information warfare

Information warfare has been described as "the use of information to achieve our national objectives."{{cite web |last1=Stein |first1=George J |title=Information warfare |url=https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=439935 |publisher=Air University (U.S.). Press |access-date=March 26, 2022 |archive-date=November 5, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181105224858/https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=439935 |url-status=live }} According to NATO, "Information war is an operation conducted in order to gain an information advantage over the opponent."{{cite web |title=Information warfare |url=https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/5/pdf/2005-deepportal4-information-warfare.pdf |publisher=NATO |access-date=March 26, 2022 |archive-date=January 2, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210102062507/https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/5/pdf/2005-deepportal4-information-warfare.pdf |url-status=live }}

Information warfare can take many forms:

• Television, internet and radio transmission(s) can be jammed to disrupt communications, or hijacked for a disinformation campaign.
• Logistics networks can be disabled.
• Enemy communications networks can be disabled or spoofed, especially online social communities in modern days.
• Stock exchange transactions can be sabotaged, either with electronic intervention, by leaking sensitive information or by placing disinformation.
• The use of drones and other surveillance robots or webcams.
• Communication management
• Synthetic media
• The organized use of social media and other online content-generation platforms can be used to influence public perceptions.{{Cite book |last1=Haq |first1=Ehsan-Ul |last2=Tyson |first2=Gareth |last3=Braud |first3=Tristan |last4=Hui |first4=Pan |title=Proceedings of the 33rd ACM Conference on Hypertext and Social Media |chapter=Weaponising Social Media for Information Divide and Warfare |date=2022-06-28 |chapter-url=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Weaponising+Social+Media+for+Information+Divide+and+Warfare&btnG= |series=HT '22 |location=New York, NY, USA |publisher=Association for Computing Machinery |pages=259–262 |doi=10.1145/3511095.3536372 |isbn=978-1-4503-9233-4|s2cid=249872702 }} (PDF format)

The United States Air Force has had Information Warfare Squadrons since the 1980s. In fact, the official mission of the U.S. Air Force is now "To fly, fight and win... in air, space and cyberspace",{{cite web|url=http://www.airforce.com/learn-about/our-mission/|title=About the Air Force: Our Mission - airforce.com|access-date=18 February 2015|archive-date=21 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151121053333/http://www.airforce.com/learn-about/our-mission/|url-status=dead}} with the latter referring to its information warfare role.

As the U.S. Air Force often risks aircraft and aircrews to attack strategic enemy communications targets, remotely disabling such targets using software and other means can provide a safer alternative. In addition, disabling such networks electronically (instead of explosively) also allows them to be quickly re-enabled after the enemy territory is occupied. Similarly, counter-information warfare units are employed to deny such capability to the enemy. The first application of these techniques was used against Iraqi communications networks in the Gulf War.

Also during the Gulf War, Dutch hackers allegedly stole information about U.S. troop movements from U.S. Defense Department computers and tried to sell it to the Iraqis, who thought it was a hoax and turned it down.{{Cite web|url=https://apnews.com/9bdfd653327fc9c17e643090f08d1d04|title=Computer security experts: Dutch hackers stole Gulf War secrets|website=AP NEWS|access-date=2019-10-20|archive-date=2019-10-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191020131858/https://apnews.com/9bdfd653327fc9c17e643090f08d1d04|url-status=live}} In January 1999, U.S. Air Intelligence computers were hit by a coordinated attack (Moonlight Maze), part of which came from a Russian mainframe. This could not be confirmed as a Russian cyber attack due to non-attribution – the principle that online identity may not serve as proof of real-world identity.{{cite web |url=http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-513930.html |title=Technology News, Analysis, Comments and Product Reviews for IT Professionals |access-date=2008-03-28 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070525045415/http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-513930.html |archive-date=2007-05-25 }}{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/|title=The Warnings? - Cyber War! - FRONTLINE - PBS|website=PBS|access-date=18 February 2015|archive-date=19 February 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150219024311/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/warnings/|url-status=live}}{{cite journal|url=http://philpapers.org/rec/TADIWA|title=Mariarosaria Taddeo, Information Warfare: A Philosophical Perspective - PhilPapers|author=Mariarosaria Taddeo|year=2012|access-date=18 February 2015|journal=Philosophy & Technology|doi=10.1007/s13347-011-0040-9|hdl=2299/8987|s2cid=17684656|hdl-access=free|archive-date=9 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200809184518/https://philpapers.org/rec/TADIWA|url-status=live}} (journal name added 31 May 2024)

Some militaries are now employing the use of iPhones to upload data and information gathered by drones in the same area.{{cite journal|title=Information Warfare: A Philosophical Perspective|doi=10.1007/s13347-011-0040-9|volume=25|journal=Philosophy & Technology|pages=105–120|author=Taddeo Mariarosaria|year = 2012|url=http://uhra.herts.ac.uk/bitstream/2299/8987/1/904727.pdf|hdl=2299/8987|s2cid=17684656|hdl-access=free}}{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/25/world/middleeast/obama-worried-about-effects-of-waging-cyberwar-in-syria.html|title=Syria War Stirs New U.S. Debate on Cyberattacks|author= DAVID E. SANGER |newspaper=The New York Times|access-date=18 February 2015|date=2014-02-24}}

File:Pro-Russian_bot_farm_in_Ukraine_(2022).jpg captured by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the Russian invasion of Ukraine]]

{{Excerpt|Chinese information operations and information warfare|paragraphs=1}}

{{Main|Russian information war against Ukraine|Disinformation in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine}}

In 2022, the Armed Forces of Ukraine took advantage of deficiencies in Russian communications by allowing them to piggyback on Ukrainian networks, connect, and communicate. Ukrainian forces then eavesdrop and cut off Russian communications at a crucial part of the conversation.{{efn |name= gerasimovKilled |1= Connectivity to GLONASS may be a factor in the lack of Russian PGM availability, and the use of 3G/4G cell towers for Russian encrypted communications (Era)

Rob Waugh (8 Mar 2022) [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-military-being-hacked-after-its-own-soldiers-destroy-3-g-internet-towers-104303881.html 'Idiots': Russian military phone calls hacked after own soldiers destroy 3G towers] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220411122434/https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-military-being-hacked-after-its-own-soldiers-destroy-3-g-internet-towers-104303881.html |date=2022-04-11 }} 3G/4G Towers Needed For Russian encrypted communications (Era) during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. This weakness was unearthed during the use of open communication ("Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate")MEHUL SRIVASTAVA, MADHUMITA MURGIA, AND HANNAH MURPHY, FT (3/9/2022, 8:33 AM) [https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/03/the-secret-us-mission-to-bolster-ukraines-cyber-defences-ahead-of-russias-invasion/ The secret US mission to bolster Ukraine’s cyber defences ahead of Russia’s invasion ] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220331160211/https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/03/the-secret-us-mission-to-bolster-ukraines-cyber-defences-ahead-of-russias-invasion/ |date=2022-03-31 }} European official: "instead of communicating solely through encrypted military-grade phones, Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate, at times simply by using their Russian cell phones.

'The Ukrainians love it—there is so much data in simply watching these phones, whether or not they are using encrypted apps,' he said.

The Ukrainians then block Russian phones from their local networks at key moments, further jamming their communications. 'Then you suddenly see Russian soldiers grabbing cell phones off Ukrainians on the street, raiding repair shops for sims,' he said. 'This is not sophisticated stuff. It’s quite puzzling." when FSB was discussing the deaths of their generals: Vitaly Gerasimov, killed 7 Mar 2022;Rob Picheta and Jack Guy, CNN [https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/08/europe/russian-general-killed-ukraine-kharkiv-intl/index.html (8 Mar 2022) Ukraine claims Russian general has been killed in Kharkiv] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220316194853/https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/08/europe/russian-general-killed-ukraine-kharkiv-intl/index.html |date=16 March 2022 }} Andrei Sukhovetsky, killed 28 Feb 2022.Doug Cunningham [https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2022/03/03/ukraine-russia-invasion-chechen-magomed-tushayev-killed/9981646322278/ (3 Mar 2022) Ukraine forces say Chechen commander Magomed Tushayev killed near Kyiv] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220411123119/https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2022/03/03/ukraine-russia-invasion-chechen-magomed-tushayev-killed/9981646322278/ |date=11 April 2022 }}Jamie Ross, who cites Christo Grozev of Bellingcat: (Tue, March 8, 2022, 5:32 AM) [https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-officer-complains-dead-general-113255353.html (7 March 2022) Russian Officer Complains About Dead General and Comms Meltdown in Intercepted Call] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230408154103/https://www.yahoo.com/news/russian-officer-complains-dead-general-113255353.html |date=8 April 2023 }} FSB (Federal Security Service, successor agency to the KGB) officers discuss Gerasimov's death amid the destruction of 3G/4G cell towers in Ukraine, and the loss of Russian encrypted communications (Era), which compromised the FSB officer's sim-card-enabled phone call. }}

To build support before it invaded Ukraine, Russia perpetuated a narrative that claimed the Ukrainian government was committing violence against its own Russian speaking population. By publishing large amounts of disinformation on the internet, the alternate narrative was picked up in search results, such as Google News.{{Cite web |last=Wirtschafter |first=Jessica Brandt and Valerie |date=2022-03-01 |title=The surprising performance of Kremlin propaganda on Google News |url=https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-surprising-performance-of-kremlin-propaganda-on-google-news/ |access-date=2022-05-24 |website=Brookings |language=en-US |archive-date=2022-05-24 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220524010855/https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-surprising-performance-of-kremlin-propaganda-on-google-news/ |url-status=live }}

Russian interference in foreign elections, most notably the Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections, has been described as information warfare.{{Cite web |date=2021-07-03 |title=Rosyjska ingerencja w amerykańskie wybory prezydenckie w latach 2016 i 2020 jako próba realizacji rewolucyjnego scenariusza walki informacyjnej |url=https://warsawinstitute.org/pl/rosyjska-ingerencja-w-amerykanskie-wybory-prezydenckie-w-latach-2016-2020-jako-proba-realizacji-rewolucyjnego-scenariusza-walki-informacyjnej/ |access-date=2022-04-28 |website=Warsaw Institute |language=pl-PL |archive-date=2022-05-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220522210934/https://warsawinstitute.org/pl/rosyjska-ingerencja-w-amerykanskie-wybory-prezydenckie-w-latach-2016-2020-jako-proba-realizacji-rewolucyjnego-scenariusza-walki-informacyjnej/ |url-status=live }}{{Cite journal |last=Wojnowski |first=Michał |date=2019 |title=Wybory prezydenckie jako narzędzie destabilizacji państw w teorii i praktyce rosyjskich operacji informacyjno-psychologicznych w XX i XXI w. |url=http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-9bf76b2c-49d8-49ce-a074-fc29ff925098 |journal=Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego |language=PL |volume=11 |issue=21 |pages=13–43 |issn=2080-1335 |access-date=2022-04-28 |archive-date=2022-04-28 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220428082428/http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-9bf76b2c-49d8-49ce-a074-fc29ff925098 |url-status=live }} According to Microsoft, Russia also interfered in the 2024 US presidential elections.{{Cite web |last=Farrell |first=James |title=Russia's 2024 Election Influence Campaign Has Started, Microsoft Analysis Finds |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesfarrell/2024/04/17/russias-2024-election-influence-campaign-has-started-microsoft-analysis-finds/ |access-date=2024-06-13 |website=Forbes |language=en |archive-date=2024-05-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240530210837/https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesfarrell/2024/04/17/russias-2024-election-influence-campaign-has-started-microsoft-analysis-finds/ |url-status=live }} NBC also reported Russia conducting disinformation campaigns in the 2024 US elections against then US president, Joe Biden.

Research suggests that Russia and the West are also engaged in an information war. For instance, Russia believes that the West is undermining its leader through the encouragement of overthrowing authoritarian regimes and liberal values. In response, Russia promotes the anti-liberal sentiments, including racism, antisemitism, homophobia, and misogyny.{{Cite journal |last=Sohl |first=Ben |date=2022 |title=Discolored Revolutions: Information Warfare ins Russia's Grand Strategy |url=https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2019/03/Sohl_45-1_TWQ.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220425215524/https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2019/03/Sohl_45-1_TWQ.pdf |archive-date=25 April 2022 |journal=The Washington Quarterly |volume=45 |issue=1 |pages=97–111|doi=10.1080/0163660X.2022.2057113 |s2cid=248393195 }} Russia has sought to promote the idea that the American democratic state is failing.

The Telegraph reported in 2024 that China and Russia were promoting pro-Palestinian influencers in order to manipulate British public opinion in favor of Russian and Chinese interests.{{Cite news |last1=Turner |first1=Camilla |last2=Lisbona |first2=Natalie |date=2024-05-18 |title=Russia and China 'manipulating UK public opinion by promoting pro-Palestinian influencers' |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/05/18/russia-china-manipulate-uk-public-opinion-pro-palestine/ |access-date=2024-06-04 |work=The Telegraph |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235 |archive-date=2024-06-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240604105618/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2024/05/18/russia-china-manipulate-uk-public-opinion-pro-palestine/ |url-status=live }} NBC reported that Russia was using different tools to cause division within the US, by delegitimizing US police operations against Pro Palestinian protests and by pivoting public conversation from the Russian invasion in Ukraine to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.{{Cite web |date=2024-04-30 |title=Russia is trying to exploit America's divisions over the war in Gaza |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/russia-trying-exploit-americas-divisions-war-gaza-rcna149759 |access-date=2024-06-13 |website=NBC News |language=en |archive-date=2024-06-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240613005448/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/russia-trying-exploit-americas-divisions-war-gaza-rcna149759 |url-status=live }} Russian media activity increased by 400% in the weeks after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel.

According to a report by Reuters, the United States ran a propaganda campaign to spread disinformation about the Sinovac Chinese COVID-19 vaccine, including using fake social media accounts to spread the disinformation that the Sinovac vaccine contained pork-derived ingredients and was therefore haram under Islamic law.{{Cite news |last1=Bing |first1=Chris |last2=Schechtman |first2=Joel |date=June 14, 2024 |title=Pentagon Ran Secret Anti-Vax Campaign to Undermine China during Pandemic |url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-covid-propaganda/ |work=Reuters}} The campaign was described as "payback" for COVID-19 disinformation by China directed against the U.S.{{Cite web |last=Toropin |first=Konstantin |date=2024-06-14 |title=Pentagon Stands by Secret Anti-Vaccination Disinformation Campaign in Philippines After Reuters Report |url=https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/06/14/pentagon-stands-secret-anti-vaccination-disinformation-campaign-philippines-after-reuters-report.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240614223757/https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/06/14/pentagon-stands-secret-anti-vaccination-disinformation-campaign-philippines-after-reuters-report.html |archive-date=2024-06-14 |access-date=2024-06-19 |website=Military.com |language=en}} The campaign ran from 2020 to mid-2021, primarily targeting people in the Philippines and used a social media hashtag for "China is the virus" in Tagalog. The primary contractor for the U.S. military on the project was General Dynamics IT, which received $493 million for its role.

While information warfare has yielded many advances in the types of attack that a government can make, it has also raised concerns about the moral and legal ambiguities surrounding this particularly new form of war. Traditionally, wars have been analyzed by moral scholars according to just war theory. However, with Information Warfare, Just War Theory fails because the theory is based on the traditional conception of war. Information Warfare has three main issues surrounding it compared to traditional warfare:

1. The risk for the party or nation initiating the cyberattack is substantially lower than the risk for a party or nation initiating a traditional attack. This makes it easier for governments, as well as potential terrorist or criminal organizations, to make these attacks more frequently than they could with traditional war.{{Cite journal|last1=Ajir|first1=Media|last2=Vailliant|first2=Bethany|date=2018|title=Russian Information Warfare: Implications for Deterrence Theory|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26481910|journal=Strategic Studies Quarterly|volume=12|issue=3|pages=70–89|jstor=26481910|issn=1936-1815|access-date=2020-10-31|archive-date=2021-02-09|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210209193856/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26481910|url-status=live}} {{open access}}
2. Information communication technologies (ICT) are so immersed in the modern world that a very wide range of technologies are at risk of a cyberattack. Specifically, civilian technologies can be targeted for cyberattacks and attacks can even potentially be launched through civilian computers or websites. As such, it is harder to enforce control of civilian infrastructures than a physical space. Attempting to do so would also raise many ethical concerns about the right to privacy, making defending against such attacks even tougher.
3. The mass-integration of ICT into our system of war makes it much harder to assess accountability for situations that may arise when using robotic and/or cyber attacks. For robotic weapons and automated systems, it's becoming increasingly hard to determine who is responsible for any particular event that happens. This issue is exacerbated in the case of cyberattacks, as sometimes it is virtually impossible to trace who initiated the attack in the first place.

Recently, legal concerns have arisen centered on these issues, specifically the issue of the right to privacy in the United States of America. Lt. General Keith B. Alexander, who served as the head of Cyber Command under President Barack Obama, noted that there was a "mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies" when writing to the Senate Armed Services Committee. A key point of concern was the targeting of civilian institutions for cyberattacks, to which the general promised to try to maintain a mindset similar to that of traditional war, in which they will seek to limit the impact on civilians.{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/world/15military.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100419041052/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/15/world/15military.html |archive-date=19 April 2010 |url-status=live |title=Cyberwar Nominee Sees Gaps in Law|date=15 April 2010|work=The New York Times}}

{{div col|colwidth=20em}}

• Active measures
• Black propaganda
• Character assassination
• Cyberwarfare
• Communications security
• Command and control warfare
• Disinformation
• Electronic warfare
• Historical revisionism
• Historical negationism
• Fake news
• Fifth Dimension Operations
• Gatekeeper (politics)
• Industrial espionage
• Information assurance
• Information operations
• Internet manipulation
• Irregular warfare
• iWar
• Kompromat
• List of cyber warfare forces
• Network-centric warfare
• New generation warfare
• Political warfare
• Propaganda
• Psychological warfare
• Public affairs (military)
• Public relations
• Storm botnet
• Transparency

{{div col end}}

Group specific:

{{div col|colwidth=20em}}

• Chinese information operations and information warfare
• Cyberwarfare in Russia
• Taliban propaganda
• White Paper on El Salvador

{{div col end}}

US specific:

{{div col|colwidth=20em}}

• Active Measures Working Group
• CIA
• COINTELPRO
• Edward Bernays
• Enemy Image, a documentary about the Pentagon's approach to news coverage of war
• Information Operations Roadmap
• Information Operations (United States)
• Pentagon military analyst program
• State-sponsored Internet propaganda
• Titan Rain

{{div col end}}

{{Notelist}}

{{Reflist|30em}}

• Jerome Clayton Glenn, "Future Mind" Chapter 9. Defense p. 195-201. Acropolis Books LTD, Washington, DC (1989)
• Winn Schwartau, "Information Warfare: Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway" Thunder's Mouth Press (1993)
• Winn Schwartau, ed, Information Warfare: Cyberterrorism: Protecting your personal security in the electronic age, Thunder's Mouth Press, 2nd ed, (1996) ({{ISBN|1560251328}}).
• John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR880/ In Athena's Camp], RAND (1997).
• Dorothy Denning, Information Warfare and Security, Addison-Wesley (1998) ({{ISBN|0201433036}}).
• James Adams, The Next World War: Computers are the Weapons and the Front line is Everywhere, Simon and Schuster (1998) ({{ISBN|0684834529}}).
• Edward Waltz, Information Warfare Principles and Operations, Artech House, 1998, {{ISBN|0-89006-511-X}}
• John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382/ Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy], RAND (2001) ({{ISBN|0833030302}}).
• Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter Books, New York (2010) ({{ISBN|978-1594032233}}). Information/intelligence warfare.
• Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace, MIT Press (2001) ({{ISBN|0262182092}}).
• Anthony H. Cordesman, Cyber-threats, Information Warfare, and Critical Infrastructure Protection: DEFENDING THE US HOMELAND (2002) ({{ISBN|0275974235}}).
• Leigh Armistead, Information Operations: The Hard Reality of Soft Power, Joint Forces Staff College and the National Security Agency (2004) ({{ISBN|1574886991}}).
• Thomas Rid, War and Media Operations: The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq, Routledge (2007) ({{ISBN|0415416590}}).

• [https://web.archive.org/web/20060624064110/http://www.historychannel.com/exhibits/science_war/iwar.html Science at War: Information Warfare], The History Channel (1998).

{{Library resources box}}{{External links|date=September 2022}}{{Commons category}}

• [https://web.archive.org/web/20080227132540/http://www.aracnet.com/~kea/Papers/Politically%20Motivated%20Computer%20Crime.pdf Hacktivism and Politically Motivated Computer Crime] (PDF)
• [http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/ Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071031020808/http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/ |date=2007-10-31 }}, Air University, U.S. Air Force.
• [http://www.iwar.org.uk IWS - The Information Warfare Site]
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20080424011010/http://infowar-monitor.net/index.php Information Warfare Monitor - Tracking Cyberpower (University of Toronto, Canada/Munk Centre)]
• [https://twitter.com/InfowarMonitor Twitter: InfowarMonitor]
• [http://www.psycom.net/iwar.1.html Information Warfare, I-War, IW, C4I, Cyberwar]
• [http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwinfo.html Federation of American Scientists - IW Resources] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071014012001/http://www.fas.org/irp/wwwinfo.html |date=2007-10-14 }}
• Association of Old Crows http://www.crows.org The Electronic Warfare and Information Operations Association.
• [http://www.c4i.org C4I.org - Computer Security & Intelligence]
• [http://www.ausairpower.net/iw.html Information Warfare, Information Operations and Electronic Attack Capabilities] Air Power Australia.
• [http://sites.nationalacademies.org/CSTB/CurrentProjects/CSTB_042220 Committee on Policy Consequences and Legal/Ethical Implications of Offensive Information Warfare] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170611090608/http://sites.nationalacademies.org/CSTB/CurrentProjects/CSTB_042220 |date=2017-06-11 }}, The National Academies.
• [http://www.information-warfare.info/ Program on Information and Warfare], Global Information Society Project, World Policy Institute.
• [http://www.informationwarriors.net Information Warriors] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201027092647/http://www.informationwarriors.net/ |date=2020-10-27 }} Information Warriors is web forum dedicated to the discussion of Navy Information Warfare.
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20110714044403/http://www.mastermind-technology.com/Sources/InfoWarfare.pdf Mastermind Corporation Information Warfare Tactics Analysis] (PDF)
• [http://www.csse.monash.edu/~carlo/infowar-in-biology.html Information Warfare in Biology] Nature's Exploitation of Information to Win Survival Contests, Monash University, Computer Science.

• [https://web.archive.org/web/20060902190923/http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/cosc511/ COSC 511] Information Warfare: Terrorism, Crime, and National Security @ Department of Computer Science, Georgetown University (1997–2002) (Dorothy Denning).
• [http://www.csse.monash.edu/~carlo/InfoWar/index.html CSE468] Information Conflict (Honours) @ School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Monash University (2006) (Carlo Kopp).
• [http://www.information-retrieval.info/cybercrime/#Anchor-44867 Information Warfare, Cyberterrorism, and Hacktivism] from Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism and Digital Law Enforcement, New York Law School.

• Col Andrew Borden, USAF (Ret.), [https://web.archive.org/web/20070819081148/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/borden.html What is Information Warfare?] Aerospace Power Chronicles (1999).
• Dr Carlo Kopp, [http://www.ausairpower.net/OSR-0200.html A Fundamental Paradigm of Infowar] (February 2000).
• [http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/theory.htm Research & Theory Links] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071030195017/http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/theory.htm |date=2007-10-30 }}, Cyberspace and Information Operations Study Center, Air War College, Air University, U.S. Air Force.
• Lachlan Brumley et al., [http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2012-02.html Cutting Through the Tangled Web: An Information-Theoretic Perspective on Information Warfare] (October 2012).
• {{cite web |last=Galeotti |first=Mark |title=I'm Sorry for Creating the 'Gerasimov Doctrine' |date=5 March 2018 |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/ |website=Foreign Policy |publisher=Slate Group |access-date=19 March 2022}}
• {{cite journal |last=Galeotti |first=Mark |title=The mythical 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and the language of threat |journal=Critical Studies on Security |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623 |issn=2162-4887 |publisher=Informa UK Limited |volume=7 |issue=2 |date=2018 |pages=157–161 |doi=10.1080/21624887.2018.1441623 |s2cid=159811828 |oclc=8319522816|url-access=subscription }}
• Michael MacDonald (2012) "[https://www.academia.edu/38592708/Black_Logos_Rhetoric_and_Information_Warfare Black Logos: Rhetoric and Information Warfare]", pages 189–220 in Literature, Rhetoric and Values: Selected Proceedings of a Conference held at University of Waterloo, 3–5 June 2011, editors Shelley Hulan, Murray McArthur and Randy Allen Harris, Cambridge Scholars Publishing {{ISBN|978-1-4438-4175-7}} .
• Taddeo, Mariarosaria (2012). Information Warfare: A Philosophical Perspective. Philosophy and Technology 25 (1):105-120.

• [http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1677/IO_in_the_21st_Century.doc. An essay on Information Operations by Zachary P. Hubbard]{{Dead link|date=January 2020 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} ([https://universityofleeds.github.io/philtaylorpapers/pmt/exhibits/1677/IO_in_the_21st_Century.doc Also Here] (Doc file) from [https://universityofleeds.github.io/philtaylorpapers/vp016efa.html this page] - working link added 31 May 2024)

• [https://web.archive.org/web/20071112211859/http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=37185&dcn=e_ndw Army, Air Force seek to go on offensive in cyber war], GovExec.com (June 13, 2007).
• [https://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSJOH45001020070614 NATO says urgent need to tackle cyber attack], Reuters (June 14, 2007).
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20070617124850/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/06/15/wcyber115.xml America prepares for 'cyber war' with China], Telegraph.uk.co (June 15, 2007).
• [https://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/15/cyber_war_screaming_fist/ NATO, US gear up for cyberpunk warfare], The Register (June 15, 2007).

• [http://information-retrieval.info/docs/DoD-IO.html Information Operations Roadmap (DOD 2003)]
• [http://information-retrieval.info/docs/DoD-IO.html Information Operations (JP 3-13 2006)]
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20090924101325/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13_3.pdf Operations Security (JP 3-13.3)] (PDF)
• [https://web.archive.org/web/20080307042755/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13_4.pdf Military Deception (JP 3-13.4)] (PDF)
• [http://information-retrieval.info/docs/DoD-IO.html Joint Doctrine for PSYOP (JP 3-53 2003)]
• [http://information-retrieval.info/docs/DoD-IO.html Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs (JP 3-61 2005)]
• [http://counterterrorism.information-warfare.info/ Destabilizing Terrorist Networks: Disrupting and Manipulating Information Flows in the Global War on Terrorism], Yale Information Society Project Conference Paper (2005).
• [http://www.information-retrieval.info/papers/symmetry/CAS-BANTLE-POSTED.pdf Seeking Symmetry in Fourth Generation Warfare: Information Operations in the War of Ideas], Presentation (PDF slides) to the Bantle - Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT) Symposium, Syracuse University (2006).
• K. A. Taipale, [http://ssrn.com/abstract=987040 Seeking Symmetry on the Information Front: Confronting Global Jihad on the Internet], 16 National Strategy F. Rev. 14 (Summer 2007).

{{Media manipulation}}{{Information security}}{{Military deception}}

{{Intelligence cycle management}}

{{Authority control}}

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Category:Propaganda in the United States

Category:Propaganda techniques using information

Category:Psychological warfare techniques

Category:21st-century conflicts

Category:Disinformation