oncoming carrier rolled Voyager to starboard before cutting the ship in two, with the bow passing down Melbourne{{'s}} port side, and the stern down the starboard.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=1}}{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=128}} Voyager{{'s}} forward boiler exploded, briefly starting a fire in the open wreckage of the carrier's bow before it was extinguished by seawater.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=1}} The destroyer's forward section sank in 10 minutes, due to the weight of the two {{convert|4.5|inch|mm|adj=on}} gun turrets.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=2}} The aft section did not begin sinking until half an hour after the collision, and did not completely submerge until 00:18.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=3–7}} In the messages that were sent immediately to the Fleet Headquarters in Sydney, Robertson underestimated the extent of the damage to Voyager{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=5}} and as a result the Captain Cook Graving Dock at Garden Island was ordered to clear the troopship {{HMAS|Sydney|R17|6}} from the dock to make room for Voyager, and the salvage ship, {{HMAS|Kimbla}}, began sailing south to tow the destroyer to Sydney.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=27}}

Melbourne launched her boats almost immediately after the collision to recover survivors, and the carrier's wardroom and C Hangar were prepared for casualties.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=4}} One cutter was able to rescue 40 people before beginning to take on water. The cutter was commanded by Leading Seaman M. A. W. Riseley, who rescued as many survivors as he could despite the weight limit of the rescue boat.{{sfn|Spicer (1964)|page=33}} The admiral's barge was damaged by debris.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=128}} Eight helicopters were also launched, but it was then deemed too dangerous to have so many active in such a small area, and they were limited to two at a time.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=129}} Most of the sailors in the water were unable or unwilling to be rescued with the helicopters' winches, so the helicopters were reassigned to provide illumination of the site with their landing lights.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=129}} At 21:58, Melbourne was informed that five minesweepers (HMA Ships {{HMAS|Snipe || 2}}, {{HMAS|Teal || 2}}, {{HMAS|Hawk|1961|2}}, {{HMAS|Ibis|M 1183|2}}, and {{HMAS|Curlew || 2}}), two search-and-rescue (SAR) boats from {{HMAS|Creswell || 6}} ({{HMAS|Air Nymph || 2}} and {{HMAS|Air Sprite || 2}}), and helicopters from Naval Air Station Nowra, had been dispatched.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=5–6}}{{sfn|McNicoll, Forgotten saviours}} The destroyer escort {{HMAS|Stuart|DE 48|6}} was also being prepared to sail.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=27}} Arriving just before 22:00, Air Nymph collected 34 survivors and attempted to transfer them to Melbourne, but swells pushed the boat up under the carrier's flight deck and damaged two communications aerials, and the SAR boat was sent back to Creswell to offload the survivors.{{sfn|McNicoll, Forgotten saviours}} Another 36 were recovered by Air Sprite and transported ashore.{{sfn|McNicoll, Forgotten saviours}} Sea searches continued until 12 February, and aircraft made occasional passes over the area until 14 February, looking for bodies.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=31}}

From the 314 personnel aboard Voyager at the time of the collision, 14 officers, 67 sailors, and one civilian dockyard worker were killed, including Stevens and all but two sailors of the bridge crew.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=72}} The majority of those killed had been in the forward section of Voyager when the collision occurred, off duty and relaxing or sleeping.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=25–6}} Only three bodies were recovered, one of them being that of Stevens. They were buried on 14 February, and the missing were declared dead on 17 February.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=33}} Memorial services were held around Australia on 21 February.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=33}} There were no casualties aboard Melbourne.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=27}}

Repairs and replacement

At 03:00, after the Voyager survivors were bedded down and the forward collision bulkheads had been inspected and shored up, Robertson handed command of the search operation to Stuart and began to make for Sydney.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|pages=130–31}} Melbourne was docked at Cockatoo Island Dockyard for repairs to her bow, which were completed by May 1964.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=21}} She remained in service with the RAN until 1982, and was sold for scrap to China in 1985.{{sfn|Hobbs, HMAS Melbourne (II) – 25 Years On|page=9}}

Following the collision, both the United Kingdom and the United States of America offered to lend ships to the RAN as a replacement; the Royal Navy offered Daring class destroyer {{HMS|Duchess|D154|6}}, while the United States Navy offered two {{sclass|Fletcher|destroyer|0}} destroyers: {{USS|The Sullivans|DD-537|6}} and {{USS|Twining|DD-540|6}}.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=21}} Duchess was accepted and modernised, and as she was only intended to be in RAN service for four years (although she was later sold to the RAN and served until 1977), the RAN ordered the construction of two improved {{sclass2|River|destroyer escort|1}}s (British Type 12 frigates), based on the {{sclass|Leander|frigate|2}} design.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=21–22}} {{HMAS|Swan|DE 50|2}} and {{HMAS|Torrens|DE 53|2}} entered service in 1970 and 1971 respectively.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=22}}

Investigations

= First Royal Commission =

Although a naval Board of Inquiry was suggested by senior RAN officers as the best way to investigate the incident, a series of incidents and accidents during the 1950s and early 1960s had left the general public with a mistrust of navy-run investigations, and prime minister Sir Robert Menzies made it clear that an inquiry supervised by a federal judge would be the only acceptable route: anything else would be seen as a cover up.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=43–5}} Regulations for such an externally supervised inquiry were supposed to have been drafted following an explosion aboard {{HMAS|Tarakan|L3017|6}} in 1950, but they were never enacted, so Menzies' only option was to call for a royal commission.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=44–6}} The commission, to be headed by former attorney-general Sir John Spicer, was announced by Menzies on 13 February 1964.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=27}} This commission was directed primarily to investigate the immediate causes of the collision, and the circumstances which led up to it. Secondary considerations included the suitability of both ships for the exercise, and the rescue and treatment of survivors.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=27}} These instructions were prepared without the consultation of the RAN.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=27}} The high number of competing arguments slowed the investigation, and it was not until 25 June that the inquiry was ended and the report begun.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=53–64}} The Spicer Report was released publicly on 26 August 1964.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=67}}

The report had a disjointed narrative and repeatedly failed to cite the relevant evidence.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=68}} Despite the three survivors from "Voyager's" bridge stating the contrary, Spicer concluded that the collision was primarily the fault of Voyager{{'s}} bridge crew, in that they neglected to maintain an effective lookout and lost awareness of the carrier's location, although he did not blame individual officers. Direct evidence from Voyager's tactical officer demonstrated that Voyager's officer of the watch did not neglect his duty at all and was watching Melbourne right up to the collision, but this evidence was rejected by Spicer primarily because "it was rejected by counsel assisting the royal commissioner and has been rejected by the Government ever since." {{sfn|McCarthy|2023|pp=33, 66, 67, 91, 92, 113 & 119 |postscript=. "I saw the officer of the watch looking at Melbourne ...with binoculars. He gave the order full ahead both engines." 2) "In the 4000 pages of transcript there was not a shred of evidence that either Melbourne or Voyager sent a mistaken signal, yet history has set these false notions in concrete."}}{{cite web |last1=Jess CBE |first1=John David |title=Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates |url=http://www.aph.gov.au |website=Australian Parliament |publisher=Australian Government |access-date=June 22, 2023 |ref=15 September 1964}}

When reporting on the contribution of Melbourne and those aboard her to the collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of Robertson and two other bridge officers, as they did not alert Voyager to the danger she was in, and appeared to not take measures to prevent Melbourne from colliding.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=67–8}} Recent investigations demonstrate that Sir John Spicer in his report in 1964 set back "Melbourne's" ship log times by two minutes to make it look like "Melbourne's" bridge crew just stood there watching Voyager come onto a collision course. Captain Robertson maintained "Voyager's" turn into the path of Melbourne was sudden, creating a perilous situation over which he had no control. History however was made by Spicer's report, not by the real evidence given by the naval men who were there.{{sfn|McCarthy|2023|pp=33, 48 & 49; Royal Commission 1967, evidence introduced by Mr Samuels QC |postscript=. "Page 23 of Justice Spicer's report on the first royal commission deliberately dismisses the ships log and tactical operators log from HMAS "Melbourne" and asserts his own signal times...having manipulated witness evidence Spicer then blamed Captain Robertson for not warning "Voyager."}}

Robertson was marked for transfer to {{HMAS|Watson || 6}}, a training base in Sydney, {{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=78}} Robertson submitted his resignation from the Navy on 10 September 1964, two days after receiving official notice of his new posting, which he saw as a demotion.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=78–9, 82}} The media and the general public considered that Robertson had been made a scapegoat for the incident.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=82}}The people and the Parliament were sceptical that a proper investigation had been undertaken. {{sfn|McCarthy|2023|p=61 |postscript=. "A decision was taken that a substantial criticism would be made of Captain Robertson before one single word of evidence had been given at the royal commission."}}

= Second Royal Commission =

Over the next few years there was increasing pressure from the public, the media, and politicians of the government and opposition over the handling of the first Royal Commission, as well as claims made by Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, the former executive officer of Voyager, that Captain Stevens frequently drank to excess and was unfit for command.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=88}}{{sfn|Cooper, The Era of Forward Defence|page=202}} On 18 May 1967, Prime minister Harold Holt announced a second Royal Commission into the Melbourne-Voyager collision, with Sir Stanley Burbury,Sir Stanley Burbury was the Chief Justice of Tasmania. The Hon. Mr Justice Kenneth Asprey,The Hon. Mr Justice Kenneth Asprey was a judge of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. and the Hon. Mr Justice Geoffrey Lucas,The Hon. Mr Justice Geoffrey Lucas was a judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland. as presiding commissioners investigating the claims made by Cabban.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=114–5}} It was the only time in Australian history that two Royal Commissions have been held on the same incident, although it was emphasised that the second enquiry was to focus on Cabban's allegations, not the accident itself.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=117}} The commission opened on 13 June 1967, and hearings commenced on 18 July.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=117–8}}

The commission looked at the proposition that Stevens was unfit for command on the evening of the incident due to illness (a duodenal ulcer), drunkenness or a combination of the two, and that the description of the collision in Spicer's report and the conclusions drawn from it were inconsistent with events.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=144-5}}{{sfn|Donnelly, Political fallout for years after tragedy of Voyager}} Stevens' ulcer had previously hospitalised him, and he had concealed its recurrence from the RAN.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=12}} There was evidence that Stevens had been served a triple brandy earlier in the night, and a post-mortem conducted on Stevens' body showed a blood alcohol level of 0.025%, though the significance of this figure was challenged by expert witnesses.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=12}}{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=256}} The hearings lasted 85 days, and the Burbury Report was released publicly on 25 February 1968.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=149, 157}} It found that Stevens was medically unfit for command, although not impaired by alcohol at the time of the collision.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=12}}{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=159–60}} Consequently, some of the findings of the first commission— those based on the assumption that Voyager was under appropriate command—required reevaluation.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=12}}{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|pages=159–60}} Robertson and the other officers of Melbourne were absolved of blame for the incident.{{sfn|Frame, The Cruel Legacy|page=160}} However, for the last 60 years, both crews were attributed responsibility for the collision in general by most media and general reports, repeating Spicer's unjust conclusions from the first enquiry.{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me the HMAS Voyager Tragedy |date=2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publishers |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=215–216 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au}}

= Additional evidence =

On condition of anonymity, a doctor informed the first Royal Commission that he had been confidentially prescribing amphetamine to Captain Stevens prior to the collision.{{sfn|Chipp & Larkin, The Third Man}} {{Page needed|date=March 2012}} This was a legal drug at the time and was carried in RAN ships' medical lockers.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=265–6}} Navy Minister Don Chipp suggested this as an explanation for the contradictory impressions created in the minds of witnesses who reported on Captain Stevens' apparent state of health and demeanour prior to the collision. This evidence was only made public after both enquiries were completed.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=265}}

Analysis

The most recent investigation in 2023 into the collision demonstrates the crews of both ships did their jobs correctly on the night of the collision. The three survivors on "Voyager's" bridge, who gave substantial evidence at both enquiries as well as the testimony of "Melbourne's bridge crew has narrowed the cause of the collision down to the impact "Melbourne's" new flying lights had on "Voyager's" bridge crew.

The cause of the collision had not been previously determined because the collision had not been investigated by experienced naval men at a board of enquiry. {{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=5}}{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=310}}{{sfn|McCarthy|2023|p=92 |postscript=. "Spicer's 1964 report set up the false charge that the bridge crews of "Melbourne" and "Voyager" were not watching each other leading up to the collision. It is one of the greatest untruths perpetrated by the history of the "Voyager" disaster."}}

Prior to 2023, and in the immediate aftermath of the collision, five possible causes were put forward:{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=x–ix, 310}}

communications between the two vessels did not reflect the ships' intentions,
those aboard Voyager had an incorrect idea of where they were in relation to Melbourne,
the sea room required for the destroyer to manoeuvre was miscalculated,
the level of training aboard one or both ships was deficient, or
an equipment failure occurred aboard one or both ships.

The equipment failure, inadequate training, and miscalculated sea room theories were disproven by the two Royal Commissions, leaving the suggestion that either a communication error aboard one of the ships caused Voyager to manoeuvre in an undesired manner, or the officers aboard Voyager were incorrectly aware of their vessel's position in relation to the much larger aircraft carrier.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=310}}

Naval historian and ex-RAN officer Tom Frame, who studied the collision for his doctoral thesis, believes that the main cause of the collision was an error in communications: specifically that the instruction to turn to 020° and then assume the plane guard station was garbled on receipt by Voyager.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=310–11}} The signal was "Foxtrot Corpen 020 22", meaning that Melbourne was about to commence flying operations on a heading of 020°, at a speed of {{convert|22|kn}}, and that Voyager was to{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=5}}{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=310}} assume the plane guard station.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=313–21}}{{sfn|Oxenbould, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager|page=106}} While the first Royal Commission considered the likelihood that the code phrase "foxtrot corpen" was reversed to become "corpen foxtrot" (an order to turn onto the given course), Frame states that it was more likely that the numbers given for the course were misheard or confused with other numbers in the signal as a turn to the south-west (various possibilities offered by Frame would have indicated a turn to the south-west instead of the north-east, with an incorrect heading between 200° and 220°, or of 270°), or that this happened in conjunction with the code phrase error.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=313–21}}{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=7}} Former RAN Commodore David Ferry disagrees with Frame's conclusions, claiming that the coincidence of two errors in the same signal was unlikely, and that either error would be sufficient cause for Stevens or the other officers to query the signal.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=8}} The most recent investigation into the collision sides with Ferry and sets out all of the signals sent by "Melbourne" to "Voyager" given in evidence at the first enquiry. This clearly demonstrated there was no signal error; Voyager's signalman himself stated that he had no doubt the final signal he received and passed to "Voyager's" officer of the watch was foxtrot corpen 020.{{sfn|McCarthy|2023|p=46 |postscript=. "Justice Spicer asked Evans if he had any doubt about the message he received. Was it foxtrot corpen or corpen foxtrot? To which Evans replied 'it was foxtrot corpen.' "}}

The idea that those aboard Voyager incorrectly assessed their position in relation to the carrier was suggested by Robertson during the first commission: he suggested that Stevens and the others aboard the destroyer may have believed that they were on Melbourne{{'s}} port bow.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|pages=310–13}} However, in his notes written at the commission, Captain Robertson stated there were no witnesses on either ship claiming to see "Voyager" on "Melbourne's" port bow before the collision. The latest study of the collision sets out the evidence given by both ship's crews in relation to the port bow theory; no witness saw Voyager on "Melbourne's port bow."{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me |date=17 October 2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publishers |location=Melbourne Vic Australia |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=98–102 |edition=1 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au |ref="Melbourne's" Cdr Jude: 'we steadied up on 020, she was definitely on our starboard bow. "Voyager's" Mechanical Engineer Andrew Clarke "we ended up on "Melbourne's" starboard side."}}

MELBOURNE'S" NEW RED FLYING LIGHTS: THE FINAL ANALYSIS

With "Voyager" on "Melbourne's starboard bow, "Voyager's" bridge crew would have seen "Melbourne's" green navigation light. However, "Melbourne" also had on her mast, new red floodlights on, which were there to assist the landing of the planes on "Melbourne." The pilot in one of the gannet's doing touchdowns on "Melbourne" stated that the new lights (which faced to port) were lighting up the cockpit in his plane. Captain Robertson asked a naval man to go forward and adjust the red light. After this was done, the red lights were facing in a starboard direction and being higher on the mast, overshot "Melbourne's" green navigation light. As "Voyager" was doing her fishtail to get into position to go astern of "Melbourne", the officer of the watch likely saw this red light and turned "Voyager" to port too early, leading to collision stations.{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me |date=17 October 2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publishers |location=Melbourne Vic Australia |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=130–139 |edition=1 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au}}

The second Royal Commission felt that this, combined with the ill health of Stevens, was the more likely cause of the collision.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=5}} Frame states that for this theory to be plausible, the entire bridge crew had to lose the tactical picture at the same time, which he considered to be too improbable.{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=312}} Ferry is also of the opinion that, unless Melbourne was both in Voyager{{'s}} radar blind spot and obscured by exhaust from the destroyer, it was unlikely that the bridge crew would think they were not to starboard of the carrier.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|pages=9–10}}

The recent study in 2023 asserts that Captain Stevens on "Voyager" had already instructed "Voyager's" officer of the watch to fishtail "Voyager" into position on "Melbourne's port quarter. It is therefore likely that "Melbourne's" red light was not seen by all of "Voyager's" bridge crew, as the captain had been in the chart area, and was standing outside that area just before the collision.{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me |date=17 October 2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publishers |location=Melbourne Vic Australia |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=117–129 |edition=1 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au}}

Ferry favours the opinion that Voyager misjudged the manoeuvring room she had.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|pages=10–12}} He claims that the destroyer knew where she was in relation to Melbourne and that the turn to starboard then reversal to port was intended to be a "fishtail" manoeuvre. Voyager was to swing out wide of the carrier, then turn back towards her, cross the stern and assume her position without having to do a loop.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|pages=10–12}} However, insufficient time was allowed for Voyager to get clear of Melbourne before turning back to port, so instead of passing behind Melbourne, the destroyer passed in front.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=11}} Ferry's theory eliminates the need for a double error in the communications signals, and the need for all on the destroyer's bridge to have such a vastly incorrect assumption of where Voyager was in relation to the carrier.{{sfn|Ferry, What caused the Voyager collision?|page=12}} In 2014 he wrote a summary of the theories, the suitability of Royal Commissions for this type of investigation and related experience from the later HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E. Evans collision.{{Cite journal|last=Ferry|first=D S|title=HMAS Melbournen/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E Evans collision)|url=https://navalinstitute.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/headmark-151.pdf|journal=Headmark|volume=March, 2014 Issue 151|pages= 2–17}}

The recent investigation in 2023 agrees with Ferry and devotes one whole chapter to "Voyager's" fishtail manoeuvre that she was doing just before the collision.{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me |date=17 October 2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publisher's |location=Melbourne Vic Australia |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=51–71 |edition=1 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au}}

In the 2015 study of the Parliamentary debate's on the "Voyager" collision , it is asserted that the crew of HMAS Voyager and HMAS Melbourne did their jobs correctly and did not make an error on the night of the collision. The crew of the Voyager were in fact watching Melbourne and did receive and pass on the signals correctly. The accident, re-examined in 2023 sets out in detail the argument that "Melbourne's" new red flying lights, which had been altered to a starboard direction, overshot "Melbourne's" green navigation light, causing "Voyagers'" officer of the watch to turn to early. Mr Murphy, representing the navy at the second enquiry rightly points out that this was an honest mistake. For the last 60 years the crews of both ships have been blamed unfairly for the tragedy. Looking at the overall picture, one has to acknowledge that those above Captain Robertson and Captain Stevens, in the Admiralty, who had planned the exercise in the first place, had failed to ensure the exercise was safe. "Melbourne's" lights should have been tested before any ship joined the "Melbourne". The treatment of the naval personnel at the first royal commission was described by John Jess, (MHR 1960-1972) as "The greatest injustice carried out in Australian service history."{{cite book |last=McCarthy |first=Elizabeth |year=2015 |title=John Jess Seeker of Justice the Role of the Parliament in the HMAS Voyager Tragedy |publisher=Sid Harta |location=Melbourne |isbn=978-1-925230-88-8|pages=130–139}}{{cite book |last1=McCarthy (nee Jess) |first1=Elizabeth |title=Abide With Me the HMAS Voyager Tragedy |date=2023 |publisher=Sid Harta Publishers |isbn=9781922958518 |pages=130–138 |url=http://www.sidharta.com.au}}

Aftermath

File:Court of Remembrance at the Voyager Memorial Park in November 2020.jpg]]

= Awards and honours =

Chief Petty Officer Jonathan Rogers was posthumously awarded the George Cross for his actions during the sinking.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=129}} Recognising that he was too large to fit through the escape hatch, he organised the evacuation of those who could escape, then led those stuck in the compartment in prayers and hymns as they died.{{sfn|Hall, HMAS Melbourne|page=129}}

William Joseph CONDON Electrical Mechanic Warfare was awarded the Albert Medal posthumously, for choosing to stay in the cafeteria and save the lives of young Naval trainee sailors, alongside CPO Rogers, who was unable to escape.

Posthumous Albert Medals for Lifesaving were awarded to Midshipman Kerry Marien and Electrical Mechanic William Condon for their actions in saving other Voyager personnel at the cost of their own lives.{{sfn|Cooper, The Era of Forward Defence|page=201}}{{London Gazette |issue=43604 |date=19 March 1965 |page=2797 }} The awards were listed in the 19 March 1965 issue of the London Gazette, along with one George Medal, five British Empire Medals for Gallantry, and three Queen's Commendations for Brave Conduct for Voyager personnel.

On 4 December 2015, it was announced that the support centre for the Canberra-class amphibious assault ships would be named after Robertson.{{cite news |url=http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/news/national/formal-apology-long-overdue-for-navy-hero-captain-john-robertson/story-fni6ulvf-1227632910033 |title=Formal apology long overdue for navy hero Captain John Robertson |last=McPhedran |first=Ian |author-link=Ian McPhedran |date=4 December 2014 |work=The Advertiser |access-date=7 December 2015}} Robertson's family and the RSL have called for a formal apology from the Australian government instead, but several government figures have stated that the naming of the centre is a "fitting acknowledgement" of Robertson's career.

= Changes to RAN procedures =

Following the investigation, changes were made within the RAN to prevent a similar occurrence.{{sfn|Oxenbould, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager|page=109}} Procedures were created for challenging another ship that was seen to be manoeuvring dangerously, or which had transmitted an unclear manoeuvring signal,{{sfn|Oxenbould, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager|page=109}} and rules for escort vessels operating with Melbourne were compiled. Among other instructions, these rules banned escorts from approaching within {{convert|2000|yd|m}} of the carrier unless specifically instructed to, and stated that any manoeuvre around Melbourne was to commence with a turn away from the carrier. The new rules were applied to all ships scheduled to sail in concert with the carrier, including those of foreign navies.{{sfn|Oxenbould, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager|page=109}}{{sfn|Frame, Where Fate Calls|page=331}}

= Compensation claims =

Families of those killed in the sinking of Voyager attempted to claim compensation for their losses, while survivors tried to make claims for post-traumatic stress and similar ailments.{{sfn|Berkovic, Lawyers still battling over Voyager}} A 1965 High Court ruling prevented armed-forces personnel from suing the government for compensation, although the wife of the dockyard worker killed in the collision was able to make a successful claim.{{sfn|Ackland, Voyager survivors' compensation all at sea}}{{cite AustLII|HCA|12|1965||litigants=Parker v Commonwealth |parallelcite=(1965) 112 CLR 295 at pp 301–2 |courtname=High Court}} The ruling was overturned in 1982.{{sfn|Ackland, Voyager survivors' compensation all at sea}}{{cite AustLII|HCA|21|1982||litigants=Groves v Commonwealth |parallelcite=(1982) 150 CLR 113 at pp 118–9, 133–4, 136, 137 |courtname=High Court}} Cases for compensation were lodged by Voyager survivors and their families, and during the 1990s, sailors from Melbourne began to make similar legal claims.{{sfn|Ackland, Voyager survivors' compensation all at sea}}{{sfn|Freckelton, HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager|page=368}}{{cite AustLII|HCA|39|1990|litigants=Commonwealth v Verwayen (Voyager case) |parallelcite=(1990) 170 CLR 394 |courtname=High Court}}.

Both groups were met with heavy legal opposition from the Australian government, with Commonwealth representatives contending that those making claims were opportunistically trying to blame a single incident for a range of life problems and had fabricated or embellished their symptoms, or were otherwise making not credible claims.{{sfn|Berkovic, Lawyers still battling over Voyager}}{{sfn|Freckelton, HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager|pages=368–9, 372}} In 2007 Peter Covington-Thomas was awarded $2 million in compensation.{{cite AustLII|NSWSC|779|2007|litigants=Covington-Thomas v Commonwealth of Australia |courtname=Supreme Court (NSW)}}.{{cite news |title=Long fight for Voyager survivors |url=https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/long-fight-for-voyager-survivors/news-story/becb374a29d702ee7b97f8d83b22f36d |access-date=3 November 2018 |newspaper=The Australian}} By May 2008, 35 cases were still ongoing, two from dependants of Voyager sailors killed in the collision, the remainder from Melbourne sailors.{{sfn|Berkovic, Lawyers still battling over Voyager}} A further 50 cases had been closed in 2007 following mediation.{{sfn|Berkovic, Lawyers still battling over Voyager}} A further group of 214 compensation cases related to the incident was closed in July 2009.{{sfn|Strong, Last HMAS Voyager claim settled, 45 years on}} Some cases had been open for more than ten years, costing the government millions of dollars a year in legal costs.{{sfn|Berkovic, Lawyers still battling over Voyager}}

In 2008, the handling of some Voyager survivors' cases was investigated by the Law Institute of Victoria, after they made complaints about the discrepancies between what they were awarded and what was received: for example, one sailor only received $72,000 from a $412,000 settlement.{{sfn|Petrie, Voyager solicitor 'overbilled millions}} All of the complaints were from cases handled by David Forster of Hollows Lawyers, who handled 89 of the 214 total cases; these resulted in a total settlement of $23 million.{{sfn|Ackland, Voyager survivors' compensation all at sea}}{{sfn|Petrie, Voyager solicitor 'overbilled millions}} Investigations found major accounting issues, including apparent double-charging for work done, and charging full fees after they were discounted or completely written off.{{sfn|Ackland, Voyager survivors' compensation all at sea}}{{sfn|Petrie, Voyager solicitor 'overbilled millions}} In 2010, receivers were called in; this was followed by the cancellation of Forster's law practising certificate in December 2011.{{sfn|Ackland, Voyager survivors' compensation all at sea}}{{sfn|Petrie, Voyager solicitor 'overbilled millions}} In 2014 the High Court dismissed Forster's challenges to the appointment of receivers,{{cite AustLII|HCASL|4|2014|litigants=Forster v Legal Services Board}}. and the refusal to issue him with a practising certificate.{{cite AustLII|HCASL|20|2014|litigants=Forster v Legal Services Board}}. In 2017 the Supreme Court of Victoria authorised the distribution of $1.8 million to Forster's former clients.{{cite AustLII|VSC|279|2017|litigants=Legal Services Board v Forster |courtname=Supreme Court (Vic)}}.{{cite news |title=Legal wrangle following Melbourne-Voyager disaster finally over for Bendigo woman |url=https://www.bendigoadvertiser.com.au/story/4835035/long-road-to-justice/ |access-date=4 November 2018 |newspaper=Bendigo Advertiser |first=William |last=Vallely|date=4 August 2017}}

Notes

References

;Royal Commission reports

{{Cite report

| author = Spicer, Sir John Armstrong

| date = 1964

| title = Report of Royal Commissioner on loss of H.M.A.S. "Voyager"

| url = https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/46252538

| publisher = A.J. Arthur, Commonwealth Govt. Printer

| location = Melbourne

| access-date = 2 February 2018

| ref=CITEREFSpicer (1964)

}}

{{Cite news

| author1 = Burbury

| author2 = Asprey

| author3 = Lucas

| name-list-style = amp

| date = 1 March 1968

| volume = 11

| issue = 5

| work = Navy News

| title = Royal Commissioners' Report on Voyager Inquiry

| url = http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Navy_News-March-1-1968.pdf

| publisher = Cumberland Newspapers Pty Ltd

| location = Parramatta