Richard Fumerton

{{Infobox philosopher

|region=Western philosophy

|era=Contemporary philosophy

|name=Richard Fumerton

|education=University of Toronto (B.A.)
Brown University (M.A., PhD)

|school_tradition=Analytic philosophy

|main_interests=epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, value theory

|notable_ideas={{hlist|metaepistemological scepticism|principle of inferential justification}}

|thesis_title=Phenomenalism

|doctoral_advisors=Roderick Chisholm, Ernest Sosa, J. Van Cleve{{Cite journal|date=1974|title=Doctoral Dissertations, 1974|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126618|journal=The Review of Metaphysics|volume=28|issue=1|pages=166–189|jstor=20126618|issn=0034-6632}}

|birth_date={{birth date and age|1949|10|7}}|birth_place=Toronto, Ontario|thesis_year=1974}}

Richard Anthony Fumerton (born October 7, 1949)Richard Fumerton Curriculum Vitae, [https://clas.uiowa.edu/philosophy/people/richard-fumerton available via The University of Iowa] is a Canadian American philosopher and professor of philosophy at the University of Iowa with research interests in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind and value theory.{{Cite book|last=Visser|first=Daniel|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7vwlDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA66|title=Thinking about Law|publisher=Siber Ink|year=2011|isbn=978-1-920025-80-9|pages=66|language=en}}{{Cite web|title=Richard Fumerton {{!}} Department of Philosophy {{!}} College of Liberal Arts & Sciences|url=https://clas.uiowa.edu/philosophy/people/richard-fumerton|access-date=2021-05-24|website=The University of Iowa}} He has been cited as an influential expert on the position of "metaepistemological scepticism".{{Cite book|last1=Pritchard|first1=Duncan|title=Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism|last2=Ranalli|first2=Chris|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2016|editor-last=Bergmann|editor-first=Michael|editor-link=Michael Bergmann (philosopher)|chapter=On Metaepistemological Scepticism|quote=Since at least the mid-1990s, there has been a wave of ‘anti-externalist’ replies to externalist responses to scepticism. Richard Fumerton has been one of the most influential figures in this wave, and alongside Barry Stroud his contributions to this debate are the most well-known. Indeed, one often finds Fumerton and Stroud being jointly identified as defenders of a position known as ‘metaepistemological scepticism’.|author-link=Duncan Pritchard|editor-last2=Coppenger|editor-first2=Brett|chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/archive/RANOMS.pdf}} He received his B.A. in philosophy from the University of Toronto in 1971 and his M.A. and PhD from Brown University in 1973 and 1974, respectively.{{Cite web|last=Mulugeta|first=Mikael|date=2016-01-27|title=Talking political philosophy and freedom|url=https://now.uiowa.edu/2016/01/talking-political-philosophy-and-freedom|access-date=2021-05-24|website=Iowa Now|language=en}} He has been the F. Wendell Miller Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa since 2003.{{Cite web|last=|first=|title=Richard Fumerton|url=https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/richard-fumerton|access-date=2021-05-24|website=Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs|publisher=Georgetown University|language=en}}

Philosophical views

Fumerton has argued for a classical internalist form of foundationalism in which foundationally justified beliefs are justified non-inferentially.{{Cite book|last=DePaul|first=Michael R.|title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2015|isbn=978-1-139-05750-9|editor-last=Audi|editor-first=Robert|editor-link=Robert Audi|edition=Third|location=New York|pages=397–398|chapter=Richard Fumerton}} Specifically, Fumerton believes that for a belief to be non-inferentially justified, it must be justified by direct acquaintance with facts and the correspondence between those facts and the belief in question.{{Cite book |last=Fumerton |first=Richard |title=A Companion to Epistemology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |year=2010 |isbn=978-1-4051-3900-7 |editor-last=Dancy |editor-first=Jonathan |edition=2nd |pages=139–143 |chapter=Twenty Epistemological Self-profiles: Richard Fumerton |editor-last2=Sosa |editor-first2=Ernest |editor-last3=Steup |editor-first3=Matthias |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z4Wt5F_hC3AC&pg=PA139}} Fumerton's foundationalism is classical or "old-fashioned" in that it claims that foundationally justified beliefs are beliefs about one's states of mind rather than beliefs about the external world.{{Cite journal |last=Barnes |first=Gordon |date=2003 |title=Resurrecting Old–Fashioned Foundationalism |url= |journal=Philosophical Books |volume=44 |issue=1 |pages=53–62 |doi=10.1111/1468-0149.00281 |issn=0031-8051}} Given this fact, Fumerton has argued that we cannot have the philosophical assurance required for knowledge about the external world. He has argued that whilst externalist theories of justification provide non-inferentially justified beliefs about the external world, these justifications are "philosophically unsatisfying" and cannot provide philosophical assurance for beliefs about the external world. Given these arguments, Fumerton thinks that there is no philosophically satisfying account of how we could know about the external world, a view known as "metaepistemological scepticism".{{Cite thesis|title=Meta-Epistemological Scepticism: Criticisms and a Defence|url=https://philpapers.org/archive/RANMSC.pdf|publisher=The University of Edinburgh|date=2015|degree=PhD|first=Chris|last=Ranalli}} pp. 1-2. He has also argued for a "principle of inferential justification" that states that for a subject S to be justified in believing a proposition P on the basis of another proposition E, S must be justified in believing that E and they must be justified in believing that E makes P probable.

In philosophical inquiry into the nature of rationality, Fumerton has been credited by Richard Foley with formulating a problem that Foley calls "Fumerton's puzzle".{{Cite journal|last=Foley|first=Richard|date=1990|title=Fumerton's Puzzle|url=http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=&rft.imuse_id=jpr_1990_0015_0109_0113&svc_id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection|journal=Journal of Philosophical Research|volume=15|pages=109–113|doi=10.5840/jpr_1990_10|issn=1053-8364|url-access=subscription}}{{Cite journal|last=Foley|first=Richard|date=1991|title=Audi on Practical Reasoning|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/27759255|journal=Behavior and Philosophy|volume=19|issue=2|pages=59–72|jstor=27759255 |issn=1053-8348}} A theory of rationality attempts to provide the conditions C under which a belief or decision is rational.{{Cite journal|last=Ye|first=Ru|date=2015|title=Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality|url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048402.2014.955862|journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy|language=en|volume=93|issue=1|pages=93–108|doi=10.1080/00048402.2014.955862|s2cid=171046040 |issn=0004-8402}} Fumerton's puzzle arises when candidate conditions are met, but an agent rationally believes that they are not met. Assuming that the agent believes that C must be met for their belief or decision to be rational, then in this case they would rationally believe that their belief or decision is irrational even though it satisfies the conditions C. When paired with the idea that it is irrational to have a belief or make a decision if one rationally believes that it is irrational, this implies that a belief or decision can be irrational even if C are satisfied. But this means that C are not sufficient conditions for rationality, implying that finding such conditions is impossible. Fumerton's puzzle can also occur when the conditions are not met, but an agent rationally believes that they are. In such a case, the agent would rationally believe that their belief or decision is rational. However, the agent's rational belief that their belief or decision is rational seems sufficient to make them rational even if C is not satisfied. This implies that C are not necessary conditions for a belief or decision to be rational.

Fumerton defended mind-body dualism in his book Knowledge, Thought and the Case for Dualism, published in 2013.{{cite journal|author=Yetter-Chappell, Helen|year=2013|title=Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism|journal=The Philosophical Quarterly|url=https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/66/263/435/2460891|volume=66|issue=263|pages=435–438|doi=10.1093/pq/pqv053}}

Publications

Foundationalism. Cambridge University Press. 2022.
A Consequentialist Defense of Libertarianism. Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.
Knowledge, Thought and the Case for Dualism. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Theory and Applications, co-edited with Diane Jeske. Broadview Press, 2012.
Philosophy Through Film, co-edited with Diane Jeske. Blackwell Publishing, 2009.
The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, with Wendy Donner. Blackwell Publishing, 2009.
Epistemology. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Realism and The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
Metaepistemology and Skepticism. Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996.
Reason and Morality: A Defense of the Egocentric Perspective. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Metaphysical and Epistemological Problems of Perception. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1985.

Richard Fumerton

Philosophical views

Publications

References

Further reading