Richard Haking

Haking was probably born in Halifax, West Yorkshire,Beckett & Corvi, 2006, p. 208. the son of a clergyman, Reverend Richard Haking. He attended the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, then was commissioned as a subaltern, with the rank of second lieutenant. Haking joined the 67th (South Hampshire) Regiment of Foot (which that year became the 2nd Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, which, much later still, became the Royal Hampshire Regiment) on 22 January 1881.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=17-18}}{{London Gazette|issue=24926|page=291|date=21 January 1881}} Haking saw service in Burma 1885–1887, during which time he was promoted to be his battalion's adjutant and was promoted to captain in 1889.Travers 1987, pp. 286–287.{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=18–19}}{{London Gazette|issue=25596|page=2800|date=11 June 1886}} He married Rachel Burford-Hancock, daughter of Sir Henry Burford-Hancock, on 28 September 1891; they had no children.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}

Haking studied at the Staff College, Camberley, from 1896 to 1897.{{efn|Travers states that he was at Staff College in 1892. Beckett's date is presented in the article, being from a more recent book.}} He was made a deputy assistant adjutant general (DAAG) for Cork District from 1898 to 1899.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}} He was promoted to major in March 1899.{{London Gazette|issue=27078|page=2958|date=9 May 1899}} He served on the staff in the Second Boer War, initially as a DAAG.{{London Gazette|issue=27131|page=6533|date=31 October 1899}}

He later returned to the Staff College, first as a lecturer 1901–1904, then as DAAG 1904–1906. While on the faculty at Camberley he was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel in January 1901.{{London Gazette|issue=27283|page=1063|date=12 February 1901}} This was made permanent in November 1903 and he was promoted again, now to brevet colonel, in June 1905.{{London Gazette|issue=27620|page=7748|date=27 November 1903}}{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}{{London Gazette|issue=27814|page=4701|date=7 July 1905}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=20}} Haking was then made a substantive colonel and became the assistant adjutant general of the 4th Division, in succession to Colonel Henry Heath, in February 1906.{{London Gazette|issue=27891|page=1518|date=2 March 1906}} He was then general staff officer, grade 1 (GSO 1, chief of staff) of the 3rd Division until 1908, then, after being promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general in June 1908, was brigadier general, general staff of Southern Command.{{London Gazette|issue=28150|page=4555|date=23 June 1908}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=21}} He was honoured with the Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) in June 1910.{{London Gazette |issue=28388|supp=y |display-supp=Supplement to the London Gazette Extraordinary |page=4476 |date=24 June 1910}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=268}}

According to Andy Simpson, in the Edwardian era, "he established a reputation as a sound tactical thinker". His book Company Training (1913) was partly inspired by Haig's 1909 Field Service Regulations.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}} The book espoused the pre-war belief that morale and leadership were the most important factor in winning a battle. He also argued that the attacker would have the advantage over the defender, even if numerically inferior, and deprecated the idea that modern weapons had made defence superior to attack. The book was reprinted during the first part of the war, at least.Travers 1987, p. 48.Carlyon 2006, p. 45. The book was considered "first class" and in Gordon Corrigan's view "even today ... has a freshness about it and an insight into human characteristics that would not be out of place in a modern military work".Corrigan 2003, p. 201. Haking was given command of the 5th Infantry Brigade, part of the 2nd Division, in September 1911.{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=21, 266}}{{London Gazette|issue=28538|page=7196|date=3 October 1911}}

Still in command of the 5th Brigade in the summer of 1914, when the First World War began, Haking took it to the Western Front, with the division forming part of I Corps (Lieutenant General Sir Douglas Haig). On 23 August—the day of the Battle of Mons—in accordance with a request by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, general officer commanding (GOC) II Corps, Haig sent Haking with three battalions to make contact with II Corps on Haig's left but Haking reported back that he had made no contact with the enemy.Sheffield 2005, p. 62. He helped force the Petit Morin during the Battle of the Marne. During the advance after the Marne, the brigade was at the forefront at the First Battle of the Aisne and on 14 September his was one of the few units to fight its way onto the Chemin des Dames, after the crossing of the River Aisne.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}} Haig recorded that the 5th Brigade made good progress on the eastern slopes of the Beaulne ridges, reaching the ridge of Tilleul de Courtacon, before having to pull back on meeting opposition. On that day he received a head wound that required three months' recuperation.Sheffield 2005, pp. 61, 70.{{efn|The ODNB gives the date of his wound as 16 September 1914.}}

He returned to the 5th Brigade on 20 November.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}} On 28 December he was promoted to major general, "for distinguished conduct in the Field", and took command of the 1st Division of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}{{London Gazette|issue=29020|page=11124|date=25 December 1914|supp=y}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=35}} The 1st Division took part in the Battle of Aubers Ridge (also known as the First Battle of Fromelles) in May 1915, where the three attacking divisions suffered 11,600 casualties, almost 4,000 of them being from the 1st Division and where he argued for further attacks despite the clear failure of the first attempt.{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=36}}Cobb 2007, p. 12. His attacking brigades lost over 50 per cent of their fighting strength in little over an hour.Lloyd 2006, p. 64. Haking was not blamed for what Simpson describes as the "flawed artillery plan and lack of artillery support" at Aubers Ridge.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}} With the BEF expanding massively in size, Haking was one of the divisional commanders (he was fourth in order of seniority after Thomas Morland, Henry Horne and Hubert Gough) whom Haig recommended to the Prime Minister, H. H. Asquith, on 8 July 1915 as suitable for command of corps and armies in due course.Robbins 2005, pp. 56–57.{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=42}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=266}}

On 1 September, Haig, commander of the First Army, recommended Haking, as a known "thruster", for command of XI Corps.{{efn|The ODNB states that he was given the command in August 1915.}} The promotion was not confirmed until 4 September, as Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief of the BEF, was ill. Haking, now a temporary lieutenant-general, held this command until the end of the war.{{London Gazette|issue=29319|page=9871|date=5 October 1915|supp=y}}

XI Corps took part as a reserve in the Battle of Loos in September 1915. He later told the Official Historian, James Edmonds, that he had thought Haig wanted XI Corps to fill the gap between I Corps (Hubert Gough) and IV Corps (Henry Rawlinson) in the offensive, not act as a reserve at all.Travers 1987, p. 17. Before the battle Haking spoke to the men of 2nd Guards Brigade. One observer recorded that he "spoke very confidently, comparing the German line to the crust of a pie, behind which, once broken, he said, there is not much resistance to be expected. He ended up by saying "I don't tell you this to cheer you up. I tell it you because I really believe it".Lloyd 2006, p. 181. He assured his commanders that there would be no German resistance once their line had been broken (letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland Feilding to his wife, 16 September 1915). Although "everyone was too optimistic", Haking's promises to regimental officers that there would be "very little opposition" were "altogether misleading" and a "most regrettable travesty of the real facts" (testimony of various colonels to the Official Historian in the mid-1920s).Robbins 2005, p. 74.

The 21st and 24th Division, New Army in XI Corps were committed to battle but not the Guards Division which was held in reserve, the attacking divisions were tired and hungry after an overnight march to conceal their presence from the enemy, at 2.30 p.m. on 25 September, the first day of the battle.Lloyd 2006, pp. 88–89. Haig requested the release of the reserve very early in the morning, soon after the attack began, and an order was indeed telephoned from GHQ after 9 a.m. French also insisted on visiting army and corps headquarters later in the morning to give his final permission. It also seems to be the case that traffic control prevented the reserves moving up. Nick Lloyd wrote that French was partly to blame for the confusion for not having decided when the reserves were to be released. General Frederick Maurice of GHQ later blamed himself for not having gone into sufficient detail when briefing Haking as he assumed that the reserves would be passing into First Army control and Haig's staff would sort the matter out. (Lessons were learned and traffic control during offensives was sharply improved thereafter.)Lloyd 2006, pp. 93, 220.

GHQ released the Guards Division to the First Army at 1:45 p.m. on 26 September, and it spent the day marching up to the front. Haking was ordered (at 11:30p.m.) to submit plans for it to attack the next day. The next day Haig wanted to call off the attack but Haking felt it would not be possible to do so in time. Haking also lifted the artillery barrage off the German front positions to bombard more distant targets at 3:00 p.m., an hour before the attack was due to begin – Rawlinson, who visited him at 10:00 a.m., thought this a bad idea, but kept his doubts to himself. Under pressure from Haig, XI Corps issued orders to the 3rd Guards Brigade that they were not to attack unless the 2nd Guards Brigade had already been successful but these orders were not issued until the former had already left their trenches.Lloyd 2006, pp. 191–192. XI Corps suffered another 8,000 casualties on the second day. Blame for the decision to continue the attack on the second day lies with Haig, although Haking took his men forward without any doubts.Lloyd 2006, pp. 156, 181.

Lloyd wrote that Haking "proved unequal to the task" of welding XI Corps into a fighting formation. Poor relations between staff "do not reflect well on his managerial skills". Although Haking was not personally responsible for the attacks on 25 and 26 September, he offered no dissent to Haig's plans and his subsequent plans shared Haig's underestimation of the enemy and "traditional" view of artillery (i.e. that it was an adjunct to the infantry attack, rather than grasping the importance of concentrated artillery fire in making such an attack possible).Lloyd 2006, pp. 215–216.

The late release of XI Corps on the first day was thought – supposedly – to have thrown away a chance of breakthrough and decisive victory. French blamed poor First Army staff work and traffic control, while Haig alleged that French had released the reserve too late. On the day, Rawlinson had telephoned Haking at 12:20 p.m. urging him to get the reserves forward and wrote on the telephone log that Haking reported "traffic" difficulties. In a letter of 10 October, Haking blamed difficulties as his divisions moved through the administration areas of I Corps and IV Corps. Haking later – after a meeting with Haig – claimed that this had been based on "memory of verbal statements made to (him)" by the commanders of the 21st Division and the 24th Division on the night of 25 September. He now wrote, "…the most careful arrangements were made by First Army to ensure that the roads were kept clear". He then blamed "indifferent march discipline" (Haig was blaming the delay on "bad march discipline" – a similar phrase). In the final paragraph of his report he wrote, "…there is none to blame except GHQ and they know it". Lloyd wrote, "it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Haking was deliberately falsifying or "cooking" his evidence to make it more palatable to (Haig)". Haig's and Haking's slur was bitterly resented by a number of officers who testified to the official historian in the 1920s about traffic congestion and poor direction by the Military Police.

Haking was also one of those who criticised French's deployment of the reserve to King George V when the King visited the front in October, as part of the moves which led to French's enforced resignation. Simpson called Loos a "disaster" but "Haking escaped censure on this occasion ... he was ... quick to back Haig in the subsequent intrigues against French, and after Haig became commander-in-chief the security of Haking's position was not in doubt".{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}

On 13 October there was another attack, somewhat better planned than the earlier efforts. Haking insisted that the attacking brigades be given precise orders as to their objectives and the direction and timing of their advance. Care was taken to see that troops were supplied with grenades, that they took machine guns forward with them and that they kept communications trenches clear. The 18-pounder guns were to be kept in the front line to give covering fire as the men went over the top, a tactic used at the Battle of Festubert earlier in the year, while at a First Army conference on 6 October it was agreed that XI Corps would be supported by "every available gun" and by smoke over a wide front (i.e. forcing the Germans to disperse their fire). Attempts were also made to assimilate tactical lessons from recent assaults and in some divisions to train on scale models.Lloyd 2006, p. 204.

On 10 and 12 October, divisional artillery concentrated on wire cutting while heavier guns concentrated on destroying enemy strongpoints. Haking persuaded himself that the enemy were "shaken and disorganised" ("little more than wishful thinking" in Lloyd's view) and that enough artillery and gas was available to win a decisive victory (the bombardment did little damage to the German positions). Haking gave highly optimistic speeches to the attacking brigades. On the day of the attack and apparently at Haking's insistence, the heavy guns were again "lifted" from the German front line an hour before the 2:00 p.m. attack, leaving them to be bombarded only by shrapnel – a tactic used by the Guards Brigade earlier in the battle. Haking ignored advice from Haig (on the telephone on 28 September) to suggest that this had been a bad idea, although in accordance with Army doctrine at the time, Haig once again delegated the decision to Haking as the "man on the spot". Haking appears to have thought that High Explosive fire might disperse British gas (although gas was an adjunct to the attack), but he also wanted to give the Germans "a chance to run away". Stuart-Wortley, GOC 46th (North Middland) Division, was part of XI Corps. He later complained that he and his troops had been "hurried into the trenches" with barely enough time "to become acquainted with the actual position". Haking overruled his wish to launch a careful step-by-step attack, telling him that he would "reach Fosse 8 without firing a shot", "seriously misleading the troops under his command" or else "simply ignorant". The attack went so badly that Lieutenant-Colonel Josiah Wedgwood sent a report to the Prime Minister.Lloyd 2006, pp. 205–207, 211.

Philip Game, GSO1 of the 46th (North Midland) Division, wrote frequently in letters to his wife (10, 11, 24 November, 8, 10, 20 December 1915) of how Haking interfered frequently with his planning.Robbins 2005, p. 32. Game described Haking as "a vindictive bully" and "really impossible, untruthful, a bully and not to be trusted" (letters of December 1915 and April 1916).Robbins 2005, p. 14.Lindsay 2011, p. 70. In May 1916 Haking complained that a unit had "dirt on their clothes" – they had in fact just come out of the trenches.Robbins 2005, p. 16. Haking claimed in May 1916 that no division could be considered a fighting unit until they had carried out a successful trench raid.Travers 1987, p. 140. In John Bourne's view "Haking had already begun to achieve a reputation as something of a loose cannon ... he did more than anyone in the BEF to encourage trench raids and 'the spirit of the bayonet'".{{sfn|Beckett|Corvi|2006|p=133}} Haking launched Battle of the Boar's Head (30 June 1916) that John Bourne called "an unnecessary and unsuccessful attack".Beckett & Corvi 2006, p. 134.

File:Major-general Sir Richard Cyril Byrne Haking, Kcb Art.IWMART1805.jpg

Haking suggested a First Army attack towards Fromelles, not towards Lille as originally planned. John Bourne wrote "that (Fromelles) took place at all owed most to the ambition and willingness of Haking to carry it out, and his unshakeable confidence that it would work. Fromelles is difficult to justify as the point for an attack, even a feint attack" as it was flat ground, broken up by water obstacles and overlooked by Aubers Ridge.{{sfn|Beckett|Corvi|2006|p=133}} Fromelles lay near the boundary of Second and First Army, opening the possibility of participation by Second Army, whose GOC, Herbert Plumer, was reluctant to stage a diversion at Ypres or Messines. Haking's plan did not take into account the earlier failure on the same ground in May 1915.

Haking "was most optimistic" about the upcoming Somme offensive (Millward War Diary, 22 June 1916).Robbins 2005, p. 75. At a conference of his corps commanders (8 July) Charles Monro (GOC First Army) said that the Battle of the Somme was progressing "favourably" but ordered Haking to prepare a plan on the assumption that he was to be assisted by a division of the Second Army and some extra artillery (on the same day the 4th Australian Division was ordered south to the Somme but instructed to leave behind its artillery). Haking presented a scheme to Monro (9 July) for a two-division attack over a front of {{cvt|4200|yd}}, aiming to capture part of Aubers−Fromelles Ridge, which lay a mile or so behind the German line. Monro rejected the plan in favour of a Canadian attack at Vimy Ridge, but after pressure from GHQ – caused by the movement of German reserves from Lille to the Somme sector – informed Haking on 13 July that it was to go ahead.Cobb 2007, pp. 15–16.

That day Haking's plan was approved at a conference at Choques, attended by Major-General Richard Butler (Deputy Chief of Staff, BEF) with Major Howard in attendance, Major-General George Barrow (Chief of Staff of the First Army) and Major-General Charles Harington (Chief of Staff of the Second Army). Plumer (GOC Second Army) also approved the plan at another meeting that day and at a later meeting it was agreed that the bombardment – by the equivalent of five or six division's worth of artillery – should start on 14 July, with a view to an attack on 17 July to capture and hold the German first line.Cobb 2007, pp. 15–16.

Haking learned that the Second Army were only giving him the artillery of the 4th Australian and the 5th Australian Division, not three as promised. Haking was also concerned at the shortage of ammunition and the inexperience of the Australian gunners. He reduced the width of the attack to around {{cvt|3500|yd|mi+km}}, apparently in the belief that he had sufficient artillery to cover this front.Cobb 2007, p. 17. Major-General Harold Walker, the commander of the 1st Australian Division, refused to let it take part in the attack, for which a British commander might have been sacked. The 5th Australian Division (Major-General James McCay) took part – the division was inexperienced, not having been in France for long.

At a meeting with Haking, Monro, Plumer, Barrow and Harington on 16 July, Butler reiterated Haig's conditions that sufficient guns and ammunition for counter-battery work be available and that intelligence reports of the movement of German reserves meant that the attack was not as urgent.{{efn|Major Howard, one of Haig's staff, had inspected the front on 14 July, and Elliott (15th Australian Brigade) showed him the {{cvt|400|yd|m}}-wide stretch of No Man's Land, overlooked by the Sugar Loaf, which his troops were expected to cross. Howard reported his concerns to Haig and to Harington. Haig provisionally approved the operation on 15 July.}} Haking was "most emphatic" that the troops were "worked up ... ready and anxious" to attack and that a delay would be poor for morale. Butler reiterated Haig's concerns in a memo (17 July).Cobb 2007, pp. 19–20.

Haking told his divisional commanders at a conference on the afternoon of 16 July, that he wanted to avoid a repetition of what had happened on the Somme on 1 July, when the Germans had had time to man their parapets before the British crossed no man's land. The artillery was to stay "on, not over [beyond]" the German positions until the infantry attacked (although he thought that the bombardment over a relatively narrow frontage would "reduce the defenders to a state of collapse before the assault") and the infantry were to be deployed in no man's land ready to "rush forward together" when the signal was given. Haking issued a letter "to be read to all troops", although he "trust(ed) them not to disclose it to anyone". The letter gave details of the artillery bombardment, including plans for a feint – deepening of the range of the bombardment and "show(ing of) bayonets over the parapet" – to tempt the Germans from their front-line dugouts so that they could then be shelled again – and also disclosed that the objective was to be limited to the German first line. The plan was thus well known, even to "the Mademoiselles" behind the British lines, although in practice the Germans, holding the high ground, could see enough of the British lines to guess that an attack was coming.Cobb 2007, pp. 21, 26–27.

The attack was postponed because of rain (that made it hard for artillery to register targets). Haking opened his advanced corps HQ at Sailly at 6:00 a.m. on 17 July – a sign that he did not expect the attack to be postponed for long. At 8:30 a.m. he sent a despatch in which, contradicting the assurances he had given, he admitted that many of the Australian gunners had never fired on the Western Front and that many of the infantry were "not fully trained" and "do not appear to be very anxious for the attack to be delivered". Eventually the start times (11:00 a.m. for artillery, 6:00 p.m. for the infantry attack) were fixed for 19 July.Cobb 2007, pp. 21–22. Although only the German front line was the target, plans were being discussed for further advances, possibly by night, in the event of complete success being achieved.Cobb 2007, p. 42.

A "surprise" attack was launched after an 11-hour bombardment, at 6:00 p.m. on 19 July. Haking launched an attack by two divisions (61st (2nd South Midland) Division (Major-General Colin Mackenzie) which consisted of 182nd, 183rd and 184th brigades and the 5th Australian Division which cost 7,000 casualties.Bean 1941, p. 442. The 18th Australian Brigade and the 14th Australian Brigade managed to cross no man's land but then suffered greater casualties in the retreat than in the original attack. the 15th Australian Brigade and 184th Brigade suffered severe casualties crossing no man's land for no result.

A further attack at 9:00 p.m. by the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division was cancelled but one Australian battalion attacked alone and suffered severe casualties. This earned the undying disgust of the commander of the 15th Australian Brigade, Brigadier-General Harold "Pompey" Elliott, who had seen 80 per cent of his two assaulting battalions killed, wounded or captured by night-fall.Beckett & Corvi 2006, p. 135.

The truth appears to be slightly more complicated. Haking, in possession of incomplete information, ordered another attack the next day. Having received fresh information about the three brigades of the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division . at 8:20 p.m. he ordered the 9:00 p.m. attack to be abandoned and that the 183rd Brigade and the 184th Brigade to return to or remain in their front line. The 5th Australian Division was ordered to consolidate its gains, ready to assist another attack by the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division the following morning, while McCay was ordered not to reinforce the 15th Australian Brigade but rather to withdraw any survivors of the initial assault. The orders were confirmed again by XI Corps HQ just after 9:00 p.m. Elliott received orders, time stamped 9:25 p.m., telling him that he might withdraw the 59th Australian Battalion if he thought its attack unlikely to succeed. Elliott later claimed in his notes on the battle that McCay had only learned at 8:35 p.m., from the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division, that the latter's attack had been cancelled but too late to stop the 58th Australian Battalion going forward, and that the blame therefore lay with Haking. Paul Cobb puts the blame with McCay and his staff for not processing Haking's orders quickly enough.Cobb 2007, pp. 70–71.

While the 58th Australian Battalion were attacking, Haking changed his mind again on the basis of fresh information. McCay informed him that the 8th Australian Brigade and 14th Australian Brigade were holding their positions in the German lines, while an Royal Flying Corps (RFC) aircrew had misinterpreted flares, probably let off by Germans, as indicating the presence of BEF troops. At 10:00 p.m., Haking's chief of staff, Brigadier-General W. H. Anderson, met with McCay and his chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Wagstaff. Haking now ordered the 184th Brigade to attack the Sugar Loaf at 3:00 a.m. to assist the Australians, while McCay was authorised to reinforce his forward positions.Cobb 2007, pp. 72–73.

McCay had information about the 8th Australian Brigade and the 14th Australian Brigade but sent a message at 10:30 p.m. to Elliott's brigade asking for an update. Elliott was none the wiser – he knew that the 60th Australian Battalion were trying to hold their position in the German lines, but as yet had no information about the 58th Australian Battalion attack, and replied (at 11:30p.m.) that although he was concerned about German machine gun fire he was willing to make another attempt on the Sugar Loaf, provided he was reinforced by the 57th Australian Battalion. An hour later Elliott learned of the failure of the attack of the 58th Australian Battalion and notified McCay at once.Cobb 2007, p. 74.

Haking cancelled the night attack at 12:10 a.m. after learning that the 61st (South Midland) Division had suffered too many casualties already and that trenches were blocked with wounded men.Cobb 2007, p. 73. At 5:00 a.m. a conference was held at Sailly, with Monro, Mackenzie, McCay and Barrow. During the meeting an up-to-date report was received from the 5th Australian Division HQ, and Monro and Haking ordered that the 14th Australian Brigade was to be withdrawn from the German front line rather than reinforced.Cobb 2007, pp. 89–90. Haking regarded the battle as over at 2:00 p.m. on 20 July, when the 5th Australian Division returned to the command of II ANZAC Corps. His advance Corps HQ at Sailly closed an hour later.Cobb 2007, p. 104. Monro and Haking concurred with McCay's veto of a proposal (21 July) that an informal local truce be negotiated in the Australian sector to allow the wounded to be collected, although this was in accordance with official GHQ policy at the time.Cobb 2007, p. 100.

Four days after the battle, Haking's four-page report accompanied Mackenzie's paper to First Army Headquarters. He wrote that 61st Division was "not sufficiently imbued with the offensive spirit to go in like one man at the appointed time". He conceded that the Australian Division had "attacked in the most gallant manner and gained the enemy's position" but added that they "were not sufficiently trained to consolidate the ground gained", a phrase which caused angst in the Australian press and was quoted by C. E. W. Bean in the Australian Official History. He claimed, "The artillery preparation was adequate. There were sufficient guns and sufficient ammunition" and that "the wire was properly cut and the assaulting Battalions had a clear run into the enemy's trenches", omitting to mention that on 17 July he had mentioned that some gunners had never before fired on the Western Front, and that many of the casualties resulted from machine guns fired from positions that the bombardment had failed to suppress. He claimed that "the lessons to be learnt from the attack apply more to the Divisions which took part than to ordinary trained Divisions" ... "the attack, though it failed, ha(d) done both divisions a great deal of good" ... and that "with two trained Divisions the position would have been a gift after the artillery bombardment; with these two new Divisions there was a good chance of success but they did not quite attain it", omitting to mention that he had had a good Division (the 1st Division) in May 1915. He also wrote that "the attack ... has done both Divisions a great deal of good" and also listed the chronology of dates and postponements, claiming that he had been "directed to attack".{{sfnm|1a1=Cobb|1y=2007|1pp=145–147, 160|2a1=Bean|2y=1941|2p=444}}

An intelligence report of 14 August wrote that no withdrawals of German troops had taken place from the Fromelles sector.Cobb 2007, p. 147. Corrigan stresses that the battle "did prevent the Germans from shifting reserves south to the Somme battlefield, and cannot be said to have been without point".Corrigan 2003, p. 202. By 26 July Haking had received McCay's report and was more generous in his praise of the Australians, although he blamed the 61st Division for failing to take the Sugar Loaf.{{sfn|Cobb|2007|p=145}}

Sir Henry Wilson (diary 30 July 1916) described Fromelles at the time as "a botch job". Captain Philip Landon testified to James Edmonds in 1938 that it had been "as good an illustration as there was of the reckless extravagance in expenditure of life (italics in original) which ruled the minds of some of the subordinate commanders, like Gen Haking, at this stage of the war" ... "the weakness of GHQ lay in not seeing that a Corps Commander, left to himself, would also be tempted to win glory for his Corps by spectacular success, and would be prodigal in using the Divisions which passed through his hands for this purpose".Robbins 2005, p. 4. Colonel E. R. Clayton later testified to Edmonds that Haking's "undue optimism was one of the direct causes of failure" of the attack at Fromelles. In the Official History, Wilfrid Miles, later wrote scathingly of the lack of preparation and the pointlessness of an attack by inexperienced troops, to seize a position which they could not possibly have held against counter-attacks, and blames the First Army for not cancelling the operation.Beckett & Corvi 2006, p. 136.

Elliott later (in 1930) criticised Haking for exaggerating the amount of artillery that would be available and for attacking without surprise. He exonerated McCay and argued that Haking, after Howard's report (which Haig had annotated to permit the attack only on condition that sufficient guns and ammunition were available) had persuaded Monro, who in turn persuaded Butler and that Haking had been keen to win glory for himself. He also stressed how Haking had ignored suggestions from Monro that the attack be postponed because of the rain and was scornful of Haking's after-battle report.Cobb 2007, pp. 156–157. Simpson wrote that Fromelles was "a costly failure" but "although the Australian Official Historian blamed Haking for the affair, fault also lay with the First Army and the 5th Australian Division....".{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}

In 2012, Michael Senior wrote that the objective of the attack was contained in the First Army Operational Order 100 (15 July),

{{blockquote|...to prevent the enemy from moving troops Southwards [sic], to take part in the main battle{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=131}}}}

Haking had ordered that the troops due to attack were to be told that

{{blockquote|The Commander in Chief [Haig] had directed XI Corps to attack the enemy in front of us, capture his front line system of trenches, and thus prevent him from reinforcing his troops to the South.|AWM 4 1/22/4 pt. 1 in Senior{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=131}}}}

Senior wrote that historians generally judged the objective of the attack, the prevention of German troops from being transferred to the Somme, had failed. Wilfid Miles, the British official historian, wrote that the IX Reserve Corps and the Guard Reserve Corps had been moved to the Somme.{{efn|In No Finer Courage: A Village in the Great War (2004) Senior had written that the attack had failed to deter the Germans from withdrawing divisions from opposite XI Corps and moving them to the Somme.{{sfn|Senior|2004|p=170}}}} Peter Pedersen wrote that the Germans knew that Fromelles was a decoy and sent reserves to the Somme. In the Australian official history Charles Bean wrote that the attack showed the Germans that they were free to withdraw troops. In 2007, Paul Cobb wrote that the Germans were not deterred from sending troops to the Somme.{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=134–135, 142}}

In his 2012 biography of Haking, Senior wrote that he had only consulted the official history volume Military Operations France and Belgium, 1916 part II for his earlier book and had changed his mind after studying German records.{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=134–135, 142}} Senior wrote that there was evidence that the transfer of troops to the south was delayed by the Attack on Fromelles. A German intelligence officer of the 6th Bavarian Reserve Division wrote on 20 July,

{{blockquote|There are no signs of any immediate repetition of the enemy attack....However, judging by the general situation, a new push is not impossible.|AWM 27 111/13 in Senior{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=131}}}}

A Bavarian document discovered in 1923 contained information that

{{blockquote|An order was captured declaring that the object of the attack was to keep German troops engaged in the sector so as to keep pressure from the Somme...a repetition of these attacks is therefore to be expected.|CAB 45/172 in Senior{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=132}}}}

Charles Bean wrote in 1930 that the Bavarians might have been sceptical that the British would sacrifice {{nowrap|7,000 men}} as a decoy.{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=132}} The IX Reserve Corps and Guard Reserve Corps had been moved from the Souchez–Vimy area, {{cvt|20|mi}} from Fromelles, well outside the sector opposite XI Corps. Troops kept in the Loos–Armentières sector, opposite XI Corps, for four weeks after 19 July were held back as a precaution. German records showed that eight divisions were in the line between Loos and Armentières on 1 July and that two were sent to the Somme by 2 July, long before the Fromelles attack; the other six divisions stayed opposite XI Corps for five to nine weeks after 19 July. Had divisions moved earlier, the Battle of Pozières {{nowrap|(23 July – 3 September),}} might have cost I Anzac Corps far more than the {{nowrap|23,000 casualties}} that it suffered. Senior concluded that because of the Attack at Fromelles, German troops had been retained opposite XI Corps as intended.{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=132–135}}

Gary Sheffield describes Haking as acquiring a reputation as a "butcher" and an organiser of pointless "stunts".Sheffield 2005, p. 61. Haking was one of the few First World War generals to have gained this label while the fighting was still taking place rather than after the war ended. It has also been claimed that he acquired the nickname among Australian troops from his propensity for ordering trench raids, and that "it is not even known how pejorative the appellation really was" given that among Australians "bastard" is almost a term of affection".

His promotions may have resulted from Haig's patronage but later attempts by Haig to obtain an Army command for him failed. Monro (3 August 1916) recommended Haking as his successor as GOC First Army.Sheffield 2005, p. 215. When it became known that Haking was the front-runner, Wilson – who had been acting army commander earlier in the year and who was also considered for the promotion this time – wrote (5 August) "it only shows how hopelessly out of touch GHQ is with what we all think of Haking".Travers 1987, pp. 12–13. Haig placed Haking in acting command of First Army from 7 August to 29 September 1916.{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=91, 266}}

A letter from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir William Robertson (10 August), said that the War Committee vetoed Haking's promotion.Sheffield 2005, p. 218.{{efn|The War Committee was a Cabinet Committee which discussed strategy in 1915–16. Some accounts confuse this with the War Council, a gathering of soldiers and politicians which discussed strategy in 1914–15.Sheffield 2005, p. 218.}} The command went instead to Lieutenant General Sir Henry Horne. The affair may have caused a curtailing of Haig's powers to make senior appointments.

Haking believed that the Germans on the Somme were "very tired, confused & rather demoralised" and "in a bad way" (Wilson diary 29 August 1916). Haking and his XI Corps took no part in the Somme, which Simpson argues "does not argue for much faith in Haking's competence ... at general headquarters".{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}} Haking was honoured with the Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath in January 1916.{{London Gazette|issue=12894|page=81|date=17 January 1916|city=e}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|p=268}}

Liddell Hart later claimed that Haking had reported Lieutenant-General Robert Broadwood (57th (2nd West Lancashire) Division) in early 1917 for "lack of fighting spirit".Robbins 2005, pp. 32, 69. Haking protested to Horne (GOC First Army) on 18 March 1917 about how he was expected to hold a four-division stretch of front with two divisions, putting too much strain on the units involved. Horne met with him to discuss his concerns.Simpson 2006, p. 74.

File:Generais Tamagnini Hacking e Gomes da Costa.jpg and Gomes da Costa, standing with General Haking.]]

After being sent to reinforce the Italian Front following the disastrous Battle of Caporetto from November 1917 to March 1918, XI Corps was returned to the Western Front and was stationed at Béthune.{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=167−184}} It was almost immediately engaged in the German spring offensive. The corps protected the Channel ports, although some sections of the corps were all but destroyed by the German "Georgette" offensive. The 2nd Portuguese Division suffered 7,000 casualties and 300 officers (out of a divisional strength of 20,000) in the Battle of Estaires. Haking and his corps "did well" in the halting of this offensive. Haking was not a believer in "defence in depth" but Simpson argues that this was not necessarily a bad thing, as the 55th (West Lancashire) Division under his command – fresh troops holding old fortifications – were able to hold their positions and even establish a defensive flank despite the rout of the Portuguese division to their south.Simpson 2006, p. 146.

Lloyd George told the War Cabinet (11 April) that the Liberal War Committee (a committee of backbench MPs) had made "very serious protests" to him that afternoon against the retention of "incompetent" officers like General Sir Hubert Gough (who had just been sacked after the Fifth Army had borne the brunt of the German March offensive) and Haking. Unlike Gough, Haking retained his command.Farrar-Hockley 1975, pp. 380–382.

File:The Hundred Days Offensive, August-november 1918 Q9584.jpg

General Gomes da Costa later wrote (in O corpo de exercito portugues na Grande Guerra: A batalha do Lys) of "the esteem in which I held General Haking ... who always showed himself through his knowledge of the Portuguese language, extremely intelligent and clever, a fine soldier and a loyal friend".Cobb 2007, p. 181.

Haking conducted a successful attack at La Bassee in June 1918. Simpson writes that his "performance continued to be far more convincing than earlier in the war". On 17 October 1918 XI Corps entered the line as part of the Fifth Army (General William Birdwood).{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}} Corrigan writes that that autumn Haking "earned a high reputation in the British offensive which ended the war", while Simpson writes that "(h)is promise before the First World War was never realised during it, but he undoubtedly showed far more skill with the soldiers of 1918 than with those under his command in 1915–16".{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}

Haking was honoured with the Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG) in 1918.

File:The Surrender of the German Army on the Western Front, November 1918 Q7193.jpg

After the war, in Corrigan's view, "his ... career was distinguished": he became chief of the British section of the Armistice Commission in 1918–1919,{{London Gazette|issue=31408|page=7788|date=17 June 1919}} commander of the British military mission to Russia and the Baltic Provinces in 1919 and commander of Allied troops in the plebiscite area of East Prussia and Danzig in 1920,{{London Gazette|issue=31860|page=4335|date=9 April 1920|supp=y}} before becoming High Commissioner to the League of Nations in Danzig in 1921–1923.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}

His rank of lieutenant-general being made permanent in January 1919,{{London Gazette|issue=31092|page=13|date=31 December 1918|supp=y}} Haking was appointed a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire (GBE) in the 1921 New Year Honours.{{London Gazette |issue=32178|date=1 January 1921|page=7|supp=y}} He became GOC British Troops in Egypt from 1923 to 1927, during which time he was appointed colonel of the Hampshire Regiment in July 1924{{London Gazette|issue=32967|page=6353|date=22 August 1924}} and was promoted to the rank of general in May 1925.{{London Gazette|issue=33064|date=7 July 1925|page=4530}} He retired from the army in 1927.{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}{{sfn|Senior|2012|pp=262, 267}}

Haking died of secondary colon cancer on 9 June 1945 at Old Mill Cottage, Bulford, Wiltshire. The funeral took place at Bulford on 12 June 1945, with military honours. He left an estate of £5,579 12s 1d ({{Inflation|UK|5580|1945|r=-3|fmt=eq|cursign=£}}).{{sfn|Matthew|2004|pp=495–496}}{{cite web|url=http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/result.php|title=Measuring Worth – Measures of worth, inflation rates, saving calculator, relative value, worth of a dollar, worth of a pound, purchasing power, gold prices, GDP, history of wages, average wage|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20160331194822/https://measuringworth.com/ukcompare/result.php|archivedate=31 March 2016}}

{{notelist}}

{{reflist}}

{{refbegin}}

• {{cite book |last=Bean |first=C. E. W. |author-link=Charles Bean |series=Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 |title-link=Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 |title=The Australian Imperial Force in France, 1916 |volume=III |publisher=Australian War Memorial |year=1941 |edition=12th |oclc=220898466}}
• {{cite book |editor-last1=Beckett |editor-first1=Dr. Ian F. |editor-last2=Corvi |editor-first2=Steven J. |title=Haig's Generals |publisher=Pen & Sword |year=2006 |location=London |isbn= 978-1-84-415892-8}}
• {{cite book |last=Carlyon |first=Les |author-link=Les Carlyon |title=The Great War |publisher=Picador Australia |year=2006 |isbn= 978-0-33-042496-7}}
• {{cite book |last=Cobb |first=Paul |title=Fromelles 1916 |publisher=The History Press |location=Stroud |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-7524-5601-0}}
• {{cite book |last=Corrigan |first=Gordon |author-link=Gordon Corrigan |title=Mud, Blood and Poppycock |publisher=Cassell |year=2003 |location=London |isbn=0-304-36659-5}}
• {{cite book |last=Farrar-Hockley |first=General Sir Anthony |author-link=Anthony Farrar-Hockley |title=Goughie |publisher=Granada |year=1975 |location=London |isbn=978-0-24-664059-8}}
• {{cite book |last=Lindsay |first=Patrick |title=Our Darkest Day: Battle of Fromelles |publisher=Hardie Grant Books |year=2011 |isbn=978-1-7427-0192-9}}
• {{cite book |last=Lloyd |first=Nick |author-link=Nick Lloyd (historian) |title=Loos 1915 |publisher=The History Press |location=Stroud |year=2006 |isbn=978-0-7524-4676-9}}
• {{cite book |editor-last=Matthew |editor-first=Colin |editor-link=Colin Matthew |year=2004 |title=Dictionary of National Biography |volume=24 |others=Essay on Haking by A. Simpson |location=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-861411-1}}
• {{cite book |last=Robbins |first=Simon |title=British Generalship on the Western Front |publisher=Routledge |location=Abingdon |year=2005 |isbn=0-415-40778-8}}
• {{cite book |last=Senior |first=M. |title=No Finer Courage: A Village in the Great War |year=2004 |publisher=Sutton |location=Stroud |isbn=978-0-7509-3666-8}}
• {{cite book |first=Michael |last=Senior |title=Haking: A Dutiful Soldier: Lt General Sir Richard Haking, XI Corps Commander 1915–18, A Study in Corps Command |isbn= 978-1-84-884643-2 |year=2012 |publisher=Pen and Sword Books}}
• {{cite book |last1=Sheffield |first1=Gary |author-link=Gary Sheffield (historian) |last2=Bourne |first2=John |title=Douglas Haig Diaries and Letters 1914–18 |publisher=Phoenix |location=London |year=2005 |isbn=978-0-29-784702-1}}
• {{cite book |last=Simpson |first=A. |title=Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914–18 |publisher=Spellmount |location=Stroud |year=2006 |isbn=978-1-86227-292-7}}
• {{cite book |last=Travers |first=Tim |title=The Killing Ground |url=https://archive.org/details/y00timo_0 |url-access=registration |via=Archive Foundation |publisher=Allen & Unwin |year=1987 |isbn=978-0-85-052964-7}}

{{refend}}

{{Refbegin}}

• {{Cite book |first1=Frank |last1=Davies |first2=Graham |last2=Maddocks |title=Bloody Red Tabs: General Officer Casualties of the Great War 1914–1918 |location=Barnsley, South Yorkshire |publisher=Leo Cooper |year=2014 |orig-year=1995 |isbn=978-1-78346-237-7}}

{{Refend}}

{{Commons category|Richard Haking}}

• [http://www.firstworldwar.com/bio/haking.htm Biography]

{{s-start}}

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{{s-bef|before=Sir David Henderson}}

{{s-ttl|title=GOC 1st Division|years=1914–1915}}

{{s-aft|after=Arthur Holland}}

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{{s-bef|before=Sir Walter Congreve}}

{{s-ttl|title=GOC British Troops in Egypt|years=1923–1927}}

{{s-aft|after=Sir Peter Strickland}}

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{{s-hon}}

{{s-bef|before=Sir Charles Knowles}}

{{s-ttl|title=Colonel of the Hampshire Regiment|years=1924–1945}}

{{s-aft|after=Sir George Jeffreys}}

{{end}}

{{High Commissioners of the League of Nations at Danzig}}

{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Haking, Richard}}

Category:1862 births

Category:1945 deaths

Category:Military personnel from Halifax, West Yorkshire

Category:Royal Hampshire Regiment officers

Category:British Army generals of World War I

Category:Knights Grand Cross of the Order of the British Empire

Category:Knights Commander of the Order of the Bath

Category:Knights Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George

Category:British military personnel of the Third Anglo-Burmese War

Category:British Army personnel of the Second Boer War

Category:Graduates of the Staff College, Camberley

Category:Academics of the Staff College, Camberley

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Category:British Army generals

Category:High commissioners of the League of Nations at Danzig