Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized government power maintained by political repression and the exclusion of potential or supposed challengers by armed force. It uses political parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the regime.Theodore M. Vesta, [{{Google books|plainurl=yes|id=XWXtXOl56KkC&c|page=17}} Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State]. Greenwood, 1999, p. 17. Adam Przeworski has theorized that "authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear and economic prosperity."{{cite book|title=Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America|url=https://archive.org/details/democracymarket00prze|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/democracymarket00prze/page/58 58]|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year= 1991|isbn=978-0-521-42335-9|first=Adam|last=Przeworski}}

Authoritarianism also tends to embrace the informal and unregulated exercise of political power, a leadership that is "self-appointed and even if elected cannot be displaced by citizens' free choice among competitors", the arbitrary deprivation of civil liberties and little tolerance for meaningful opposition. A range of social controls also attempt to stifle civil society while political stability is maintained by control over and support of the armed forces, a bureaucracy staffed by the regime and creation of allegiance through various means of socialization and indoctrination. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart identify authoritarianism in politicians and political parties by looking for values of security, conformity, and obedience.{{Cite book |last1=Norris |first1=Pippa |title=Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and the rise of authoritarian-populism |last2=Inglehart |first2=Ronald |date=2018 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-42607-7 |location=New York, NY |pages=14}}

Authoritarianism is marked by "indefinite political tenure" of the ruler or ruling party (often in a one-party state) or other authority. The transition from an authoritarian system to a more democratic form of government is referred to as democratization.

Authoritarian regimes often adopt "the institutional trappings" of democracies such as constitutions.Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, "The Political Economy of Autocratic Constitutions", in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 80. Constitutions in authoritarian states may serve a variety of roles, including "operating manual" (describing how the government is to function); "billboard" (signal of regime's intent), "blueprint" (outline of future regime plans), and "window dressing" (material designed to obfuscate, such as provisions setting forth freedoms that are not honored in practice).Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 3–10. Authoritarian constitutions may help legitimize, strengthen, and consolidate regimes.Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 54. An authoritarian constitution "that successfully coordinates government action and defines popular expectations can also help consolidate the regime's grip on power by inhibiting re coordination on a different set of arrangements."Davis S. Law & Mila Versteeg, "Constitutional Variation Among Strains of Authoritarianism" in Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 173. Unlike democratic constitutions, authoritarian constitutions do not set direct limits on executive authority; however, in some cases such documents may function as ways for elites to protect their own property rights or constrain autocrats' behavior.Michael Albertus & Victor Menaldo, Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes (eds. Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 54, 80.

The Soviet Russia Constitution of 1918, the first charter of the new Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was described by Vladimir Lenin as a "revolutionary" document. It was, he said, unlike any constitution drafted by a nation-state.{{Cite web|url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/constitution-1918|title=Constitution of 1918|website=Encyclopedia.com|access-date=30 May 2022|archive-date=5 August 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200805084630/https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/constitution-1918|url-status=live}} The concept of "authoritarian constitutionalism" has been developed by legal scholar Mark Tushnet.Tushnet, Mark (January 2015). [https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4654&context=clr "Authoritarian Constitutionalism"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200117092344/https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4654&context=clr |date=2020-01-17 }}. Cornell Law Review. Cambridge University Press. 100 (2): 36–50. {{doi|10.1017/CBO9781107252523.004}}. Tushnet distinguishes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes from "liberal constitutionalist" regimes ("the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices") and from purely authoritarian regimes (which reject the idea of human rights or constraints on leaders' power). He describes authoritarian constitutionalist regimes as (1) authoritarian dominant-party states that (2) impose sanctions (such as libel judgments) against, but do not arbitrarily arrest, political dissidents; (3) permit "reasonably open discussion and criticism of its policies"; (4) hold "reasonably free and fair elections", without systemic intimidation, but "with close attention to such matters as the drawing of election districts and the creation of party lists to ensure as best it can that it will prevail{{snd}}and by a substantial margin"; (5) reflect at least occasional responsiveness to public opinion; and (6) create "mechanisms to ensure that the amount of dissent does not exceed the level it regards as desirable." Tushnet cites Singapore as an example of an authoritarian constitutionalist state, and connects the concept to that of hybrid regimes.

Scholars such as Seymour Lipset,{{cite journal|last=Lipset|first=Seymour Martin|s2cid=53686238|date=1959|title=Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy|journal=The American Political Science Review|volume=53|issue=1|pages=69–105|doi=10.2307/1951731|issn=0003-0554|jstor=1951731}} Carles Boix, Susan Stokes,{{cite journal|last1=Boix|first1=Carles|last2=Stokes|first2=Susan C.|date=July 2003|title=Endogenous Democratization|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=55|issue=4|pages=517–549|doi=10.1353/wp.2003.0019|s2cid=18745191|issn=0043-8871}} Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens{{cite book|title=Capitalist Development and Democracy|publisher=University Of Chicago Press|year=1992}} argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a democracy).{{cite journal|last1=Przeworski|first1=Adam|last2=Limongi|first2=Fernando|date=1997|title=Modernization: Theories and Facts|journal=World Politics|volume=49|issue=2|pages=155–183|issn=0043-8871|jstor=25053996|doi=10.1353/wp.1997.0004|s2cid=5981579}}

Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances the bourgeoise and labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other circumstances.{{cite journal|last=Bellin|first=Eva|date=January 2000|title=Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=52|issue=2|pages=175–205|doi=10.1017/S0043887100002598|s2cid=54044493|issn=1086-3338}} Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term.{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/voting-for-autocracy/F6671D230EC7C458A30035ADB20F9289|title=Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico|last=Magaloni|first=Beatriz|year=2006|publisher=Cambridge Core|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511510274|isbn=978-0-511-51027-4|language=en|access-date=2019-12-17|archive-date=2020-04-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200405121924/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/voting-for-autocracy/F6671D230EC7C458A30035ADB20F9289|url-status=live}}

According to Michael Albertus, most land reform programs tend to be implemented by authoritarian regimes that subsequently withhold property rights from the beneficiaries of the land reform. Authoritarian regimes do so to gain coercive leverage over rural populations.{{Cite book|last=Albertus|first=Michael|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/property-without-rights/C9DDCF77AE8E55C573242F4552A8DDA2|title=Property without Rights: Origins and Consequences of the Property Rights Gap|date=2021|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-83523-7|doi=10.1017/9781108891950|s2cid=241385526|archive-date=4 April 2023|access-date=12 March 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404082007/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/property-without-rights/C9DDCF77AE8E55C573242F4552A8DDA2|url-status=live}}

Authoritarian regimes typically incorporate similar political institutions to that of democratic regimes, such as legislatures and judiciaries, although they may serve different purposes. Democratic regimes are marked by institutions that are essential to economic development and individual freedom, including representative legislatures and competitive political parties.{{cite book |last1=Frantz |first1=Erica |title=Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know |date=4 September 2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York, NY |doi=10.1093/wentk/9780190880194.003.0005 |isbn=978-0-19-088019-4 |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/wentk/9780190880194.003.0005 |access-date=3 March 2023}}{{cite web |last1=Pei |first1=Minxin |title=Economic Institutions, Democracy, and Development |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/1999/02/economic-institutions-democracy-and-development?lang=en |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |access-date=3 March 2023}} Most authoritarian regimes embrace these political structures, but use it in a way that reinforces their power. Authoritarian legislatures, for example, are forums through which leaders may enhance their bases of support, share power, and monitor elites.{{cite journal |last1=Bonvecchi |first1=Alejandro |last2=Simison |first2=Emilia |title=Legislative Institutions and Performance in Authoritarian Regimes. |journal=Comparative Politics |date=1 July 2017 |volume=49 |issue=4 |pages=521–544 |doi=10.5129/001041517821273099 |url=https://doi.org/10.5129/001041517821273099 |access-date=3 March 2023|hdl=11336/76721 |hdl-access=free }} Additionally, authoritarian party systems are extremely unstable and unconducive to party development, largely due to monopolistic patterns of authority.{{cite journal |last1=Golosov |first1=Grigorii V. |title=Authoritarian Party Systems: Patterns of Emergence, Sustainability and Survival |journal=Comparative Sociology |date=1 January 2013 |volume=12 |issue=5 |pages=617–644 |doi=10.1163/15691330-12341274 |url=https://doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341274 |access-date=3 March 2023}} Judiciaries may be present in authoritarian states where they serve to repress political challengers, institutionalize punishment, and undermine the rule of law.{{Cite book |last=Shen-Bayh |first=Fiona Feiang |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/undue-process/D4FFC5257A81B574BA91D141712CB1B8 |title=Undue Process: Persecution and Punishment in Autocratic Courts |date=2022 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-009-19713-7 |doi=10.1017/9781009197151 |archive-date=27 May 2024 |access-date=27 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240527181504/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/undue-process/D4FFC5257A81B574BA91D141712CB1B8 |url-status=live }}

Democratic and authoritarian arguably differ most prominently in their elections. Democratic elections are generally inclusive, competitive, and fair.{{cite journal |last1=Kirkpatrick |first1=Jeane J. |title=Democratic Elections and Government |journal=World Affairs |date=1984 |volume=147 |issue=2 |pages=61–69 |jstor=20672013 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672013 |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=11 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311184226/https://www.jstor.org/stable/20672013 |url-status=live }} In most instances, the elected leader is appointed to act on behalf of the general will. Authoritarian elections, on the other hand, are frequently subject to fraud and extreme constraints on the participation of opposing parties. Autocratic leaders employ tactics like murdering political opposition and paying election monitors to ensure victory.{{cite journal |last1=Magaloni |first1=Beatriz |title=The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule. |journal=American Journal of Political Science |date=21 June 2010 |volume=54 |issue=3 |pages=751–765 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00458.x |url=https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00458.x |access-date=3 March 2023}} The proportion of authoritarian regimes with elections and support parties has risen in recent years. This is largely due to the increasing popularity of democracies and electoral autocracies, leading authoritarian regimes to imitate democratic regimes in hopes of receiving foreign aid and dodging criticism.{{cite journal |last1=Herre |first1=Bastian |last2=Ortiz-Ospina |first2=Esteban |title=Democracy |url=https://ourworldindata.org/democracy?insight=the-world-has-become-much-more-democratic-over-the-last-t |journal=Our World in Data |date=15 March 2013 |access-date=3 March 2023 |archive-date=11 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230311184003/https://ourworldindata.org/democracy?insight=the-world-has-become-much-more-democratic-over-the-last-t |url-status=live }} Flawed elections also give authoritarians a controlled way to monitor public sentiment.{{Cite journal |last1=Gehlbach |first1=Scott |last2=Luo |first2=Zhaotian |last3=Shirikov |first3=Anton |last4=Vorobyev |first4=Dmitriy |date=2025 |title=Is there really a dictator's dilemma? Information and repression in autocracy |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12952 |journal=American Journal of Political Science |language=en |doi=10.1111/ajps.12952 |issn=1540-5907 |archive-date=11 February 2025 |access-date=11 February 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250211140624/https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12952 |url-status=live }}

According to a 2018 study, most party-led dictatorships regularly hold popular elections. Prior to the 1990s, most of these elections had no alternative parties or candidates for voters to choose. Since the end of the Cold War, about two-thirds of elections in authoritarian systems allow for some opposition, but the elections are structured in a way to heavily favor the incumbent authoritarian regime.{{Cite book|last1=Geddes|first1=Barbara|title=How Dictatorships Work|last2=Wright|first2=Joseph|last3=Frantz|first3=Erica|date=2018|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-316-33618-2|pages=137–140|doi=10.1017/9781316336182|s2cid=226899229}} In 2020, almost half of all authoritarian systems had multi-party governments.{{Cite journal |last1=Bokobza |first1=Laure |last2=Nyrup |first2=Jacob |date=2024 |title=Authoritarian multiparty governments |journal=Democratization |volume=31 |issue=8 |pages=1669–1694 |language=en |doi=10.1080/13510347.2024.2338858 |pmid=39611165 |issn=1351-0347|pmc=11601049 }} Cabinet appointments by an authoritarian regime to outsiders can consolidate their rule by dividing the opposition and co-opting outsiders.

Hindrances to free and fair elections in authoritarian systems may include:

• Control of the media by the authoritarian incumbents.
• Interference with opposition campaigning.
• Electoral fraud.
• Violence against opposition.
• Large-scale spending by the state in favor of the incumbents.
• Permitting of some parties, but not others.
• Prohibitions on opposition parties, but not independent candidates.
• Allowing competition between candidates within the incumbent party, but not those who are not in the incumbent party.

The foundations of stable authoritarian rule are that the authoritarian prevents contestation from the masses and other elites. The authoritarian regime may use co-optation or repression (or carrots and sticks) to prevent revolts.{{Cite book|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/coercive-distribution/9C80A3A49C2197C4A7A01BC39E104A67|title=Coercive Distribution by Michael Albertus|last1=Albertus|first1=Michael|last2=Fenner|first2=Sofia|date=2018|website=Elements in the Politics of Development|language=en|access-date=5 November 2019|last3=Slater|first3=Dan|doi=10.1017/9781108644334|isbn=978-1-108-64433-4|archive-date=25 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200425034222/https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/coercive-distribution/9C80A3A49C2197C4A7A01BC39E104A67|url-status=live}} Authoritarian rule entails a balancing act whereby the ruler has to maintain the support of other elites (frequently through the distribution of state and societal resources) and the support of the public (through distribution of the same resources): the authoritarian rule is at risk if the balancing act is lopsided, as it risks a coup by the elites or an uprising by the mass public.{{Cite book|last=Frye|first=Timothy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qdoBEAAAQBAJ|title=Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia|date=2021|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-21698-0|language=en}}{{Cite book|last1=Mesquita|first1=Bruce Bueno de|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1PlRlcgQdpMC|title=The Logic of Political Survival|last2=Smith|first2=Alastair|last3=Morrow|first3=James D.|last4=Siverson|first4=Randolph M.|date=2005|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-52440-7|language=en}}

{{main|Political censorship|Propaganda}}

According to a 2019 study by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, authoritarian regimes have over time become less reliant on violence and mass repression to maintain control. The study shows instead that authoritarians have increasingly resorted to manipulation of information as a means of control. Authoritarians increasingly seek to create an appearance of good performance, conceal state repression, and imitate democracy.{{Cite journal|last1=Guriev|first1=Sergei|last2=Treisman|first2=Daniel|author1-link=Daniel Treisman|date=2019|title=Informational Autocrats|journal=Journal of Economic Perspectives|volume=33|issue=4|pages=100–127|doi=10.1257/jep.33.4.100|issn=0895-3309|doi-access=free}}

While authoritarian regimes invest considerably in propaganda out of a belief that it enhances regime survival, scholars have offered mixed views as to whether propaganda is effective.{{Cite journal |last1=Rosenfeld |first1=Bryn |last2=Wallace |first2=Jeremy |date=2024 |title=Information Politics and Propaganda in Authoritarian Societies |url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-035951 |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |language=en |volume=27 |issue=1 |pages=263–281 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-035951 |s2cid=267602602 |issn=1094-2939 |archive-date=24 February 2024 |access-date=10 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224153047/https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041322-035951 |url-status=live }}

Andrew J. Nathan notes that "regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, over-centralization of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. ... Few authoritarian regimes{{snd}}be they communist, fascist, corporatist, or personalist{{snd}}have managed to conduct orderly, peaceful, timely, and stable successions."Andrew J. Nathan, [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/38546/summary "Authoritarian Resilience"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181005030724/https://muse.jhu.edu/article/38546/summary|date=2018-10-05}}, Journal of Democracy, 14.1 (2003), pp. 6–17.

Political scientist Theodore M. Vestal writes that authoritarian political systems may be weakened through inadequate responsiveness to either popular or elite demands and that the authoritarian tendency to respond to challenges by exerting tighter control, instead of by adapting, may compromise the legitimacy of an authoritarian state and lead to its collapse.

One exception to this general trend is the endurance of the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party which has been unusually resilient among authoritarian regimes. Nathan posits that this can be attributed to four factors such as (1) "the increasingly norm-bound nature of its succession politics"; (2) "the increase in meritocratic as opposed to factional considerations in the promotion of political elites"; (3) "the differentiation and functional specialization of institutions within the regime"; and (4) "the establishment of institutions for political participation and appeal that strengthen the CCP's legitimacy among the public at large."

Some scholars have challenged notions that authoritarian states are inherently brittle systems that require repression and propaganda to make people comply with the authoritarian regime. Adam Przeworski has challenged this, noting that while authoritarian regimes do take actions that serve to enhance regime survival, they also engage in mundane everyday governance and their subjects do not hold a posture towards the regime at all moments of their life. He writes, "People in autocracies do not incessantly live under the shadow of dramatic historical events; they lead everyday routine lives."{{Cite journal |last=Przeworski |first=Adam |date=2023 |title=Formal Models of Authoritarian Regimes: A Critique |journal=Perspectives on Politics |language=en |volume=21 |issue=3 |pages=979–988 |doi=10.1017/S1537592722002067 |s2cid=252446987 |issn=1537-5927|doi-access=free }} Similarly, Thomas Pepinsky has challenged the common mental image of an authoritarian state as one of grim totalitarianism, desperate hardship, strict censorship, and dictatorial orders of murder, torture and disappearances. He writes, "life in authoritarian states is mostly boring and tolerable."{{Cite web |last=Pepinsky |first=Thomas |date=2017-01-09 |title=Life in authoritarian states is mostly boring and tolerable |url=https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/9/14207302/authoritarian-states-boring-tolerable-fascism-trump |website=Vox |language=en |access-date=7 September 2023 |archive-date=23 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201123054603/https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/1/9/14207302/authoritarian-states-boring-tolerable-fascism-trump |url-status=live }}

Yale University political scientist Milan Svolik argues that violence is a common characteristic of authoritarian systems. Violence tends to be common in authoritarian states because of a lack of independent third parties empowered to settle disputes between the dictator, regime allies, regime soldiers and the masses.{{Cite book|url=https://campuspress.yale.edu/svolik/the-politics-of-authoritarian-rule/|title=The Politics of Authoritarian Rule|first=Milan W.|last=Svolik|publisher=Cambridge University Press|date=2012|pages=2, 15, 23|access-date=2019-10-21|archive-date=2019-10-21|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021220420/https://campuspress.yale.edu/svolik/the-politics-of-authoritarian-rule/|url-status=live}}

Authoritarians may resort to measures referred to as coup-proofing (structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power). Coup-proofing strategies include strategically placing family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creating of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and developing multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.{{cite journal |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP844.html |title=Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East |last=Quinlivan |first=James T. |date=1999 |journal=International Security |volume=42 |issue=2 |pages=131–165 |doi=10.1162/016228899560202 |s2cid=57563395 |access-date=2019-10-21 |archive-date=2019-10-21 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021225444/https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP844.html |url-status=live}} Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring{{cite journal|last=Powell|first=Jonathan|s2cid=54646102|date=1 December 2012|title=Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=56|issue=6|pages=1017–1040|doi=10.1177/0022002712445732|issn=0022-0027}}{{cite journal|last1=Braithwaite|first1=Jessica Maves|last2=Sudduth|first2=Jun Koga|date=1 January 2016|title=Military purges and the recurrence of civil conflict|journal=Research & Politics|volume=3|issue=1|page=2053168016630730|doi=10.1177/2053168016630730|issn=2053-1680|doi-access=free}} and reduce the likelihood of mass protests.{{Cite journal |last1=Chin |first1=John |last2=Song |first2=Wonjun |last3=Wright |first3=Joseph |date=2022 |title=Personalization of Power and Mass Uprisings in Dictatorships |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=53 |issue=1 |pages=25–44 |language=en |doi=10.1017/S0007123422000114 |s2cid=249976554 |issn=0007-1234|doi-access=free }} However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,{{Cite book |last=Talmadge |first=Caitlin |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XRhJCgAAQBAJ |title=The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes |date=2015 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-0175-7 |language=en}}{{cite journal|last1=Narang|first1=Vipin|last2=Talmadge|first2=Caitlin|date=31 January 2017|title=Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War|journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution|volume=62|issue=7|pages=1379–1405|doi=10.1177/0022002716684627|s2cid=151897298}}{{cite journal|last1=Brown|first1=Cameron S.|last2=Fariss|first2=Christopher J.|last3=McMahon|first3=R. Blake|date=1 January 2016|title=Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution|journal=International Interactions|volume=42|issue=1|pages=1–30|doi=10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598|s2cid=214653333|issn=0305-0629}}{{subscription required}}{{cite journal|last=Bausch|first=Andrew W.|title=Coup-proofing and Military Inefficiencies: An Experiment|journal=International Interactions|year=2017 |pages=1–32|doi=10.1080/03050629.2017.1289938|issn=0305-0629|volume=44|issue=1 |s2cid=157891333}} and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.{{cite journal|last=Leon|first=Gabriel|date=1 April 2014|title=Soldiers or politicians? Institutions, conflict, and the military's role in politics|journal=Oxford Economic Papers|volume=66|issue=2|pages=533–556|citeseerx=10.1.1.1000.7058|doi=10.1093/oep/gpt024|issn=0030-7653}} A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.{{cite journal|last1=Frantz|first1=Erica|last2=Stein|first2=Elizabeth A.|date=4 July 2016|title=Countering Coups Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=50|issue=7|pages=935–962|doi=10.1177/0010414016655538|s2cid=157014887|issn=0010-4140}} Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting. According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighboring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.{{cite news|first1=Curtis |last1=Bell |first2=Jonathan|last2=Powell|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/30/will-turkeys-coup-attempt-prompt-others-nearby/|title=Will Turkey's coup attempt prompt others nearby?|newspaper=Washington Post|date=30 July 2016|access-date=21 October 2019|archive-date=21 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191021225446/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/30/will-turkeys-coup-attempt-prompt-others-nearby/|url-status=live}} A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.{{cite journal|last1=Böhmelt|first1=Tobias|last2=Ruggeri|first2=Andrea|last3=Pilster|first3=Ulrich|date=1 April 2017|title=Counterbalancing, Spatial Dependence, and Peer Group Effects*|url=http://repository.essex.ac.uk/15571/1/Counterbalancing_Spatial_Dependence_and.pdf|journal=Political Science Research and Methods|volume=5|issue=2|pages=221–239|doi=10.1017/psrm.2015.55|hdl=20.500.11850/130560 |s2cid=56130442|issn=2049-8470|access-date=21 October 2019|archive-date=22 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170922003642/http://repository.essex.ac.uk/15571/1/Counterbalancing_Spatial_Dependence_and.pdf|url-status=live}} A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.{{cite journal|last1=Easton|first1=Malcolm R.|last2=Siverson|first2=Randolph M.|date=2018|title=Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d'état|journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=55|issue=5|pages=596–608|doi=10.1177/0022343318763713|s2cid=117585945}} A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler."{{cite journal|last1=Escribà-Folch|first1=Abel|last2=Böhmelt|first2=Tobias|last3=Pilster|first3=Ulrich|date=2019-04-09|title=Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=37|issue=5|language=en|pages=559–579|doi=10.1177/0738894219836285|s2cid=159416397|issn=0738-8942|hdl=10230/46774|hdl-access=free}}

According to a 2019 study, personalist dictatorships are more repressive than other forms of dictatorship.{{Cite journal|last1=Frantz|first1=Erica|last2=Kendall-Taylor|first2=Andrea|last3=Wright|first3=Joseph|last4=Xu|first4=Xu|title=Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=82|pages=372–377|doi=10.1086/706049|issn=0022-3816|year=2020|s2cid=203199813}}

According to Yale professor Juan José Linz there a three main types of political regimes today: democracies,

totalitarian regimes and, sitting between these two, authoritarian regimes (with hybrid regimes).{{cite book | author1 = Juan José Linz| author1-link = Juan José Linz | date = 2000 | title = Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes | publisher =Lynne Rienner Publisher | page = 143| isbn = 978-1-55587-890-0 | oclc = 1172052725 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=8cYk_ABfMJIC&pg=PA143}}{{cite book | editor-first = Jonathan | editor-last = Michie | year=2014 | title = Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences | publisher = Routledge | page = 95 | isbn = 978-1-135-93226-8 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=ip_IAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA95}}

According to University of Michigan professor Dan Slater, modern forms of authoritarianism are fundamentally dissimilar from historical forms of nondemocratic rule. He links modern authoritarianism to the era of mass politics, which began with the French Revolution.{{Citation |last=Slater |first=Dan |title=Authoritarianism's Historical Entanglements |date=2024 |work=The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.2 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.2 |isbn=978-0-19-887199-6}}

• An authoritarian regime has "a concentration of power in a leader or an elite not constitutionally responsible to the people".{{cite web |title=Definition of authoritarian |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authoritarian |website=Merriam Webster |access-date=11 April 2022 |archive-date=5 March 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080305222719/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authoritarian |url-status=live }} Unlike totalitarian states, they will allow social and economic institutions not under governmental control, and tend to rely on passive mass acceptance rather than active popular support.
• An Autocracy is a state/government in which one person possesses "unlimited power".
• A Totalitarian state is "based on subordination of the individual to the state and strict control of all aspects of the life and productive capacity of the nation especially by coercive measures (such as censorship and terrorism)".{{cite web |title=Definition of totalitarian |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totalitarian |website=Merriam Webster |access-date=11 April 2022 |archive-date=24 April 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090424141216/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/totalitarian |url-status=live }} and are ruled by a single ruling party made up of loyal supporters.{{cite web |title=Totalitarianism and autocracy |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/totalitarianism/Totalitarianism-and-autocracy |access-date=11 April 2022 |website=Britannica |archive-date=11 April 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220411222240/https://www.britannica.com/topic/totalitarianism/Totalitarianism-and-autocracy |url-status=live }} Unlike autocracies, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition", totalitarian states are characterized by an official ideology, which "seek only to gain absolute political power and to outlaw opposition",(according to Hannah Arendt) and "seek to dominate every aspect of everyone's life as a prelude to world domination".
• A Fascist state is autocratic and based on a political philosophy/movement, (such as that of the Fascisti of pre-WWII Italy) "that exalts nation and often race above the individual and that stands for a centralized autocratic government headed by a dictatorial leader, severe economic and social regimentation, and forcible suppression of opposition".{{cite web |title=Definition of fascism |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fascism |website=Merriam Webster |access-date=11 April 2022 |archive-date=22 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170822084905/https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fascism |url-status=live }}
• Authoritarian personality is the personality type treating authority figures with obedience. A study found evidence for both left-wing and right-wing authoritarianism.{{cite journal | last1=Conway III | first1=Lucian Gideon | last2=Zubrod | first2=Alivia | last3=Chan | first3=Linus | last4=McFarland | first4=James D. | last5=Van de Vliert | first5=Evert | title=Is the myth of left-wing authoritarianism itself a myth? | journal=Frontiers in Psychology | volume=13 | date=8 Feb 2023 | issn=1664-1078 | pmid=36846476 | pmc=9944136 | doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1041391 | doi-access=free | page=}}

Several subtypes of authoritarian regimes have been identified by Linz and others.Mark J. Gasiorowski, [{{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=uxO2QHFzlZsC |page=105 }} The Political Regimes Project], in On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants (ed. Alex Inketes), 2006, pp. 110–111. Linz identified the two most basic subtypes as traditional authoritarian regimes and bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes:

• Traditional authoritarian regimes are those "in which the ruling authority (generally a single person)" is maintained in power "through a combination of appeals to traditional legitimacy, patron-client ties and repression, which is carried out by an apparatus bound to the ruling authority through personal loyalties." An example is Ethiopia under Haile Selassie I.File:Card Stunt for Park Chung-hee.jpg in Army Parade at Armed Forces Day on 1 October 1973]]
• Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are those "governed by a coalition of military officers and technocrats who act pragmatically (rather than ideologically) within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality." Mark J. Gasiorowski suggests that it is best to distinguish "simple military authoritarian regimes" from "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" in which "a powerful group of technocrats uses the state apparatus to try to rationalize and develop the economy" such South Korea under Park Chung-hee.

According to Barbara Geddes, there are seven typologies of authoritarian regimes: dominant party regimes, military regime, personalist regimes, monarchies, oligarchic regimes, indirect military regimes, or hybrids of the first three.{{Cite journal|last1=Geddes|first1=Barbara|last2=Wright|first2=Joseph|last3=Frantz|first3=Erica|date=2014|title=Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/abs/autocratic-breakdown-and-regime-transitions-a-new-data-set/EBDB9E5E64CF899AD50B9ACC630B593F|journal=Perspectives on Politics|language=en|volume=12|issue=2|pages=313–331|doi=10.1017/S1537592714000851|s2cid=145784357|issn=1537-5927|archive-date=27 January 2023|access-date=19 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230127111603/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/abs/autocratic-breakdown-and-regime-transitions-a-new-data-set/EBDB9E5E64CF899AD50B9ACC630B593F|url-status=live}}

Subtypes of authoritarian regimes identified by Linz are corporatist or organic-statistic, racial and ethnic "democracy" and post-totalitarian.

• Corporatist authoritarian regimes "are those in which corporatism institutions are used extensively by the state to coopt and demobilize powerful interest groups." This type has been studied most extensively in Latin America.
• Racial and ethnic "democracies" are those in which "certain racial or ethnic groups enjoy full democratic rights while others are largely or entirely denied those rights", such as in South Africa under apartheid.
• Post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes are those in which totalitarian institutions (such as the party, secret police and state-controlled mass media{{cite journal |last1=Heinrich |first1=Andreas |last2=Pleines |first2=Heiko |title=The Meaning of 'Limited Pluralism' in Media Reporting under Authoritarian Rule |journal=Politics and Governance |volume=6 |issue=2 |page=103 |doi=10.17645/pag.v6i2.1238 |year=2018 |doi-access=free }}) remain, but where "ideological orthodoxy has declined in favor of routinization, repression has declined, the state's top leadership is less personalized and more secure, and the level of mass mobilization has declined substantially." Examples include the Russian Federation and Soviet Eastern Bloc states in the mid-1980s. The post-Mao Zedong People's Republic of China was viewed as post-totalitarian in the 1990s and early 2000s, with a limited degree of increase in pluralism and civil society.{{cite journal|title=Dissent and the emergence of civil society in post-totalitarian China|first=Maire|last=O'Brien|journal=Journal of Contemporary China|pages=153–166|date=1998|volume=7|issue=17|doi=10.1080/10670569808724310}}{{cite journal |author=Lai |first=H. H. |date=2006 |title=Religious policies in post-totalitarian China: Maintaining political monopoly over a reviving society |journal=Journal of Chinese Political Science |volume=11 |pages=55–77 |doi=10.1007/BF02877033 |s2cid=154504959 |doi-access=}} however, in the 2010s, particularly after Xi Jinping succeeded as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and rose to power in 2012, Chinese state repression sharply increased, aided by digital control and mass surveillance.{{cite news|first1=Paul |last1=Mozur |first2=Aaron|last2=Krolik|title=A Surveillance Net Blankets China's Cities, Giving Police Vast Powers|date=December 17, 2019|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/technology/china-surveillance.html|newspaper=New York Times|access-date=February 27, 2020|archive-date=March 3, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200303084626/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/technology/china-surveillance.html|url-status=live}}{{cite journal|first=Xiao|last=Qiang|title=The rise of China as a digital totalitarian state|date=February 21, 2018|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/21/china-internet/|newspaper=Washington Post|access-date=February 27, 2020|archive-date=March 28, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200328102144/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/21/china-internet/|url-status=live}}{{cite web|first=Michael|last=Clarke|title=In Xinjiang, China's 'Neo-Totalitarian' Turn Is Already a Reality|work=The Diplomat|url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/in-xinjiang-chinas-neo-totalitarian-turn-is-already-a-reality/|date=March 10, 2018|access-date=February 27, 2020|archive-date=February 27, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200227151827/https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/in-xinjiang-chinas-neo-totalitarian-turn-is-already-a-reality/|url-status=live}}

File:18th Summit of Non-Aligned Movement gets underway in Baku 026.jpg and Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro on 25 October 2019]]

Authoritarian regimes are also sometimes subcategorized by whether they are more personalistic or populist.{{Additional citation needed|date=May 2024}} Personalistic authoritarian regimes are characterized by arbitrary rule and authority exercised "mainly through patronage networks and coercion rather than through institutions and formal rules." Personalistic authoritarian regimes have been seen in post-colonial Africa. By contrast, populist authoritarian regimes "are mobilizational regimes in which a strong, charismatic, manipulative leader rules through a coalition involving key lower-class groups." Examples include Argentina under Juan Perón, Russia under Vladimir Putin, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro.Juan de Onis, {{usurped|[https://web.archive.org/web/20180704165440/http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/juan-de-onis/after-chavez-authoritarianism-still-threatens-latin-america "After Chavez, Authoritarianism Still Threatens Latin America"]}}, World Affairs (May 15, 2013): "the followers of the late President Hugo Chávez continue to apply the playbook of authoritarian populism throughout Latin America in their pursuit of more power...one of the Mercosur partners are challenging the basic political practices of authoritarian populism implanted in Venezuela."Kurt Weyland, [http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/latin-america%E2%80%99s-authoritarian-drift-threat-populist-left "Latin America's Authoritarian Drift: The Threat from the Populist Left"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181125081115/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/latin-america%E2%80%99s-authoritarian-drift-threat-populist-left|date=2018-11-25}}, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (July 2013), pp. 18–32.

A typology of authoritarian regimes by political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater includes four categories:

• machine (oligarchic party dictatorships);
• bossism (autocratic party dictatorships);
• juntas (oligarchic military dictatorships); and
• strongman (autocratic military dictatorships).

Lai and Slater argue that single-party regimes are better than military regimes at developing institutions (e.g. mass mobilization, patronage networks and coordination of elites) that are effective at continuing the regime's incumbency and diminishing domestic challengers; Lai and Slater also argue that military regimes more often initiate military conflicts or undertake other "desperate measures" to maintain control as compared to single-party regimes.

John Duckitt suggests a link between authoritarianism and collectivism, asserting that both stand in opposition to individualism.{{Cite journal | last1 = Duckitt | first1 = J. | title = Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct | jstor = 3791588 | journal = Political Psychology | volume = 10 | issue = 1 | pages = 63–84 | year = 1989 | doi = 10.2307/3791588 }} Duckitt writes that both authoritarianism and collectivism submerge individual rights and goals to group goals, expectations and conformities.{{Cite journal | last1 = Kemmelmeier | first1 = M. | last2 = Burnstein | first2 = E. | last3 = Krumov | first3 = K. | last4 = Genkova | first4 = P. | last5 = Kanagawa | first5 = C. | last6 = Hirshberg | first6 = M. S. | last7 = Erb | first7 = H. P. | last8 = Wieczorkowska | first8 = G. | last9 = Noels | first9 = K. A. | s2cid = 32361036 | title = Individualism, Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies | journal = Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology | volume = 34 | issue = 3 | page = 304 | year = 2003 | doi = 10.1177/0022022103034003005}}

According to Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, authoritarian regimes that are created in social revolutions are far more durable than other kinds of authoritarian regimes.{{Cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=odRkEAAAQBAJ |title=Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism |last2=Way |first2=Lucan |date=2022 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-16952-1 |language=en}}

{{See also|Democratic backsliding|Democratization}}

File:Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2024.svg by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2024.{{Cite web |title=EIU Democracy Index 2020 – World Democracy Report |url=https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210303040250/https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2020/ |archive-date=2021-03-03 |access-date=2021-03-07 |website=Economist Intelligence Unit}} Blue countries are democratic, yellow are hybrid regimes, and brown are authoritarian governments.]]

Authoritarianism and democracy are not necessarily fundamental opposites and may be thought of as poles at opposite ends of a scale, so that it is possible for some democracies to possess authoritarian elements, and for an authoritarian system to have democratic elements.{{cite journal |last1=Frantz |first1=Erica |year=2018 |title=Authoritarian Politics: Trends and Debates |journal=Politics and Governance |volume=6 |issue=2 |pages=87–89 |doi=10.17645/pag.v6i2.1498 |via=Cogitatio Press |doi-access=free}}{{Unreliable source?|date=May 2024}}{{cite news |last1=Koesel |first1=Karrie J. |last2=Bunce |first2=Valerie |author-link2=Valerie Jane Bunce |last3=Weiss |first3=Jessica Chen |author-link3=Jessica Chen Weiss |date=2020 |title=In South Carolina, Democrats debated when a dictator is really a dictator. So what's the answer? |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/27/south-carolina-democrats-debated-when-dictator-is-really-dictator-so-whats-answer/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200227142856/https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/27/south-carolina-democrats-debated-when-dictator-is-really-dictator-so-whats-answer/ |archive-date=2020-02-27 |access-date=2020-02-27 |newspaper=The Washington Post |type=Monkey Cage}}{{cite book |last1=Koesel |first1=Karrie |url=https://global.oup.com/academic/product/citizens-and-the-state-in-authoritarian-regimes-9780190093495?cc=us&lang=en& |title=Citizens and the State in Authoritarian Regimes: Comparing China and Russia |last2=Bunce |first2=Valerie |last3=Weiss |first3=Jessica |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2020 |isbn=978-0-19-009349-5 |location=Oxford, New York |access-date=2020-02-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200227142901/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/citizens-and-the-state-in-authoritarian-regimes-9780190093495?cc=us&lang=en& |archive-date=2020-02-27 |url-status=live}}{{Verify source|date=May 2024}} Authoritarian regimes may also be partly responsive to citizen grievances, although this is generally only regarding grievances that do not undermine the stability of the regime.{{Cite book|last=Truex|first=Rory|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/making-autocracy-work/57BB75703B01DB41446C2C4E052B74CF|title=Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China|date=2016|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-107-17243-2|doi=10.1017/cbo9781316771785|archive-date=27 March 2023|access-date=30 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230327231320/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/making-autocracy-work/57BB75703B01DB41446C2C4E052B74CF|url-status=live}}{{Cite journal|last=Lueders|first=Hans|date=2022|title=Electoral Responsiveness in Closed Autocracies: Evidence from Petitions in the former German Democratic Republic|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/electoral-responsiveness-in-closed-autocracies-evidence-from-petitions-in-the-former-german-democratic-republic/4A5EE12EAE79CA7E93CC5BC4BD2B9C85|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=116|issue=3|pages=827–842|language=en|doi=10.1017/S0003055421001386|s2cid=245452279|issn=0003-0554|archive-date=4 April 2023|access-date=23 December 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404082011/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/electoral-responsiveness-in-closed-autocracies-evidence-from-petitions-in-the-former-german-democratic-republic/4A5EE12EAE79CA7E93CC5BC4BD2B9C85|url-status=live}} An illiberal democracy, or procedural democracy, is distinguished from liberal democracy, or substantive democracy, in that illiberal democracies lack features such as the rule of law, protections for minority groups, an independent judiciary and the real separation of powers.Thomas H. Henriksen, American Power after the Berlin Wall (Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 199: "experts emphasize that elections alone, without the full democratic panoply of an independent judiciary, free press, and viable political parties, constitute, in reality, illiberal democracies, which still menace their neighbors and destabilize their regions."David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 231: "Illiberal democracies may have reasonably free and fair national elections based on broad suffrage, but they do not counteract the tyranny of the majority with effective protections for ethnic and religious minorities or various types of dissenters."Rod Hague & Martin Harrop, Political Science: A Comparative Introduction (7th ed.: Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 259: "The gradual implementation of the rule of law and due process is an accomplishment of liberal politics, provide a basis for distinguishing liberal from illiberal democracies, and both from authoritarian regimes."Vladimir Popov, "Circumstances versus Policy Choices: Why Has the Economic Performance of the Soviet Successor States Been So Poor" in After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transition (eds. Michael McFaul & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 20: "The least efficient institutions are in illiberal democracies combining poor rule of law with democracy ... Less democratic regimes with weak rule of law ... appear to do better than illiberal democracies in maintaining institutional capacity."

A further distinction that liberal democracies have rarely made war with one another; research has extended the theory and finds that more democratic countries tend to have few wars (sometimes called militarized interstate disputes) causing fewer battle deaths with one another and that democracies have far fewer civil wars.

{{cite journal |author=Hegre, Håvard |first2=Tanja |last2=Ellington |first3=Scott |last3=Gates |author4=Nils Petter Gleditsch |name-list-style=amp |title=Towards A Democratic Civil Peace? Opportunity, Grievance and Civil War 1816–1992 |journal=American Political Science Review |year=2001 |volume=95 |pages=33–48 |url=http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/peace.htm |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20040406173943/http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/peace.htm |archive-date= 2004-04-06|doi=10.1017/S0003055401000119 |s2cid=7521813 }}{{cite book|author=Ray, James Lee |title=A Lakatosian View of the Democratic Peace Research Program From Progress in International Relations Theory |editor-first=Colin |editor-last=Elman |editor2=Miriam Fendius Elman |url=http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/g/gDf5Ty/6%20ray%20demo%20peace%20FIRST%20PROOFS.pdf |publisher=MIT Press |year=2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060625203811/http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/g/gDf5Ty/6%20ray%20demo%20peace%20FIRST%20PROOFS.pdf |archive-date=2006-06-25 }}

Research shows that the democratic nations have much less democide or murder by government. Those were also moderately developed nations before applying liberal democratic policies.{{cite book |author=Rummel |first=R. J. |author-link=R. J. Rummel |url=https://archive.org/details/powerkillsdemocr00rumm |title=Power kills: democracy as a method of nonviolence |publisher=Transaction Publishers |year=1997 |isbn=978-1-56000-297-0 |location=New Brunswick, New Jersey}} Research by the World Bank suggests that political institutions are extremely important in determining the prevalence of corruption and that parliamentary systems, political stability and freedom of the press are all associated with lower corruption.Daniel Lederman, Norman Loayza, & Rodrigo Res Soares, [https://ssrn.com/abstract=632777 "Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210119120724/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=632777 |date=2021-01-19 }}, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2708 (November 2001).

A 2006 study by economist Alberto Abadie has concluded that terrorism is most common in nations with intermediate political freedom. The nations with the least terrorism are the most and least democratic nations, and that "transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy may be accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism."{{cite journal|title=Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism|first=Alberto|last=Abadie|journal=American Economic Review|volume=96|issue=2|date=May 2006|pages=50–56|url=https://economics.mit.edu/files/11865|doi=10.1257/000282806777211847|access-date=2019-10-24|archive-date=2019-10-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191024142040/https://economics.mit.edu/files/11865|url-status=live}} Studies in 2013 and 2017 similarly found a nonlinear relationship between political freedom and terrorism, with the most terrorist attacks occurring in partial democracies and the fewest in "strict autocracies and full-fledged democracies."{{cite journal|title=Fighting Terrorism: The Democracy Advantage|first=Amichai|last=Magen|journal=Journal of Democracy|date=January 2018|url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/fighting-terrorism-the-democracy-advantage/|volume=29|issue=1|pages=111–125|doi=10.1353/jod.2018.0009|s2cid=158598818|access-date=2020-03-24|archive-date=2020-03-24|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200324175546/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/fighting-terrorism-the-democracy-advantage/|url-status=live}} A 2018 study by Amichai Magen demonstrated that liberal democracies and polyarchies not only suffer fewer terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, but also suffer fewer casualties in terrorist attacks as compared to other regime types, which may be attributed to higher-quality democracies' responsiveness to their citizens' demands, including "the desire for physical safety", resulting in "investment in intelligence, infrastructure protection, first responders, social resilience, and specialized medical care" which averts casualties. Magen also stated that terrorism in closed autocracies sharply increased starting in 2013.

Within national democratic governments, there may be subnational authoritarian enclaves. A prominent examples of this includes the Southern United States after Reconstruction, as well as areas of contemporary Argentina and Mexico.{{Cite book |last=Gibson |first=Edward L. |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/boundary-control/FA0E9312CAB6FD68F3BF3C67E8CFAB42 |title=Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies |date=2013 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-19223-1 |archive-date=26 March 2023 |access-date=28 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326033142/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/boundary-control/FA0E9312CAB6FD68F3BF3C67E8CFAB42 |url-status=live }}{{Cite journal |last=Eaton |first=Kent |last2=Giraudy |first2=Agustina |date=2025 |title=What Can Latin America Tell Us about Subnational Democratic Erosion in the United States? |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/what-can-latin-america-tell-us-about-subnational-democratic-erosion-in-the-united-states/96124FAB1FAC4C00976A613CA283D8CC |journal=Perspectives on Politics |language=en |doi=10.1017/S1537592725000015 |issn=1537-5927}}

Another type of authoritarian regime is the competitive authoritarian regime, a type of civilian regime that arose in the post-Cold War era. In a competitive authoritarian regime, "formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but ... incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents."{{cite book |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |last2=Way |first2=Lucan A. |title=Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War |date=2010 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NZDI05p1PDgC |pages=5–7 |isbn=978-1-139-49148-8 |access-date=2019-07-03 |archive-date=2020-06-12 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200612042246/https://books.google.com/books?id=NZDI05p1PDgC |url-status=live }}{{cite journal |last1=Mufti |first1=Mariam |title=What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades of Scholarship? |journal=Politics and Governance |volume=6 |issue=5 |pages=112–119 |doi=10.17645/pag.v6i2.1400 |year=2018|doi-access=free }} The term was coined by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way in their 2010 book of the same name to discuss a type of hybrid regime that emerged during and after the Cold War.{{cite news |last1=Tomasky |first1=Michael |title=Do the Republicans Even Believe in Democracy Anymore? |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/opinion/republicans-trump-democracy.html |access-date=3 July 2019 |newspaper=New York Times |date=1 July 2019 |archive-date=2 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190702234600/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/opinion/republicans-trump-democracy.html |url-status=live }}

Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from fully authoritarian regimes in that elections are regularly held, the opposition can openly operate without a high risk of exile or imprisonment and "democratic procedures are sufficiently meaningful for opposition groups to take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power." Competitive authoritarian regimes lack one or more of the three characteristics of democracies such as free elections (i.e. elections untainted by substantial fraud or voter intimidation); protection of civil liberties (i.e. the freedom of speech, press and association) and an even playing field (in terms of access to resources, the media and legal recourse).Levitsky & Way (2010), pp. 7–12.

Authoritarianism is considered a core concept of fascismNolte, Ernst (1965). The Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism. Translated by Leila Vennewitz. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. p. 300. {{ISBN|978-0-03-052240-6}}.Turner, Henry Ashby (1975). Reappraisals of Fascism. New Viewpoints. p. 162. {{ISBN|978-0-531-05579-3}}. "[Fascism]'s goals of radical and authoritarian nationalism".Hagtvet, Bernt; Larsen, Stein Ugelvik; Myklebust, Jan Petter, eds. (1984). Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism. Columbia University Press. p. 424. {{ISBN|978-82-00-05331-6}}. "[...] organized form of integrative radical nationalist authoritarianism".Paxton, Robert (2004). The Anatomy of Fascism. Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 32, 45, 173. {{ISBN|978-1-4000-4094-0}}. and scholars agree that a fascist regime is foremost an authoritarian form of government, although not all authoritarian regimes are fascist. While authoritarianism is a defining characteristic of fascism, scholars argue that more distinguishing traits are needed to make an authoritarian regime fascist.{{cite book|last1=Weber|first1=Eugen|title=Varieties of fascism : doctrines of revolution in the twentieth century|date=1964|publisher=Van Nostrand|location=New York|isbn=978-0-89874-444-6|edition=reprint}}{{cite book|last1=Laclau|first1=Ernesto|title=Politics and ideology in Marxist theory : capitalism, fascism, populism|date=1977|publisher=Verso|location=London|isbn=978-1-84467-788-7|edition=English-language}}{{cite book|last1=Fritzsche|first1=Peter|title=Rehearsals for fascism : populism and political mobilization in Weimar Germany|date=1990|publisher=Oxford Univ. Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0-19-505780-5|edition=1st printing}}{{cite book|last1=Griffin|first1=Roger|title=The nature of fascism|date=1991|publisher=St. Martin's Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0-312-07132-5|edition=1st American}}{{cite book|last1=Payne|first1=Stanley G.|title=A history of fascism, 1914–45|date=1995|publisher=UCL Press|location=London|isbn=978-0-299-14874-4|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780299148744}}{{cite book|last1=Eatwell|first1=Roger|title=Fascism : a history|date=1996|publisher=Allen Lane|location=New York|isbn=978-0-7139-9147-5|edition=1st American|url=https://archive.org/details/fascismhistory00eatw}}{{cite book|last1=Laqueur|first1=Walter|title=Fascism : past, present, future|url=https://archive.org/details/fascismpastprese00laqu|url-access=registration|date=1996|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=New York|isbn=978-0-19-511793-6|edition=reprint}}{{cite book|last1=Reich|first1=Wilhelm|title=The mass psychology of fascism|url=https://archive.org/details/masspsychologyof00reic|url-access=registration|date=2000|publisher=Farrar, Straus & Giroux|location=New York|isbn=978-0-374-50884-5|edition=3rd revised and enlarged}}{{cite book|last1=Paxton|first1=Robert|title=The Anatomy of Fascism|date=2004|publisher=Knopf Imprint|location=New York|isbn=978-1-4000-4094-0|edition=1st|url=https://archive.org/details/anatomyoffascism00paxt_0}}

{{Excerpt|Authoritarian socialism|paragraphs=1|only=paragraphs}}

{{main article|Libertarian authoritarianism|Liberal autocracy}}

Multiple scholars have identified a form of libertarian authoritarianism emerging in the early 21st century. Wendy Brown describes it as emerging from neoliberalism, opposing both democracy and public institutions while defining freedom in terms of speech and actions that promote homophobia, white supremacy and male privilege.{{cite journal|first1=Wendy|last1=Brown|first2=Jo|last2=Littler|title=Where the fires are|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/248/article/690919/pdf|journal=Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture|date=Spring 2018|issn=1741-0797|pages=14–25|volume=68|issue=68 |doi=10.3898/136266218822845619 }}{{cite journal|first1=Anne Sisson|last1=Runyan|title=What Is Intersectionality and Why Is It Important?|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26606288|journal=Academe|date=November–December 2018|issn=0190-2946|pages=10–14|volume=104|issue=6|jstor=26606288 |quote=This political moment is fueled by what political theorist Wendy Brown calls “libertarian authoritarianism.” Brown defines libertarian authoritarianism as both an extension and a result of neoliberalism: it simultaneously guts public institutions, undermines democracy, and defines freedom as the freedom to be sexist, racist, homophobic, and xenophobic and to engage in speech and actions that uphold the violence of white male supremacy.}} Other scholars have connected it to QAnon{{cite journal|first1=Roche|last1=Cárcel|first2=Juan|last2=Antonio|title=The Religious Genesis of Conspiracy Theories and Their Consequences for Democracy and Religion: The Case of QAnon|journal=Religions|date=June 1, 2023|issn=2077-1444|pages=734|volume=14|issue=6|doi=10.3390/rel14060734|doi-access=free |quote=We will conclude by pointing out that QAnon affects the coherence and stability of religious beliefs and democracy; in fact, it can be seen as libertarian authoritarianism and populism, advocating a sick freedom, the ultimate expression of the modern feeling of individual powerlessness and of a Modernity that has failed to deliver on its promises.|hdl=10045/134890|hdl-access=free}} and to the Argentinian Presidency of Javier Milei.{{cite journal|first1=Dieter|last1=Boris|first2=Patrick|last2=Eser|title=The Mysterious Rise of the »Messiah« Milei: Argentina as an Experimental Laboratory for Libertarian Authoritarianism?|url=https://www.prokla.de/index.php/PROKLA/article/view/2126|journal=PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft|date=31 May 2024|issn=2700-0311|pages=325–350|volume=54|issue=215|doi=10.32387/prokla.v54i215.2126}}

Carolin Amlinger and Oliver Nachtwey, in Offended Freedom: The Rise of Libertarian Authoritarianism, describe libertarian authoritarianism as arising from a backlash to government efforts to contain the COVID-19 pandemic and, more broadly, against the increasing complexity of the world, ultimately leading to hostility towards democracy.{{cite book|first1=Carolin|last1=Amlinger|first2=Oliver|last2=Nachtwey|date=December 2024|accessdate=2025-02-22|title=Offended Freedom: The Rise of Libertarian Authoritarianism|publisher=Wiley|url=https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Offended+Freedom%253A+The+Rise+of+Libertarian+Authoritarianism-p-9781509560868}}{{cite journal|last=Heinz|first=Janine|title="Libertärer Autoritarismus in Österreich–eine empirische Annäherung."|journal=Die Auswirkungen der Corona-Pandemie auf die österreichische Gesellschaft.|publisher=Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG|date=2024|pages=353–392 |doi=10.5771/9783748942696-353 |isbn=978-3-7489-4269-6 |quote=In 2022, the sociologists Carolin Amlinger and Oliver Nachtwey published a much-acclaimed book in which they argue that the Corona crisis has given rise to a new form of "libertarian authoritarianism". This new authoritarianism is characterized by the fact that individual freedom is not seen as relative but as an absolute right and, as a result, any governmental interference with the private sphere is seen as an attack on human rights and freedom of expression.|doi-access=free}} Writing in Jacobin and New Statesman, Amlinger and Nachtwey define libertarian authoritarians as those who believe in the abolition of the democratic state on the basis of its restrictions on individual freedoms, and "consider the democratic state itself, the authorities and their regulations, to be invasive and harmful"; they described the fundamental basis of libertarian authoritarianism to be based in "post-truth politics", and that in the late-modern era, believers validate their opinions "with proto-scientific evidence, rumours, conspiracy theories and fake news". They describe neoliberalism as an additional factor contributing towards the recent rise of the ideology.{{Cite web |last1=Nachtwey |first1=Oliver |last2=Amlinger |first2=Carolin |date=2023-12-07 |title=The new authoritarian personality |url=https://www.newstatesman.com/ideas/2023/12/new-authoritarian-personality |access-date=2025-02-13 |website=New Statesman |language=en-US}}{{Cite web |last1=Amlinger |first1=Carolin |last2=Nachtwey |first2=Oliver |date=January 29, 2025 |title=In Elon Musk, Libertarianism and Authoritarianism Combine |url=https://jacobin.com/2025/01/musk-authoritarianism-libertarianism-afd-trump |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250130040002/https://jacobin.com/2025/01/musk-authoritarianism-libertarianism-afd-trump/ |archive-date=January 30, 2025 |access-date=2025-02-12 |website=Jacobin |language=en-US}} Individuals they identify as modern adherents to the ideology include Peter Thiel, Elon Musk, and Javier Milei, having merged their libertarianism with their "authoritarian tendencies".

File:Mussolini mezzobusto.jpg, the founder of Italian fascism, called his regime the "Totalitarian State": "Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State."{{cite journal |last=Delzell |first=Charles F. |title=Remembering Mussolini |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40257305 |journal=The Wilson Quarterly |volume=12 |number=2 |date=Spring 1988 |page=127 |publisher=Wilson Quarterly |location=Washington, D.C. |jstor=40257305 |access-date=2022-04-24 |archive-date=2022-05-13 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220513050107/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40257305 |url-status=live }} Retrieved April 8, 2022]]

Totalitarianism is a label used by various political scientists to characterize the most tyrannical strain of authoritarian systems; in which the ruling elite, often subservient to a dictator, exert near-total control of the social, political, economic, cultural and religious aspects of society in the territories under its governance.{{Cite book |title=The Concise Encyclopedia of Democracy |publisher=Routledge |year=2013 |isbn=978-1-57958-268-5 |location=New York, NY |pages=51, 391}}

Linz distinguished new forms of authoritarianism from personalistic dictatorships and totalitarian states, taking Francoist Spain as an example. Unlike personalistic dictatorships, new forms of authoritarianism have institutionalized representation of a variety of actors (in Spain's case, including the military, the Catholic Church, Falange, monarchists, technocrats and others). Unlike totalitarian states, the regime relies on passive mass acceptance rather than popular support.Todd Landman, Studying Human Rights (Routledge, 2003), p. 71 (citing Linz 1964 and others). According to Juan Linz the distinction between an authoritarian regime and a totalitarian one is that an authoritarian regime seeks to suffocate politics and political mobilization while totalitarianism seeks to control and use them. Authoritarianism primarily differs from totalitarianism in that social and economic institutions exist that are not under governmental control. Building on the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz, Paul C. Sondrol of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs has examined the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian dictators and organized them in a chart:{{Cite journal |last1 = Sondrol |first1 = P. C. |s2cid = 144333167 |title = Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner |journal = Journal of Latin American Studies |volume = 23 |issue = 3 |page = 599 |year = 2009 |doi = 10.1017/S0022216X00015868}}

{|class="wikitable"

|-

!

!Totalitarianism

!Authoritarianism

|-

|Charisma

|High

|Low

|-

|Role conception

|Leader as function

|Leader as individual

|-

|Ends of power

|Public

|Private

|-

|Corruption

|Low

|High

|-

|Official ideology

|Yes

|No

|-

|Limited pluralism

|No

|Yes

|-

|Legitimacy

|Yes

|No

|}

Sondrol argues that while both authoritarianism and totalitarianism are forms of autocracy, they differ in three key dichotomies:

{{blockquote|(1) Unlike their bland and generally unpopular authoritarian brethren, totalitarian dictators develop a charismatic "mystique" and a mass-based, pseudo-democratic interdependence with their followers via the conscious manipulation of a prophetic image.

(2) Concomitant role conceptions differentiate totalitarians from authoritarians. Authoritarians view themselves as individual beings largely content to control and often maintain the status quo. Totalitarian self-conceptions are largely teleological. The tyrant is less a person than an indispensable function to guide and reshape the universe.

(3) Consequently, the utilisation of power for personal aggrandizement is more evident among authoritarians than totalitarians. Lacking the binding appeal of ideology, authoritarians support their rule by a mixture of instilling fear and granting rewards to loyal collaborators, engendering a kleptocracy.|sign=|source=}}

File:Kim Il-sung in 1950.jpg, founder of North Korea, established an authoritarian regime which was modeled after other totalitarian countries.{{cite book | last=Bluth | first=C. | title=Crisis on the Korean Peninsula | publisher=Potomac Books | year=2011 | isbn=978-1-57488-887-4 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Da4NeG2vpXIC&pg=PA62 | access-date=2023-02-05 | page=62}}]]

Compared to totalitarianism, "the authoritarian state still maintains a certain distinction between state and society. It is only concerned with political power and as long as that is not contested it gives society a certain degree of liberty. Totalitarianism, on the other hand, invades private life and asphyxiates it."Radu Cinpoes, Nationalism and Identity in Romania: A History of Extreme Politics from the Birth of the State to EU Accession, p. 70. Another distinction is that "authoritarianism is not animated by utopian ideals in the way totalitarianism is. It does not attempt to change the world and human nature." Carl Joachim Friedrich writes that "a totalist ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of ... industrial mass society" are the three features of totalitarian regimes that distinguish them from other autocracies.

Greg Yudin, a professor of political philosophy at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, argues "political passivity and civic disengagement" are "key features" of authoritarianism, while totalitarianism relies on "mass mobilization, terror and homogeneity of beliefs".{{cite news |title=Putin's War in Ukraine Shatters an Illusion in Russia |newspaper=The New York Times |agency=New York Times |date=9 April 2022 | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/09/world/europe/putin-ukraine-russia.amp.html |last1=Tavernise |first1=Sabrina }}

In 2010, Dani Rodrik wrote that democracies outperform autocracies in terms of long-term economic growth, economic stability, adjustments to external economic shocks, human capital investment, and economic equality.{{Cite web|last=Rodrik|first=Dani|date=2010-08-09|title=The Myth of Authoritarian Growth {{!}} by Dani Rodrik|url=https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-myth-of-authoritarian-growth|access-date=2022-01-07|website=Project Syndicate|language=en|archive-date=18 February 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130218065349/https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-myth-of-authoritarian-growth|url-status=live}} A 2019 study by Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson found that democracy increases GDP per capita by about 20 percent over the long-term.{{Cite journal|last1=Acemoglu|first1=Daron|last2=Naidu|first2=Suresh|last3=Restrepo|first3=Pascual|last4=Robinson|first4=James A.|date=2019|title=Democracy Does Cause Growth|url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/700936|journal=Journal of Political Economy|volume=127|issue=1|pages=47–100|doi=10.1086/700936|hdl=1721.1/124287|s2cid=222452675|issn=0022-3808|hdl-access=free|archive-date=4 April 2023|access-date=7 January 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404005435/https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/700936|url-status=live}} According to Amartya Sen, no functioning liberal democracy has ever suffered a large-scale famine.{{Cite journal|last1=Sen|first1=A. K.|year=1999|title=Democracy as a Universal Value|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=10|issue=3|pages=3–17|doi=10.1353/jod.1999.0055|s2cid=54556373}} Studies suggest that several health indicators (life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality) have a stronger and more significant association with democracy than they have with GDP per capita, size of the public sector or income inequality.{{Cite journal |last1=Franco |first1=Á. |last2=Álvarez-Dardet |first2=C. |last3=Ruiz |first3=M. T. |year=2004 |title=Effect of democracy on health: ecological study |journal=BMJ |volume=329 |issue=7480 |pages=1421–1423 |doi=10.1136/bmj.329.7480.1421 |pmc=535957 |pmid=15604165}}

One of the few areas that some scholars have theorized that autocracies may have an advantage, is in industrialization.{{Cite journal |last1=Gerring |first1=John |last2=Gjerløw |first2=Haakon |last3=Knutsen |first3=Carl Henrik |date=2022 |title=Regimes and industrialization |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X2100406X |journal=World Development |language=en |volume=152 |page=105791 |doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105791 |issn=0305-750X |hdl-access=free |hdl=10852/89922}} In the 20th century, Seymour Martin Lipset argued that low-income authoritarian regimes have certain technocratic "efficiency-enhancing advantages" over low-income democracies that gives authoritarian regimes an advantage in economic development.Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, & Michael M. Weinstein, [https://books.google.com/books?id=JiNLH1I50PkC The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151007173459/https://books.google.com/books?id=JiNLH1I50PkC|date=2015-10-07}} (Council on Foreign Relations/Psychology Press, 2005). By contrast, Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle and Michael M. Weinstein (2005) argue that democracies "realize superior development performance" over authoritarianism, pointing out that poor democracies are more likely to have steadier economic growth and less likely to experience economic and humanitarian catastrophes (such as refugee crises) than authoritarian regimes; that civil liberties in democracies act as a curb on corruption and misuse of resources; and that democracies are more adaptable than authoritarian regimes.

According to Allan C. Stam and Dan Reiter, liberal democracies have an advantage in battlefield performance over non-democracies and illiberal democracies.{{Cite book |last1=Reiter |first1=Dan |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s7tq |title=Democracies at War |last2=Stam |first2=Allan C. |date=2002 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-08949-2 |jstor=j.ctt7s7tq |archive-date=12 November 2023 |access-date=18 January 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231112214135/https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s7tq |url-status=live }} They argue that this democratic advantage is derived from the fact that democratic soldiers fight harder, democratic states tend to ally together in war, and democracies can employ more economic resources towards combat. However, critics argue that democracy itself makes little difference in war and that some other factors, such as overall power, determine whether a country would achieve victory or face defeat. In some cases, such as the Vietnam War, democracy may even have contributed to defeat.{{Cite journal |last=Downes |first=Alexander B. |date=2009 |title=How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of Democratic Victory in War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40207151 |journal=International Security |volume=33 |issue=4 |pages=9–51 |doi=10.1162/isec.2009.33.4.9 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=40207151 |s2cid=5275270}}{{Cite journal |last1=Reiter |first1=Dan |last2=Stam |first2=Allan C. |last3=Downes |first3=Alexander B. |date=2009 |title=Another Skirmish in the Battle over Democracies and War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389217 |journal=International Security |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=194–204 |doi=10.1162/isec.2009.34.2.194 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=40389217 |s2cid=18796232 |archive-date=29 April 2024 |access-date=18 January 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240429223400/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389217 |url-status=live }}{{Cite book |last1=Brown |first1=Michael E. |url=https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/do-democracies-win-their-wars |title=Do Democracies Win Their Wars? |last2=Coté |first2=Owen R. |last3=Lynn-Jones |first3=Sean M |last4=Miller |first4=Steven E. |date=2011 |publisher=The MIT Press |isbn=9780262515900 |series=International Security Readers |archive-date=1 July 2022 |access-date=18 January 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220701145138/https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/do-democracies-win-their-wars |url-status=live }}{{Cite book |last=Merom |first=Gil |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-democracies-lose-small-wars/74B08003103C8E81F94B7D2E4A1AD28D |title=How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. |date=2003 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9780521804035 |doi=10.1017/CBO9780511808227 |archive-date=11 April 2024 |access-date=18 January 2025 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240411173856/https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/how-democracies-lose-small-wars/74B08003103C8E81F94B7D2E4A1AD28D |url-status=live }} Jasen Castillo argues that autocratic states may in certain circumstances have an advantage over democracies; for example, authoritarian regimes may have ideologies that require unconditional loyalty, which may contribute to military cohesion.{{Cite book |last=Castillo |first=Jasen J. |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvqr1d70 |title=Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion |date=2014 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-8047-8910-3 |doi=10.2307/j.ctvqr1d70 |jstor=j.ctvqr1d70}}

Due to elevated fears against military coups against authoritarian regimes, authoritarian regimes may put loyalists in the military. This may reduce military effectiveness as loyalty is prioritized over experience when filling key positions within the military.{{Cite book |last=Talmadge |first=Caitlin |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XRhJCgAAQBAJ |title=The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes |date=2015 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-0175-7 |language=en |access-date=27 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230803203553/https://books.google.com/books?id=XRhJCgAAQBAJ |archive-date=3 August 2023 |url-status=live}}{{Cite journal |last1=Narang |first1=Vipin |last2=Talmadge |first2=Caitlin |date=31 January 2017 |title=Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in War |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=62 |issue=7 |pages=1379–1405 |doi=10.1177/0022002716684627 |s2cid=151897298}}{{Cite journal |last1=Biddle |first1=Stephen |last2=Zirkle |first2=Robert |date=1996-06-01 |title=Technology, civil-military relations, and warfare in the developing world |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/01402399608437634 |url-status=live |journal=Journal of Strategic Studies |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=171–212 |doi=10.1080/01402399608437634 |issn=0140-2390 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200430002634/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/10.1080/01402399608437634 |archive-date=30 April 2020 |access-date=31 March 2021}}{{Cite journal |last=Paine |first=Jack |date=2022 |title=Reframing The Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military's Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/reframing-the-guardianship-dilemma-how-the-militarys-dual-disloyalty-options-imperil-dictators/FAB035DCE1D5EA6CE383D3A7DFB48062 |url-status=live |journal=American Political Science Review |language=en |volume=116 |issue=4 |pages=1425–1442 |doi=10.1017/S0003055422000089 |issn=0003-0554 |s2cid=247278896 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305000829/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/reframing-the-guardianship-dilemma-how-the-militarys-dual-disloyalty-options-imperil-dictators/FAB035DCE1D5EA6CE383D3A7DFB48062 |archive-date=5 March 2022 |access-date=4 March 2022}}

Authoritarian rule before World War II includes short-lived dictatorships and has been claimed to be understudied.{{cite book | last=Morgenbesser | first=Lee | title=The Oxford Handbook of Authoritarian Politics | chapter=The Lost Works of Nondemocratic Rule | publisher=Oxford University Press | date=18 Jul 2024 | isbn=978-0-19-887199-6 | doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198871996.013.62 | page=}}

{{main|Anti-authoritarianism}}

Both World War II (ending in 1945) and the Cold War (ending in 1991) resulted in the replacement of authoritarian regimes by either democratic regimes or regimes that were less authoritarian.

World War II saw the defeat of the Axis powers by the Allied powers. All the Axis powers (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan) had totalitarian or authoritarian governments, and two of the three were replaced by governments based on democratic constitutions. The Allied powers were an alliance of Democratic states and (later) the Communist Soviet Union. At least in Western Europe the initial post-war era embraced pluralism and freedom of expression in areas that had been under control of authoritarian regimes. The memory of fascism and Nazism was denigrated. The new Federal Republic of Germany banned its expression. In reaction to the centralism of the Nazi state, the new constitution of West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) exercised "separation of powers" and placed "law enforcement firmly in the hands" of the sixteen Länder or states of the republic, not with the federal German government, at least not at first.[https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/security/federal-police/federal-police-node.html The Federal Police] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181005030924/https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/topics/security/federal-police/federal-police-node.html |date=2018-10-05 }}. Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community of Germany

Culturally there was also a strong sense of anti-authoritarianism based on anti-fascism in Western Europe. This was attributed to the active resistance from occupation and to fears arising from the development of superpowers.{{cite book |title=Sign Wars: The Culture Jammers Strike Back! |last=Cox |first=David |year=2005 |publisher=LedaTape Organisation |isbn=978-0-9807701-5-5 |page=108 |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=zKo8DrmamAwC |page= }} |access-date=22 October 2011}} Anti-authoritarianism also became associated with countercultural and bohemian movements such as the Beat Generation in the 1950s,{{cite web|url=https://www.pbs.org/wnet/americannovel/timeline/beatgeneration.html|title=Retired Site PBS Programs|website=pbs.org|access-date=4 September 2016|archive-date=7 July 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070707044219/https://www.pbs.org/wnet/americannovel/timeline/beatgeneration.html|url-status=live}} the hippies in the 1960s"The way of the hippie is antithetical to all repressive hierarchical power structures since they are adverse to the hippie goals of peace, love and freedom ... Hippies don't impose their beliefs on others. Instead, hippies seek to change the world through reason and by living what they believe."{{cite web |title=The Way of the Hippy |first=Skip |last=Stone |url=https://www.hipplanet.com/books/atoz/way.htm |website=www.hipplanet.com |access-date=16 May 2022 |archive-date=26 August 2003 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030826132408/https://www.hipplanet.com/books/atoz/way.htm |url-status=live }} and punks in the 1970s.{{Cite book| last = McLaughlin | first = Paul | title = Anarchism and Authority | publisher = Ashgate | location = Aldershot | year = 2007 | isbn = 978-0-7546-6196-2 | page = 10}}

In South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Uruguay moved away from dictatorships to democracy between 1982 and 1990.{{cite news |title=The challenge of the past |newspaper=The Economist |date=22 October 1998 |url=https://www.economist.com/the-americas/1998/10/22/the-challenge-of-the-past |access-date=17 October 2018 |archive-date=18 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181018043503/https://www.economist.com/the-americas/1998/10/22/the-challenge-of-the-past |url-status=live }}

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the other authoritarian/totalitarian "half" of the Allied Powers of World War II collapsed. This led not so much to revolt against authority in general, but to the belief that authoritarian states (and state control of economies) were outdated.{{cite news |last1=Tharoor |first1=Ishaan |title=The man who declared 'the end of history' fears for democracy's future |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/09/the-man-who-declared-the-end-of-history-fears-for-democracys-future/?noredirect=on |access-date=4 October 2018 |agency=Washington Post |date=9 February 2017 |archive-date=30 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181130030528/https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/09/the-man-who-declared-the-end-of-history-fears-for-democracys-future/?noredirect=on |url-status=live }} The idea that "liberal democracy was the final form toward which all political striving was directed" became very popular in Western countries and was celebrated in Francis Fukuyama's book The End of History and the Last Man. According to Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., "all the new states that stumbled out of the ruins of the Soviet bloc, except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, seemed indeed to be moving towards democracy in the early 1990s" as were the countries of East Central Europe and the Balkans.{{cite web | last1=Fairbanks | first1=Charles H. Jr. |title=Causes of Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Republics |url=https://ge.boell.org/en/2014/01/16/causes-authoritarianism-former-soviet-republics |website=Heinrich Boell Stiftung |access-date=5 October 2018 |date=16 January 2014 |archive-date=6 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181006000531/https://ge.boell.org/en/2014/01/16/causes-authoritarianism-former-soviet-republics |url-status=live }}

In December 2010, the Arab Spring arose in response to unrest over economic stagnation but also in opposition to oppressive authoritarian regimes, first in Tunisia, and spreading to Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere. Regimes were toppled in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and partially in Yemen while other countries saw riots, civil wars or insurgencies. Most Arab Spring revolutions failed to lead to enduring democratization. In the decade following the Arab Spring, of the countries in which an autocracy was toppled in the Arab spring, only Tunisia had become a genuine democracy; Egypt backslid to return to a military-run authoritarian state, while Libya, Syria and Yemen experienced devastating civil wars.{{cite news|first=Matt|last=Bradley|url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/10-years-after-arab-spring-autocratic-regimes-hold-upper-hand-n1251710|title=10 years after Arab Spring, autocratic regimes hold the upper hand|date=December 19, 2020|publisher=NBC News|archive-date=28 May 2023|access-date=15 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230528122021/https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/10-years-after-arab-spring-autocratic-regimes-hold-upper-hand-n1251710|url-status=live}}{{cite news|first=Kali|last=Robinson|date=December 2, 2020|publisher=Council on Foreign Relations|title=The Arab Spring at Ten Years: What's the Legacy of the Uprisings?|url=https://www.cfr.org/article/arab-spring-ten-years-whats-legacy-uprisings|archive-date=1 June 2023|access-date=15 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230601220021/https://www.cfr.org/article/arab-spring-ten-years-whats-legacy-uprisings|url-status=live}}

Since 2005, observers noted what some have called a "democratic recession",{{cite journal |last1=Ignatieff |first1=Michael |title=Are the Authoritarians Winning? |journal=New York Review of Books |date=10 July 2014 |volume=65 |issue=11 |access-date=4 October 2018 |url=https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/06/28/hitlers-rise-it-can-happen-here/ |archive-date=22 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180922122324/https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/06/28/hitlers-rise-it-can-happen-here/ |url-status=live }}{{cite journal |last1=Levitsky |first1=Steven |last2=Way |first2=Lucan |title=The Myth of Democratic Recession |journal=Journal of Democracy |date=January 2015 |volume=26 |issue=1 |pages=45–58 |access-date=4 October 2018 |url=https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Levitsky-26-1.pdf |doi=10.1353/jod.2015.0007 |s2cid=154831503 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180828220545/http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Levitsky-26-1.pdf |archive-date=28 August 2018 |url-status=dead }} although some such as Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have disputed that there was a significant democratic decline before 2013. In 2018, the Freedom House declared that from 2006 to 2018 "113 countries" around the world showed "a net decline" in "political rights and civil liberties" while "only 62" experienced "a net improvement."{{cite web |title=Freedom in the World 2018 Democracy in Crisis |url=https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 |website=Freedom House |access-date=4 October 2018 |archive-date=7 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191007111055/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 |url-status=live }} Its 2020 report marked the fourteenth consecutive year of declining scores.{{cite web |title=New Report: Freedom in the World 2020 finds established democracies are in decline |url=https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-freedom-world-2020-finds-established-democracies-are-decline |website=Freedom House |access-date=20 September 2020 |language=en |archive-date=15 September 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200915184801/https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-freedom-world-2020-finds-established-democracies-are-decline |url-status=live }} By 2020, all countries marked as "not free" by Freedom House had also developed practices of transnational repression, aiming to police and control dissent beyond state borders.{{Cite journal|last=Tsourapas|first=Gerasimos|date=2020|title=Global Autocracies: Strategies of Transnational Repression, Legitimation, and Co-Optation in World Politics|journal=International Studies Review|volume=23|issue=3|pages=616–644|language=en|doi=10.1093/isr/viaa061 |issn=1521-9488|doi-access=free}}

{| class="wikitable" style="float:right"

|+ International trends in
democracy/authoritarianism

|-

!

! countries becoming
more democratic

! countries becoming
more authoritarian

|-

! late 1990s

| 72

| 3

|-

! 2021

| 15

| 33

|-

| colspan=3 style="text-align: center;" |source: V-Dem{{cite news |last1=Leonhardt |first1=David |title=Democracy Challenged 'A Crisis Coming': The Twin Threats to American Democracy |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/17/us/american-democracy-threats.html |access-date=20 September 2022 |agency=New York Times |date=17 September 2022 |archive-date=1 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231101094836/https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/17/us/american-democracy-threats.html |url-status=live }}{{cite web |title=Democracy Report 2022 Autocratization Changing Nature? |url=https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf |website=V-Dem |access-date=20 September 2022 |archive-date=2 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220302141653/https://v-dem.net/media/publications/dr_2022.pdf |url-status=live }}

|}

Writing in 2018, American political journalist David Frum stated: "The hopeful world of the very late 20th century{{snd}}the world of NAFTA and an expanding NATO; of the World Wide Web 1.0 and liberal interventionism; of the global spread of democracy under leaders such as Václav Havel and Nelson Mandela{{snd}}now looks battered and delusive."{{cite journal |last1=Frum |first1=David |title=The Republican Party Needs to Embrace Liberalism |journal=Atlantic |date=November 2018 |access-date=4 October 2018 |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/the-case-for-liberal-republicanism/570790/ |archive-date=4 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004141954/https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/the-case-for-liberal-republicanism/570790/ |url-status=live }}

Michael Ignatieff wrote that Fukuyama's idea of liberalism vanquishing authoritarianism "now looks like a quaint artifact of a vanished unipolar moment" and Fukuyama himself expressed concern. By 2018, only one Arab Spring uprising (that in Tunisia) resulted in a transition to constitutional democratic governance{{cite journal|last1=Ruthven|first1=Malise|title=How to Understand ISIS|journal=New York Review of Books|date=23 June 2016|volume=63|issue=11|url=http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/06/23/how-to-understand-isis/|access-date=12 June 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160807014415/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/06/23/how-to-understand-isis/|archive-date=7 August 2016}} and a "resurgence of authoritarianism and Islamic extremism" in the region{{cite web |author=Phua |first=Yun Ru |date=31 March 2015 |title=After Every Winter Comes Spring: Tunisia's Democratic Flowering – Berkeley Political Review |url=http://bpr.berkeley.edu/2015/03/30/after-every-winter-comes-spring-tunisias-democratic-flowering/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170729220649/https://bpr.berkeley.edu/2015/03/30/after-every-winter-comes-spring-tunisias-democratic-flowering/ |archive-date=29 July 2017 |access-date=11 February 2017 |publisher=Bpr.berkeley.edu}} was dubbed the Arab Winter.{{cite web |url= https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/9753123/Middle-East-review-of-2012-the-Arab-Winter.html |title= Middle East review of 2012: the Arab Winter |work= The Telegraph |date= 31 December 2012 |access-date= 19 July 2014 |archive-date= 10 June 2019 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20190610162006/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/9753123/Middle-East-review-of-2012-the-Arab-Winter.html |url-status= live }}{{cite news | publisher = The Jerusalem Post | url = http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Analysis-Arab-Winter-is-coming-to-Baghdad-359348 | title = Analysis: Arab Winter is coming to Baghdad | work = The Telegraph | access-date = 8 October 2014 | archive-date = 14 July 2019 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190714211712/https://www.jpost.com//Middle-East/Analysis-Arab-Winter-is-coming-to-Baghdad-359348 | url-status = live }}{{cite web |url=http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2014/April/Expert-Warns-of-Americas-Coming-Arab-Winter/ |title=Expert Warns of America's Coming 'Arab Winter' |date=8 September 2014 |publisher=CBN |access-date=8 October 2014 |archive-date=9 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181209063914/http://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2014/april/expert-warns-of-americas-coming-arab-winter |url-status=live }}{{cite magazine |url= http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-arab-winter |title= The Arab Winter |magazine= The New Yorker |date= 28 December 2011 |access-date= 8 October 2014 |archive-date= 25 September 2018 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20180925113516/https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-arab-winter |url-status= live }}{{cite magazine |url= http://www.spu.edu/about-spu/news/articles/2014/may/arab-spring |title= Arab Spring or Arab Winter? |magazine= The New Yorker |access-date= 8 October 2014 |archive-date= 18 July 2019 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20190718054118/https://spu.edu/about-spu/news/articles/2014/may/arab-spring |url-status= live }}

Various explanations have been offered for the new spread of authoritarianism. They include the downside of globalization, and the subsequent rise of populism and neo-nationalism,{{cite web |last1=Bhagavan |first1=Manu |title=We are witnessing the rise of global authoritarianism on a chilling scale |url=https://qz.com/643497/we-are-witnessing-the-rise-of-global-authoritarianism-on-a-chilling-scale/ |website=Qz.com |date=21 March 2016 |access-date=4 October 2018 |archive-date=4 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004230109/https://qz.com/643497/we-are-witnessing-the-rise-of-global-authoritarianism-on-a-chilling-scale/ |url-status=live }} and the success of the Beijing Consensus, i.e. the authoritarian model of the People's Republic of China.{{cite web |last1=Cowen |first1=Tyler |date=April 3, 2017 |title=Opinion: China's Success Explains Authoritarianism's Allure |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-03/china-s-success-explains-authoritarianism-s-allure |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180818160326/https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-03/china-s-success-explains-authoritarianism-s-allure |archive-date=2018-08-18 |access-date=4 October 2018 |website=Bloomberg}} In countries such as the United States, factors blamed for the growth of authoritarianism include the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and slower real wage growth{{cite web |last1=Cowen |first1=Tyler |title=Why is authoritarianism on the rise? |url=https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/04/why-is-authoritarianism-on-the-rise.html |website=marginalrevolution.com |access-date=4 October 2018 |date=4 April 2017 |archive-date=5 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181005071800/https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/04/why-is-authoritarianism-on-the-rise.html |url-status=live }}{{Unreliable source?|date=May 2024}} as well as social media's elimination of so-called "gatekeepers" of knowledge – the equivalent of disintermediation in economics – so that a large fraction of the population considers to be opinion what were once "viewed as verifiable facts" – including everything from the danger of global warming to the preventing the spread of disease through vaccination – and considers to be fact what are actually only unproven fringe opinions.{{cite web |last=Kaiser |first=Charles |date=8 April 2018 |title=Can it Happen Here? review: urgent studies in rise of authoritarian America (Review of Cass Sunstein book Can It Happen Here?: Authoritarianism in America) |url=https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/apr/07/can-it-happen-here-review-trump-republicans-authoritarian-america-fascism |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181004225913/https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/apr/07/can-it-happen-here-review-trump-republicans-authoritarian-america-fascism |archive-date=4 October 2018 |access-date=4 October 2018 |website=The Guardian}}

In United States politics, white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, neo-Nazi skinheads, and adherents of the Christian Identity, ideology have long operated as a loose network. In the internet age, far-right extremists throughout the U.S. and much of the West have consolidated further into a movement known as the Alt-Right, which has inspired numerous terrorist attacks while at the same time increasing the mainstream appeal of white supremacism. According to Azani et al.:

The current resurgence of far-right ideology may be explained by a variety of factors, primarily, the strategic adjustment of white supremacists to soften overtly racist rhetoric in order to appeal to a wider audience. This new discourse attempts to normalize white supremacy, developing intellectual and theoretical foundations for racism based on the notion that the white race is at risk of eradication, threatened by the growing population of immigrants and people of colour. The pre-existing, offensive white supremacist, fascist and neo-Nazi ideas that drove the white power movement of the twentieth century were thus rebranded through a new innocuous defensive frame of white victimhood. As such, the new strategy of racist rhetoric has allowed the movement to co-opt mainstream political debates surrounding immigration and globalization, drawing large audiences through a deliberate obfuscation of the underlying ideology.

There is no one consensus definition of authoritarianism, but several annual measurements are attempted, including Freedom House's annual Freedom in the World report. Some countries such as Venezuela, among others, that are currently or historically recognized as authoritarian did not become authoritarian upon taking power or fluctuated between an authoritarian, flawed democracy, and hybrid regime due to periods of democratic backsliding or democratization. Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia are often regarded as the most infamous examples of "totalitarian" systems. Some countries such as China and various fascist regimes have also been characterized as totalitarian, with some periods being depicted as more authoritarian, or totalitarian, than others.

States characterized as authoritarian are typically not rated as democracies by The Economist Democracy Index or as 'free' by Freedom House's Freedom in the World index, and do not reach a high score on V-Dem Democracy Indices. Contemporary examples of totalitarian states include North Korea (officially, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea).{{Cite book |title=The Concise Encyclopedia of Democracy |publisher=Routledge |year=2013 |isbn=978-1-57958-268-5 |location=New York, NY |page=391 |chapter=Totalitarianism}}

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• Absolute monarchy
• Authoritarian capitalism
• Authoritarian conservatism
• Authoritarian socialism
• Autocracy
• Criticism of democracy
• Dictator
• Left-wing dictatorship
• List of banned political parties
• Managed democracy
• Religion and authoritarianism
• Right-wing dictatorship
• Totalitarianism
• U.S. policy toward authoritarian governments

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Citations

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• {{cite book |last=Amandae |first=Sonja |date=2003 |title=Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0226016542}}
• {{cite book |last=Huntington |first=Samuel P. |date=1970 |title=Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-party Systems |publisher=Basic Books |isbn=978-0465005697}}
• Linz, Juan J. (1964). "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain". In Allard, Eric; Littunen, Yrjo. Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems. Helsinki: Academic Bookstore.
• {{cite journal |last=Löwy |first=Michael |author-link=Michael Löwy |date=1986 |title=Mass organization, party, and state: Democracy in the transition to socialism |journal=Transition and Development: Problems of Third World Socialism |volume=94}}

• Frantz; Erica; Geddes, Barbara; Wrights, Joseph (2018). How Dictatorships Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. {{doi|10.1017/9781316336182}}.

• {{Wikiquote-inline|Authoritarianism}}

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