freedom of navigation
{{Short description|International maritime legal concept}}
{{Use American English|date=January 2019}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=April 2025}}
Freedom of navigation (FON) is a principle of law of the sea that ships flying the flag of any sovereign state shall not suffer interference from other states when in international waters, apart from the exceptions provided for in international law.{{sfnp|Dupuy|Vignes|1991|p=836}} In the realm of international law, it has been defined as “freedom of movement for vessels, freedom to enter ports and to make use of plant and docks, to load and unload goods and to transport goods and passengers".{{cite web |title=The Oscar Chinn Case |date=December 12, 1934 |publisher=Permanent Court of International Justice |url=http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1934.12.12_oscar_chinn.htm}}| This right is now also codified as Article 87(1)a of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
History
= Development as a legal concept =
Freedom of navigation as a legal and normative concept has developed only relatively recently. Until the early modern period, international maritime law was governed by customs that differed across countries’ legal systems and were only sometimes codified, as for example in the 14th-century Crown of Aragon Consulate of the Sea ({{Langx|es|Consulado del mar}}; {{Langx|it|Consolato del mare}}; also known in English as the Customs of the Sea). These customs were developed and employed in local jurisprudence, often cases in prize courts regarding the capture of goods on the high seas by privateers. Under the Consolato customs (and other contemporary codes), "enemy goods can be captured on neutral ships and neutral goods are free on board enemy's ships." This established a framework under which neutral shipping was not inviolable in time of war, meaning navies were free to attack ships of any nation on the open seas, however the goods belonging to neutral countries on those ships, even if they were enemy ships, were not to be taken. This legal custom, which hereafter will be referred to as the consolato rule, was long observed by England (later Great Britain), France, and Spain, as major naval powers.{{sfnp|Atherley-Jones|Bellot|1907|pp=284–285}}
New theories about how to run the maritime world, however, started to emerge as time went on and maritime trade, travel, and conquest by the great European naval forces began to stretch beyond of European waterways.Two main schools of thought emerged in the 17th century. The first, championed most famously by John Selden, promoted the concept of mare clausum, which held that states could limit or even close off seas or maritime areas to access by any or all foreign ships, just as areas of land could be owned by a state, limiting foreign activity there.{{cite book|last=Selden|first=John|title=Mare Clausum; The Right and Dominion of the Sea in Two Books |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ASVeAAAAcAAJ&pg=PP1|year=1663|publisher=Andrew Kembe and Edward Thomas|location=London}} Other notable supporters of this idea included John Burroughs{{cite book|last=Borough|first=Sir John|title=An Historical Account of the Royal Fishery of Great Britain: Or the Sovereignty of the British Seas Proved by Records, History, and the Municipal Laws of the Kingdom.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=h0vzvQAACAAJ&pg=PP1|year=1720|publisher=E. Curll}} and William Welwod.{{cite book|last=Welwood|first=William|title=An Abridgement of All Sea-lawes: Gathered Forth of All Writings and Monuments, which are to be Found Among Any People or Nation|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nAdlAAAAcAAJ&pg=PP1|year=1636|publisher=Ioane Man and Benjamin Fisher|location=London}} In the larger geopolitical context, mare clausum was backed by the major naval and colonial powers of the day, including Spain and Portugal. As these powers extended their reach to the New World and across Africa and Asia, they wished to consolidate control over their new empires and access to trade and resources there by denying other countries access to the sea routes leading to these areas.{{cite journal |last1=O'Connell |first1=D.P. |title=The Law of the Sea |journal=Journal of the Royal Society of Arts |date=June 1976 |volume=124 |issue=5239 |pages=367–379 |jstor=41372335 }} By quite literally closing off access to the seas using their naval muscle, these states would profit handsomely from the growing maritime trade routes and foreign colonies.
Meanwhile, the Dutch Republic, the dominant European trade carrier, championed a different rule, known as mare liberum (free seas), summarized as "a free ship [makes] free goods." This meant that even enemy goods, always excepting contraband, were inviolate in neutral bottoms (i.e. hulls),{{ref|a}} making neutral ships off-limits for attack on the high seas. For the Dutch Republic, this was essential in order to secure the safety and viability of their extensive trade network. This concept was coined by Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist and a founding father of international law.{{cite book|last=Grotius|first=Hugo|authorlink=Hugo Grotius|editor=Robert Feenstra|title=Hugo Grotius Mare Liberum 1609-2009: Original Latin Text and English Translation|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bmWwCQAAQBAJ&pg=PP1|year=2009|publisher=BRILL|isbn=978-90-474-3045-2}} Grotius advocated for a shift in maritime norms that would make the high seas free for transport and shipping, regardless of the country of origin of the ship. This would represent not only a change in law, but also a fundamental shift in the perception of the maritime realm as something not to be owned, as land is, but rather as a shared resource. Behind this concept is a liberal view of sovereign equality, in which all states have equal access to the high seas, and a view of an interdependent world connected by the sea.{{cite book| last=Wolfrum |first=Rüdiger |chapter=The Freedom of Navigation: Modern Challenges Seen from a Historical Perspective |editor=Lilian del Castillo|title=Law of the Sea, From Grotius to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Liber Amicorum Judge Hugo Caminos |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=stkuBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA89 |year=2015 |publisher=BRILL Nijhoff |isbn=978-90-04-28378-7|pages=89–103}}
As the dominant naval powers of Spain and Portugal weakened, and international trade increased, Grotius’ mare liberum concept would come to be the accepted custom governing sovereignty at sea.{{cite book |last=Scovazzi |first=Tullio |chapter=The Origin of the Theory of Sovereignty of the Sea |editor=Lilian del Castillo |title=Law of the Sea, From Grotius to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Liber Amicorum Judge Hugo Caminos |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=stkuBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA48 |year=2015 |publisher=BRILL Nijhoff|isbn=978-90-04-28378-7|pages=48–63}}
= From concept to custom to law =
Freedom of navigation came to be embodied in bilateral treaties to become part of what would today be called international law. The earliest example of such a treaty is one concluded between King Henry IV of France and the Ottoman Porte in 1609, followed in 1612 by one between the Porte and the Dutch Republic. Once the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch Republic had ended during which Spain defended their claim of sovereignty over the oceans against the Dutch claim of "freedom of the high seas," as developed in Hugo Grotius' Mare Liberum, the two concluded a treaty of commerce in which "free ship, free goods" was enshrined. The Dutch Republic subsequently concluded bilateral treaties with most other European countries, containing the "free ship, free goods" principle, sometimes resorting to the use of force to obtain that concession, as against England in the Treaty of Breda (1667) and again in the Treaty of Westminster (1674). England, however, also held fast to the consolato rule in relations with other countries, as did France, until in 1744 it relented and extended the privilege to the neutral Dutch.{{sfnp|Atherley-Jones|Bellot|1907|pp=286–287}}
The Dutch eventually established a web of bilateral treaties that extended the privilege of "freedom of navigation" to their ships through much of Europe. During the many 18th-century European wars they remained neutral, serving all belligerents with their shipping services. Great Britain, in particular, chafed under the arrangement, as it was the dominant naval power in the 18th century, and the Dutch privilege undermined the effectiveness of its naval blockades. Matters came to a head during the War of the American Revolution, when the Dutch, shielded by the 1674 Anglo-Dutch treaty, supplied both the Americans and the French. The British made extensive use of their "right of search" of Dutch ships, which led to the Affair of Fielding and Bylandt by which a British naval squadron, in peacetime, arrested a Dutch convoy despite the objections of its Dutch naval escort.
Soon afterward, the British abrogated the 1674 treaty, which might have meant the death of the "free ship, free goods" doctrine, but Empress Catherine II of Russia had taken up the torch around the same time. In March 1780, she published a manifesto in which (among other things) she claimed the "free ship, free goods" principle, as a fundamental right of neutral states. To defend that principle, she formed the First League of Armed Neutrality to which the Dutch adhered at the end of the year (which sparked the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War). The principles from her manifesto were soon adhered to by the members of the League and by France, Spain and the new American Republic also (even if, as belligerents, they could not become members of the League).{{sfnp|Atherley-Jones|Bellot|1907|pp=288–289}}
Nevertheless, as a principle of international law (apart from treaty law) "free ship, free goods" was soon again overturned by the practice of both sides in the French Revolutionary Wars of the turn of the 19th century. For instance, in the jurisprudence of the American courts of the early 19th-century, the consolato principle was universally applied in cases not covered by treaties. On the other hand, the US government made it a steadfast practice to enshrine the "free ship, free goods" principle in the treaties of amity and commerce it concluded with other countries (starting with the 1778 one with France and the 1782 one with the Dutch Republic).
In other words, the American view (following the British practice) was that at that time consolato was customary international law, which, however, could be superseded by treaty law on a bilateral basis. The US, however, earnestly strove for the substitution of consolato by "free ship" in customary law also.{{sfnp|Atherley-Jones|Bellot|1907|pp=283–284}}
That state of affairs came about when Britain finally gave up its resistance to the principles, first formulated by Empress Catherine in 1780, and acquiesced in the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, which enshrined "free ship makes free goods" and rejecting "enemy ship makes enemy goods." The Declaration was signed by the major powers (except the US) and it was soon adhered to by most other powers. The new rule (a combination of the "best" parts of Consolato and "free ship") became that a "neutral flag covers enemy's goods (except contraband); neutral goods are not liable to seizure under the enemy's flag."{{sfnp|Atherley-Jones|Bellot|1907|p=298}}
While the concept as a whole became accepted international custom and law, the practice and implementation of freedom of navigation would during these years be developed through local jurisprudence and political decision-making.{{cite book |editor-last=Shaw |editor-first=Malcolm N. |chapter=The Law of the Sea |title=International Law |pages=410–412 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |edition=eighth |year=2017 |isbn=9781107188471 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GR4xDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA410}} While local jurisprudence differed, usually a consensus view emerged over time. A key example is the issue of territorial waters. While there was agreement that a certain expanse of the seas from a state's shorelines would be under stricter state control than the high seas, the exact distance this control would extend from the shoreline was debated. However, over time through local governance and jurisprudence a general agreement emerged that territorial waters would extend three leagues or three miles from the shoreline. This norm- and custom-formation continued for centuries within the frame of mare liberum.{{cite book |last=Pinto |first=M.C.W. |chapter=Hugo Grotius and the Law of the Sea |editor=Lilian del Castillo |title=Law of the Sea, From Grotius to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Liber Amicorum Judge Hugo Caminos |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=stkuBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA89|year=2015|publisher=BRILL Nijhoff|isbn=978-90-04-28378-7|pages=18–47}}
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)
Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) are closely linked to the concept of freedom of navigation, and in particular to the enforcement of relevant international law and customs regarding freedom of navigation.{{cite journal |last=Galdorisi |first=George |date=1996 |title=The United States freedom of navigation program: A bridge for international compliance with the 1982 United Nations convention on the law of the sea? |journal=Ocean Development & International Law |volume=27|issue=4 |pages=399–408 |doi=10.1080/00908329609546091}} The drafting of UNCLOS was driven in part by states' concerns that strong national maritime interests could lead to excessive maritime claims over coastal seas, which could threaten freedom of navigation.{{cite book|last1=Kraska|first1=James|last2=Pedrozo|first2=Raul|title=International Maritime Security Law|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=x1mBzyEXLNIC&pg=PP1|year=2013|publisher=Martinus Nijhoff|isbn=978-90-04-23357-7}} FONOPs are a method of enforcing UNCLOS and avoiding these negative outcomes by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice, using ships to sail through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, and in particular those areas that states have attempted to close off to free navigation as defined under UNCLOS and international law and custom.{{cite thesis |id={{ProQuest|1643255666}} |last1=Aceves |first1=William Joseph |year=1990 |title=The Freedom of Navigation program: A study on the relationship between law and strategy}}
FONOPs are a modern operational reinforcement of a norm that has been strengthening for nearly four hundred years. Freedom of navigation has been thoroughly practiced and refined, and ultimately codified and accepted as international law under UNCLOS, in a legal process that was inclusive and consent-based. FONOPs are outgrowths of this development of international law, based on sovereign equality and international interdependence.
=United States Freedom of Navigation Program=
The US Department of Defense defines FONOPs as "operational challenges against excessive maritime claims" through which "the United States demonstrates its resistance to excessive maritime claims".{{cite report |publisher=United States Department of Defense |date=December 31, 2018 |title=Department of Defense Report to Congress Annual Freedom of Navigation Report Background |url=https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20(final).pdf?ver=2019-03-19-103517-010}} The United States has an institutionalized FONOPs program called the Freedom of Navigation Program, which undertakes many FONOPs around the world every year. The program publishes annual reports chronicling each year's FONOPs,{{Cite web |title=DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) Reports |publisher=Under Secretary of Defense for Policy |url=https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033835/https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/ |archive-date=May 31, 2019 |url-status=live}} and a listing of relevant foreign maritime claims.{{Cite web |url=https://www.jag.navy.mil/about/organization/ojag/code-01/code-10/mcrm/ |title=Maritime Claims Reference Manual |website=U.S. Navy JAG Corps |access-date=May 31, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033835/https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm|archive-date=May 31, 2019|url-status=live}}
The United States Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program was formally established under President Jimmy Carter in 1979. The program was reaffirmed by the administration of Ronald Reagan in 1983 in its Ocean Policy Statement. The Program has continued under all successive administrations since.{{Cite journal |title=How Strategic Norm-Shaping Undergirds America's Command of the Commons |last=Odell |first=Rachel Esplin |page=1 |date=August 31, 2019 |journal=Working Paper for Presentation at the American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Conference August 31, 2019 |publisher=Massachusetts Institute of Technology |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3451412_code1609318.pdf}}
The FON Program challenges what the U.S. considers to be excessive territorial claims on the world's oceans and airspace. The position of the United States is that all nations must obey the international law of the sea, as codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.{{Cite press release |url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html |title=President's Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans |date=May 15, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110814100059/http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html |archive-date=August 14, 2011 |work=George W. Bush Whitehouse Archives |url-status=live}}{{cite press release |url=https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/joint-statement-us-asean-special-leaders-summit-sunnylands-declaration |title=Joint Statement of the U.S.-ASEAN Special Leaders' Summit: Sunnylands Declaration |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170121082908/https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/joint-statement-us-asean-special-leaders-summit-sunnylands-declaration |archive-date=January 21, 2017 |url-status=live |work=Obama White House Archives |date=February 16, 2016 |quote=Shared commitment to ...ensuring maritime security and safety, including the rights of freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas, and unimpeded lawful maritime commerce as described in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ...}} The U.S. Department of State writes:
{{blockquote|text=U.S. policy since 1983 provides that the United States will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention. The United States will not, however, acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses. The FON Program since 1979 has highlighted the navigation provisions of the LOS Convention to further the recognition of the vital national need to protect maritime rights throughout the world. The FON Program operates on a triple track, involving not only diplomatic representations and operational assertions by U.S. military units, but also bilateral and multilateral consultations with other governments in an effort to promote maritime stability and consistency with international law, stressing the need for and obligation of all States to adhere to the customary international law rules and practices reflected in the LOS Convention.{{cite web |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity/ |title=Archived: Maritime Security and Navigation |publisher=United States Department of State |date=January 20, 2009}}}}
U.S. armed forces have conducted FONOPs in areas claimed by other countries but considered by the U.S. to be international waters, such as naval operations in the Gulf of Sidra in the 1980s;{{cite news |first=James |last=Gerstrenzang |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-03-28-mn-624-story.html |title=U.S. Navy Ends Maneuvers in Gulf of Sidra |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161005114102/http://articles.latimes.com/1986-03-28/news/mn-624_1_u-s-navy |archive-date=October 5, 2016 |work=Los Angeles times |url-status=live |date=March 28, 1986}} as well as in strategically important straits (such as Gibraltar, Hormuz, and Malacca).{{cite journal |first=Nilufer |last=Oral |url=https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passage-rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage |title=Transit Passage Rights in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran's Threats to Block the Passage of Oil Tankers |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161005105452/https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passage-rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage |archive-date=October 5, 2016 |journal=ASIL Insights |volume=16 |issue=16 |publisher=American Society of International Law |date=May 3, 2012}}
One of the notable operations conducted as innocent passage and part of Freedom of Navigation program was performed by {{USS|Yorktown|CG-48|6}}, during which, on February 12, 1988, she was "nudged" by the Soviet frigate Bezzavetnyy in an attempt to divert the vessel out of Soviet territorial waters.{{cite journal |last=Aceves |first=William J. |title=Diplomacy at Sea: U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the Black Sea |journal=Naval War College Review |volume=46 |issue=2 |date=Spring 1993 |pages=59–79 |jstor=44642450 |url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3420&context=nwc-review}}{{cite news |last=Campbell |title=USS Caron{{'}}s Black Sea Scrape Furthered International Law, National Interest |work=The Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger Star |date=June 12, 1988 |page=C3, col. 1}}
= Innocent passage vis-à-vis FONOPs =
{{see also|Innocent passage}}
The concept of innocent passage in international law and under UNCLOS refers as noted earlier to the right of a vessel to pass through the territorial waters of a foreign state under certain conditions.{{cite book |last=Rothwell |first=Donald R. |chapter=Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea: The UNCLOS Regime and Asia Pacific State Practice |editor1=Donald R. Rothwell |editor2=Sam Bateman |title=Navigational Rights and Freedoms, and the New Law of the Sea |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=e9z3h6uy7CYC&pg=PA74 |year=2000|publisher=Martinus Nijhoff |isbn=90-411-1499-8|pages=74–93}} While related to FONOPs in that both innocent passages and FONOPs involve vessels traversing seas claimed by a foreign state, they differ in that if a vessel claims it is traversing under innocent passage terms, it implies a concession that the vessel is in fact traveling through territorial waters of another state.{{Cite magazine |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/are-freedom-of-navigation-operations-and-innocent-passage-really-the-same/ |title=Are Freedom of Navigation Operations and Innocent Passage Really the Same? |first=Joseph A. |last=Bosco |magazine=The Diplomat |date=February 27, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033837/https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/are-freedom-of-navigation-operations-and-innocent-passage-really-the-same/|archive-date=May 31, 2019|url-status=live}} Both innocent passage and FONOPs challenge a state's imposed limitations on freedom of navigation in a maritime area, but innocent passage accepts that the area is within a state's waters, while a FONOP can be used to challenge a state's territorial claim to an area.{{Cite magazine |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/fonops-to-preserve-the-right-of-innocent-passage/|title=FONOPs to Preserve the Right of Innocent Passage?|last=Odom |first=Jonathan G. |magazine=The Diplomat |date=February 25, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033834/https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/fonops-to-preserve-the-right-of-innocent-passage/|archive-date=May 31, 2019|url-status=live}}
= Criticism =
There are many critics of FONOPs, with a wide breadth of criticisms regarding the efficacy, bellicosity, and legality of FONOPs. One group of critics argues that FONOPs are unnecessarily risky and lead to escalation.{{Cite web |url=http://en.nanhai.org.cn/index/research/paper_c/id/166.html |title=South China Sea: Some Recent Analyses Lack Balance |last=Valencia |first=Mark J. |website=National Institute for South China Sea Studies |date=February 5, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033835/http://en.nanhai.org.cn/index/research/paper_c/id/166.html|archive-date=May 31, 2019 |url-status=live}}{{cite magazine |last1=Panter |first1=Jonathan G. |title=Will Americans Die for Freedom of Navigation? |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/06/freedom-of-navigation-operation-china-us-maritime-law/ |magazine=Foreign Policy |date=April 6, 2021}} Chinese government responses to American FONOPs in the South China Sea fall under this category of criticism.{{cite web |last=Swaine |first=Michael D. |date=November 15, 2010 |title=China's Assertive Behavior—Part One: On 'Core Interests' |publisher=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2010/11/chinas-assertive-behaviorpart-one-on-core-interests?lang=en}}{{Cite news |url=https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/01/07/after-latest-fonop-china-fires-stern-complaints-at-us/ |title=After latest FONOP, China fires 'stern complaints' at US |first=Christopher |last=Bodeen |agency=Associated Press |date=January 7, 2019 |work=Navy Times}} A second group of critics argue that FONOPs are unnecessary, and that states should focus on the protection of their own ships rather than using ship operations to check other states' maritime claims.{{cite journal |last1=Hawkins |first1=William R. |title=Strategy and 'Freedom of Navigation' |journal=The National Interest |date=Summer 1988 |volume=12 |issue=12 |pages=48–56 |jstor=42894566 }} Still other critics argue that FONOPs are ineffective at their goal of limiting other states' maritime claims.{{Cite magazine |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/08/americas-freedom-of-navigation-operations-are-lost-at-sea/ |title=America's Freedom of Navigation Operations Are Lost at Sea |first1=Zack |last1=Cooper |first2=Gregory|last2 =Poling |magazine=Foreign Policy |date=January 8, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033834/https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/08/americas-freedom-of-navigation-operations-are-lost-at-sea/|archive-date=May 31, 2019|url-status=live}}{{Cite magazine |url=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-freedom-navigation-operations-east-asia-enough-45257|title=Are Freedom of Navigation Operations in East Asia Enough? |last=Holmes |first=James |date=February 23, 2019 |magazine=The National Interest |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033834/https://nationalinterest.org/feature/are-freedom-navigation-operations-east-asia-enough-45257 |archive-date=May 31, 2019 |url-status=live}}{{Cite magazine |url=https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/us-fonops-in-the-south-china-sea-intent-effectiveness-and-necessity/ |title=US FONOPs in the South China Sea: Intent, Effectiveness, and Necessity |first=Mark J. |last=Valencia |magazine=The Diplomat |date=July 11, 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033834/https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/us-fonops-in-the-south-china-sea-intent-effectiveness-and-necessity/ |archive-date=May 31, 2019 |url-status=live}}{{Cite web |url=https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/weve-seen-movie-latest-us-innocent-passage-freedom-navigation-operation-south-china-sea |title=We've Seen This Movie Before: The Latest U.S. "Innocent Passage" Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea |first=Julian |last=Ku |date=May 11, 2016 |website=Lawfare |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240113134019/https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/weve-seen-movie-latest-us-innocent-passage-freedom-navigation-operation-south-china-sea |archive-date=January 13, 2024 |url-status=live}}
FONOPs in the South China Sea
{{See also|Territorial disputes in the South China Sea}}
File:South China Sea vector.svg
According to BBC correspondents, the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea could potentially be a major geopolitical flashpoint. China has used land reclamation to expand disputed islands, and has built runways on them.{{cite news |title=Australia conducting 'freedom of navigation' flights in South China Sea |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-35099445 |work=BBC News |date=December 15, 2015}}
=U.S. FONOPS in the South China Sea=
{{See also|FONOPs during the Obama Administration}}
In 2013 and 2014, the US conducted FONOPs in areas claimed by China, Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. During the presidency of the Obama administration there was an increase in attention on China and Asia in general leading to the pivot to Asia from 2012. This also was reflected in an increased number of FONOPs in the South China Sea. In 2015 the Obama administration authorized two FONOPs and three FONOPs were authorized in 2016.{{cite news |last=Larter |first=David B. |title=In challenging China's claims in the South China Sea, the US navy is getting more assertive |work=Defense News |date=February 5, 2020 |url=https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/05/in-challenging-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-the-us-navy-is-getting-more-assertive/}} Several of the FONOPs that got most media coverage were the missions conducted by the guided-missile destroyers {{USS|Lassen|DDG-82|6}} in 2015; and {{USS|Curtis Wilbur|DDG-54|6}} and {{USS|William P. Lawrence|DDG-110|6}} in 2016.
In May 2015, the Wall Street Journal reported that the "US Navy regularly conducts freedom of navigation transits in the region ... [but] has yet to receive explicit authorization from the administration to do so within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands."{{Cite news |last=Entous |first=A. |author2=Lubold, G. |author3=Barnes, J. E. |title=US military proposes challenge to China sea claims |url=http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-proposes-challenge-to-china-sea-claims-1431463920 |access-date=May 5, 2016 |newspaper=WSJ |language=en-US}} On May 13, 2015, Senator Bob Corker mentioned the Wall Street Journal article while questioning Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David B. Shear about piloting a boat within {{convert|12|nmi|lk=in}} of one of the artificial islands and asked Shear directly: "Are we actually going to do that?"{{Cite web |last=US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations |title=Safeguarding American Interests in the East and South China Seas |url=https://www.foreign.senat |access-date=November 29, 2023 |website=U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations |language=en-US}} At the start of October 2015, the US Department of Defense made it clear that a FONOP within 12 nautical miles of one of China's artificial islands was "not a question of if, but when,"{{Cite web |last=De Luce |first=D. |author2=McLeary, P. |title=In South China Sea, a Tougher U.S. Stance |date=October 2, 2015 |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/02/in-south-china-sea-a-tougher-u-s-stance |website=Foreign Policy |language=en-US}} and by mid-October 2015, US officials said the FONOP was expected "within days."{{Cite web |last=Feith |first=D. |title=What Lies in the South China Sea |date=October 13, 2015 |url=http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-lies-in-the-south-china-sea-1444756962 |website=The Wall Street Journal |language=en-US}} On October 27, 2015, Lassen navigated within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of "Freedom of Navigation Operations."{{cite web |title=After Months of Waiting, US Finally Begins Freedom of Navigation Patrols Near China's Man-Made Islands |date=October 27, 2015 |publisher=The Diplomat |url=https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/after-months-of-waiting-us-finally-begins-freedom-of-navigation-patrols-near-chinas-man-made-islands/ |access-date=November 13, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151117024200/https://thediplomat.com/2015/10/after-months-of-waiting-us-finally-begins-freedom-of-navigation-patrols-near-chinas-man-made-islands/ |archive-date=November 17, 2015 |url-status=live }}{{Cite web |last=Wagner |first=Benjamin K |title=Lessons from Lassen: Plotting a Proper Course for Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea |publisher=JE Asia & Int'l L. |year=2016 |url=https://www.academia.edu/26746022 |access-date=November 29, 2023 |website=HeinOnline |language=en-US}}
Since October 2015, as part of the U.S. FON Operations (FONOP) program, U.S. Navy ships have patrolled near the artificial islands China has created in the disputed Spratly and Paracel archipelagos to underscore the U.S.'s position that the artificial islands constructed by China are located in international waters.{{cite web |first1=Michael |last1=Green |first2=Bonnie |last2=Glaser |first3=Gregory |last3=Poling |url=https://amti.csis.org/the-u-s-asserts-freedom-of-navigation-in-the-south-china-sea/ |title=The U.S. Asserts Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea |website=Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative |publisher=Center for Strategic and International Studies |date=October 27, 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161005121113/https://amti.csis.org/the-u-s-asserts-freedom-of-navigation-in-the-south-china-sea/ |archive-date=October 5, 2016 |url-status=live}}{{Cite web |title=US Navy carries out third FONOP in South China Sea|first=Euan |last=Graham |website=The Interpreter |publisher=Lowy Institute for International Policy |date=May 10, 2016 |url=https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-navy-carries-out-third-fonop-south-china-sea |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160511124904/http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/05/10/US-Navy-carries-out-third-FONOP-in-South-China-Sea.aspx|archive-date=May 11, 2016|url-status=live}} USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of reclaimed-land islands (the so-called "Great Wall of Sand") in October 2015.{{cite news |first1=Andrea |last1=Shalal |first2=David |last2=Brunnstrom |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-idUSKCN0SK2AC20151026 |title=U.S. Navy destroyer nears islands built by China in South China Sea |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170703085024/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-idUSKCN0SK2AC20151026 |archive-date=July 3, 2017 |url-status=live |publisher=Reuters |date=October 26, 2015}}{{cite news |first1=Ben |last1=Blanchard |first2=Andrea |last2=Shalal |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-idUSKCN0SK2AC20151027 |title=Angry China shadows U.S. warship near man-made islands |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170529010655/http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-idUSKCN0SK2AC20151027 |archive-date=May 29, 2017 |url-status=live |publisher=Reuters |date=October 28, 2015}}{{cite news |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34647651 |title=China says US warship's Spratly islands passage 'illegal'] |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190219134815/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34647651 |archive-date=February 19, 2019 |work=BBC News |date=October 27, 2015}} USS Curtis Wilbur sailed within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in the Paracel Islands in January 2016, and USS William P. Lawrence came within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands in May 2016.{{cite web |first=Nick |last=Bisley |title=We should think carefully about an Australian FONOP in the South China Sea |url=https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/we-should-think-carefully-about-australian-fonop-south-china-sea |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161005110709/http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/02/04/We-should-think-carefully-about-an-Australian-FONOP-in-the-South-China-Sea.aspx |archive-date=October 5, 2016 |url-status=live |work=The Interpreter |publisher=Lowy Institute for International Policy |date=February 4, 2016}}
In early 2017, the Trump administration stopped FONOPs in the South China Sea hoping China might increase its pressure on North Korea over its missile launch tests.{{cite news |first=Till |last=Fähnders |title=Zerstörer auf heikler Fahrt |trans-title=Destroyer on a delicate journey |language=de |date=August 11, 2017 |work=Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung |url=https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/von-trump-zu-biden/nordkorea-konflikt-amerika-uebt-mit-marinemanoever-druck-auf-china-aus-15147257.html}} In mid 2017, it restarted FONOPs.{{cite news |agency=Associated Press |date=August 10, 2017 |title=Navy official says US warship has carried out freedom of navigation operation near China-held island in South China Sea |work=The Seattle Times |url=https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/navy-official-says-us-warship-has-carried-out-freedom-of-navigation-operation-near-china-held-island-in-south-china-sea/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170812173609/https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/navy-official-says-us-warship-has-carried-out-freedom-of-navigation-operation-near-china-held-island-in-south-china-sea/2017/08/10/168aa086-7dc2-11e7-b2b1-aeba62854dfa_story.html |archive-date=August 12, 2017}} After restarting the FONOPs in the South China Sea the Trump administration increased the number of FONOPs authorized. Trump authorized six FONOPs in 2017 and five operations in 2018. 2019 saw a record high number of U.S. FONOPs in South China Sea with a total of nine operations conducted.{{cite news |last=Power |first=John |title=US freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea hit record high in 2019 |work=South China Morning Post |date=February 5, 2020 |url=https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3048967/us-freedom-navigation-patrols-south-china-sea-hit-record-high}}
May 2018 also saw the first FONOP with the participation of two U.S. warships. On May 27, 2018, a US Navy {{sclass|Arleigh Burke|destroyer|1}}, {{USS|Higgins|DDG-76|6}}, and a {{sclass|Ticonderoga|cruiser|1}}, {{USS|Antietam|CG-54|6}}, sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Paracel Islands, which are controlled by China.{{cite news |work=Naval Today |title=US warships sail near Chinese-claimed Paracel Islands in South China Sea |date=May 28, 2018 |url=https://navaltoday.com/2018/05/28/us-warships-sail-near-chinese-claimed-paracel-islands-in-south-china-sea/}} The FONOP came shortly after the Pentagon announced that it would disinvite the Chinese navy for its Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) military exercise off Hawaii the same summer, which is a US flagship naval exercise.{{cite news |last1=Eckstein |first1=Megan |title=China Disinvited from Participating in 2018 RIMPAC Exercise |url=https://news.usni.org/2018/05/23/china-disinvited-participating-2018-rimpac-exercise |work=USNI News |publisher=United States Naval Institute |date=May 23, 2018}} The FONOP was called a "serious infringement on China’s sovereignty" by China's defense ministry.
On September 30, 2018, {{USS|Decatur|DDG-73|6}} was undertaking a FONOP near the Gaven and Johnson Reefs in the Spratly Islands when the {{ship|Chinese destroyer|Lanzhou|170|6}}, approached to within {{convert|45|yards|m}} of Decatur, in what the US Navy termed "a series of increasingly aggressive maneuvers"{{Cite news |url=https://news.usni.org/2018/10/01/37006 |title=Destroyer USS Decatur Has Close Encounter With Chinese Warship |first=Ben |last=Werner |date=October 1, 2018 |website=USNI News |publisher=United States Naval Institute |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033835/https://news.usni.org/2018/10/01/37006 |archive-date=May 31, 2019 |url-status=live}} This forced the American destroyer to maneuver to avoid a collision.
In December 2018 China deployed naval forces to warn off {{USS|Chancellorsville|CG-62|6}} while it made a FONOP around the Paracel Islands without approval of the Chinese government. "The Southern Theatre Command organized navy and air forces to monitor the US vessel, and gave warning for it to leave", a statement by the Southern Theatre Command said in response to the U.S. FONOP. The Statement also called for the U.S. to properly manage its navy and air fleet to avoid miscalculations.{{cite news |last=Ng |first=Teddy |title=Chinese navy sent to confront USS Chancellorsville in latest South China Sea stand-off |work=South China Morning Post |date=December 1, 2018 |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2175916/chinese-navy-sent-confront-uss-chancellorsville-latest-south}}
The U.S. FONOPs continued into 2020. The U.S. Navy conducted its first FONOP in 2020 on January 25 by sending the littoral combat ship {{USS|Montgomery|LCS-8|6}} past Chinese claims in the Spratly Islands. During the FONOP China sent two fighter-bomber aircraft scrambling overhead to intimidate the crew of Montgomery, according to Chinese state media. The January 25 patrol was officially aimed at China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Specifically, the United States Navy challenged the notion that innocent passage through claimed territorial waters requires previous notification.{{cite news |last1=Ziezulewicz |first1=Geoff |last2=Shawn |first2=Snow |title=Navy conducts year's first FONOP in South China Sea |url=https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/01/28/navy-conducts-years-first-fonop-in-south-china-sea/ |work=Navy Times |date=January 28, 2020}}
On April 28, 2020, the Japan-based American guided-missile destroyer {{USS|Barry|DDG-52|6}} conducted a freedom of navigation operation in the vicinity of Paracel Island chain off Vietnam.{{cite news |last=LaGrone |first=Sam |title=China Says PLA Scrambled Aircraft, Ships to "Expel" U.S. Warships from South China Sea Island Chain |work=USNI News |publisher=United States Naval Institute |date=April 28, 2020 |url=https://news.usni.org/2020/04/28/china-says-pla-scrambled-aircraft-ships-to-expel-u-s-warship-from-south-china-sea-island-chain}} The PLA's Southern Theatre Command claimed its forces forced USS Barry out of disputed Spratly Islands waters; a US Navy spokesman denied that Barry had been ejected by the PLA and stated "all interactions that occurred were in accordance with maritime norms".{{cite news |last1=Zhao |first1=Christina |title=Navy sends second ship into disputed waters after China claims it scrambled jets to expel U.S. destroyer |url=https://www.newsweek.com/us-navy-ship-sails-disputed-sea-amid-escalating-tensions-china-over-coronavirus-pandemic-1501057 |work=Newsweek |date=April 29, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200430140014/https://www.newsweek.com/us-navy-ship-sails-disputed-sea-amid-escalating-tensions-china-over-coronavirus-pandemic-1501057 |archive-date=April 30, 2020 |url-status=live}} The operation was carried out during the COVID-19 pandemic which have seen accusation from both Beijing and Washington accusing each other of trying to take more military control over the South China Sea during the pandemic. The operation done by USS Barry was followed up the next day on April 29 with a FONOP around the Spratly Islands done by {{USS|Bunker Hill|CG-52|6}}. This was the first time the U.S. conducted two FONOPs within two days.{{cite news |last=Lendon |first=Brad |title=US Navy stages back-to back challenges to Beijing's South China Sea claims |publisher=CNN |date=April 30, 2020 |url=https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/30/asia/south-china-sea-us-navy-freedom-of-navigation-intl-hnk/index.html}}{{cite news |last=LaGrone |first=Sam |title=USS Bunker Hill Conducts 2an South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Operation This Week |work=USNI News |date=April 29, 2020 |url=https://news.usni.org/2020/04/29/uss-bunker-hill-conducts-2nd-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operation-this-week}} The back-to-back missions has been seen by some as a new U.S. strategy under the Pentagon slogan "strategic predictability, operation unpredictability." After the FONOP by USS Bunker Hill a spokesperson from the United States Seventh Fleet responsible for carrying out the operations said: "The United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows—regardless of the location of excessive maritime claims and regardless of current events."
=FONOPs done by non-U.S actors in South China Sea=
{{Expand section|date=May 2020}}
In 2015 Australia confirmed that it had been conducting "routine" FONOP flights over disputed territory in the South China Sea.
In May 2017 Japan sent an {{Sclass|Izumo|helicopter destroyer|1}} and two destroyers on a three-month tour of the South China Sea, where they conducted exercises with an {{Sclass|Oyashio|submarine|1}}. This was Japan's biggest foray into the region since the Second World War.
In April 2018 three Australian naval vessels transited the South China Sea towards Vietnam and, along the way, met a 'robust' challenge from the People's Liberation Army Navy.{{cite news |title=Australian warships 'challenged' by Chinese navy in South China Sea |url=https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/20/australian-warships-challenged-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-sea |access-date=March 2, 2025 |work=The Guardian |agency=Australian Associated Press |date=April 19, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240603173322/https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/20/australian-warships-challenged-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-sea|archive-date=June 3, 2024|url-status=live}}
At the June 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue ministers from France and the UK jointly{{cite news |title=France, UK announce South China Sea freedom of navigation operations |url=https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/06/france-uk-announce-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operations/ |agency=NavalToday |publisher=NavalToday |date=June 6, 2018 |access-date=June 25, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180625075700/https://navaltoday.com/2018/06/06/france-uk-announce-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-operations/ |archive-date=June 25, 2018 |url-status=live }} announced that their ships would sail through the South China Sea to continue to uphold the collective right to freedom of navigation.{{cite web |last1=Choong |first1=William |title=South China Sea: bringing power to bear |url=https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/06/south-china-sea-power |website=IISS |access-date=June 5, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180625075910/https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/06/south-china-sea-power |archive-date=June 25, 2018 |url-status=live }} The announcement came after the UK and France announced separately in July 2017 and May 2018 respectively that they would increase their involvement in the South China Sea.
The Royal Navy also conducted what is believed to be a FONOP with {{HMS|Albion|L14|6}}, a 22,000-ton amphibious transport dock, in late August 2018 in the waters near the Paracel Islands. The FONOP conducted by Albion was unlike many U.S. FONOPs a traditional assertion of freedom of navigation on the high seas.{{cite web |last1=Tuan |first1=Anh Luc |title=Are France and the UK Here to Stay in the South China Sea? |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/are-france-and-the-uk-here-to-stay-in-the-south-china-sea/ |publisher=The Diplomat |access-date=March 2, 2025 |date=September 14, 2018}}
{{cite web |last1=Hemmings |first1=John |title=Charting Britain’s Moves in the South China Sea |url=https://rusi.org/commentary/charting-britain’s-moves-south-china-sea |publisher=Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies |access-date=March 2, 2025 |date=August 6, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806005052/https://rusi.org/commentary/charting-britain%E2%80%99s-moves-south-china-sea|archive-date=August 6, 2020|url-status=dead}} Beijing denounced the Albion mission because it sailed within its territorial waters around the Paracels without seeking prior approval. A spokesperson from the Royal Navy said that "HMS Albion exercised her rights for freedom of navigation in full compliance with international law and norms."{{Cite news |agency=Reuters |date=September 6, 2018 |title=China complains over British warship sailing through disputed South China Sea |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/06/china-complains-over-british-warship-sailing-through-disputed-south-china-sea |access-date=March 13, 2024 |work=The Guardian |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}} The British FONOP has been seen by commentators{{who|date=February 2024}} as a signal that the Royal Navy is likely to be a regular party patrolling the South China Sea.
In June 2019, the Royal Canadian Navy frigate {{HMCS|Regina|FFH 334|6}} and the Canadian replenishment ship {{MV|Asterix}} sailed through the Taiwan Strait northwards towards the East China Sea. They were shadowed by both Chinese and Taiwanese naval and coast guard vessels during the voyage.{{cite web |last1=Fisher |first1=Matthew |title=Canada's Transit of the Taiwan Strait |url=https://www.cgai.ca/canadas_transit_of_the_taiwan_strait |access-date=March 29, 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241111083736/https://www.cgai.ca/canadas_transit_of_the_taiwan_strait |archive-date=November 11, 2024 |date=June 2019 |url-status=live}}
In October 2021 the Royal New Zealand Navy's
{{HMNZS|Te Kaha}} accompanied the UK Carrier Strike Group during a freedom of navigation transit through the South China Sea.{{cite news |last1=Ensor |first1=Jamie |title=New Zealand warship sailing disputed South China Sea as Taiwan warns 'we will fight to end' if China attacks |url=https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2021/10/new-zealand-warship-sailing-disputed-south-china-sea-as-taiwan-warns-we-will-fight-to-end-if-china-attacks.html |access-date=November 27, 2023 |work=Newshub |date=October 6, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220617005140/https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2021/10/new-zealand-warship-sailing-disputed-south-china-sea-as-taiwan-warns-we-will-fight-to-end-if-china-attacks.html |archive-date=June 17, 2022}}
In mid-December 2022 The New Zealand Herald reported that 92 missions flown by Royal New Zealand Air Force fixed-wing aircraft since 2015 had been intercepted by the aircraft of foreign states in the Middle East and East Asia. The identity of these foreign powers and the exact location of these interceptions were withheld on national security grounds under the Official Information Act.{{cite news |last1=Block |first1=George |title=Exclusive: Kiwi Air Force missions repeatedly intercepted by foreign military jets |url=https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/exclusive-kiwi-air-force-missions-repeatedly-intercepted-by-foreign-military-jets/NCTXWT7YSNHAJJBHKNUXBY26OU/|access-date=March 2, 2025 |work=The New Zealand Herald |date=December 19, 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240418041920/https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/exclusive-kiwi-air-force-missions-repeatedly-intercepted-by-foreign-military-jets/NCTXWT7YSNHAJJBHKNUXBY26OU/|archive-date=April 18, 2024|url-status=live}}
In June 2023, {{HMNZS|Te Mana}} was confronted by two People's Liberation Army Navy frigates, helicopters, and four other vessels near the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.{{cite news |last1=Cleave |first1=Louisa |last2=Penfold |first2=Paula |title=NZ frigate confronted by Chinese navy in South China Seas, investigation reveals |url=https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300907470/nz-frigate-confronted-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-seas-investigation-reveals |access-date=November 27, 2023 |work=Stuff |date=June 18, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231107083342/https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/300907470/nz-frigate-confronted-by-chinese-navy-in-south-china-seas-investigation-reveals |archive-date=November 7, 2023}}
On November 24, 2023 The Guardian reported that the Australian warship {{HMAS|Toowoomba|FFH 156|6}} had entered the Taiwan Strait the day prior as part of a FONOP exercise.{{cite news |last1=Karp |first1=Paul |title=Australian warship HMAS Toowoomba sailed through sensitive Taiwan Strait close to China |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/24/taiwan-says-australian-warship-sailed-through-sensitive-taiwan-strait-close-to-china |access-date=March 2, 2025 |work=The Guardian |agency=Reuters |date=November 24, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250218134554/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/24/taiwan-says-australian-warship-sailed-through-sensitive-taiwan-strait-close-to-china|archive-date=February 18, 2025|url-status=live}}
On September 25, 2024, the New Zealand warship {{HMNZS|Aotearoa}} sailed through the Taiwan Strait with {{HMAS|Sydney|DDG 42|6}} as part of a joint exercise with the Japanese Self-Defense Force. This marked the first time since 2017 that a Royal New Zealand Navy vessel had sailed through the Taiwan Strait as part of a FONOP exercise.{{cite web |last1=Thomson |first1=Jono |title=Taiwan Welcomes NZ Navy's First Taiwan Strait Transit in 7 Years |url=https://www.asiamediacentre.org.nz/taiwan-welcomes-nz-navy-s-first-taiwan-strait-transit-in-7-years-say-scholars |website=Asia Media Centre |publisher=Asia New Zealand Foundation |access-date=March 2, 2025 |date=October 16, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250210040804/https://www.asiamediacentre.org.nz/taiwan-welcomes-nz-navy-s-first-taiwan-strait-transit-in-7-years-say-scholars|archive-date=February 10, 2025}}
=Chinese view of FONOPs in South China Sea=
China views FONOPs in the South China Sea, and particularly those undertaken with military vessels, as provocative,{{cite journal |last1=Keyuan |first1=Zou |title=Navigation in the South China Sea:Why Still an Issue? |journal=The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law |date=June 14, 2017 |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=243–267 |doi=10.1163/15718085-12322038 |url=http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/18582/1/18582%20navigation%20in%20the%20scs%202017.pdf }} as they assert that freedom of navigation does not apply to military vessels within foreign EEZs and territorial waters."China’s Territorial and Maritime Disputes in the South and East China Seas:: What Role for International Law?" In China's Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century, 235. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2017. China also claims that FONOPs violate Chinese law, including the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone" and the "Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea".{{Cite web|url=https://amti.csis.org/how-china-can-resolve-fonop-deadlock/|title=How China Can Resolve the FONOP Deadlock in the South China Sea|date=March 1, 2019|website=Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative|language=en-US|access-date=May 31, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190402051158/https://amti.csis.org/how-china-can-resolve-fonop-deadlock/|archive-date=April 2, 2019|url-status=live}} The Chinese Navy and Coast Guard often shadow foreign vessels on FONOPs.{{Cite web|url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2175916/chinese-navy-sent-confront-uss-chancellorsville-latest-south|title=Chinese navy confronts US warship in South China Sea|date=December 1, 2018|website=South China Morning Post|language=en|access-date=May 31, 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190531033835/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2175916/chinese-navy-sent-confront-uss-chancellorsville-latest-south|archive-date=May 31, 2019|url-status=live}}
In late February 2025, the Chinese Navy sent a task group consisting of the Jiangkai-class frigate {{ship|Chinese frigate|Hengyang||2}}, the Renhai-class cruiser {{ship|Chinese destroyer|Zunyi|107|2}} and the Fushi-class replenishment vessel {{ship|Chinese ship|Weishanhu||2}} to conduct live-fire exercises within Australia's exclusive economic zone in the Tasman Sea, disrupting several international flights. Their activities were monitored by the Australian and New Zealand Defence Forces.{{cite web |title=People’s Liberation Army–Navy vessels operating near Australia |url=https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2025-03-01/peoples-liberation-army-navy-vessels-operating-near-australia |website=defence.gov.au |publisher=Australian Department of Defence |access-date=March 2, 2025 |date=March 1, 2025}}{{cite news |title=What we know about the Chinese vessels conducting military exercises in the Tasman Sea |url=https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/chinese/542972/what-we-know-about-the-chinese-vessels-conducting-military-exercises-in-the-tasman-sea |access-date=March 3, 2025 |work=Radio New Zealand |date=February 25, 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250301205625/https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/chinese/542972/what-we-know-about-the-chinese-vessels-conducting-military-exercises-in-the-tasman-sea |archive-date=March 1, 2025}}{{cite news |last1=Doherty |first1=Ben |last2=Dumas |first2=Daisy |title=A murky picture has emerged over China’s live-fire drills. Who knew what when? |url=https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/feb/27/a-murky-picture-has-emerged-over-chinese-live-fire-drills-who-knew-what-when |access-date=March 3, 2025 |work=The Guardian |date=February 26, 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250303081159/https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/feb/27/a-murky-picture-has-emerged-over-chinese-live-fire-drills-who-knew-what-when |archive-date=March 3, 2025}} Australian Financial Review correspondent Jessica Sier, University of Waikato law professor Al Gillespie and an South China Morning Post editorial described the Chinese naval exercise in the Tasman Sea as a response to Australian and New Zealand naval activities in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.{{cite web |last1=Gillespie |first1=Alexander |title=A Chinese own goal? How war games in the Tasman Sea could push NZ closer to AUKUS |url=https://theconversation.com/a-chinese-own-goal-how-war-games-in-the-tasman-sea-could-push-nz-closer-to-aukus-250615 |website=The Conversation |access-date=March 2, 2025 |date=February 24, 2025|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250303104359/https://theconversation.com/a-chinese-own-goal-how-war-games-in-the-tasman-sea-could-push-nz-closer-to-aukus-250615|archive-date=March 3, 2025|url-status=live}}{{cite news |last1=Sier |first1=Jessica |title=China tests Australia’s, Trump’s resolve on Taiwan |url=https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-tests-australia-s-trump-s-resolve-on-taiwan-20250223-p5leff |access-date=March 2, 2025 |work=Australian Financial Review |date=February 23, 2025|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250303104726/https://www.afr.com/world/asia/china-tests-australia-s-trump-s-resolve-on-taiwan-20250223-p5leff|archive-date=March 3, 2025|url-status=live}}{{cite news |title=Editorial: Exercise by China’s PLA Navy sends timely reminder |url=https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3300635/exercise-chinas-pla-navy-sends-timely-reminder |access-date=March 2, 2025 |work=South China Morning Post |date=March 1, 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250303104910/https://www.scmp.com/opinion/article/3300635/exercise-chinas-pla-navy-sends-timely-reminder|archive-date=March 3, 2025|url-status=live}}
See also
- Innocent passage
- Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
- Danube River Conference of 1948
- FONOPs during the Obama Administration
- Freedoms of the air
- Operation Prosperity Guardian US-led multinational coalition in response to attacks on shipping in the Red Sea
Notes
:1.{{note|a}}The exception of contraband implies that the inviolability of neutral ships was never absolute, as the principle still admitted the right of visit and search by belligerents.
References
{{Reflist}}
Sources
- {{cite book|last1=Atherley-Jones|first1=Llewellyn Archer|last2=Bellot|first2=Hugh Hale Leigh|title=Commerce in War|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=B3gNAAAAYAAJ&pg=PP1|year=1907|publisher=Methuen & Company}}
- {{cite book|last1=Dupuy|first1=René Jean|last2=Vignes|first2=Daniel|title=A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea |volume=1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=26gryLXeWwAC&pg=PP1|year=1991|publisher=Martinus Nijhoff Publishers|isbn=0-7923-0924-3}}
External links
- [https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/maritimesecurity/ Maritime Security: Freedom of Navigation (FON) Operations]
- [http://www.fas.org/man/docs/adr_00/apdx_i.htm Freedom of Navigation] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160315212055/http://fas.org/man/docs/adr_00/apdx_i.htm |date=March 15, 2016 }}