carbon price

{{Climate change mitigation}}

Carbon pricing is considered by many economists to be the most economically efficient way to reduce emissions,{{cite web |title=What is a carbon price and why do we need one? |url=http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/faqs/what-is-a-carbon-price-and-why-do-we-need-one/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515120801/http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/faqs/what-is-a-carbon-price-and-why-do-we-need-one/ |archive-date=May 15, 2019 |access-date=May 15, 2019 |publisher=London School of Economics}}{{cite journal |last1=Hagman |first1=David |last2=Ho |first2=Emily |last3=Loewenstein |first3=George |date=June 2019 |title=Nudging out support for a carbon tax |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0474-0.epdf?author_access_token=tst1A-oZnQ8zUO18wGGPQdRgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0Nfy3PIgvrwnNXQzIbXH8z1Wkqhm6g5NiMnxMk__ebsKxGQNB0hMf1Vpo-ZiNplSt5LeLyks-Q3sdrpBdfxxHvAfQylqqwqHxgEml7GEGOxaQ%3D%3D |url-status=live |journal=Nature Climate Change |volume=9 |issue=6 |pages=484–489 |bibcode=2019NatCC...9..484H |doi=10.1038/s41558-019-0474-0 |s2cid=182663891 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200128223914/https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0474-0.epdf?author_access_token=tst1A-oZnQ8zUO18wGGPQdRgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0Nfy3PIgvrwnNXQzIbXH8z1Wkqhm6g5NiMnxMk__ebsKxGQNB0hMf1Vpo-ZiNplSt5LeLyks-Q3sdrpBdfxxHvAfQylqqwqHxgEml7GEGOxaQ%3D%3D |archive-date=January 28, 2020 |access-date=September 3, 2019|url-access=subscription }} taking into account the costs of both efficiency measures and the inconvenience of lesser fossil fuels. By pricing the externalities of carbon emissions, efficiency comes about by eliminating the market failure of the unpriced external costs of carbon emissions at its source. It is regarded as more efficient than renewable energy subsidies given to individual firms,{{Cn|date=July 2024}} because the difficulties of determining the value of emissions to each firm makes command and control regulation less likely to be efficient.

In a carbon tax model, a tax is imposed on carbon emissions produced by a firm. In a cap-and-trade design, the government establishes an emissions cap and allocates to firms emission allowances, which can thereafter be privately traded. Emitters without the required allowances face a penalty more than the price of permits. Assuming all else is equal, the market for permits will automatically adjust the carbon price to a level that ensures that the cap is met. The EU ETS uses this method. In practice, it has resulted in a fairly strong carbon price from 2005 to 2009, but that was later undermined by an oversupply and the Great Recession. Recent policy changes have led to a steep increase of the carbon price since 2018, exceeding 100€ (${{To USD|100|EUR|round=yes|year=}}) per ton of {{CO2}} in February 2023.

Evaluations of 21 carbon pricing schemes, show that at least 17 of these have caused reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The achieved emissions reductions range between 5% and 21% for the studied schemes.{{Cite journal |last=Döbbeling-Hildebrandt |first=Niklas |last2=Miersch |first2=Klaas |last3=Khanna |first3=Tarun M. |last4=Bachelet |first4=Marion |last5=Bruns |first5=Stephan B. |last6=Callaghan |first6=Max |last7=Edenhofer |first7=Ottmar |last8=Flachsland |first8=Christian |last9=Forster |first9=Piers M. |last10=Kalkuhl |first10=Matthias |last11=Koch |first11=Nicolas |last12=Lamb |first12=William F. |last13=Ohlendorf |first13=Nils |last14=Steckel |first14=Jan Christoph |last15=Minx |first15=Jan C. |date=2024-05-16 |title=Systematic review and meta-analysis of ex-post evaluations on the effectiveness of carbon pricing |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-48512-w |journal=Nature Communications |language=en |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=4147 |doi=10.1038/s41467-024-48512-w |issn=2041-1723 |pmc=11099057 |pmid=38755167}}

The exact monetary damage of the social cost caused by a tonne of {{CO2}} depends on climate and economic feedback effects and remains to some degree uncertain. Latest calculations show an increasing trend:

File:ETS-allowance-prices.svg

Cap-and-trade systems can include price stability provisions with floor and ceiling limits. Such designs are often referred to as hybrid designs.{{rp|47}} To the extent the price is controlled by these limits, it can be considered a tax.

Carbon emissions trading works by setting a quantitative limit on the emissions produced by emitters. As a result, the price automatically adjusts to this target. This is the main advantage compared to a fixed carbon tax. A carbon tax is considered easier to enforce on a broad-base scale than cap-and-trade programs. The simplicity and immediacy of a carbon tax has been proven effective in British Columbia, Canada – enacted and implemented in five months.{{Cite web |last1=Beinecke |first1=Frances |last2=Sachs |first2=Jeffrey D. |last3=Krupp |first3=Fred |last4=Pielke Jr. |first4=Roger A. |last5=Stavins |first5=Robert N. |last6=Komanoff |first6=Charles |last7=Claussen |first7=Eileen |last8=Fischhoff |first8=Baruch |date=2009-05-07 |title=Putting a Price on Carbon: An Emissions Cap or a Tax? by |url=http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2148 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100802013609/http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2148 |archive-date=2010-08-02 |access-date=2010-08-06 |publisher=Yale Environment 360}} A hybrid cap-and-trade program puts a limit on price increases and, in some cases, sets a floor price as well. The upper limit is set by adding more allowances to the market at a set price while the floor price is maintained by not allowing sales into the market at a price below the floor.{{Cite web |title=Carbon Pricing 101 |url=https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/reduce-emissions/cap-trade-carbon-tax |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190924165902/https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/reduce-emissions/cap-trade-carbon-tax |archive-date=September 24, 2019 |access-date=2019-10-11 |website=Union of Concerned Scientists |language=en}} The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, for example, sets an upper limit on allowance prices through its cost containment provision.

However, industries may successfully lobby to exempt themselves from a carbon tax. It is therefore argued that with emissions trading, polluters have an incentive to cut emissions, but if they are exempted from a carbon tax, they have no incentive to cut emissions.{{Cite web |author=Smith, S. |date=11 June 2008 |title=Environmentally Related Taxes and Tradable Permit Systems in Practice |url=https://one.oecd.org/document/COM/ENV/EPOC/CTPA/CFA(2007)31/FINAL/en/pdf |access-date=2010-04-26 |publisher=OECD, Environment Directorate, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration }} On the other hand, freely distributing emission permits could potentially lead to corrupt behaviour.{{Cite book |last=World Bank |url=http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-0-8213-7987-5 |title=World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change |date=2009-11-06 |publisher=The World Bank |isbn=978-0-8213-7987-5 |language=en |doi=10.1596/978-0-8213-7987-5}}

Most cap and trade programs have a descending cap, usually a fixed percentage every year, which gives certainty to the market and guarantees that emissions will decline over time. With a tax, there can be estimates of reduction in carbon emissions, which may not be sufficient to change the course of climate change. A declining cap gives allowance for firm reduction targets and a system for measuring when targets are met. It also allows for flexibility, unlike rigid taxes. Providing emission permits (also called allowances) under emissions trading is preferred in situations where a more accurate target level of emissions certainty is needed.{{Cite book |title=Trade and climate change: a report by the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Trade Organization |date=2009 |publisher=World Trade Organization |isbn=978-92-870-3522-6 |editor-last=Tamiotti |editor-first=Ludivine |location=Geneva |editor-last2=Teh |editor-first2=Robert |editor-last3=Kulaçoğlu |editor-first3=Vesile |editor-last4=Olhoff |editor-first4=Anne |editor-last5=Simmons |editor-first5=Benjamin |editor-last6=UNEP |editor-last7=World Trade Organization}}

Standard proposals for using carbon revenues include

• a return to the public on a per-capita basis{{cite journal |last1=Held |first1=Benjamin |title=Carbon Dividend – An Instrument for a Socially Just Environmental and Climate Policy? |journal=Wirtschaftsdienst |date=2019 |volume=1 |pages=53–60 |doi=10.1007/s10273-019-2395-y |url=https://www.wirtschaftsdienst.eu/inhalt/jahr/2019/heft/1/beitrag/der-oekobonus-instrument-fuer-eine-sozial-gerechte-umwelt-und-klimapolitik.html |language=de, en |hdl=10419/213707 |s2cid=159287863 |hdl-access=free |access-date=May 11, 2021 |archive-date=May 12, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210512084706/https://www.wirtschaftsdienst.eu/inhalt/jahr/2019/heft/1/beitrag/der-oekobonus-instrument-fuer-eine-sozial-gerechte-umwelt-und-klimapolitik.html |url-status=live }} This can compensate the risk of rising energy prices reaching high levels as long as cheap wind and solar power is not available yet. Rich people who tend to have a larger carbon footprint would pay more while poorer people can even benefit from such a regulation.
• subsidies accelerating the transition to renewable energy
• research, public transport, car sharing and other policies that promote carbon neutrality
• subsidies for negative emissions: Depending on the technology, such as PyCCS or BECCS, the cost for generating negative emissions is about $150–165 per ton of CO₂.{{Cite journal |doi = 10.1088/1748-9326/aabb0e|title = Biogeochemical potential of biomass pyrolysis systems for limiting global warming to 1.5 °C|journal = Environmental Research Letters|volume = 13|issue = 4|page = 044036|year = 2018|last1 = Werner|first1 = C.|last2 = Schmidt|first2 = H-P|last3 = Gerten|first3 = D.|last4 = Lucht|first4 = W.|last5 = Kammann|first5 = C.|bibcode = 2018ERL....13d4036W|doi-access = free}} The removal past emissions – 1,700 Gt in total{{cite web |last1=Stainforth |first1=Thorfinn |title=More than half of all CO2 emissions since 1751 emitted in the last 30 years |url=https://ieep.eu/news/more-than-half-of-all-co2-emissions-since-1751-emitted-in-the-last-30-years |publisher=IEEE |date=2020-04-29}} – can theoretically be addressed by auctioning allowances starting with a price that exceeds the removal costs of the proposed emissions.

About one third of the systems stays below $10/t{{CO2}}, the majority is below $40. One exception is the steep incline in the EU-ETS reaching $60 in September 2021. Sweden and Switzerland are the only countries with more than $100/t{{CO2}}.

File:Carbon prices.png

Unexpected spikes in natural gas prices and commodities such as oil and coal in 2021 caused a debate whether a carbon price increase should be postponed to avoid additional social burden. On the other hand, a redistribution on a per-capita-basis would even release poorer households which tend to consume less energy compared to wealthier parts of the population. The higher the high carbon price the greater the relief. Looking at individual situations though, the compensation would not apply to commuters in rural areas or people living in houses with poor insulation. They neither have liquidity to invest into solutions using less fossil fuels and would be dependent on credits or subsidies. On the other hand, a carbon price still helps to provide an incentive to use more effective fossil fuel technologies such as CCGT gas turbines in contrast to high-emission coal.{{cite web |last1=Elkerbout |first1=Milan |title=Don't let high gas prices stop the EU ETS from doing its real job |url=https://energypost.eu/dont-let-high-gas-prices-stop-the-eu-ets-from-doing-its-real-job/ |website=Energy Post |date=2021-10-07}}

In the relevant countries with ETS and taxes, about 40% to 80% of emissions are covered.{{harvnb|World Bank|2021|pp=29–30}} The schemes differ much in detail. They include or exclude fuels, transport, heating, agriculture or other greenhouse gases apart from {{CO2}} like methane or fluorinated gases.{{cite web |last1=Asen |first1=Elke |title=Carbon Taxes in Europe 2020 |url=https://taxfoundation.org/carbon-taxes-in-europe-2020/ |publisher=Tax Foundation |access-date=13 September 2021 |archive-date=September 13, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210913161138/https://taxfoundation.org/carbon-taxes-in-europe-2020/ |url-status=live }} In many EU member states like France or Germany, there is a coexistence of two systems: The EU-ETS covers power generation and large industry emissions while national ETS or taxes put a different price on petrol, natural gas and oil for private consumption.

The final consumer price for fuels and electric energy depends on individual tax regulations and conditions in each country. Though carbon pricing is playing an increasing role, energy taxes, VAT, utility expenses and other components are still the main cause for completely different price levels between countries.

The table gives examples for a carbon price of $100 or 100 units of any other currency accordingly. Food calculation is all based on {{CO2}} equivalents including the high impact of methane emissions.

{{Green economics sidebar}}

{{See also|Economics of climate change mitigation}}

Many economic properties of carbon pricing hold regardless of whether carbon is priced with a cap or a tax. However, there are a few important differences. Cap-based prices are more volatile and so they are riskier for investors, consumers and for governments that auction permits. Also, caps tend to short-out the effect of non-price policies such as renewables subsidies, while carbon taxes do not.

Carbon leakage is the effect that regulation of emissions in one country/sector has on the emissions in other countries/sectors that are not subject to the same regulation.{{cite book

|year=2007

|chapter=Mitigation from a cross-sectoral perspective

|title=Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

|editor=B. Metz

|publisher=IPCC

|author=Barker, T.

|chapter-url=http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch11.html

|access-date=2010-04-05

|display-authors=etal

|display-editors=etal

|archive-date=2011-06-08

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110608063706/http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch11.html

|url-status=dead

}} There is no consensus over the magnitude of long-term carbon leakage.{{cite book

|year=1996

|author=Goldemberg, J.

|page=[https://archive.org/details/climatechange1990000unse_h1m9/page/31 31]

|chapter=Introduction: scope of the assessment

|title=Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

|editor=J.P. Bruce

|publisher=IPCC

|chapter-url=http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sar/wg_III/ipcc_sar_wg_III_full_report.pdf

|isbn=978-0-521-56854-8

|display-authors=etal

|display-editors=etal

|url=https://archive.org/details/climatechange1990000unse_h1m9/page/31

}}

The leakage rate is defined as the increase in CO₂ emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action, divided by the reduction in emissions of countries taking domestic mitigation action. Accordingly, a leakage rate greater than 100% means that actions to reduce emissions within countries had the effect of increasing emissions in other countries to a greater extent, i.e., domestic mitigation action had actually led to an increase in global emissions.

Estimates of leakage rates for action under the Kyoto Protocol ranged from 5% to 20% as a result of a loss in price competitiveness, but these leakage rates were considered very uncertain. For energy-intensive industries, the beneficial effects of Annex I actions through technological development were considered possibly substantial. However, this beneficial effect had not been reliably quantified. On the empirical evidence they assessed, Barker et al. (2007) concluded that the competitive losses of then-current mitigation actions, e.g., the EU-ETS, were not significant.

Under the EU ETS rules [http://www.emissions-euets.com/carbon-leakage-exposure-factor-clef Carbon Leakage Exposure Factor] is used to determine the volumes of free allocation of emission permits to industrial installations.

A general perception among developing countries is that discussion of climate change in trade negotiations could lead to green protectionism by high-income countries{{cite web

|year=2010

|title=World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change

|publisher=World Bank

|url=http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/08/16/000334955_20100816043111/Rendered/PDF/530770WDR020101Official0Use0Only161.pdf

|page=251

|access-date=2010-04-06

|archive-date=March 4, 2016

|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304033114/http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2010/08/16/000334955_20100816043111/Rendered/PDF/530770WDR020101Official0Use0Only161.pdf

|url-status=live

}} Eco-tariffs on imports ("virtual carbon") consistent with a carbon price of $50 per ton of CO₂ could be significant for developing countries. In 2010, World Bank commented that introducing border tariffs could lead to a proliferation of trade measures where the competitive playing field is viewed as being uneven. Tariffs could also be a burden on low-income countries that have contributed very little to the problem of climate change.

Cap-and-trade and carbon taxes interact differently with non-price policies such as renewable energy subsidies. The IPCC explains this as follows:

A carbon tax can have an additive environmental effect to policies such as subsidies for the supply of RE. By contrast, if a cap-and-trade system has a binding cap (sufficiently stringent to affect emission-related decisions), then other policies such as RE subsidies have no further impact on reducing emissions within the time period that the cap applies [emphasis added].{{rp|29}}

According to a 2020 study carbon prices have not harmed economic growth in wealthy industrialized democracies.{{Cite journal|last=Driscoll|first=Daniel|date=January 2020|title=Do Carbon Prices Limit Economic Growth?|journal=Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World|language=en-US|volume=6|pages=237802311989832|doi=10.1177/2378023119898326|issn=2378-0231|doi-access=free}}

In order for such a business model to become attractive, the subsidies would therefore have to exceed this value. Here, a technology openness could be the best choice, as a reduction in costs due to technical progress can be expected. Already today, these costs of generating negative emissions are below the costs{{Clarify|reason=cost in which country?|date=March 2021}} of CO₂ of $220 per ton,{{cite web|url = https://news.stanford.edu/2015/01/12/emissions-social-costs-011215/|title = Estimated social cost of climate change not accurate, Stanford scientists say|date = January 12, 2015|access-date = June 24, 2019|archive-date = June 24, 2019|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190624053019/https://news.stanford.edu/2015/01/12/emissions-social-costs-011215/|url-status = live}} which means that a state-subsidized business model for creating negative emissions already makes economic sense today.{{Citation needed|date=March 2021}} In sum, while a carbon price has the potential to reduce future emissions, a carbon subsidy has the potential to reduce past emissions.{{Clarify|reason=sentence is hard to understand - how is a carbon price different from a carbon subsidy?|date=March 2021}}

{{See also|Carbon emission trading}}

In late 2013, William Nordhaus, president of the American Economic Association, published The Climate Casino, which culminates in a description of an international "carbon price regime". Such a regime would require national commitments to a carbon price, but not to a specific policy. Carbon taxes, caps, and hybrid schemes could all be used to satisfy such a commitment. At the same time Martin Weitzman, a leading climate economist at Harvard, published a theoretical study arguing that such a regime would make it far easier to reach an international agreement, while a focus on national targets would continue to make it nearly impossible. Nordhaus also makes this argument, but less formally.

Similar views have previously been discussed by Joseph Stiglitz and have previously appeared in a number of papers. The price-commitment view appears to have gained major support from independent positions taken by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).{{cite news|last1=Davenport|first1=Coral|title=Carbon Pricing Becomes a Cause for the World Bank and I.M.F.|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/us/politics/carbon-pricingbecomes-a-cause-for-the-world-bank-and-imf.html|newspaper=The New York Times|access-date=April 25, 2016|date=April 23, 2016|archive-date=April 24, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160424095231/http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/us/politics/carbon-pricingbecomes-a-cause-for-the-world-bank-and-imf.html|url-status=live}}

The "Economists' Statement on Climate Change" was signed by over 2500 economists including nine Nobel Laureates in 1997. This statement summarizes the economic case for carbon pricing as follows:

The most efficient approach to slowing climate change is through market-based policies. In order for the world to achieve its climatic objectives at minimum cost, a cooperative approach among nations is required – such as an international emissions trading agreement. The United States and other nations can most efficiently implement their climate policies through market mechanisms, such as carbon taxes or the auction of emissions permits.

Carbon offsets for individuals{{cite web|title=For Individuals - Offset Your Carbon Footprint|url=https://carbonfund.org/take-action/individuals/|access-date=2021-07-21|website=Carbonfund.org|language=en-US|archive-date=July 16, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210716053023/https://carbonfund.org/take-action/individuals/|url-status=live}} and businesses{{cite web|title=For Businesses - Offset Your Corporate Footprint|url=https://carbonfund.org/take-action/businesses/|access-date=2021-07-21|website=Carbonfund.org|language=en-US|archive-date=July 21, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210721181903/https://carbonfund.org/take-action/businesses/|url-status=live}} may also be purchased through carbon offset retailers{{cite web|title=Carbon Offset Retailer|url=https://carbonfund.org/carbon-offset-retailer/|access-date=2021-07-21|website=Carbonfund.org|language=en-US|archive-date=July 21, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210721184717/https://carbonfund.org/carbon-offset-retailer/|url-status=live}} like Carbonfund.org Foundation.

A new quantity commitment approach, suggested by Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, is for all countries to commit to the same global emission target. The "assembly of governments" would issue permits in the amount of the global target and all upstream fossil-fuel providers would be forced to buy these permits.

In 2019 the UN Secretary General asked governments to tax carbon.{{cite news |title=Tax carbon, not people: UN chief issues climate plea from Pacific 'frontline' |url=https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/15/tax-carbon-not-people-un-chief-issues-climate-plea-from-pacific-frontline |work=The Guardian |date=May 15, 2019 |access-date=May 15, 2019 |archive-date=May 15, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190515102904/https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/may/15/tax-carbon-not-people-un-chief-issues-climate-plea-from-pacific-frontline |url-status=live }}

The economics of carbon pricing is much the same for taxes and cap-and-trade. Both prices are efficient;{{efn|ignoring the riskiness of prices under caps}} they have the same social cost and the same effect on profits if permits are auctioned. However, some economists argue that caps prevent non-price policies, such as renewable energy subsidies, from reducing carbon emissions, while carbon taxes do not. Others argue that an enforced cap is the only way to guarantee that carbon emissions will actually be reduced; a carbon tax will not prevent those who can afford to do so from continuing to generate emissions.

Besides cap and trade, emission trading can refer to project-based programs, also referred to as a credit or offset programs. Such programs can sell credits for emission reductions provided by approved projects. Generally there is an additionality requirement that states that they must reduce emissions more than is required by pre-existing regulation. An example of such a program is the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. These credits can be traded to other facilities where they can be used for compliance with a cap-and-trade program.[http://www.epa.gov/capandtrade/documents/tradingtypes.pdf Types of Trading] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121025183559/http://www.epa.gov/capandtrade/documents/tradingtypes.pdf |date=October 25, 2012 }}. Clean Air Market Programs. Retrieved July 8, 2012. Unfortunately the concept of additionality is difficult to define and monitor, with the result that some companies purposefully increased emissions in order to get paid to eliminate them.{{cite news

|last=Szabo

|first=Michael

|title=Firms abusing Kyoto carbon trading scheme: watchdog

|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65C1FZ20100614?loomia_ow=t0:s0:a49:g43:r1:c0.250000:b34867586:z0

|newspaper=Reuters

|access-date=August 5, 2010|date=June 14, 2010

}}

Cap-and-trade programs often allow "banking" of permits. This means that permits can be saved and can be used in the future.{{Citation needed|date=May 2019}} This allows an entity to over-comply in early periods in anticipation of higher carbon prices in subsequent years.[https://web.archive.org/web/20100307112312/http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/1002capandtrade.pdf Cap and trade programs for greenhouse gas]. iasplus.com This helps to stabilize the price of permits.

{{notelist}}

{{Reflist|35em|refs=

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{{cite web | title = Additionality in the Clean Development Mechanism | author = Benito Müller | year = 2009 | publisher = Oxford Institute for Energy Studies | access-date = July 26, 2014 | url = http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/EV44.pdf | archive-date = August 10, 2014 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140810161420/http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/documents/EV44.pdf | url-status = live }}

{{cite web

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|author=Martin Weitzman

|year=2013

|publisher=World Bank

|access-date=August 1, 2014

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|url-status=dead

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|archive-date=October 20, 2014

}}

{{cite web | title = Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure | author = Joseph Stiglitz | year = 2010 | publisher = Project Syndicate | access-date = July 26, 2014 | url = http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/overcoming-the-copenhagen-failure | archive-date = August 12, 2014 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140812101020/http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/overcoming-the-copenhagen-failure | url-status = live }}

{{ Cite book

|title = The Climate Casino

|author = William D. Nordhaus | year = 2013 | publisher = Yale University Press |isbn = 978-0300189773 }}

{{cite web | title = Factsheet: Climate, Environment, and the IMF | author = IMF | year = 2014 | publisher = International Monetary Fund | access-date = August 2, 2014 | url = http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/enviro.pdf | archive-date = August 8, 2014 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140808042008/http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/enviro.pdf | url-status = live }}

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{{cite web

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• {{cite book |ref= {{harvid|IPCC SR15|2018}}

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}} [https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/ Global Warming of 1.5 °C —].

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• {{cite journal | ref={{harvid|Kikstra|2021}}

|last1=Kikstra |first1=Jarmo S |last2=Waidelich |first2=Paul |last3=Rising |first3=James |last4=Yumashev |first4=Dmitry |last5=Hope |first5=Chris |last6=Brierley |first6=Chris M |title=The social cost of carbon dioxide under climate-economy feedbacks and temperature variability |journal=Environmental Research Letters |date=2021-09-06 |volume=16 |issue=9 |page=094037 |doi=10.1088/1748-9326/ac1d0b |bibcode=2021ERL....16i4037K |s2cid=237427400 |doi-access=free }}

• {{cite book | ref={{harvid|World Bank|2021}}

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• {{cite web| ref={{harvid|NZ Govt|2020}}

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• {{cite web |ref={{harvid|EWG|2011}}| title=Meat Eater's Guide |url=https://static.ewg.org/reports/2011/meateaters/pdf/methodology_ewg_meat_eaters_guide_to_health_and_climate_2011.pdf |publisher=Environmental Working Group |date=2011}}
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• [https://ourclimate.us/ Our Climate Put A Price On It campaign]
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20140812183852/http://www.cdmrulebook.org/359 CDM Rulebook] — Defines Kyoto commitments
• [https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-december-2009/statements-and-resources/appendix-i-quantified-economy-wide-emissions-targets-for-2020 UN Climate Change Framework] — Lists national commitments for 2020
• [http://pricingcarbon.org/ Pricing Carbon Initiative] — US focused effort for carbon-pricing commitments

{{Portal|Global Warming|Economics}}

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