Oil campaign of World War II

The British had identified the importance of Germany's fuel supplies before the war in their "Western Air Plan 5(c)".Hastings, 2013{{rp|56}} The focus of British bombing during 1940 changed repeatedly in response to directives from the Air Ministry. At the start of June, oil targets were made a priority of night bombing with attacks on other war industry to be made on dark nights (when the oil targets could not be located) but with the proviso that "indiscriminate action" should be avoided. On 20 June oil targets were made third priority below the German aircraft industry and lines of communication between Germany and the armies at the front. Following a brief period when German shipping was given priority, oil targets were made secondary priority in mid July under a policy of concentrated attack with five oil refineries listed for attention.{{rp|56–57}} Sir Charles Portal was sceptical of the likelihood of success, saying that only a few targets could be located by average crews under moonlit conditions.

The RAF viewed Axis oil as a "vital centre",{{cite book |last=Tedder |first=Arthur |author-link=Arthur Tedder, 1st Baron Tedder |year=1966 |title=With Prejudice |location=Boston |publisher=Little, Brown & Company |page=502}} and in February 1941, the British Air Staff expected that RAF Bomber Command would, by destruction of half of a list of 17 targets, reduce Axis oil production capacity by 80%.{{cite web

|title=Campaign Diary

|url=http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary.html

|work=Royal Air Force Bomber Command 60th Anniversary

|publisher=UK Crown

|access-date=2009-03-22

|url-status=dead

|archive-url=http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070706011932/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/jul44.html

|archive-date=6 July 2007

}}: [http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary_france.html May–June 1940 (Battle of France)] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081207002424/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary_france.html |date=7 December 2008 }},

[http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1941_1.html January–April 1941] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121011155524/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1941_1.html |date=11 October 2012 }},

[http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1941_2.html May–August 1941] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090303223416/http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary1941_2.html |date=3 March 2009 }}

{{See also|Western Allied campaign in Romania}}

Although the Butt Report of August 1941 identified the poor accuracy and performance of RAF bombing at the time,{{rp|70–71}} Air Chief Marshal Charles Portal maintained at the 1943 Casablanca Conference the great importance of oil targets in Axis territory.{{cite book |last=US Secretary |date=January 1943 |title=Casablanca Conference: Papers and Minutes of Meetings |url=https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p4013coll8/id/3688/ |location=Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library; Combined Chiefs of Staff: Conference proceedings, 1941–1945; Box 1 |publisher=Office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff |pages=40–43, 88, 255–256 }} The first US bombing of a European target was of the Ploiești refineries in Romania on 12 June 1942 and the oil campaign continued at a lower priority until 1944. Priority fell with the need for attacks on German V-weapon targets ("Operation Crossbow") in France and then the attacks on lines of communication in preparation for the invasion of France (described as the "Transportation Plan").

File:Ploiesti 1943 bombardament.jpg in Romania burning after the raid of B-24 Liberator bombers in Operation Tidal Wave]]

In March 1944 the "Plan for Completion of Combined Bomber Offensive" was put forward which found favour with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. The plan proposed attacking "fourteen synthetic plants [of Brabag ] and thirteen refineries" of Nazi Germany.{{Citation |last=Williamson |first=Charles C. |author2=Hughes, R. D. |author3=Cabell, C. P. |author4=Nazarro, J. J. |author5=Bender, F. P. |author6= Crigglesworth, W. J. |date=5 March 1944 |title=Plan for Completion of Combined Bomber Offensive |location=Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library: Smith, Walter Bedell: Collection of World War II Documents, 1941–1945; Box No.: 48 |publisher=HQ, U.S.S.T.A.F }}{{Citation |last=Spaatz |first=Carl |author-link=Carl Spaatz |date=5 March 1944 |title=[memo to Eisenhower for the] Plan for Completion of Combined Bomber Offensive |publisher=Office of the Commanding General, HQ U.S.S.T.A.F }}{{Citation |last=Turner |first=Mark |date=6 March 1944 |title=letter ("Dear General Curtis") |location=Lansdowne House, Berkeley Square W. 1. |publisher= Ministry of Economic Warfare }} (in same folder of Box 48){{Citation|last=Turner |first=Smith D. |date=6 March 1944 |title=letter ("Dear General Curtis") |location=American Embassy, Mission for Economic Affairs, 1 Grosvenor Square, London, W. 1. |publisher=The Foreign Service of the United States of America }} (in same folder of Box 48) The plan estimated Axis oil production could be reduced by 50% by bombing—33% below the amount Nazi Germany needed{{cite book |last=Eisenhower |first=David |author-link=David Eisenhower |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ypmKPwAACAAJ |year=1991 |orig-year=1986 |title=Eisenhower: At War 1943–1945 |location=New York |publisher=Wings Books |pages=184–189 |isbn=0-517-06501-0 }}—but also included 4 additional priorities: first oil, then fighter and ball bearing production, rubber production, and bomber output. The damage caused by the 12 and 28 May{{cite web |last=D'Olier |first=Franklin |author2=Alexander |author3=Ball |author4=Bowman |author5=Galbraith |author6=Likert |author7=McNamee |author8=Nitze |author9=Russell |author10=Searls |author11=Wright |date=30 September 1945 |title=The Attack on Oil |url=http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto |access-date=2009-02-10 |work=The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War) |publisher=Air University Press |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040727153254/http://www.usaaf.net/surveys/eto/ |archive-date=27 July 2004 }} trial bombings of oil targets, as well as the confirmation of the oil facilities' importance and vulnerability from Ultra intercepts and other intelligence reports, would result in the oil targets becoming the highest priority on 3 September 1944.{{cite book |last1=Kreis |first1=John F. |last2=Cochran Jr |first2=Alexander S. |last3=Ehrhart |first3= Robert C. |last4=Fabyanic |first4= Thomas A. |last5=Futrell |first5= Robert F. |last6=Williamson |first6= Murray |year=1996 |title=Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rf_7ioBSUCgC&pg=PA241 |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Air Force Historical Studies Office |id=Accession Number: [https://web.archive.org/web/20110717061856/http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA442835 ADA442835] |page=241 |access-date=2008-11-28 |isbn=978-1-4289-1405-6}}

In June 1944, in response to Air Ministry query on resources, Bomber Command staff estimated it would take 32,000 tons of bombs to destroy 10 oil targets in the Ruhr. Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris agreed to divert spare effort to oil targets. They were deemed to be of such importance that one raid was staged that consisted only of bomb carrying fighters, to rest the bomber crews and surprise the defenders.{{rp|246–247}}

In late summer 1944 the Allies began using reconnaissance photo information to time bombing with the resumption of production at a facility. Even with the weather limitations: "This was the big breakthrough ... a plant would be wounded ... by successive attacks on its electrical grid—its nervous system—and on its gas and water mains." (author Donald Miller).Miller 2006{{Rp|320}} However, due to bad fall and winter weather, a "far greater tonnage" was expended on Transportation Plan targets than oil targets.{{cite book |last=Mets |first=David R. |edition=paperback|year=1988 |title=Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=k2aRUSysuUQC&pg=PT357 |pages=357 |publisher=Random House Publishing |isbn=9780307538222 }} The benzol (oil) plant at Linz in Austria was bombed on 16 October 1944.{{cite book|first=Samuel W. |last=Mitcham|author-link=Samuel W. Mitcham|title=Eagles of the Third Reich |year=2007 |publisher=Stackpole |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_HkHU5RJJekC&pg=PA26 |page=261 |isbn=9780811734059 |access-date=2017-01-04}}

In January 1945, the priority of oil targets was lowered.

To prevent oil supplies from Romania reaching Germany, the RAF had extended its aerial mining activities to the Danube.

Despite the RAF and Harris claims regarding the great importance of oil targets, Harris had opposed assigning the highest priority to oil targets{{cite book |last=Thompson |year=1956 |first=H.L. |chapter=14. Bomber Command and the Battle of Germany |title=NEW ZEALANDERS WITH THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (VOL. II) |url=https://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-2RAF-c14.html |series=The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939–1945 |page=391 |access-date=2009-03-26}} but acknowledged post-war that the campaign was "a complete success" with the qualifier: "I still do not think that it was reasonable, at that time, to expect that the [oil] campaign would succeed; what the Allied strategists did was to bet on an outsider, and it happened to win the race."{{Rp|311}}{{cite book |last=Taylor |first=Frederick |author-link=Frederick Taylor (historian) |year=2005 |orig-year=2004 |edition=HarperCollins |title=Dresden, Tuesday, February 13, 1945 |url=https://archive.org/details/unset0000unse_b8e7 |url-access=registration |location=London |publisher=Bloomsbury |isbn=0-7475-7084-1 |page=[https://archive.org/details/unset0000unse_b8e7/page/202 202]}}

Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1067 prohibited German post-war production of oil through July 1947, and the United States Army made post-war provisions to rehabilitate and use petroleum installations where needed, as well as to dispose of unneeded captured equipment.{{Citation |title=Quartermaster POL Plan for Continental Operation |last=Office of the Chief Quartermaster |first=U.S. Army European Theater of Operations |location=[document located at:] United States Army Center of Military History }} After inspections of various plants by the "European technology mission" (Plan for Examination of Oil Industry of Axis Europe){{cite web|date=10 February 1945|title=tbd|url=http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%20Reels/Linked/B1870/B1870-0073-0208%20Item%204.pdf|access-date=2009-03-22|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080821144535/http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Tom%20Reels/Linked/B1870/B1870-0073-0208%20Item%204.pdf|archive-date=21 August 2008}} and a report in March 1946, the United States Bureau of Mines{{cite web |title=Report on Investigations by Fuels and Lubricants Teams at the I.G. Farbenindustrie, A. G., Works, Ludwigshafen and Oppau |first=W. C. |last=Schroeder |date=August 1946 |url=http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Bureau_of_Mines/info_circ/ic_7375/ic_7375.htm |publisher=US Bureau of Mines, Office of Synthetic Liquid Fuels |access-date=2009-03-21 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071108041008/http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/Bureau_of_Mines/info_circ/ic_7375/ic_7375.htm |archive-date=2007-11-08 }} employed seven Operation Paperclip synthetic fuel scientists in a Fischer–Tropsch chemical plant in Louisiana, Missouri.{{cite web |title=German Synthetic Fuels Scientists |work=Primary Documents – Presentations "Fischer–Tropsch Process and Product Development During World War II – 2001" |url=http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/presentations/ft_ww2/ft_ww2_slide33.htm |author=Schubert, Paul |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924013714/http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/presentations/ft_ww2/ft_ww2_slide33.htm |archive-date=2015-09-24 }} In October 1975, Texas A&M University began the German Document Retrieval Project and completed a report on 28 April 1977. The report identified final investigations of the German plants and interrogations of German scientists by the British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, the US Field Information Agency (Technical), and the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee.{{cite web | title = Department of Energy | url = http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/DOE/germ_doc_ret_proj/germ_doc_toc.htm | date = 20 September 1977 | access-date = 2015-02-06}}

Despite its successes, by the spring of 1944 the Combined Bomber Offensive had failed to dislocate the German economy or inflict severe disruptions in the production of vital items; the oil campaign missions were the first targeted attacks to accomplish these goals.{{cite book | title=The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945 | publisher=Praeger | author=Levine, Alan J. | year=1992 | location=Westport, Connecticut | pages=143 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UdioX_F5OIwC&pg=PA143 | isbn=0-275-94319-4}} The US strategic bombing survey (USSBS) identified "catastrophic" damage. German industry in and of itself was not significantly affected by attacks on oil targets, as coal was its primary source of energy, but in its analysis of strategic bombing as a whole the USSBS identified the consequences of the breakdown of transportation resulting from attacks against transportation targets as "probably greater than any other single factor" in the final collapse of the German economy.{{rp|159}}

Several prominent German military officers, however, described the oil campaign as critical to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Adolf Galland,{{Efn|Inspector of Fighters of the Luftwaffe until relieved of command in January 1945}} wrote in his book "the most important of the combined factors which brought about the collapse of Germany",{{cite book |last=Galland |first=Adolf |author-link=Adolf Galland |year=1968 |title=The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces, 1938–1945 |location=New York |publisher=Ballantine Books |pages=239 |orig-year=1954}} and the Luftwaffe's wartime leader, Hermann Göring, described it as "the utmost in deadliness".{{Rp|287}}

Albert Speer, writing in his memoir, said that "It meant the end of German armaments production."{{cite book |last=Speer |first=Albert |author-link=Albert Speer |date=1970 |others=Translated by Richard and Clara Winston |title=Inside the Third Reich |publisher=Macmillan |location=New York and Toronto |isbn=978-0-684-82949-4 |lccn=70119132 |url=https://archive.org/details/insidethirdreich00albe }}{{Rp|412–4}}

It has been stated to have been "effective immediately, and decisive within less than a year".{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AC1GlWYTe3EC&pg=PA205 |page=205 |title=Operations analysis in the U.S. Army Eighth Air Force in World War II |isbn=9780821801581 |last1=McArthur |first1=Charles W. |year=1990 |publisher=American Mathematical Soc. }} Luftwaffe Field Marshal Erhard Milch, referring to the consequences of the oil campaign, claimed that "The British left us with deep and bleeding wounds, but the Americans stabbed us in the heart."{{cite book |last=Henderson |first=Horace Edward |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8-ZmVU_iRcgC&pg=PA213 |title=The Greatest Blunders of World War II: How Errors Mistakes and Blunders Determined Victory or Defeat |date=August 2001 |publisher=iUniverse |isbn=9780595162673 |page= |pages=213}}

The following statistics are from the British Bombing Survey Unit. Figures are for the oil campaign in the last year of the war.Hall 2005{{rp|158}}

Number of attacks by the RAF and USAAF against oil targets:

Short tons dropped on oil targets:

The efficiency of the bombing was lacking. Working from German records for certain sites, the USSBS determined that on average 87% of Allied bombs fell outside the factory perimeter and that only a few percent struck plant or equipment inside the boundary. The USAAF could put 26% of their bombing within the factories in good bombing conditions, 12% when using a mix of visual and instruments but only 5% when it had to use instrument-only bombing techniques; and 80% of their tonnage was delivered under partly or fully instrument conditions. The RAF bombing by night with Pathfinder techniques averaged 16% inside the factory.

Bomber Command's efforts against oil were more efficient in some regards – although delivering a smaller total tonnage than the USAAF 8th and 15th Air Forces together, it delivered more tonnage in fewer attacks than the 8th AF which was also operating from bases in eastern England.Hall 1998 p157 The USSBS believed that Bomber Command's heavy bombs{{snd}}{{convert|4000|lb|kg|adj=on}} Blockbuster bombs{{snd}}were more effective than an equivalent weight of smaller bombs. Both RAF and USAAF dropped a large number of bombs on oil targets that failed to explode: 19% and 12% respectively.{{rp|158–159}}

• Oil campaign chronology of World War II
• Oil campaign targets of World War II
• Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran (August–September 1941) to secure access to Persian oil
• Dutch East Indies campaign (1941–1942) Japan operation to secure oil and rubber resources
• Case Blue and Operation Edelweiss - by Germany in the summer of 1942
• Battle of Romania in August 1944, which deprived the Axis of Romanian oil fields
• Chaco War - A major conflict fought on the assumption that the Chaco region could be a rich source of oil
• Operation Tidal Wave II - USAF air campaign aimed at disrupt Islamic State oil production and transport capabilities

{{notelist}}

{{Reflist}}

• {{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gxp6RAAACAAJ |author-link=Ray Bowden |first=Ray |last=Bowden |title=Merseburg: Blood, Flak & Oil: The 8th Air Force Missions |year=2008 |publisher=Design Oracle |isbn=978-1-898575-04-7}}
• {{cite book |last=Hall |first=R. Cargill |title=Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment |publisher=University Press of the Pacific |orig-year=1998 |year=2005 |isbn=1-4102-2480-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XAKdPAAACAAJ }}
• {{cite book |first1= Donald |last1=Caldwell |first2= Richard |last2=Muller |author-link2= Richard R. Muller |year= 2007 |publisher= MBI Publishing Company|title= The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=XrFmy7U6xngC&pg=PA190 |chapter= The Oil Campaign May–August 1944 |isbn=978-1-85367-712-0}}
• {{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XUMuAAAAQBAJ |author-link=Max Hastings |last=Hastings |first=Max |title=Bomber Command |publisher=Michael Joseph Ltd. |orig-year=1979 |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-330-51361-6}}
• {{cite book |last=Miller |first=Donald L. |year=2006 |title=Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany |location=New York |publisher=Simon & Schuster |isbn= 978-0-7432-3544-0}}

{{RAF WWII strategic bombing}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Oil Campaign of World War Ii}}

Category:World War II strategic bombing

Category:Campaigns of World War II

Category:Campaigns, operations and battles of World War II involving the United Kingdom

Category:Allied logistics in the Western European Campaign (1944–1945)

Category:Military logistics of Nazi Germany