Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe

The paper opened with an acknowledgement that "conventional wisdom" supports a "quick and decisive victory" as the outcome of a Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg, but listed a number of studies that had arrived at more optimistic conclusions from a NATO perspective, beginning with a 1973 article by Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith. It then separates the topic of the paper into two questions: whether the Soviets had "the capacity to effect a blitzkrieg" and whether there were prospects "for a Soviet success"?{{rp|3,4}}

After concluding surprise was unlikely to play a role without of a NATO failure to mobilise,{{rp|5,6}} Mearsheimer conducted an analysis of the balances of forces on the NATO-Warsaw Central Front (West Germany), where the Pact had a 2.8:1 advantage in artillery, a 2.5:1 advantage in tanks and a 1.2:1 advantage in standing manpower, placing emphasis on the qualitative advantage of NATO artillery.{{rp|7,8}}

Mearsheimer further argued that, in addition to NATO's ability to replenish its losses, an initial mobilisation to prevent the Pact advantage from reaching 2:1 was {{emphasis|desirable}}, but not strictly necessary to prevent an overwhelming advance.{{rp|8-10}} He followed this with a comparative analysis of NATO and Warsaw Pact doctrine relevant to the scenario, concluding that thanks to NATO's forward defense strategy the war "would be won or lost along the inter-German border", and that preventing a breakthrough was crucial to the defense of NATO due to a lack of reserve strength.{{rp|13,14}}

With this scenario set, Mearsheimer went into detail on this hypothetical NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Germany, employing among other arguments a rigid 3:1 rule of minimum advantage for advance that would become central to the ensuing criticism of this article.{{cite journal |date=1989 |first=John J. |last=Mearsheimer |title=Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics |pages=54–89 |doi=10.2307/2538780 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=13 |issue=4 |jstor=2538780}} Since Soviet doctrine required a 5:1 advantage but lacked such an advantage across the front provided NATO was able to launch a multi-pronged attack, Mearsheimer argued they were unlikely to be able to advance enough to avoid attrition warfare.{{rp|14-19}} This was followed with a detailed analysis of the most likely Pact vector of attack, which highlighted the NATO defensive urban warfare advantage.{{rp|20-26}} In more minute detail, he then examined the physical parameters affecting a hypothetical Warsaw Pact advance, from favourable NATO force-to-space ratios and the "crossing the T" phenomenon unfavourable to advance, to the lack of a Soviet response to NATO's proliferation of ATGMs.{{rp|26-32}}

The battlefield analysis ended with an argument that the inflexiblity of initiative brought about by the command structure of the Soviet Army would lead to the army being unable to effectively exploit any holes in the NATO frontline at the NCO level, negatively evaluating attempts to overcome this deficiency with "steamroller tactics". Further complicating that was the relative inexperience of the conscripts stationed in East Germany and the unreliability of the Warsaw Pact as a whole.{{rp|32-36}} In the conclusion, the statement by United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that "the burden of deterrence" had "once again fallen on the conventional forces" was welcomed, warning that the deployment of the American Corps in NORTHAG must be completed, that the Belgians, British and Dutch must continue to modernise their forces and that NATO must prepare to respond to even ambiguous Warsaw Pact mobilisations.{{rp|36}}

More widely read than his previous studies, it is this paper along with his 1983 book that propelled Mearsheimer onto the academic scene as an "Optimist"{{efn|Optimistic from a NATO perspective, regarding its ability to defend in the European theatre. Not to be confused with the "Peace movement".{{cite journal |date=1984 |first=Ben |last=Dankbaar |title=Alternative Defense Policies and the Peace Movement |pages=141–155 |doi=10.1177/002234338402100205 |journal=Journal of Peace Research |issn=0022-3433 |volume=21 |issue=2}}{{rp|147}}}} in their debate with the "Pessimists",{{unbulleted list citebundle | {{cite journal |date=1983 |first=Richard Kevin |last=Betts |author-link=Richard K. Betts |title=Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old Choices |pages=140–162 |doi=10.2307/2626735 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=7 |issue=4|jstor=2626735 }} | {{cite journal |date=1985 |first=Richard Ned |last=Lebow |author-link=Richard Ned Lebow |title=The Soviet Offensive in Europe: The Schlieffen Plan Revisited? |pages=44–78 |doi=10.2307/2538541 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=9 |issue=4|jstor=2538541 }} Page 45. | {{cite journal |date=1987 |first1=Jack |last1=Snyder |first2=Scott D. |last2=Sagan |title=The Origins of Offense and the Consequences of Counterforce |pages=187–198 |doi=10.2307/2538891 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=11 |issue=3|jstor=2538891 }} Pages 191-192. | {{cite journal |date=1988 |first=Eliot Asher |last=Cohen |title=Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance |pages=50–89 |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/2538896 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=13 |issue=1|doi=10.2307/2538896 |jstor=2538896 }} Page 51. | {{cite journal |date=1988 |first=Robert Dean |last=Blackwill |author-link=Robert D. Blackwill |title=Conceptual Problems of Conventional Arms Control |pages=28–47 |doi=10.2307/2538993 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=12 |issue=4|jstor=2538993 }} | {{cite book |date=1993-05-14 |first=William K. |last=Sutey |title=The Active Defense and AirLand Battle in Soviet Military Thought |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA274364.pdf}} Page 46. | {{cite journal |date=2020-09-30 |first1=Rachel |last1=Tecott |first2=Andrew |last2=Halterman |title=The Case for Campaign Analysis: A Method for Studying Military Operations |url=https://www.racheltecott.com/s/Tecott_Halterman_TheCaseforCampaignAnalysis.pdf |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=45 |issue=4 |page=7}} | {{cite journal |date=2023 |first=Nicholas Evan |last=Sarantakes |title=The Future-War Literature of the Reagan Era—Winning World War III in Fiction |url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol76/iss3/7 |journal=Naval War College Review |issn=0028-1484 |volume=76 |issue=3}} }} which has been termed the "Great Debate" in security circles,{{cite web |date=2019 |first=Joshua T. |last=Christian |publisher=School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083211.pdf |title=An Examination of Force Ratios |location=Fort Leavenworth}}{{rp|20}} in which moderate Pessimists held a majority.{{cite book |date=May 1990 |first=Laurinda L. |last=Rohn |title=Conventional Forces in Europe: A New Approach to the Balance, Stability, and Arms Control |isbn=0-8330-0687-8 |url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R3732.pdf}}{{rp|38}}

The context of the article was described in Matthews 1996,{{cite journal |date=1996 |first=John C. III |last=Matthews |title=Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter |pages=112–146 |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/2539110 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=21 |issue=1 |doi=10.2307/2539110 |jstor=2539110 |quote=It was thought by som analysts that NATO forces were at a good force-to-space ratio, and that cuts might jeopardize the ability of the NATO divisions to hold.}} as standing in opposition US president Ronald Reagan's strengthening of NATO forces in Europe, supported by Samuel P. Huntington,{{cite journal |date=1984 |first=Samuel Phillips |last=Huntington |title=Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe |pages=32–56 |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/2538699 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=8 |issue=3s|doi=10.2307/2538699 |jstor=2538699 }} among others.{{unbulleted list citebundle | {{cite journal |date=1983 |first=Johan Jørgen |last=Holst |author-link=Johan Jørgen Holst |title=Domestic concerns and nuclear doctrine: How should the nuclear posture be shaped? |pages=28–42 |doi=10.1080/05679328308457434 |journal=The Adelphi Papers |issn=0567-932X |volume=23 |issue=183}} Page 38. | {{cite journal |date=1989 |first=Michael C. |last=Desch |title=The Keys that Lock Up the World: Identifying American Interests in the Periphery |pages=86–121 |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/2538766 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=14 |issue=1|doi=10.2307/2538766 |jstor=2538766 }} Page 88. | {{cite journal |date=1990 |first=Fareed |last=Zakaria |author-link=Fareed Zakaria |title=The Reagan Strategy of Containment |pages=373–395 |doi=10.2307/2150823 |journal=Political Science Quarterly |issn=0032-3195 |volume=105 |issue=3|jstor=2150823 }} Page 384. }} Although Huntington himself initially reviewed Mearsheimer's article favourably.{{cite journal |date=1983 |first=Samuel Phillips |last=Huntington |title=Broadening the strategic focus: Comments on Michael Howard's paper |pages=27–32 |doi=10.1080/05679328308457439 |journal=The Adelphi Papers |issn=0567-932X |volume=23 |issue=184}}{{rp|28}} Also relevant was the debate over whether or not the US nuclear weapons in West Germany were necessary.{{unbulleted list citebundle | {{cite book |date=1984 |first=Daniel |last=Frei |title=Alternatives to the First Use of Nuclear Weapons |isbn=9781003053828}} | {{cite journal |date=1985 |first=David |last=Garnham |title=Extending Deterrence with German Nuclear Weapons |pages=96–110 |doi=10.2307/2538791 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=10 |issue=1|jstor=2538791 }} Page 99. | {{cite book |date=1988 |first=Edward A. |last=Kolodziej |chapter=SDI, Alliance Coherence, and East—West Nuclear Stability |pages=29–58 |title=Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe |isbn=978-1-349-09181-2 |location=Houndmills |publisher=The Macmillan Press}} }}

Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe was positively received by Posen and Evera 1983,{{cite journal |first1=Barry R. |last1=Posen |first2=Stephen |last2=Van Evera |title=Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment |pages=3–45 |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/2538484 |journal=International Security |date=1983 |issn=0162-2889 |volume=8 |issue=1 |doi=10.2307/2538484 |jstor=2538484 |quote=An excellent essay on the NATO conventional balance}}{{rp|15}} Brauch and Unterseher 1984,{{cite journal |date=June 1984 |first1=Hans Günter |last1=Brauch |first2=Lutz |last2=Unterseher |title=Review Essay: Getting Rid of Nuclear Weapons: A Review of a Few Proposals for a Conventional Defense of Europe |pages=193–199 |doi=10.1177/002234338402100209 |journal=Journal of Peace Research |issn=0022-3433 |volume=21 |issue=2 |quote=The ESEC study is in line with the 'bean counting' philosophy, a force balance that only marginally takes into account qualitative aspects — contrasting what Mearsheimer has done recently in a convincing manner.}}{{rp|195}} Lübkemeier 1985,{{cite journal |date=1985 |first=Eckhard |last=Lübkemeier |title=Extended Deterrence: Implications for Arms Limitation and Reduction |pages=249–254 |doi=10.1177/096701068501600306 |journal=Bulletin of Peace Proposals |issn=0007-5035 |volume=16 |issue=3}}{{rp|250}} Dean 1986{{cite journal |date=1986 |first=Jonathan |last=Dean |title=Assessing the Warsaw Pact Threat to NATO's Central Front |pages=26–34 |doi=10.1080/03932728608456594 |journal=The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs |issn=0393-2729 |volume=21 |issue=3}} and to some extent Weinstein 1983,{{cite web |date=1983-07-15 |first=John M. |last=Weinstein |title=All Features Grate and Stall: Soviet Strategic Vulnerabilities and the Future of Deterrence |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA138901.pdf}}{{rp|22–23}} and Strachan 1985{{cite journal |date=1985 |first=Hew |last=Strachan |title=Conventional Defence in Europe |pages=27–43 |doi=10.2307/2619778 |journal=International Affairs |issn=1473-799X |volume=61 |issue=1|jstor=2619778 }} and Simpson 1985.{{cite journal |date=1985 |first=John |last=Simpson |title=New conventional weapon technologies and conventional disarmament |pages=82–96 |doi=10.1080/01440388508403813 |journal=Arms Control |issn=0099-4561 |volume=6 |issue=1}}{{rp|85}}

Its conclusions were opposed on methodological grounds by Jack Snyder{{cite journal |date=1985 |first=Jack Lewis |last=Snyder |title=Richness, Rigor, and Relevance in the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy |pages=89–108 |doi=10.2307/2538588 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=9 |issue=3|jstor=2538588 }} and with alternative models by William Kaufmann,{{cite book |date=1983 |first=William Weed |last=Kaufmann |chapter=Nonnuclear Deterrence |pages=88–89 |title=Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question |publisher=Brookings Institution |isbn=0815781180}} William Mako{{cite book |date=1983 |first=William P. |last=Mako |title=U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe |publisher=Brookings Institution |isbn=0815754442 |url=https://archive.org/details/usgroundforcesde0000mako_g1h7}} and Andrew Hamilton.{{cite journal |date=1983 |first=Andrew |last=Hamilton |title=Redressing the Conventional Balance: NATO's Reserve Military Manpower |pages=111–136 |doi=10.2307/2538792 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=10 |issue=1|jstor=2538792 }}{{rp|125}} With the exception of Corcoran 1983,{{cite book |date=1983-06-01 |first=Edward A. |last=Corcoran |title=Improving Europe's Conventional Defense |series=Strategic Issues Research Memorandum}}{{rp|9–10}} most concrete opposition did not come until three separate articles published in 1988 by Snyder,{{cite journal |date=1988 |first=Jack Lewis |last=Snyder |title=Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options |pages=48–77 |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/2538994 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=12 |issue=4|doi=10.2307/2538994 |jstor=2538994 }} by Joshua Epstein{{cite journal |date=1988 |first=Joshua Morris |last=Epstein |title=Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe |pages=154–165 |doi=10.2307/2538999 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=12 |issue=4|jstor=2538999 }} and by Eliot A. Cohen,{{cite journal |date=1988 |first=Eliot Asher |last=Cohen |title=Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance |pages=50–89 |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/2538896 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=13 |issue=1|doi=10.2307/2538896 |jstor=2538896 }} building on an earlier review by Aaron Friedberg.{{cite journal |date=1988 |first=Aaron Louis |last=Friedberg |title=Review: The Assessment of Military Power: A Review Essay |pages=190–202 |doi=10.2307/2538805 |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=12 |issue=3|jstor=2538805 }}

Although the reception that year was not entirely negative, with some praise in Sens 1988,{{cite thesis |date=1988-08-17 |first=Allen Gregory |last=Sens |publisher=University of British Columbia |title=NATO and the INF Controversy: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and the Atlantic Alliance |url=https://open.library.ubc.ca/media/download/pdf/831/1.0097804/1 |location=Vancouver}} Makinda 1988{{cite journal |date=1988 |first=Samuel M. |last=Makinda |title=Moscow and the INF treaty |pages=133–144 |doi=10.1080/10357718808444974 |journal=Australian Outlook |issn=1035-7718 |volume=42 |issue=3}}{{rp|141}} and Thomson 1989,{{cite journal |date=1989 |first=James A. |last=Thomson |title=An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance |pages=72–102 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA220311.pdf |journal=The Adelphi Papers |issn=0567-932X |volume=29 |issue=236|doi=10.1080/05679328908448874 }}{{rp|92}} most papers published in the immediate aftermath of these were critical.{{cite journal |date=1985 |first=Peter |last=Jones |title=New Conventional Technologies and Their Possible Impact on Conventional Arms Control Verification in Europe |pages=152–167 |doi=10.1080/01440388908403907 |journal=Arms Control |issn=0099-4561 |volume=10 |issue=2}}{{cite journal |date=1989 |first=Phillipp |last=Borinski |title=Mitigating West Germany's Strategic Dilemmas |pages=531–549 |doi=10.1177/0095327X8901500404 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |issn=0095-327X |volume=15 |issue=4}}{{rp|535}}

It has been employed favourably in some retrospective analyses.{{cite book |date=2009 |first=Stephen |last=Van Evera |chapter=Foreword |pages=xi-xvi |title=American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat inflation since 9/11 |isbn=9780203879092}}{{cite journal |date=2018 |first=James A. |last=Thomson |author-link=James Thomson (executive) |title=Deterrence Then and Now |pages=1–8 |url=https://doi.org/10.1515/sirius-2018-0024 |journal=SIRIUS - Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen |eissn=2510-2648 |volume=2 |issue=2|doi=10.1515/sirius-2018-0024 }}{{rp|3}} That by Barry D. Watts, then director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, relayed Cohen's criticisms.{{cite journal |date=2007-12-24 |first=Barry D. |last=Watts |title=Ignoring reality: Problems of theory and evidence in security studies |pages=115–171 |doi=10.1080/09636419708429344 |journal=Security Studies |issn=0963-6412 |volume=7 |issue=2}} The 2016 review by military Kenton White criticised it for not taking USSR and general WTO airborne capabilities{{efn|Tecott and Halterman defended Mearsheimer's omission. "He omits airpower variables from his model not because he thinks these variables are irrelevant to the outcome, but because he argues that airpower would favor NATO, only strengthening his argument."}} or their OMG concept, while following Cohen in arguing for an alternative view that the WTO might have been able to prepare a "standing start"{{efn|A possibility publicised by senators Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett in a 1977 report.{{cite book |date=1977 |first1=Sam |last1=Nunn |first2=Dewey Follett Sr. |last2=Bartlett |publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office |title=NATO and the New Soviet Threat: Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=a0bQAAAAMAAJ |location=Washington, D.C.}}}} attack undetected enough for the resulting delay to allow for the WTO to potentially collapse part of the NATO front, which Mearsheimer had argued was not a danger.{{cite thesis |date=October 2016 |first=Kenton |last=White |chapter=Credibility Analysis – Mearsheimer's viewpoint |pages=283–288 |title=British Defence Planning and Britain's NATO commitment, 1979 – 1985 |url=https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/69597/1/21813746_White_thesis.pdf}} White followed this up in more detail in 2017.{{cite journal |date=2017 |first=Kenton |last=White |title=Mearsheimer's Folly: NATO's Cold War Capability and Credibility |url=https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/80596 |journal=Infinity Journal |eissn=2312-5888 |volume=5 |issue=4}} A less detailed critique was published by international relations professor Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou.{{cite book |date=2016-10-23 |first=Arash |last=Heydarian Pashakhanlou |chapter=Fear in the Works of Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer |pages=23–44 |doi=10.1007/978-3-319-41012-8_2 |title=Realism and Fear in International Relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer Reconsidered |isbn=978-3-319-41012-8}} The approach of Cohen and Kenton was in turn criticised in the overview of Tecott and Halterman, which defended Mearsheimer while warning about his "over-extrapolation" on the basis of a single scenario,{{cite journal |date=2020-09-30 |first1=Rachel |last1=Tecott |first2=Andrew |last2=Halterman |title=The Case for Campaign Analysis: A Method for Studying Military Operations |url=https://www.racheltecott.com/s/Tecott_Halterman_TheCaseforCampaignAnalysis.pdf |journal=International Security |issn=0162-2889 |volume=45 |issue=4}} echoing Richard Stoll's 1990 defense of Mearsheimer's article to justify further model-based approaches.{{cite journal |date=1990 |first=Richard J. |last=Stoll |title=The Russians Are Coming: A Computer Simulation |pages=193–213 |url=https://hdl.handle.net/1911/75021 |journal=Armed Forces & Society |issn=0095-327X |volume=16 |issue=2|doi=10.1177/0095327X9001600202 |hdl=1911/75021 }}

{{blockquote|

|text=The credibility of NATO's defences was analysed and discussed ... Many of the contemporary analyses looked at strategy or numbers, taking a wholesale approach, but failed to address the overall capability based on existing force structures. An example is the analysis given by Dr J Mearsheimer, which provides an example contemporary to the period. It provides a useful perspective on the difficulties inherent in assessing the credibility of defence policy from a purely academic standpoint.

|author=Kenton White

|source=Credibility Analysis – Mearsheimer's viewpoint (2016)

}}

Outside the context of the debate{{cite thesis |date=June 1991 |first=Bristow |last=Hardin |publisher=University of California |title=The militarized social democracy and racism: The relationships between militarism, racism and social welfare policy in the United States |location=Santa Cruz}} and with the passage of time, the article began to see uncritical use,{{cite journal |date=2015 |first=Christine M. |last=Leah |title=Deterrence and Arms Control in a Second Conventional Age |pages=401–421 |doi=10.1080/01495933.2015.1089122 |journal=Comparative Strategy |issn=0149-5933 |volume=34 |issue=5}}{{cite web |date=2018-04-20 |first=Dylan |last=Motin |publisher=The Institute for Basic Social Science |title=The Making of a Blitzkrieg: Russia's Decision to Go to War with Afghanistan, Georgia, but not Ukraine |url=http://basicdata.kr/uploads/2018/04/20/Russia_Conference.pdf |archive-date=2022-04-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220412220347/http://basicdata.kr/uploads/2018/04/20/Russia_Conference.pdf}} especially with the successful urban defences of the Russo-Ukrainian War.{{cite thesis |date=2022-08-17 |first=Julian T. |last=Rippy |publisher=Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology |title=A Mixed-Methods Approach to Force Estimation in Military Operations Other Than War |hdl=1721.1/147231 |url=https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/147231}}{{cite journal |date=June 2024 |first=Dylan |last=Motin |title=The Logic of U.S. Deployment in Norway: The Trump Administration and NATO's Northern Front |pages=50–71 |url=http://ejournal.fisip.unjani.ac.id/index.php/JGSS/article/download/1815/479 |journal=Journal of Global Strategic Studies |eissn=2798-4427 |volume=4 |issue=1|doi=10.36859/jgss.v4i1.1815 |doi-access=free }}{{rp|57}}

{{notelist}}

• John Mearsheimer bibliography

{{reflist}}

{{John Mearsheimer}}

Category:1982 in the United States

Category:Academic journal articles

Category:Books by John Mearsheimer

Category:Cold War