Populism

The term "populism" has long been subject to mistranslation and used to describe a broad and often contradictory array of movements and beliefs. Its usage has spanned continents and contexts, leading many scholars to characterize it as a vague or overstretched concept, widely invoked in political discourse, yet inconsistently defined and poorly understood.{{sfnm|1a1=Canovan|1y=1981|1p=3|2a1=Canovan|2y=1982|2p=544|3a1=Akkerman|3y=2003|3p=148|4a1=Mudde|4a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|4y=2017|4p=2|5a1=Anselmi|5y=2018|5p=5|6a1=Hawkins|6a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|6y=2019|6p=3|7a1=Brett|7y=2013|7p=410|8a1=Taggart|8y=2002|8p=162}} Against this backdrop, numerous studies have examined the term’s usage and diffusion across media, politics, and academic scholarship, highlighting the reciprocal influence among these spheres and tracing the semantic shifts that have shaped the evolving meaning of the concept.{{cite paper |last=Stavrakakis |first=Yannis |title=How did ‘populism’ become a pejorative concept? And why is this important today? A genealogy of double hermeneutics |date=2017 |journal=Populismus Working Papers |number=6 |url=https://ikee.lib.auth.gr/record/313933/files/stavrakakis-populismus-wp-6-upload.pdf |access-date=2025-04-01}}{{cite journal |last=Jäger |first=Anton |title=The Semantic Drift: Images of Populism in Post‐War American Historiography and Their Relevance for (European) Political Science |journal=Constellations |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=310–323 |date=September 2017 |doi=10.1111/1467-8675.12308 |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8675.12308 |access-date=1 April 2025}}

The word first appeared in English in 1858, used as an antonym for “aristocratic” in a translation of a work by Alphonse de Lamartine.{{Cite book|last=Lamartine|first=Alphonse Marie L. de Prat de|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lWIIAAAAQAAJ|title=History of the constituent assembly, 1789-90|date=1858|language=en}} In the Russian Empire of the 1860s and 1870s, the term was associated with the narodniki, a left-leaning agrarian movement whose name is often translated as “populists”.{{sfnm|1a1=Allcock|1y=1971|1p=372|2a1=Canovan|2y=1981|2pp=5–6}} Russian populism in the late 19th century aimed to transfer political power to the peasant communes through a radical program of agrarian reform, and would constitute a breeding ground influencing the Russian revolutions.{{sfn|March|2007|p=65}} In English, however, the term gained broader prominence through its use by the U.S.-based People's Party and its predecessors, active between the 1880s and early 1900s.{{sfnm|1a1=Allcock|1y=1971|1p=372|2a1=Canovan|2y=1981|2p=5|3a1=Akkerman|3y=2003|3p=148}} The People's Party championed small-scale farmers, advocating for expansionist monetary policies and accessible credit, and was relatively progressive on issues concerning women’s and minority rights for its time.{{cite book|last1=Frank|first1=Thomas|title=The People, No|date=2020|publisher=Metropolitan Books|isbn=978-1-250-22010-3|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AXGVDwAAQBAJ}} {{Cite book |last=Clanton |first=Glene |title=Populism: The Humane Preference in America |date=1991 |publisher=Twayne |location=Boston |pages=44, 83, 129, 131}} {{Cite book |last=McMath |first=Robert |title=American Populism: A Social History 1877–1898 |date=1992 |publisher=Hill & Wang |location=New York |pages=125, 127}} Although both the Russian and American movements have been labeled "populist", they differed in their ideological content and historical trajectory.{{sfnm|1a1=Allcock|1y=1971|1p=372|2a1=Canovan|2y=1981|2p=14}}

In the early 20th century, particularly in France, the term shifted into the realm of literature, where it came to designate a genre of novel that sympathetically portrayed the lives of the lower classes.{{Cite book |author=Tarragoni, Federico |title=L'esprit démocratique du populisme |url=https://www.editionsladecouverte.fr/l_esprit_democratique_du_populisme-9782707197306 |location=Paris |publisher=La Découverte |year=2019 |page=145 |isbn=9782707197306 |ref={{harvid|Tarragoni}}}}{{sfn|Eatwell|2017|p=366}} Léon Lemonnier published a manifesto for the genre in 1929, and Antonine Coullet-Tessier established a prize for it in 1931.{{cite news |last=Lemonnier |first=Léon |title=Un manifeste littéraire : le roman populiste |newspaper=L’Œuvre |date=27 August 1929 |issue=5079 |url=https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k4618359n |language=fr}}

The term entered the Latin American political lexicon in the post-war period, becoming a defining feature of the region’s political landscape.{{Cite book |author=Zicman de Barros, Thomás; Lago, Miguel |title=Do que falamos quando falamos de populismo |url=https://www.companhiadasletras.com.br/livro/9786559211241/do-que-falamos-quando-falamos-de-populismo |location=São Paulo |publisher=Companhia das Letras |year=2022 |page= |pages=33–42 |isbn=9786559211241 |ref={{harvid|Zicman de Barros and Lago}}}} It was initially associated in the media with charismatic leaders capable of mobilizing recently urbanized populations, particularly those displaced by rural migration. These new urban groups, increasingly integrated into electoral politics, were seen as escaping older systems of clientelist control such as “halter voting” (voto de cabresto or voto cantado) and began to redefine national political life. Although often viewed with suspicion and associated with manipulation or demagoguery, populism in this context frequently carried a positive connotation and was openly embraced by political actors.{{sfn|Zicman de Barros and Lago|pp=43–47}}

Until the 1950s, use of the term populism in academia remained restricted largely to historians studying the People's Party. In 1954, however, two pivotal publications marked a turning point in the conceptual development of the term. In the United States, analyzing the rise of McCarthyism, sociologist Edward Shils published an article proposing populism as a term to describe anti-elite trends in US society more broadly.{{cite journal |last=Shils |first=Edward |title=Populism and the Rule of Law |journal=University of Chicago Law School Conference on Jurisprudence and Politics |volume=15 |year=1954}}{{sfn|Allcock|1971|pp=372–373}} Simultaneously in Brazil, political scientist Hélio Jaguaribe, responding to the country’s emerging “populist hype” in the press, published what is considered the first academic text on Latin American populism, framing it as a form of class conciliation.{{cite journal |last=Jaguaribe |first=Hélio |title=O que é o ademarismo? |journal=Cadernos do Nosso Tempo |volume=2 |pages=139–149 |year=1954 |url=https://periodicos.uff.br/revista_estudos_politicos/article/view/38628/22150 |doi=10.22409/rep.v3i5.38628}}

Following Shils’ intervention, the 1960s saw populism gain increasing traction among US sociologists and other academics in the social sciences.{{sfnm|1a1=Allcock|1y=1971|1p=371|2a1=Hawkins|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2019|2p=2}} Notably, historian Richard Hofstadter and sociologist Daniel Bell reinterpreted the legacy of the People's Party through a critical lens, portraying it as an expression of status anxiety and irrationalism.{{cite book |last=Hofstadter |first=Richard |title=The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. |chapter=The Folklore of Populism |year=1990 |orig-year=1955 |publisher=Vintage Books |location=New York}}{{cite book |last=Bell |first=Daniel |title=The Radical Right |chapter=Interpretations of American Politics |publisher=Criterion Books |location=New York |year=1956}} A parallel trend unfolded in Latin America, where scholars—often influenced by Marxist frameworks—began to investigate populism as a political phenomenon tied to modernization, mass mobilization, and developmentalist ideologies. Despite the growing interest, scholarly consensus on the definition of populism remained elusive. Notably, a 1967 conference at the London School of Economics that brought together many of the era’s leading experts failed to produce a unified theoretical framework.{{cite book|title=Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics|last=Ionescu|first=Ghita|last2=Gellner|first2=Ernest (Eds.)|publisher=The Garden City Press|year=1967|location=Letchworth}}{{sfn|Allcock|1971|p=378}}

The convergence of new—and often contested—academic interpretations with the use of the term by political forces critical of those labeled as populists has contributed to its increasingly negative connotation. The absence of a coherent ideological platform or consistent programmatic formulation among self-proclaimed populists, combined with the lack of a coordinated international movement, has further enabled the term to vary widely in meaning.{{sfn|Canovan|1981|p=6}} As a result, populism has come to be applied across a broad range of political contexts and figures, often without clear or consistent definition.{{sfnm|1a1=Albertazzi|1a2=McDonnell|1y=2008|1p=3|2a1=Mudde|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2017|2p=2}} The term has often been conflated with other concepts like demagoguery,{{sfnm|1a1=Stanley|1y=2008|1p=101|2a1=Hawkins|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2019|2p=1}} and generally presented as something to be feared and discredited.{{sfn|Stanley|2008|p=101}} It has often been applied as a catchword to movements that are considered to be outside the political mainstream or a threat to democracy.{{sfnm|1a1=Canovan|1y=2004|1p=244|2a1=Tormey|2y=2018|2p=260|3a1=Mény|3a2=Surel|3y=2002|3p=3}}

Although scholars had already observed that populism was becoming a recurring feature of Western democracies by the early 1990s,{{sfn|Canovan|2004|p=242}}{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=551}} the term gained unprecedented global prominence following the political upheavals of 2016—most notably, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union. Both events were widely interpreted as expressions of populist sentiment, sparking renewed public interest in the concept.{{sfn|Tormey|2018|p=260}}{{sfn|Anselmi|2018|p=1}} Reflecting this heightened attention, the Cambridge Dictionary selected "populism" as its Word of the Year in 2017.{{cite web|url=https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/populism-revealed-as-2017-word-of-the-year-by-cambridge-university-press|title='Populism' revealed as 2017 Word of the Year by Cambridge University Press|publisher=Cambridge University Press|date=30 November 2017|access-date=9 August 2018|archive-date=9 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180809090852/https://www.cam.ac.uk/news/populism-revealed-as-2017-word-of-the-year-by-cambridge-university-press|url-status=live}}

This so-called "populist hype" also found its counterpart in academia.{{cite book |last1=Glynos |first1=Jason |last2=Mondon |first2=Aurélien |title=Populism and Passions |chapter=The political logic of the populist hype: The case of right-wing populism’s ‘meteoric rise’ and its relation to the status quo |editor1-last=Cossarini |editor1-first=Paolo |editor2-last=Vallespín |editor2-first=Fernando |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781351205474 |doi=10.4324/9781351205474-6 |url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351205474-6}} Whereas between 1950 and 1960 roughly 160 publications on populism were recorded, that number rose to over 1,500 between 1990 and 2000.{{sfn|Anselmi|2018|p=3}}{{sfn|Taggart|2002|p=63}} From 2000 to 2015, an average of 95 academic papers and books annually included the term "populism" in their title or abstract as catalogued by Web of Science. In 2016, that number climbed to 266; in 2017, it reached 488; and by 2018, it had grown to 615.{{Cite journal|last1=Noury|first1=Abdul|last2=Roland|first2=Gerard|date=11 May 2020|title=Identity Politics and Populism in Europe|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=23|issue=1|pages=421–439|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-033542|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}

The conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term—exacerbated by this spike in political and academic attention—has led some scholars to propose abandoning "populism" as an analytical category altogether. In particular, the frequent conflation of populism with far-right nativism has drawn criticism for misrepresenting the ethos of historical self-described populists, while also providing a euphemistic gloss for racist or authoritarian political actors seeking legitimacy by claiming to represent "the people."{{cite book |last1=Brown |first1=Katy |last2=Mondon |first2=Aurelien |last3=Winter |first3=Aaron |chapter=‘I’m not “racist” but’: Liberalism, Populism and Euphemisation in the Guardian |editor1-last=Freedman |editor1-first=Des |title=Capitalism's Conscience: 200 Years of the Guardian |publisher=Pluto Press |year=2021 |isbn=9780745343341 |url=https://repository.uel.ac.uk/item/89wvz |access-date=1 April 2025}}{{Cite journal|last=Art|first=David|date=2020|title=The Myth of Global Populism|journal=Perspectives on Politics|volume=20|issue=3|language=en|pages=999–1011|doi=10.1017/S1537592720003552|s2cid=228858887|issn=1537-5927|doi-access=}}{{sfnm|1a1=Stanley|1y=2008|1p=101|2a1=March|2y=2007|2pp=68–69}}

In contrast, others argue that the concept remains too integral to political analysis to be discarded. If clearly defined, they contend, "populism" could be a valuable tool for understanding a broad range of political actors, especially those operating on the margins of mainstream politics.{{sfnm|1a1=Canovan|1y=1981|1pp=5-6|2a1=Albertazzi|2a2=McDonnell|2y=2008|2p=3|3a1=Mudde|3a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|3y=2017|3p=5}}

As a polysemic concept, populism has been interpreted through various theoretical lenses and given multiple definitions. Today, the main theoretical approaches to populism are the ideational, class-based, discursive, performative, strategic, and economic frameworks.

The ideational approach defines populism as a "thin-centred ideology" that divides society into two antagonistic groups: "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite," and sees politics as an expression of the general will (volonté générale) of the people.Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, pp. 149–150.Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p. 6.Abi-Hassan 2017, p. 427. It positions populism not as a comprehensive ideology but one that attaches itself to broader political movements like socialism, or conservatism.Stanley 2008, pp. 95, 99–100, 106–107.March 2007, p. 64.Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008, p. 4. Scholars like Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser emphasize that populism is moralistic rather than programmatic, promoting a binary worldview that resists compromise.Mudde 2004, p. 544. This ideology is present across diverse political systems, is not limited to charismatic leadership, and can be employed flexibly to support a range of agendas on both the left and the right.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=545}}

According to ideational scholars, populism constructs "the people" as a virtuous and unified group, often with vague or shifting boundaries, allowing populist leaders to define inclusion or exclusion based on strategic goals. This group is seen as sovereign and historically grounded, whose common sense is viewed as superior to elite expertise or institutional knowledge. Conversely, "the elite" is portrayed as a homogeneous, corrupt force undermining the people's will. Depending on context, elites may be defined economically, politically, culturally, or even ethnically. The concept of the general will is presented in the ideational approch as central to populist rhetoric, aligning with a critique of representative democracy in favor of direct forms of decision-making such as referendums. This approach resonates with Rousseau's philosophical legacy, suggesting that only "the people" know what is best for society.

Ideational scholars emphasize the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1p=79|2a1=Zaslove|2a2=Geurkink|2a3=Jacobs|2a4=Akkerman|2y=2021|3a1=Albertazzi|3a2=McDonnell|3y=2008|3p=10|4a1=Anselmi|4y=2018|4p=2|5a1=March|5y=2007|5p=73}} While they note that not all populists are authoritarian and recognize that populism can help redeem liberal democracy from its shortcomings when operating in opposition—by mobilizing social groups who feel excluded from political decision-making processes and by raising awareness among socio-political elites of popular grievances{{sfnm|1a1=March|1y=2007|1p=72-73|2a1=Mudde|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2017|2pp=83, 84}}—they generally contend that populism becomes inherently detrimental to pluralism once in power.{{cite book |last1=Mudde |first1=Cas |last2=Rovira Kaltwasser |first2=Cristóbal |title=Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? |chapter=Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |year=2012 |page=10 |isbn=9781139152365 |doi=10.1017/CBO9781139152365 |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139152365}}{{cite book|last1=Levitsky|first1=Steven|title=Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Latin America|last2=Loxton|first2=James|date=30 August 2012|publisher=American Political Science Association|location=New Orleans}} By often claiming to represent the authentic will of the people, populists—particularly those aligned with right-wing movements—bypass or actively undermine liberal democratic institutions designed to safeguard minority rights, most notably the judiciary and the media, which are frequently portrayed as disconnected from the populace.{{sfnm|1a1=March|1y=2007|1p=73|2a1=Mudde|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2017|2pp=81-90|3a1=McDonnell|3a2=Cabrera|3y=2019|3p=493|4a1=Akkerman|4y=2003|4p=56}}{{Cite web|last=Norris|first=Pippa|author-link=Pippa Norris|date=April 2017|title=Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks|url=http://journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/media/Journal%20of%20Democracy%20Web%20Exchange%20-%20Norris_0.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180411111001/https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/sites/default/files/media/Journal%20of%20Democracy%20Web%20Exchange%20-%20Norris_0.pdf|archive-date=11 April 2018|access-date=28 August 2018|website=Journal of Democracy|series=Online Exchange on "Democratic Deconsolidation"|publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press|language=en|type=Scholarly response to column published online}}{{Cite web|last1=Mounk|first1=Yascha|last2=Kyle|first2=Jordan|date=26 December 2018|title=What Populists Do to Democracies|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210309020711/https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/hard-data-populism-bolsonaro-trump/578878/|archive-date=9 March 2021|access-date=27 December 2018|website=The Atlantic|language=en-US|type=Ideas}} This dynamic can be especially potent in contexts where the rule of law has weak institutional foundations, creating fertile ground for democratic backsliding.{{Cite journal |last1=Kyriacou |first1=Andreas |last2=Trivin |first2=Pedro |date=2025 |title=Populism and the rule of law: The importance of institutional legacies |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12935 |journal=American Journal of Political Science |language=en |doi=10.1111/ajps.12935 |issn=1540-5907}} In such cases, populist governance may give rise to what philosopher John Stuart Mill termed the "tyranny of the majority."{{sfn|March|2007|p=73}}

The ideational definition is not without criticism. Some argue that it proceeds deductively, establishing a definition in advance and then applying it to cases in a way that imposes rigid assumptions—such as moral dualism and the homogeneity of "the people"—that may not hold empirically in all contexts.{{Cite journal|last=Freeden|first=Michael|date=2017-01-02|title=After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology|journal=Journal of Political Ideologies|volume=22|issue=1|pages=1–11|doi=10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813}}{{Cite journal|last=Katsambekis|first=Giorgos|date=2022-01-02|title=Constructing 'the people' of populism: a critique of the ideational approach from a discursive perspective|journal=Journal of Political Ideologies|volume=27|issue=1|pages=53–74|doi=10.1080/13569317.2020.1844372}}{{Cite journal|last1=Stavrakakis|first1=Yannis|last2=Jäger|first2=Anton|date=2018|title=Accomplishments and limitations of the 'new' mainstream in contemporary populism studies|journal=European Journal of Social Theory|volume=21|issue=4|pages=547–565|doi=10.1177/1368431017723337}}{{Cite journal|last1=Dean|first1=Jonathan|last2=Maiguashca|first2=Bice|date=2020|title=Did somebody say populism? Towards a renewal and reorientation of populism studies|journal=Journal of Political Ideologies|volume=25|issue=1|pages=11–27|doi=10.1080/13569317.2020.1699712|hdl=10871/38714|hdl-access=free}} Others caution that if broadly applied, the term risks becoming too vague, potentially encompassing most political discourse.

Class-based approaches interpret populism as a phenomenon rooted in social class dynamics. Latin American scholars such as Hélio Jaguaribe and Gino Germani were among the first to interpret populism as a mass-based phenomenon of political mobilization, characteristic of societies undergoing rapid modernization.{{cite journal |last=Germani |first=Gino |year=1961 |title=Démocratie représentative et classes populaires en Amérique latine |journal=Sociologie du travail |volume=3 |issue=4 |pages=96–113}} They emphasized features such as personalist leadership, the political incorporation of previously excluded social sectors, and institutional fragility—often accompanied by authoritarian tendencies.{{cite book|first=Gino|last=Germani|title=Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zY6CMlIY0e0C|year=1978|publisher=Transaction Publishers|isbn=978-1-4128-1771-4|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151017084111/https://books.google.com/books?id=zY6CMlIY0e0C|archive-date=17 October 2015}} In Germani’s case, his theory of national-popular movements and the “authoritarianism of the popular classes” was developed in dialogue with American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset.{{cite book |last=Germani |first=Ana Alejandra |title=Antifascism and Sociology: Gino Germani 1911–1979 |publisher=Transaction Publishers |year=2008 |location=New Brunswick, NJ |isbn=978-1412806817 |url=https://www.routledge.com/Antifascism-and-Sociology-Gino-Germani-1911-1979/Germani/p/book/9781412806817}}{{cite book |last=Amaral |first=Samuel Eduardo |year=2018 |chapter=El movimiento nacional-popular: el intercambio Germani-Lipset |title=El movimiento nacional-popular: Gino Germani y el peronismo |series=Colección de estudios de historia del peronismo |pages=51–80 |publisher=Eduntref |location=Sáenz Peña}} Drawing in part on analyses of McCarthyism, Lipset argued that populism is a movement that unites various social classes, typically around a charismatic leader.{{Cite book |last=Lipset |first=Seymour Martin |author-link1=Seymour Martin Lipset |title=Political Man |url=https://archive.org/details/politicalmansoci00inlips |location=New York |publisher=Doubleday & Company |year=1960 |pages=167–173 }} While noting that this characteristic also appears in fascism, Lipset emphasized a key distinction: fascism draws primarily from the middle classes, whereas populism finds its main social base among the poor.

A more explicitly class-oriented interpretation comes from the Marxist tradition, particularly influential in Latin America through thinkers such as Francisco Weffort and Fernando Henrique Cardoso.{{Cite book |last=Weffort |first=Francisco |author-link1=Francisco Weffort |title=O populismo na política brasileira |location=São Paulo |publisher=Civilização Brasileira |year=1978 |isbn=9788521905998 }}{{Cite journal |last=Cardoso |first=Fernando Henrique |author-link1=Fernando Henrique Cardoso |title=Proletariado no Brasil: situação e comportamento social |journal=Revista Brasiliense |issue=41 |year=1962 |pages=98–122 }} Breaking with the sympathetic stance toward Russian populism found in the late writings of Karl Marx,{{Cite book |chapter=Late Marx: gods and craftsmen |title=Late Marx and the Russian Road |editor-first=Teodor |editor-last=Shanin |pages=3–39 |year=1983 |location=London |publisher=Monthly Review Press |isbn=9780853456476 }} these Latin American Marxists drew instead on Marx’s reflections on Bonapartism and Antonio Gramsci's concept of Caesarism. From this perspective, populism arises in moments of equilibrium between antagonistic classes—when the bourgeoisie has lost its hegemonic capacity but the proletariat has not yet seized power.{{Cite journal |last=Ronderos |first=Sebastián |last2=Zicman de Barros |first2=Thomás |title=Populism and Anti-populism in Brazilian Politics: Masses, Political Logics and Contested Signifiers |journal=Aurora |volume=12 |issue=36 |year=2020 |doi=10.23925/v12n36_dossie2 |url=https://doi.org/10.23925/v12n36_dossie2 |doi-access=free }} In such conditions, political power gains autonomy from dominant classes and positions itself as an arbiter, drawing support from what Marx termed the “mass”: a disorganized group lacking class consciousness and vulnerable to charismatic leadership.

Marxist critics in Latin America acknowledged populism’s role in integrating the popular masses into political life and fostering social and economic development. However, they argued that this integration was limited—proto-democratic in form but ultimately constrained within a bourgeois framework. Populist regimes, they contended, often demobilized collective organization by substituting social benefits and labor reforms for class struggle, while subordinating trade unions to state control and electoral interests. These critiques have been challenged by historians who argue that the so-called populist period in Latin American history was in fact marked by a growing politicization of workers—one that may have posed a challenge to established political and economic interests.{{Cite book |chapter=O colapso do colapso do populismo, ou a propósito de uma herança maldita |title=O populismo e sua história: Debate e crítica |editor-first=Jorge |editor-last=Ferreira |first=Daniel Aarão |last=Reis |location=Rio de Janeiro |publisher=Civilização Brasileira |year=2001 |page=319 |isbn=9788520005774 }}

File:Presentación del Documental CATASTROIKA y Presentación de la Revista Debates y Combates (7215329954).jpg developed a distinctive definition of populism, viewing it as a potentially positive force for emancipatory social change.]]

The discursive approach is most closely associated with Argentine political theorist Ernesto Laclau and other scholars of the so-called Essex School.{{Cite book |last=Laclau |first=Ernesto |author-link1=Ernesto Laclau |title=On Populist Reason |location=London |publisher=Verso |year=2005 |isbn=9781844671861 }} For Laclau, populism should be understood as a discursive logic in which a series of unmet demands coalesce around a symbol that names a popular movement in opposition to an elite. Although charismatic leaders are often the most common symbols of populist movements, the discursive approach maintains that populism can exist without this type of leadership.

Unlike the ideational approach, the discursive tradition does not necessarily view the opposition of the "bottom" against the "top" as moralistic. In contrast to the Marxist approach, it also criticizes what it sees as the idealization of an autonomous social class, as opposed to a manipulated mass. From a constructivist perspective, Laclau and his followers argue that political subjects—and particularly an entity such as "the people"—are always radically contingent discursive constructions, capable of taking on various forms.{{Cite book |last=Marchart |first=Oliver |chapter=The Political and the Impossibility of Society: Ernesto Laclau |title=Post-foundational political thought: Political difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1r2bs1 |location=Edinburgh |publisher=Edinburgh University Press |year=2007 |pages=154–176 |isbn=9780748624973 |doi=10.3366/j.ctt1r2bs1.10 }}

Normatively, Laclau’s definition of populism refrains from judging whether populism is inherently positive or negative.{{cite AV media |people=Laclau, Ernesto |date=2011 |title=Populism: Manipulation or Emancipation [Λαϊκισμός: Χειραγώγηση ή χειραφέτηση] |medium=Television program episode |series=Places of Life, Places of Ideas [Τόποι Ζωής, Τόποι Ιδεών], directed by Giorgos Keramidiotis |location=Thessaloniki |publisher=ET3 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9A8hEbJMhgs&ab_channel=stazybohorn&t=1572 |time=23:15–27:05}} However, it sets itself apart from previous approaches by regarding some populist experiences in power as genuinely democratizing. Building on this perspective, some scholars influenced by Laclau argue that populism is inherently emancipatory and pluralistic, and that authoritarian and nationalist movements often labeled as populist would be more accurately described as fascist.{{cite book |last1=Biglieri |first1=Paula |last2=Cadahia |first2=Luciana |title=Seven Essays on Populism: For a Renewed Theoretical Perspective |publisher=Polity |location=Medford |year=2021 |isbn=9781509542215 |pages=20–40}}

The performative approach, also known as the socio-cultural approach, is sometimes presented as a branch of the discursive approach. Its main exponents include Pierre Ostiguy, Benjamin Moffitt, and María Esperanza Casullo.{{Cite book|chapter=Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.3 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.013.3|title=The Oxford Handbook of Populism |pages=73–97 |year=2017 |location=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780198803560 |first=Pierre |last=Ostiguy |editor-first1=Cristóbal |editor-last1=Rovira Kaltwasser |editor-first2=Paul |editor-last2=Taggart |editor-first3=Paulina |editor-last3=Ochoa Espejo |editor-first4=Pierre |editor-last4=Ostiguy}}{{Cite book |last=Moffitt |first=Benjamin |title=The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvqsdsd8 |doi=10.11126/stanford/9780804796132.001.0001 |location=Palo Alto |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2016 |isbn=9781503604216 }}{{Cite book|chapter=Populism as Synecdochal Representation: Understanding the Transgressive Bodily Performance of South American Presidents|url=https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003110149-6 |doi=10.4324/9781003110149-6|title=Populism in Global Perspective: A Performative and Discursive Approach |pages=75–94 |year=2021 |location=London |publisher=Routledge |isbn=9781003110149 |first=María Esperanza |last=Casullo |editor-first1=Pierre |editor-last1=Ostiguy |editor-first2=Francisco |editor-last2=Panizza |editor-first3=Benjamin |editor-last3=Moffitt}}{{Cite journal|last=Aiolfi |first=Théo |title=Populism as a Transgressive Style |journal=Global Studies Quarterly |volume=2 |issue=1 |year=2022 |doi=10.1093/isagsq/ksac006 }} This approach views populism not as a fixed ideology but as a political style—a repertoire of symbolically mediated performances through which leaders construct and navigate power. Rather than focusing on what populists believe, this perspective highlights how they communicate and present themselves, encompassing rhetoric, gestures, body language, fashion, imagery, and staging. These aesthetic and performative elements are essential to how populism operates in practice.

Critiquing what it sees as excessive formalism in Laclau’s theory, the performative approach emphasizes the theatrical and transgressive nature of populism. Populist actors often break with traditional norms and expectations of political behavior, embracing styles that are irreverent, culturally popular, and emotionally charged. Populism is thus seen as a performance that challenges the boundaries of "respectable" political discourse.

While some scholars focus on the performances of charismatic leaders, others emphasize the historical and social dimension of populist transgression, noting its capacity to mobilize marginalized sectors traditionally excluded from political life. The sudden entry of these groups into the public sphere is often experienced as disruptive or shocking.{{Cite journal|last1=Zicman de Barros |first1=Thomás |last2=Aiolfi |first2=Théo |title=The Transgressive Aesthetics of Populism |journal=Politics |pages=1–19 |year=2025 |doi=10.1177/02633957241312601 |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/02633957241312601 }}

As with the discursive approach, advocates of the performative theory maintain that populism can, in some cases, express emancipatory potential.

An additional framework has been described as the "political-strategic" approach. This applies the term populism to a political strategy in which a charismatic leader seeks to govern based on direct and unmediated connection with their followers.{{cite journal |last=Roberts |first=Kenneth M. |year=1995 |title=Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism in Latin America: The Peruvian case |journal=World Politics |volume=48 |issue=1 |pages=82–116 |doi=10.1353/wp.1995.0004 }} Kurt Weyland defined this conception of populism as a political strategy employed by a personalist leader who governs throught direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.{{cite journal |last=Weyland |first=Kurt |year=1999 |title=Neoliberal populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe |journal=Comparative Politics |volume=31 |issue=4 |pages=379–401 |jstor=422236 }} According to this perspective, a populist strategy for winning and exerting state power stands in tension with democracy and the values of pluralism, open debate, and fair competition.{{cite journal|last1=Weyland|first1=Kurt|date=July 2013|title=Latin America's Authoritarian Drift|journal=Journal of Democracy|volume=24|issue=3|pages=18–32|doi=10.1353/jod.2013.0045|s2cid=154433853}}{{cite book|last1=Madrid|first1=Raúl|title=The Rise of Ethnic Politics in Latin America|date=June 2012|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-15325-6|location=Cambridge|pages=178–83}}

A common criticism of the strategic approach is that, by focusing on leadership, this concept of populism does not allow for the existence of populist parties or populist social movements.{{sfn|Hawkins|Rovira Kaltwasser|2019|p=6}} As a result, it overlooks historical cases often considered paradigmatic of populism, such as the US People's Party.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2013|p=154}} Furthermore, this approach may inadvertently reinforce popular perceptions of populism as a style of politics characterized by overly simplistic solutions to complex problems, delivered in an emotionally charged manner or through the promotion of short-term, unrealistic, and unsustainable policies.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|pp=542-543}} While this usage may seem intuitively meaningful, some argue that it is difficult to apply empirically, since most political actors engage in slogans and rhetoric, and distinguishing between emotionally charged and rational arguments can be problematic. This phenomenon is more accurately described as demagogy or opportunism.

Closely related to the ideas of demagogy and opportunism, the socioeconomic definition of populism refers to a pattern of irresponsible economic policymaking, in which governments implement expansive public spending—typically financed by foreign loans—followed by inflationary crises and subsequent austerity measures.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=3–4|2a1=Hawkins|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2019|2p=6}} This understanding gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s through economists such as Rudiger Dornbusch, Jeffrey Sachs, and Sebastián Edwards, particularly in studies of Latin American economies.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=3}} It builds on earlier critiques by Argentine economist Marcelo Diamand, who argued that economies like Argentina experienced cyclical swings between unsustainable populist spending and excessive austerity.{{Cite book |last=Aslanidis |first=Paris |chapter=The Red Herring of Economic Populism |title=The Palgrave Handbook of Populism |editor-last=Oswald |editor-first=Michael |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |location=London |year=2021 |pages=245–261 |doi=10.1007/978-3-030-80803-7_14 |isbn=9783030808037 |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-80803-7_14 }} Although Diamand critiqued both extremes, later U.S.-based economists largely abandoned his condemnation of austerity, instead framing it as a necessary corrective for economic instability.{{Cite journal |last=Sachs |first=Jeffrey |title=Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America |journal=Labour Relations and Economic Performance |pages=137–169 |year=2021 |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-11562-4_6 |url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-11562-4_6 }}{{Cite book |last1=Dornbusch |first1=Rudiger |last2=Edwards |first2=Sebastián |title=The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America |location=Chicago |publisher=University of Chicago Press |year=1991 |pages=1–4 |url=https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/macroeconomics-populism-latin-america }}

While still invoked by some economists and journalists—particularly in Latin America—this economic definition of populism remains relatively uncommon in the broader social sciences.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=4}} Critics argue that it reduces populism to left-wing economic mismanagement, overlooks the term’s political and ideological dimensions, and fails to account for populist leaders who implemented neoliberal policies.{{Cite journal |last=Weyland |first=Kurt |title=Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe |journal=Comparative Politics |volume=31 |issue=4 |pages=379–401 |year=1999 |doi=10.2307/422236 |jstor=422236 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/422236 }} The term "populism" is often used in this context to stigmatize heterodox economic policies, thereby narrowing space for debate.

Over the decades, and across various theoretical approaches, populism has been associated with massification and the dissolution of social bonds. Explanations for this process vary, pointing to economic, labor, and cultural transformations, along with their subjective consequences.{{cite journal|last1=Berman|first1=Sheri|title=The Causes of Populism in the West|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|date=11 May 2021|volume=24|issue=1|pages=71–88|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-102503|doi-access=free}}

The economic grievance thesis argues that economic factors have contributed to the formation of a 'left-behind' precariat marked by low job security, high inequality, and wage stagnation. On this account, the group would be more inclined to support populism.{{sfn|Inglehart|Norris|2016|p=1-2|pp=29–30|loc=Bibliography}}{{Cite book|last1=Norris|first1=Pippa|title=Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism|last2=Inglehart|first2=Ronald|year=2019|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1-108-59584-1|pages=134–139|doi=10.1017/9781108595841|s2cid=242313055}}{{Cite journal|last1=Broz|first1=J. Lawrence|last2=Frieden|first2=Jeffry|last3=Weymouth|first3=Stephen|date=2021|title=Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=75|issue=2|pages=464–494|doi=10.1017/S0020818320000314|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}} Reasons for precarity vary: in the Global North, it has often been linked to a decline in living standards due to deindustrialization, economic liberalization, and deregulation, whereas in the Global South, it tends to follow a truncated process of upward mobility, in which workers emerge from extreme poverty but remain in unstable, low-quality employment and living conditions.{{cite book |last=Pinheiro-Machado |first=Rosana |year=2024 |editor1-last=Gabriel |editor1-first=Markus |editor2-last=Katsman |editor2-first=Anna |editor3-last=Liess |editor3-first=Thomas |editor4-last=Milberg |editor4-first=William S. |chapter=Why and How Precarious Workers Support Neo-Illiberalism |pages=59–78 |title=Beyond Neoliberalism and Neo-Illiberalism: Economic Policies and Performance for Sustainable Democracy |volume=1 |publisher=transcript |location=Bielefeld |url=https://doi.org/10.14361/978389474877 |doi=10.14361/978389474877}} To account for these dynamics, some theories focus specifically on the effects of economic crises,{{Cite book|last=Mudde|first=Cas|title=Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe|date=2007|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-511-49203-7|location=Cambridge|pages=205–206|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511492037}}{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=100}} or inequality,{{Cite journal|last1=Flaherty|first1=Thomas M.|last2=Rogowski|first2=Ronald|date=2021|title=Rising Inequality As a Threat to the Liberal International Order|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=75|issue=2|pages=495–523|doi=10.1017/S0020818321000163|issn=0020-8183|doi-access=free}} while others emphasize globalization’s role in disrupting established labor markets and fueling economic dislocation.

Macro-level evidence suggests that resentment toward out­groups tends to rise during periods of economic hardship,{{cite book|last1=Dancygier|first1=RM.|title=Immigration and Conflict in Europe|date=2010|publisher=Princeton University Press|location=Princeton, NJ|pages=}} and economic crises have been associated with gains for far-right parties—entities frequently conflated with populist movements, though not necessarily synonymous.{{cite journal|last1=Klapsis|first1=Antonis|title=Economic Crisis and Political Extremism in Europe: From the 1930s to the Present|journal=European View|date=December 2014|volume=13|issue=2|pages=189–198|doi=10.1007/s12290-014-0315-5|doi-access=free}}{{cite journal|last1=Funke|first1=Manuel|last2=Schularick|first2=Moritz|last3=Trebesch|first3=Christoph|title=Going to extremes: Politics after financial crises, 1870–2014|journal=European Economic Review|date=September 2016|volume=88|pages=227–260|doi=10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.006|s2cid=154426984|url=https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp5553.pdf}} However, micro-level studies have found only limited evidence linking individual economic grievances directly to support for populist candidates or parties.

The modernization losers theory argues that certain aspects of transition to modernity have caused demand for populism. This argument was advanced in the 1950s by Hofstadter and other early revisionist scholars who examined the People’s Party, interpreting their populism as a response to deep-seated cultural anxieties in the face of modern economic and social transformations. This anxiety manifested in a partial rejection of modernity—not against technology or progress itself, but against the perceived social and moral effects of modern capitalism and urbanization. More recently, scholars have pointed to the anomie that followed industrialization, resulting in dissolution, fragmentation, and differentiation, which weakened the traditional ties of civil society and increased individualization.{{cite journal|last1=Betz|first1=Hans-Georg|last2=Johnson|first2=Carol|title=Against the current—stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right|journal=Journal of Political Ideologies|publisher=Informa UK Limited|volume=9|issue=3|year=2004|issn=1356-9317|doi=10.1080/1356931042000263546|pages=311–327| hdl=2440/15888|s2cid=143439884|hdl-access=free}} Some analysts argue that such conditions—marked by fragmented identities and weak collective structures—now resemble the dynamics long observed in the Global South, where class fluidity, economic insecurity, and limited institutional integration have historically shaped populist politics.{{cite book |last=Miguel |first=Luis Felipe |title=Democracia na periferia capitalista: impasses do Brasil |publisher=Autêntica |year=2022 |location=Belo Horizonte |isbn=9786559281435}} Populism appeals to déclassé elements across all social strata, offering a broad identity which gives sovereignty to the previously marginalized masses as "the people".{{Cite journal|date=6 November 2017|editor-last1=Rovira Kaltwasser|editor-first1=Cristóbal|editor-link1=Cristóbal Rovira|editor2-last=Taggart|editor2-first=Paul|editor3-last=Espejo|editor3-first=Paulina Ochoa|editor4-last=Ostiguy|editor4-first=Pierre|title=The Oxford Handbook of Populism|journal=Oxford Handbooks Online|pages=269–270|doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001|isbn=978-0-19-880356-0}}

Another theory that connects the emergence of populism to transformations associated with modernity—though from a different angle—is the cultural backlash thesis. Focusing specifically on the rise of far-right populism, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argue that such movements are a reaction to the growing prominence of postmaterialism in many developed countries, including the spread of feminism, multiculturalism, and environmentalism.{{cite book|last1=Norris|first1=Pippa|last2=Inglehart|first2=Ronald|title=Cultural Backlash|publisher=Cambridge University Press|date=2019|isbn=978-1-108-59584-1|doi=10.1017/9781108595841|s2cid=242313055}} According to this view, the diffusion of new ideas and values gradually challenges established norms, eventually reaching a "tipping point" that provokes a backlash from segments of the population who previously held dominant social positions—particularly older, white, less-educated men—expressed through support for right-wing populism. Some theories limit this argument to being a reaction to just the increase of ethnic diversity from immigration.{{cite book|last=Mudde|first=Cas|title=Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe|publisher=Cambridge University Press|date=2007|isbn=978-0-521-61632-4|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511492037}} Such theories are particularly popular with sociologists and with political scientists studying industrial world and American politics.

Empirical studies testing the cultural backlash thesis have produced mixed results. While individual-level research shows strong links between sociocultural attitudes—such as views on immigration or racial resentment—and support for right-wing populist parties, macro-level analyses have not consistently found correlations between aggregate populist sentiment and electoral outcomes. Nonetheless, political science and psychology research point to the significant role of group-based identity threats: individuals who feel their social group is under threat are more likely to back political actors who promise to protect its status and identity.{{cite journal|last1=Craig|first1=Maureen A.|last2=Richeson|first2=Jennifer A.|title=On the Precipice of a 'Majority-Minority' America: Perceived Status Threat From the Racial Demographic Shift Affects White Americans' Political Ideology|journal=Psychological Science|date=June 2014|volume=25|issue=6|pages=1189–1197|doi=10.1177/0956797614527113|pmid=24699846|s2cid=28725639|url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614527113}}{{cite journal|last1=Mutz|first1=Diana C.|title=Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote|journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences|date=8 May 2018|volume=115|issue=19|pages=E4330–E4339|doi=10.1073/pnas.1718155115|pmid=29686081|pmc=5948965|bibcode=2018PNAS..115E4330M|doi-access=free}} Although much of this work has focused on white identity politics, similar patterns are observed among other groups that perceive themselves as marginalized.{{cite journal|last1=Outten|first1=H. Robert|last2=Schmitt|first2=Michael T.|last3=Miller|first3=Daniel A.|last4=Garcia|first4=Amber L.|title=Feeling Threatened About the Future: Whites' Emotional Reactions to Anticipated Ethnic Demographic Changes|journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin|date=January 2012|volume=38|issue=1|pages=14–25|doi=10.1177/0146167211418531|pmid=21844094|s2cid=26212843|url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167211418531|access-date=24 August 2021}}{{cite journal|last1=Taijfel|first1=H|title=Experiments in intergroup discrimination.|journal=Scientific American|date=November 1970|volume=223|issue=5|pages=96–102|doi=10.1038/scientificamerican1170-96|pmid=5482577|bibcode=1970SciAm.223e..96T|url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/5482577/|access-date=24 August 2021}}

Various authors have presented populism as a response, reaction, or symptom of post-democracy.{{cite book |last=Mouffe |first=Chantal |title=For a Left Populism |year=2018 |publisher=Verso |location=London |page=4}} Post-democracy refers to a condition in which the formal institutions of liberal democracy—elections, parties, and representative government—continue to exist, but their functioning is increasingly dominated by elites, technocratic decision-making, and market forces.

In this context, populism is seen as a reaction to the narrowing of political choice and the decline of responsive, representative governance. Scholars offer various explanations for this development. One perspective holds that these dynamics are especially pronounced in societies where civil society is weak or in decline—a condition that some scholars view as historically characteristic of the Global South, where populism has been more recurrent, but which is increasingly visible in the Global North as well. Others emphasize the role of globalization, which is seen as having seriously limited the powers of national elites and constrained their capacity to respond to popular demands.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|pp=555–56}} Another commonly cited factor is the convergence of mainstream parties, particularly those on the center-left and center-right, which often avoid addressing contentious or pressing public concerns.{{cite book|last1=Steinmo|first1=Sven|last2=Thelen|first2=Kathleen|last3=Longstreth|first3=Frank|title=Structuring politics : historical institutionalism in comparative analysis|date=1992|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge|isbn=978-0-521-42830-9}}{{cite journal|last=Wilkin|first=Peter|title=Rip It Up and Start Again: The Challenge of Populism in the Twenty-First Century|journal=Journal of World-Systems Research|publisher=University Library System, University of Pittsburgh|volume=24|issue=2|date=2018-08-14|issn=1076-156X|doi=10.5195/jwsr.2018.855|pages=314–324|s2cid=150004828|url=https://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/jwsr/article/download/855/1161| doi-access=free}} In the United States, mechanisms such as gerrymandering, special-interest lobbying, and opaque campaign financing contribute to the perception that government is unresponsive to the majority. In the European Union, the transfer of policy authority to technocratic and supranational bodies—such as the European Central Bank—can distance decision-making from voters, further intensifying democratic disaffection.{{cite book|last1=Tucker|first1=Paul M. W.|title=Unelected Power : the Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State|date=2019|publisher=Princeton University Press|location=Princeton, New Jersey|isbn=978-0-691-19698-5}} Likewise, widespread corruption scandals can deepen the sense that political elites are self-serving and out of touch with ordinary citizens, which can increase support for populist movements.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=100}}

Several scholars have linked the rise of populism to transformations in media and communication dynamics. Since the late 1960s, the spread of television has contributed to the personalization of politics, favoring charismatic leadership over party-centered politics—an approach frequently associated with populism.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=553}} Furthermore, as private media companies competed for audiences, they increasingly prioritized sensationalism and political scandal, fostering anti-establishment sentiment and public cynicism toward government institutions, and creating a media environment conducive to populist appeals.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1y=2004|1p=553|2a1=Mudde|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2017|2pp=103–104}}

In the digital era, scholars have argued that social media platforms have further reshaped political communication in ways that favor populist discourse. These platforms have been described as having "elective affinities" with populism, as they bypass traditional gatekeeping mechanisms and foster the impression that political authority and legitimacy now rest directly with the people.{{cite journal |last=Gerbaudo |first=Paolo |title=Social Media and Populism: An Elective Affinity? |journal=Media, Culture & Society |volume=40 |issue=5 |pages=745–753 |date=2018 |doi=10.1177/0163443718772192 |s2cid=149856507}}

There are three forms of political mobilization which populists have adopted: that of the populist leader, the populist political party, and the populist social movement.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=42–43|2a1=Gagnon|2a2=Beausoleil|2a3=Son|2a4=Arguelles|2y=2018|2p=vi}}

{{See also|Demagogue}}

Populism is often associated with charismatic and dominant leaders,{{sfn|Tormey|2018|p=268}} and the populist leader is, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "the quintessential form of populist mobilization".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=43}} These individuals campaign and attract support on the basis of their own personal appeal.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=43}} Their supporters then develop a perceived personal connection with the leader.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=43}} For these leaders, populist rhetoric allows them to claim that they have a direct relationship with "the people",{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=44}} and in many cases they claim to be a personification of "the people" themselves,{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1p=43|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=197}} presenting themselves as the vox populi or "voice of the people".{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1p=62|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=204}} Hugo Chávez for instance stated: "I demand absolute loyalty to me. I am not an individual, I am the people."{{sfn|de la Torre|2017|p=202}} Populist leaders can also present themselves as the saviour of the people because of their perceived unique talents and vision, and in doing so can claim to be making personal sacrifices for the good of the people.{{sfn|Albertazzi|McDonnell|2008|p=4}} Because loyalty to the populist leader is thus seen as representing loyalty to the people, those who oppose the leader can be branded "enemies of the people".{{sfn|Albertazzi|McDonnell|2008|p=7}}

The overwhelming majority of populist leaders have been men,{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=43}} although there have been various females occupying this role.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=69}} Most of these female populist leaders gained positions of seniority through their connections to previously dominant men; Eva Perón was the wife of Juan Perón, Marine Le Pen the daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, Keiko Fujimori the daughter of Alberto Fujimori, and Yingluck Shinawatra the sister of Thaksin Shinawatra.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=74}}

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|footer = Populist leaders often play on gendered stereotypes. US-based Sarah Palin portrayed a maternal image as a "mama grizzly";{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=70}} Italy's Silvio Berlusconi boasted of his sexual virility.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=64}}

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Canovan noted that populists often used "colourful and undiplomatic language" to distinguish themselves from the governing elite.{{sfn|Canovan|2004|p=242}} In Africa, several populist leaders have distinguished themselves by speaking in indigenous languages rather than either French or English.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=110}} Populist leaders often present themselves as people of action rather than people of words, talking of the need for "bold action" and "common sense solutions" to issues which they call "crises".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=64}} Male populist leaders often express themselves using simple and sometimes vulgar language in an attempt to present themselves as "the common man" or "one of the boys" to add to their populist appeal.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=64, 66}}

An example of this is Umberto Bossi, the leader of the right-wing populist Italian Lega Nord, who at rallies would state "the League has a hard-on" while putting his middle-finger up as a sign of disrespect to the government in Rome.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=66}} Another recurring feature of male populist leaders is the emphasis that they place on their own virility.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=64}} An example of this is the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who bragged about his bunga bunga sex parties and his ability to seduce young women.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=64}} Among female populist leaders, it is more common for them to emphasise their role as a wife and mother.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=70}} The US right-wing populist Sarah Palin for instance referred to herself as a "hockey mom" and a "mama grizzly",{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=70}} while Australian right-wing populist Pauline Hanson stated that "I care so passionately about this country, it's like I'm its mother. Australia is my home and the Australian people are my children."{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=70}}

Populist leaders typically portray themselves as outsiders who are separate from the "elite". Female populist leaders sometimes reference their gender as setting them apart from the dominant "old boys' club",{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=69–70}} while in Latin America a number of populists, such as Evo Morales and Alberto Fujimori, emphasised their non-white ethnic background to set them apart from the white-dominated elite.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=72–73|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=198}} Other populists have used clothing to set them apart.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=110}} In South Africa, the populist Julius Malema and members of his Economic Freedom Fighters attended parliament dressed as miners and workers to distinguish themselves from the other politicians wearing suits.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=110}} In instances where wealthy business figures promote populist sentiments, such as Ross Perot, Thaksin Shinawatra, or Berlusconi, it can be difficult to present themselves as being outside the elite, however this is achieved by portraying themselves as being apart from the political, if not the economic elite, and portraying themselves as reluctant politicians.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=70–71}}

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser noted that "in reality, most populist leaders are very much part of the national elite", typically being highly educated, upper-middle class, middle-aged males from the majority ethnicity.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=73–74}}

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that "true outsiders" to the political system are rare, although cited instances like Venezuela's Chávez and Peru's Fujimori.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=74–75}} More common is that they are "insider-outsiders", strongly connected to the inner circles of government but not having ever been part of it.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=75}} The Dutch right-wing populist Geert Wilders had for example been a prominent back-bench MP for many years before launching his populist Party for Freedom,{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=74}} while in South Africa, Malema had been leader of the governing African National Congress (ANC) youth league until he was expelled, at which he launched his own populist movement.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=111}} Only a few populist leaders are "insiders", individuals who have held leading roles in government prior to portraying themselves as populists.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=75–76}} One example is Thaksin Shinawatra, who was twice deputy prime minister of Thailand before launching his own populist political party;{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=75–76}} another is Rafael Correa, who served as the Ecuadorean finance minister before launching a left-wing populist challenge.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=74}}

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|footer = Some populist leaders give their name to wider populist political movements; examples include the Peronism of Juan Perón or the Fortuynism of Pim Fortuyn.

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Populist leaders are sometimes also characterised as strongmen or—in Latin American countries—as caudillos.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=63}} In a number of cases, such as Argentina's Perón or Venezuela's Chávez, these leaders have military backgrounds which contribute to their strongman image.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=63}}

Other populist leaders have also evoked the strongman image without having a military background; these include Italy's Berlusconi, Slovakia's Mečiar, and Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=63}}

Populism and strongmen are not intrinsically connected, however; as stressed by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, "only a minority of strongmen are populists and only a minority of populists is a strongman".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=63}} Rather than being populists, many strongmen—such as Spain's Francisco Franco—were elitists who led authoritarian administrations.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=63}}

In most cases, these populist leaders built a political organisation around themselves, typically a political party, although in many instances these remain dominated by the leader.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=43–44}} These individuals often give a populist movement its political identity, as is seen with movements like Fortuynism in the Netherlands, Peronism in Argentina, Berlusconism in Italy and Chavismo in Venezuela.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=43}} Populist mobilisation is not however always linked to a charismatic leadership.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=42}} Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that populist personalist leadership was more common in countries with a presidential system rather than a parliamentary one because these allow for the election of a single individual to the role of head of government without the need for an accompanying party.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=58}} Examples where a populist leader has been elected to the presidency without an accompanying political party have included Peron in Argentina, Fujimori in Peru, and Correa in Ecuador.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=58}}

{{Further|topic=the role of the mass media in the emergence of populism|Mediatization (media)}}

A subset of populism which deals with the use of media by politicians is called "media populism".{{Cite web|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259758469|title=Media Populism: A Conceptual Clarification and Some Theses on its Effects | Request PDF}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304700743|title= Populism and the Media|format=PDF}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/10026/media-populism-how-media-populism-and-inflating-fear-empowers-populist-politicians|title=Media Populism: How Media Populism and Inflating Fear Empowers Populist Politicians | Frontiers Research Topic|website=www.frontiersin.org}}

Populist leaders often use the media in order to mobilize their support.{{sfn|Rovira Kaltwasser|Taggart|Ochoa Espejo|Ostiguy|2019|p=270}} In Latin America, there is a long tradition of using mass media as a way for charismatic leaders to directly communicate with the poorly educated masses, first by radio and then by television.{{Cite book|last=Foweraker, Joe.|title=Governing Latin America|date=2003|publisher=Polity|isbn=978-0-7456-2372-6|pages=105|oclc=491442847}} The former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez had a weekly show called Aló Presidente, which according to historian Enrique Krauze gave some Venezuelans "at least the appearance of contact with power, through his verbal and visual presence, which may be welcomed by people who have spent most of their lives being ignored."{{Cite news|last=Nolan|first=Rachel|date=4 May 2012|title=Hugo Chávez's Totally Bizarre Talk Show|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/magazine/hugo-chavezs-totally-bizarre-talk-show.html|access-date=30 September 2019|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=30 September 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190930171441/https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/magazine/hugo-chavezs-totally-bizarre-talk-show.html|url-status=live}}

The media has also been argued to have helped populists in countries of other regions by giving exposure to the most controversial politicians for commercial reasons.{{sfn|Rovira Kaltwasser|Taggart|Ochoa Espejo|Ostiguy|2019|p=467}} Donald Trump was claimed to have received $5 billion worth of free coverage during his 2016 campaign.{{Cite web|title=Donald Trump Rode $5 Billion in Free Media to the White House|url=https://www.thestreet.com/politics/donald-trump-rode-5-billion-in-free-media-to-the-white-house-13896916|last=Stewart|first=Emily|website=TheStreet|date=20 November 2016|language=en-us|access-date=6 May 2020|archive-date=11 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200511162015/https://www.thestreet.com/politics/donald-trump-rode-5-billion-in-free-media-to-the-white-house-13896916|url-status=live}} Tabloids are often stereotyped as presenting a platform for populist politics due to their tendency toward melodrama, infotainment, and conflict, and thus provide support for populist parties.{{sfn|Akkerman|2011|p=932}} Examples of this have been the support given by Kronen Zeitung to the Austrian Freedom Party and the Berlusconi-owned presses' support for Italy's National Alliance in the mid-1990s.{{sfn|Akkerman|2011|p=932}} Based on his analysis of Dutch and British media, Tjitske Akkerman however argued that tabloids were no more prone to populism than the quality press.{{sfn|Akkerman|2011|p=942}}

In the 21st century, populists have increasingly used social media to bypass the mainstream media and directly approach their target audiences.{{sfn|Stier|Posch|Bleier|Strohmaier|2017|p=1365}} In earlier periods, before radio, thought "mass media" newspapers tended to operate more like social media than modern newspapers, publishing local gossip and with little fact-checking; the expansion of newspapers to rural areas of the United States in the early twentieth century increased support for populist parties and positions.{{cite journal|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-economic-history/article/abs/delivering-the-vote-the-political-effect-of-free-mail-delivery-in-early-twentieth-century-america/8FEA56D50F5093890D58AF7004B4ADA5|doi=10.1017/S0022050716000784|title=Delivering the Vote: The Political Effect of Free Mail Delivery in Early Twentieth Century America|year=2016|last1=Perlman|first1=Elisabeth Ruth|last2=Sprick Schuster|first2=Steven|journal=The Journal of Economic History|volume=76|issue=3|pages=769–802|s2cid=157332747}} It has been claimed that while traditional media, acting as so-called 'gatekeepers', filter the messages that they broadcast through journalistic norms, social media permits a 'direct linkage' from political actors to potential audiences.{{Cite journal|last1=Engesser|first1=Sven|last2=Ernst|first2=Nicole|last3=Esser|first3=Frank|last4=Büchel|first4=Florin|date=8 July 2016|title=Populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology|journal=Information, Communication & Society|volume=20|issue=8|pages=1109–1126|doi=10.1080/1369118x.2016.1207697|s2cid=147799675|issn=1369-118X}} It has been claimed that the use of Twitter helped Donald Trump win the US presidency,{{Cite news|last1=Shear|first1=Michael D.|last2=Haberman|first2=Maggie|last3=Confessore|first3=Nicholas|last4=Yourish|first4=Karen|last5=Buchanan|first5=Larry|last6=Collins|first6=Keith|date=2 November 2019|title=How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in Over 11,000 Tweets|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html|access-date=6 May 2020|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=1 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200501184836/https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html|url-status=live}} while the same has been claimed regarding the use of YouTube by the Jair Bolsonaro 2018 presidential campaign.{{Cite news|last1=Fisher|first1=Max|last2=Taub|first2=Amanda|date=11 August 2019|title=How YouTube Radicalized Brazil|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html|access-date=6 May 2020|issn=0362-4331|archive-date=16 May 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200516131617/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/11/world/americas/youtube-brazil.html|url-status=live}}

Political systems with low political efficacy or high wasted votes can contribute to populism.{{cite journal|doi=10.1111/1475-6765.12374|title=Empowered and enraged: Political efficacy, anger and support for populism in Europe|year=2020|last1=Rico|first1=Guillem|last2=Guinjoan|first2=Marc|last3=Anduiza|first3=EVA|journal=European Journal of Political Research|volume=59|issue=4|pages=797–816|s2cid=213404031|url=https://ddd.uab.cat/pub/artpub/2020/259034/eurjoupol_a2020v59n4p797iENG_postprint.pdf}} Populist leaders have been claimed to be more successful in presidential systems. This is because such systems give advantage to charismatic populist leaders, especially when institutionalized parties are weak.{{Cite book|editor-last1=Hawkins|editor-first1=Kirk Andrew|editor-last2=Carlin|editor-first2=Ryan E.|editor-last3=Littvay|editor-first3=Levente|editor-last4=Rovira Kaltwasser|editor-first4=Cristóbal|author-link4=Cristóbal Rovira|title=The ideational approach to populism : concept, theory, and analysis|isbn=978-1-315-19692-3|page=281|oclc=1053623603}} This is especially the case in two-round systems, because outsiders who might not win most votes in the first round of voting might be able to do so when faced against a mainstream candidate in the second round.{{Cite journal|last=Carreras|first=Miguel|date=5 June 2012|title=The Rise of Outsiders in Latin America, 1980–2010|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=45|issue=12|pages=1458|doi=10.1177/0010414012445753|s2cid=55404711|issn=0010-4140}} This has been claimed to be evident in the 1990 Peruvian general election won by Alberto Fujimori, who lost on the first round. Furthermore, Juan José Linz has argued that the direct relationship between the president and the electorate fosters a populist perception of the president as representing the whole people and their opponents as resisting the popular will.{{Cite book|last1=Linz, Juan J. (Juan José)|last2=Valenzuela, Arturo|title=The Failure of presidential democracy|date=1994|publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press|isbn=978-0-8018-4639-7|page=25|oclc=28674855}}

File:Acto de Posesion del Gobernador Arias Cardenas.jpg]]

Another form of mobilisation is through populist political parties. Populists are not generally opposed to political representation, but merely want their own representatives, those of "the people", in power.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=51}} In various cases, non-populist political parties have transitioned into populist ones;{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=54–55|2a1=Hawkins|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2019|2p=10}} the elitist Socialist Unity Party of Germany, a Marxist–Leninist group which governed East Germany, later transitioned after German re-unification into a populist party, The Left.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=54–55}} In other instances, such as the Austrian FPÖ and Swiss SVP, a non-populist party can have a populist faction which later takes control of the whole party.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=55}}

In some examples where a political party has been dominated by a single charismatic leader, the latter's death has served to unite and strengthen the party, as with Argentina's Justicialist Party after Juan Perón's death in 1974, or the United Socialist Party of Venezuela after Chávez's death in 2013.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=56}} In other cases, a populist party has seen one strong centralising leader replace another, as when Marine Le Pen replaced her father Jean-Marie as the leader of the National Front in 2011, or when Heinz-Christian Strache took over from Haider as chair of the Freedom Party of Austria in 2005.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=55–56}}

Many populist parties achieve an electoral breakthrough but then fail to gain electoral persistence, with their success fading away at subsequent elections.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=60}} In various cases, they are able to secure regional strongholds of support but with little support elsewhere in the country; the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) for instance gained national representation in the Austrian parliament solely because of its strong support in Carinthia.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=60}} Similarly, the Belgian Vlaams Belang party has its stronghold in Antwerp, while the Swiss People's Party has its stronghold in Zürich.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=60}}

File:Madrid - Acampada Sol 2011 43.JPG, 2011]]

An additional form is that of the populist social movement.{{sfn|Hawkins|Rovira Kaltwasser|2019|p=10}} Populist social movements are comparatively rare, as most social movements focus on a more restricted social identity or issue rather than identifying with "the people" more broadly.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=51}} However, after the Great Recession of 2007 a number of populist social movements emerged, expressing public frustrations with national and international economic systems. These included the Occupy movement, which originated in the US and used the slogan "We are the 99%", and the Spanish Indignados movement, which employed the motto: "real democracy now—we are not goods in the hands of politicians and bankers".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=48}}

Few populist social movements survive for more than a few years, with most examples, like the Occupy movement, petering out after their initial growth.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=56}} In some cases, the social movement fades away as a strong leader emerges from within it and moves into electoral politics.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=56}} An example of this can be seen with the India Against Corruption social movement, from which emerged Arvind Kejriwal, who founded the Aam Aadmi Party ("Common Man Party").{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=56}} Another is the Spanish Indignados movement which appeared in 2011 before spawning the Podemos party led by Pablo Iglesias Turrión.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=56–57|2a1=Tormey|2y=2018|2pp=266–67}} These populist social movements can exert a broader societal impact which results in populist politicians emerging to prominence; the Tea Party and Occupy movements that appeared in the US during the late 2000s and early 2010s have been seen as an influence on the rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders as prominent figures in the mid-2010s.{{sfn|Hawkins|Rovira Kaltwasser|2019|p=11}}

Some populist leaders have sought to broaden their support by creating supporter groups within the country. Chavez, for instance, ordered the formation of Bolivarian Circles, Communal Councils, Urban Land Committees, and Technical Water Roundtables across Venezuela.{{sfn|de la Torre|2017|p=205}} These could improve political participation among poorer sectors of Venezuelan society, although also served as networks through which the state transferred resources to those neighbourhoods which produced high rates of support for Chavez government.{{sfn|de la Torre|2017|p=205}}

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser suggested that to deflate the appeal of populism, those government figures found guilty of corruption need to be seen to face adequate punishment.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=110}} They also argued that stronger rule of law and the elimination of systemic corruption were also important facets in preventing populist growth.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=111}} They believed that mainstream politicians wishing to reduce the populist challenge should be more open about the restrictions of their power, noting that those who backed populist movements were often frustrated with the dishonesty of established politicians who "claim full agency when things go well and almost full lack of agency when things go wrong".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=112}} They also suggested that the appeal of populism could be reduced by wider civic education in the values of liberal democracy and the relevance of pluralism.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=112}}

What Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser believed was ineffective was a full-frontal attack on the populists which presented "them" as "evil" or "foolish", for this strategy plays into the binary division that populists themselves employ.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=116}} In their view, "the best way to deal with populism is to engage—as difficult as it is—in an open dialogue with populist actors and supporters" in order to "better understand the claims and grievances of the populist elites and masses and to develop liberal democratic responses to them".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=118}}

{{Quote box|width=25em|quote=In trying to win over populist supporters, and perhaps even some elites, liberal democrats should avoid both simplistic solutions that pander to "the people" and elitist discourses that dismiss the moral and intellectual competence of ordinary citizens – both will only strengthen the populists. Most importantly, given that populism often asks the right questions but provides the wrong answers, the ultimate goal should be not just the destruction of populist supply, but also the weakening of populist demand. Only the latter will actually strengthen liberal democracy.|source=Political scientists Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=118}}}}

Mainstream politicians have sometimes sought to co-operate or build alliances with populists. In the United States, for example, various Republican Party figures aligned themselves with the Tea Party movement, while in countries such as Finland and Austria populist parties have taken part in governing coalitions.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=113}} In other instances, mainstream politicians have adopted elements of a populist political style while competing against populist opponents.{{Cite journal|last=Bossetta|first=Michael|date=28 June 2017|title=Fighting fire with fire: Mainstream adoption of the populist political style in the 2014 Europe debates between Nick Clegg and Nigel Farage|journal=The British Journal of Politics and International Relations|volume=19|issue=4|pages=715–734|doi=10.1177/1369148117715646|s2cid=149175911|issn=1369-1481|url=https://curis.ku.dk/portal/da/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire(3bd11a1b-816b-4442-8b26-e133dab177e0).html|access-date=19 September 2018|archive-date=25 November 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181125074038/https://curis.ku.dk/portal/da/publications/fighting-fire-with-fire(3bd11a1b-816b-4442-8b26-e133dab177e0).html|url-status=live}} Various mainstream centrist figures, such as Hillary Clinton and Tony Blair, have argued that governments needed to restrict migration to hinder the appeal of right-wing populists utilising anti-immigrant sentiment in elections.{{cite news|last= Wintour|first= Patrick|date= 22 November 2018|title= Hillary Clinton: Europe Must Curb Immigration to Stop Rightwing Populists|url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/hillary-clinton-europe-must-curb-immigration-stop-populists-trump-brexit|work= The Guardian|access-date= 25 November 2018|archive-date= 24 November 2018|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20181124214558/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/hillary-clinton-europe-must-curb-immigration-stop-populists-trump-brexit|url-status= live}}{{cite news|last= Wintour|first= Patrick|date= 22 November 2018|title= Clinton, Blair, Renzi: Why we Lost, How to Fight Back|url= https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/clinton-blair-renzi-why-we-lost-populists-how-fight-back-rightwing-populism-centrist|work= The Guardian|access-date= 28 November 2018|archive-date= 28 November 2018|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20181128072941/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/22/clinton-blair-renzi-why-we-lost-populists-how-fight-back-rightwing-populism-centrist|url-status= live}}

A more common approach has been for mainstream parties to openly attack the populists and construct a cordon sanitaire to prevent them from gaining political office.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=113}} Once populists are in political office in liberal democracies, the judiciary can play a key role in blocking some of their more illiberal policies, as has been the case in Slovakia and Poland.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=114}} The mainstream media can play an important role in blocking populist growth; in a country like Germany, the mainstream media is for instant resolutely anti-populist, opposing populist groups whether left or right.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=114}}

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser noted that there was an "odd love-hate relationship between populist media and politicians, sharing a discourse but not a struggle".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=115}}

In certain countries, certain mainstream media outlets have supported populist groups; in Austria, the Kronen Zeitung played a prominent role in endorsing Haider, in the United Kingdom the Daily Express supported the UK Independence Party, while in the United States, Fox News gave much positive coverage and encouragement to the Tea Party movement.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=114}} In some cases, when the populists have taken power, their political rivals have sought to violently overthrow them; this was seen in the 2002 Venezuelan coup d'état attempt, when mainstream groups worked with sectors of the military to unseat Hugo Chávez's government.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=113}}

Another discursive strategy of mainstream parties dealing with populist actors is demonization.{{Citation|last=Mouffe|first=C.|title=The "end of politics" and the challenge of right-wing populism|date=2005|url=https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/item/92xq4/the-end-of-politics-and-the-challenge-of-right-wing-populism|pages=72–98|editor-last=Panizza|editor-first=F.|place=London|publisher=Verso|language=en|isbn=978-1-85984-489-2|access-date=2023-01-06}}{{Cite thesis|last=van Heerden|first=S. C.|date=2014|title=What did you just call me? A study on the demonization of political parties in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2011|url=https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=f8e80cdf-7b59-436c-ae95-76897a25aa5c|language=en|type=PhD dissertation}} However, Schwörer and Fernández-García found that this practice is less common in Western Europe as usually assumed and that the center-right even refuses to harshly attack the populist radical right.{{Cite journal|last1=Schwörer|first1=Jakob|last2=Fernández-García|first2=Belén|date=2021-11-10|title=Demonisation of political discourses? How mainstream parties talk about the populist radical right|journal=West European Politics|volume=44|issue=7|pages=1401–1424|doi=10.1080/01402382.2020.1812907|s2cid=225288458|issn=0140-2382|doi-access=free}} In a similar vein, mainstream parties use the term "populism" to delegitimize populist actors due to its negative connotation among the public but also use the term to attack non-populist competitors.{{Cite journal|last=Schwörer|first=Jakob|date=2021-08-01|title=Don't call me a populist! The meaning of populism for western European parties and politicians|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379421000779|journal=Electoral Studies|language=en|volume=72|pages=102358|doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102358|s2cid=236238925|issn=0261-3794}}

{{Quote box|width=25em|align=right|quote=Although the term "populist" can be traced back to populares (courting the people) Senators in Ancient Rome, the first political movements emerged during the late nineteenth century. However, some of the movements that have been portrayed as progenitors of modern populism did not develop a truly populist ideology. It was only with the coming of Boulangism in France and the American People's Party, which was also known as the Populist Party, that the foundational forms of populism can fully be discerned. In particular, it was during this era that terms such as "people" and "popular sovereignty" became a major part of the vocabulary of insurgent political movements that courted mass support among an expanding electorate by claiming that they uniquely embodied their interests[.]|source=Political historian Roger Eatwell{{sfn|Eatwell|2017|pp=365–366}}}}

Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser argue that populism is a modern phenomenon.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=21}} However, attempts have been made to identify manifestations of populism in the democracy of classical Athens.{{cite journal|last1=Adamidis|first1=Vasileios|title=Manifestations of populism in late 5th century Athens|journal=New Studies in Law and History|date=2019|pages=11–28}} Eatwell noted that although the actual term populism parallels that of the Populares who were active in the Roman Republic, these and other pre-modern groups "did not develop a truly populist ideology."{{sfn|Eatwell|2017|p=365}} The origins of populism are often traced to the late nineteenth century, when movements calling themselves populist arose in both the United States and the Russian Empire.{{sfnm|1a1=Eatwell|1y=2017|1p=365|2a1=Mudde|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2017|2p=21}} Populism has often been linked to the spread of democracy, both as an idea and as a framework for governance.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=21}}

Conversely, the historian Barry S. Strauss argued that populism could also be seen in the ancient world, citing the examples of the fifth-century B.C. Athens and Populares, a political faction active in the Roman Republic from the second century BCE.{{cite news|title=Historian offers lessons from antiquity for today's democracy|last=Glaser|first=Linda B.|date=1 January 2017|website=Cornell University Department of History|url=https://history.cornell.edu/news/historian-offers-lessons-antiquity-today%25E2%2580%2599s-democracy|access-date=26 April 2019|archive-date=25 April 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190425150407/https://history.cornell.edu/news/historian-offers-lessons-antiquity-today%2525E2%252580%252599s-democracy|url-status=live}} The historian Rachel Foxley argued that the Levellers of 17th-century England could also be labelled "populists", meaning that they believed "equal natural rights ... must shape political life"{{sfn|Foxley|2013|p=207}}{{clarify|date=June 2019}} while the historian Peter Blickle linked populism to the Protestant Reformation.{{cite book|first= Andrew|last= Pettegree|title= The Reformation: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=HDC_veJaoQ8C&pg=PA153|year= 2004|publisher= Taylor & Francis|page= 153|isbn= 978-0-4153-1668-2|access-date= 15 June 2018|archive-date= 28 August 2019|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224336/https://books.google.com/books?id=HDC_veJaoQ8C&pg=PA153|url-status= live}}{{cite book|first=Carter|last=Lindberg|title=The European Reformations|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4cTb-zKfjS8C&pg=PA21|year=2011|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|page=21|isbn=978-1-4443-6086-8|access-date=15 June 2018|archive-date=28 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224339/https://books.google.com/books?id=4cTb-zKfjS8C&pg=PA21|url-status=live}}

{{main|Populism in Europe}}

In the Russian Empire during the late 19th century, the narodnichestvo movement emerged, championing the cause of the empire's peasantry against the governing elites.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=32}} The movement was unable to secure its objectives; however, it inspired other agrarian movements across eastern Europe in the early 20th century.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=33}} Although the Russian movement was primarily a movement of the middle class and intellectuals "going to the people", in some respects their agrarian populism was similar to that of the US People's Party, with both presenting small farmers (the peasantry in Europe) as the foundation of society and main source of societal morality.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=33}} According to Eatwell, the narodniks "are often seen as the first populist movement".{{sfn|Eatwell|2017|p=366}}

File:Arrest of a Propagandist.jpg's painting, Arrest of a Propagandist (1892), which depicts the arrest of a narodnik]]

In German-speaking Europe, the völkisch movement has often been characterised as populist, with its exultation of the German people and its anti-elitist attacks on capitalism and Jews.{{sfn|Eatwell|2017|p=366}} In France, the Boulangist movement also utilised populist rhetoric and themes.{{sfn|Eatwell|2017|pp=366–367}} In the early 20th century, adherents of both Marxism and fascism flirted with populism, but both movements remained ultimately elitist, emphasising the idea of a small elite who should guide and govern society.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=33}} Among Marxists, the emphasis on class struggle and the idea that the working classes are affected by false consciousness are also antithetical to populist ideas.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=33}}

After 1945 populism was largely absent from Europe, in part due to the domination of Marxism–Leninism in Eastern Europe and a desire to emphasise moderation among many West European political parties.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=33–34}} However, over the coming decades, a number of right-wing populist parties emerged throughout the continent.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=548}} These were largely isolated and mostly reflected a conservative agricultural backlash against the centralisation and politicisation of the agricultural sector then occurring.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=34}} These included Guglielmo Giannini's Common Man's Front in 1940s Italy, Pierre Poujade's Union for the Defense of Tradesmen and Artisans in late 1950s France, Hendrik Koekoek's Farmers' Party of the 1960s Netherlands, and Mogens Glistrup's Progress Party of 1970s Denmark.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=548}} Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s there also came a concerted populist critique of society from Europe's New Left, including from the new social movements and from the early Green parties.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1y=2004|1p=548|2a1=March|2y=2007|2p=66}} However it was only in the late 1990s, according to Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, that populism became "a relevant political force in Europe", one which could have a significant impact on mainstream politics.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=34}}

Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc of the early 1990s, there was a rise in populism across much of Central and Eastern Europe.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=35}} In the first multiparty elections in many of these countries, various parties portrayed themselves as representatives of "the people" against the "elite", representing the old governing Marxist–Leninist parties.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=36}} The Czech Civic Forum party for instance campaigned on the slogan "Parties are for party members, Civic Forum is for everybody".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=36}} Many populists in this region claimed that a "real" revolution had not occurred during the transition from Marxist–Leninist to liberal democratic governance in the early 1990s and that it was they who were campaigning for such a change.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=37}}

The collapse of Marxism–Leninism as a central force in socialist politics also led to a broader growth of left-wing populism across Europe, reflected in groups like the Dutch Socialist Party, Scottish Socialist Party, and German's The Left party.{{sfn|March|2007|p=67}} Since the late 1980s, populist experiences emerged in Spain around the figures of José María Ruiz Mateos, Jesús Gil and Mario Conde, businessmen who entered politics chiefly to defend their personal economic interests, but by the turn of the millennium their proposals had proved to meet a limited support at the ballots at the national level.{{Cite book|title=Ultrapatriotas. Extrema derecha y nacionalismo de la guerra fría a la era de la globalización|publisher=Crítica|location=Barcelona|year=2003|page=263|author-link=Xavier Casals i Meseguer|first=Xavier|last=Casals|isbn=978-84-8432-430-0|chapter=El fracaso del populismo protestatario|language=es}}

File:Right-wing populist parties in European national parliaments (Mai 2019).png

File:Jean Marie LePen.jpg, founder and leader of the French National Front, the "prototypical radical right party" which used populism to advance its cause{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=34–35}}]]

At the turn of the 21st century, populist rhetoric and movements became increasingly apparent in Western Europe.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1y=2004|1p=550|2a1=Albertazzi|2a2=McDonnell|2y=2008|2p=2}} Populist rhetoric was often used by opposition parties. For example, in the 2001 electoral campaign, the Conservative Party leader William Hague accused Tony Blair's governing Labour Party government of representing "the condescending liberal elite". Hague repeatedly referring to it as "metropolitan", implying that it was out of touch with "the people", who in Conservative discourse are represented by "Middle England".{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=550}} Blair's government also employed populist rhetoric; in outlining legislation to curtail fox hunting on animal welfare grounds, it presented itself as championing the desires of the majority against the upper-classes who engaged in the sport.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=551}} Blair's rhetoric has been characterised as the adoption of a populist style rather than the expression of an underlying populist ideology.{{sfn|Bang|Marsh|2018|p=354}}

By the 21st century, European populism{{Cite book|last1=Zienkowski|first1=Jan|title=Imagining the peoples of Europe. Populist discourses across the political spectrum|last2=Breeze|first2=Ruth|publisher=John Benjamins|year=2019|isbn=978-90-272-0348-9|location=Amsterdam}} was again associated largely with the political right.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=549}} The term came to be used in reference both to radical right groups like Jörg Haider's FPÖ in Austria and Jean-Marie Le Pen's FN in France, as well as to non-radical right-wing groups like Silvio Berlusconi's {{Lang|it|Forza Italia|italic=no}} or Pim Fortuyn's LPF in the Netherlands.{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=549}} The populist radical right combined populism with authoritarianism and nativism.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=34}}See: {{cite journal|last=Breeze|first=Ruth|title=Positioning "the people" and Its Enemies: Populism and Nationalism in AfD and UKIP|journal=Javnost – the Public|publisher=Informa UK Limited|volume=26|issue=1|date=2018-11-30|issn=1318-3222|doi=10.1080/13183222.2018.1531339|pages=89–104| s2cid=150034518}}

Conversely, the Great Recession also resulted in the emergence of left-wing populist groups in parts of Europe, most notably the Syriza party which gained political office in Greece and the Podemos party in Spain, displaying similarities with the US-based Occupy movement.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=37}} Like Europe's right-wing populists, these groups also expressed Eurosceptic sentiment towards the European Union, albeit largely from a socialist and anti-austerity perspective rather than the nationalist perspective adopted by their right-wing counterparts.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=37}} Populists have entered government in many countries across Europe, both in coalitions with other parties as well by themselves, Austria and Poland are examples of these respectively.{{cite book|last1=Reinemann|first1=C.|last2=Stanyer|first2=J.|last3=Aalberg|first3=T.|last4=Esser|first4=F.|last5=de Vreese|first5=C.H.|title=Communicating Populism: Comparing Actor Perceptions, Media Coverage, and Effects on Citizens in Europe|publisher=Taylor & Francis|series=Routledge Studies in Media, Communication, and Politics|year=2019|isbn=978-0-429-68784-6}}

The UK Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn has been called populist,{{cite web|last1=Stewart|first1=Heather|last2=Elgot|first2=Jessica|title=Labour plans Jeremy Corbyn relaunch to ride anti-establishment wave|url=https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/15/labour-plans-jeremy-corbyn-relaunch-as-a-leftwing-populist|website=The Guardian|access-date=16 May 2017|date=15 December 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170329004522/https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/dec/15/labour-plans-jeremy-corbyn-relaunch-as-a-leftwing-populist|archive-date=29 March 2017}}{{cite web|last1=Walker|first1=Michael J|title=Could Corbyn trigger the next populist political earthquake?|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/jeremy-corbyn-labour-relaunch-populist-politics-donald-trump-political-earthquake-failed-complacency-a7500376.html|website=The Independent|access-date=16 May 2017|date=29 December 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170615145341/http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/jeremy-corbyn-labour-relaunch-populist-politics-donald-trump-political-earthquake-failed-complacency-a7500376.html|archive-date=15 June 2017}}{{cite news|last1=Bush|first1=Steven|title=Labour is running a great risk with its populist turn|url=http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/01/labour-running-great-risk-its-populist-turn|website=New Statesman|access-date=16 May 2017|language=en|date=4 January 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170215124335/http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2017/01/labour-running-great-risk-its-populist-turn|archive-date=15 February 2017}} with the slogan "for the many not the few" having been used.{{cite news|last1=Mandelson|first1=Peter|title=As Labour's new dawn fades, populists offer false promise|url=https://www.ft.com/content/5ee9c05a-25de-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025|website=Financial Times|access-date=16 May 2017|date=21 April 2017|url-access=limited|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170423053907/https://www.ft.com/content/5ee9c05a-25de-11e7-a34a-538b4cb30025|archive-date=23 April 2017}}{{cite web|last1=Rentoul|first1=John|title=Why Jeremy Corbyn cannot copy Donald Trump's populism|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-jeremy-corbyn-cannot-copy-donald-trump-s-populism-a7527376.html|website=The Independent|access-date=16 May 2017|date=14 January 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170117005548/http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-jeremy-corbyn-cannot-copy-donald-trump-s-populism-a7527376.html|archive-date=17 January 2017}}{{failed verification|date=April 2024}}{{cite web|last1=Bean|first1=Emma|title=Blair: Failing Tories spend no time worrying about the threat from Labour {{!}} LabourList|url=http://labourlist.org/2017/04/blair-failing-tories-spend-no-time-worrying-about-the-threat-from-labour/|website=LabourList {{!}} Labour's biggest independent grassroots e-network|access-date=16 May 2017|date=3 April 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170421120304/http://labourlist.org/2017/04/blair-failing-tories-spend-no-time-worrying-about-the-threat-from-labour/|archive-date=21 April 2017}}{{failed verification|date=April 2024}}

After the 2016 UK referendum on membership of the European Union, in which British citizens voted to leave, some have claimed the "Brexit" as a victory for populism, encouraging a flurry of calls for referendums among other EU countries by populist political parties.{{Cite news|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/eu-faces-brexit-contagion-as-populist-parties-across-europe-call/|title=EU faces Brexit 'contagion' as populist parties across Europe call for referendums|newspaper=The Telegraph|date=24 June 2016|access-date=25 June 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160624121752/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/eu-faces-brexit-contagion-as-populist-parties-across-europe-call/|archive-date=24 June 2016|last1=Foster|first1=Peter|last2=Squires|first2=Nick|last3=Orange|first3=Richard}}

{{main|Populism in the United States|Populism in Canada}}

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In North America, populism has often been characterised by regional mobilisation and loose organisation.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=22}} During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, populist sentiments became widespread, particularly in the western provinces of Canada, and in the southwest and Great Plains regions of the United States. In this instance, populism was combined with agrarianism and often known as "prairie populism".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=23}} For these groups, "the people" were yeomen—small, independent farmers—while the "elite" were the bankers and politicians of the northeast.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=23}} In some cases, populist activists called for alliances with labor (the first national platform of the National People's Party in 1892 calling for protecting the rights of "urban workmen".{{sfn|Tindall|1966|p=90}} In the state of Georgia in the early 1890s, Thomas E. Watson led a major effort to unite poor white farmers, and included some African-American farmers.{{sfn|Tindall|1966|p=118}}{{sfn|Woodward|1938}}

The People's Party of the late 19th century United States is considered to be "one of the defining populist movements";{{sfn|Mudde|2004|p=548}} its members were often referred to as the Populists at the time.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=23}} Its radical platform included calling for the nationalisation of railways, the banning of strikebreakers, and the introduction of referendums.{{sfn|Canovan|1981|p=17}} The party gained representation in several state legislatures during the 1890s, but was not powerful enough to mount a successful presidential challenge. In the 1896 presidential election, the People's Party supported the Democratic Party candidate William Jennings Bryan; after his defeat, the People's Party's support plunged.{{sfnm|1a1=Canovan|1y=1981|1pp=17–18, 44–46|2a1=Mudde|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2017|2p=23}}

Other early populist political parties in the United States included the Greenback Party, the Progressive Party of 1924 led by Robert M. La Follette, Sr., and the Share Our Wealth movement of Huey P. Long in 1933–1935.{{cite book|last1=Rosenstone|first1=S.J.|last2=Behr|first2=R.L.|last3=Lazarus|first3=E.H.|title=Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major Party Failure – Updated and Expanded Second Edition|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1984|isbn=978-0-691-02613-8}}{{cite book|last=Formisano|first=R.P.|title=For the People: American Populist Movements from the Revolution to the 1850s|publisher=University of North Carolina Press|series=Caravan Book|year=2008|isbn=978-0-8078-8611-3}} In Canada, populist groups adhering to a social credit ideology had various successes at local and regional elections from the 1930s to the 1960s, although the main Social Credit Party of Canada never became a dominant national force.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=23–24}}

By the mid-20th century, US populism had moved from a largely progressive to a largely reactionary stance, being closely intertwined with the anti-communist politics of the period.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=24}} In this period, the historian Richard Hofstadter and sociologist Daniel Bell compared the anti-elitism of the 1890s Populists with that of Joseph McCarthy.{{cite web|last1=Kazin|first1=Michael|title=How Can Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Both Be 'Populist'?|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/magazine/how-can-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-both-be-populist.html|access-date=13 July 2016|website=The New York Times|date=22 March 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170209061534/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/magazine/how-can-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-both-be-populist.html|archive-date=9 February 2017}} Although not all academics accepted the comparison between the left-wing, anti-big business Populists and the right-wing, anti-communist McCarthyites, the term "populist" nonetheless came to be applied to both left-wing and right-wing groups that blamed elites for the problems facing the country.

Some mainstream politicians in the Republican Party recognised the utility of such a tactic and adopted it; Republican President Richard Nixon for instance popularised the term "silent majority" when appealing to voters.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=24}} Right-wing populist rhetoric was also at the base of two of the most successful third-party presidential campaigns in the late 20th century, that of George C. Wallace in 1968 and Ross Perot in 1992.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=25}} These politicians presented a consistent message that a "liberal elite" was threatening "our way of life" and using the welfare state to placate the poor and thus maintain their own power.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=25}}

Former Oklahoma Senator Fred R. Harris, first elected in 1964, ran unsuccessfully for the US presidency in 1972 and 1976. Harris' New Populism embraced egalitarian themes.{{Cite book|last=Lowitt|first=Richard|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/48811446|title=Fred Harris : his journey from liberalism to populism|date=2002|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|isbn=978-0-7425-2162-9|location=Lanham, Md.|oclc=48811446}}

In the first decade of the 21st century, two populist movements appeared in the US, both in response to the Great Recession: the Occupy movement and the Tea Party movement.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=26}} The populist approach of the Occupy movement was broader, with its "people" being what it called "the 99%", while the "elite" it challenged was presented as both the economic and political elites.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=26–27}} The Tea Party's populism was Producerism, while "the elite" it presented was more party partisan than that of Occupy, being defined largely—although not exclusively—as the Democratic administration of President Barack Obama.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=26–27}}

The 2016 presidential election saw a wave of populist sentiment in the campaigns of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, with both candidates running on anti-establishment platforms in the Democratic and Republican parties, respectively.{{cite news|last1=Kazin|first1=Michael|title=How Can Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders Both Be 'Populist'?|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/magazine/how-can-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-both-be-populist.html|access-date=25 May 2016|date=22 March 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170209061534/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/magazine/how-can-donald-trump-and-bernie-sanders-both-be-populist.html|archive-date=9 February 2017|newspaper=The New York Times}} Both campaigns criticised free trade deals such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership but differed significantly on other issues, such as immigration.{{cite news|last1=Litvan|first1=Laura|title=Trump and Sanders Shift Mood in Congress Against Trade Deals|newspaper=Bloomberg.com|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-17/trump-and-sanders-shift-mood-in-congress-against-trade-deals|access-date=25 May 2016|agency=Bloomberg|date=17 May 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160521215110/http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-05-17/trump-and-sanders-shift-mood-in-congress-against-trade-deals|archive-date=21 May 2016}}{{cite web|last1=Brodwin|first1=David|title=Nobody Wins a Trade War|url=https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2016-03-14/the-economic-danger-of-trumps-and-sanders-trade-proctectionism|access-date=25 May 2016|website=U.S. News & World Report|date=14 March 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160513050239/http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/articles/2016-03-14/the-economic-danger-of-trumps-and-sanders-trade-proctectionism|archive-date=13 May 2016}}{{cite news|last1=Fontaine|first1=Richard|last2=Kaplan|first2=Robert D.|title=How Populism Will Change Foreign Policy|url=https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-05-23/how-populism-will-change-foreign-policy|access-date=25 May 2016|website=Foreign Affairs|date=23 May 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160524105923/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-05-23/how-populism-will-change-foreign-policy|archive-date=24 May 2016}}{{Cite journal |last1=Eklundh |first1=Emmy |last2=Stengel |first2=Frank A |last3=Wojczewski |first3=Thorsten |date=2024-09-09 |title=Left populism and foreign policy: Bernie Sanders and Podemos |url=https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/100/5/1899/7750271 |journal=International Affairs |language=en |volume=100 |issue=5 |pages=1899–1918 |doi=10.1093/ia/iiae137 |issn=0020-5850}} Other studies have noted an emergence of populist rhetoric and a decline in the value of prior experience in U.S. intra-party contests such as congressional primaries.{{cite book|last1=Cowburn|first1=Mike|editor1-last=Oswald|editor1-first=Michael T|title=The Palgrave Handbook of Populism|date=2022|publisher=Springer International Publishing|isbn=978-3-030-80803-7|pages=421–435|chapter-url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80803-7_26|chapter=Experience Narratives and Populist Rhetoric in U.S. House Primaries|doi=10.1007/978-3-030-80803-7_26|s2cid=244153720}} Nativism and hostility toward immigrants (especially Muslims, Hispanics and Asians) were common features.{{sfn|Mudde|2012}}

{{Main|Populism in Latin America}}

File:Javier Milei en el Salón Blanco 2 (cropped).jpg

Populism has been dominant in Latin American politics since the 1930s and 1940s,{{sfn|de la Torre|2017|p=195}} being far more prevalent there than in Europe.{{sfn|March|2007|p=69}} Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser noted that the region has the world's "most enduring and prevalent populist tradition".{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=27}} They suggested that this was the case because it was a region with a long tradition of democratic governance and free elections, but with high rates of socio-economic inequality, generating widespread resentments that politicians can articulate through populism.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=27–28}} March instead thought that it was the important role of "catch-all parties and prominent personalities" in Latin American politics which had made populism more common.{{sfn|March|2007|p=69}}

The first wave of Latin American populism began at the start of the Great Depression in 1929 and last until the end of the 1960s.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=28}} In various countries, politicians took power while emphasising "the people": these included Getúlio Vargas in Brazil, Juan Perón in Argentina, and José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=28–29|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=196}} These relied on the Americanismo ideology, presenting a common identity across Latin America and denouncing any interference from imperialist powers.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=29}} The second wave took place in the early 1990s;{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1p=29|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=198}} de la Torre called it "neoliberal populism".{{sfn|de la Torre|2017|p=198}}

In the late 1980s, many Latin American states were experiencing economic crisis and several populist figures were elected by blaming the elites for this situation.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=29}} Examples include Carlos Menem in Argentina, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, and Alberto Fujimori in Peru.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1p=29|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=198}} Once in power, these individuals pursued neoliberal economic strategies recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1pp=29–30|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=199}} Unlike the first wave, the second did not include an emphasis on Americanismo or anti-imperialism.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=31}}

The third wave began in the final years of the 1990s and continued into the 21st century.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=31}} It overlapped in part with the pink tide of left-wing resurgence in Latin America. Like the first wave, the third made heavy use of Americanismo and anti-imperialism, although this time these themes presented alongside an explicitly socialist programme that opposed the free market.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=31}} Prominent examples included Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Cristina de Kirchner in Argentina, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.{{sfnm|1a1=March|1y=2007|1p=71|2a1=Mudde|2a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|2y=2017|2p=31|3a1=de la Torre|3y=2017|3p=199}} These socialist populist governments have presented themselves as giving sovereignty "back to the people", in particular through the formation of constituent assemblies that would draw up new constitutions, which could then be ratified via referendums.{{sfnm|1a1=Mudde|1a2=Rovira Kaltwasser|1y=2017|1p=32|2a1=de la Torre|2y=2017|2p=200}} In this way they claimed to be correcting the problems of social and economic injustice that liberal democracy had failed to deal with, replacing it with superior forms of democracy.{{sfn|de la Torre|2017|p=201}}

During the 1990s, there was a growth in populism in both Australia and New Zealand.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=38}}

In New Zealand, Robert Muldoon, the 31st Prime Minister of New Zealand from 1975 to 1984, had been cited as a populist.{{cite news|last1=Cowen|first1=Tyler|title=Feisty, Protectionist Populism? New Zealand Tried That|newspaper=Bloomberg.com|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-13/feisty-protectionist-populism-new-zealand-tried-that|publisher=Bloomberg L.P.|access-date=18 June 2017|date=13 February 2017|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170301144234/https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-13/feisty-protectionist-populism-new-zealand-tried-that|archive-date=1 March 2017}} Populism has become a pervasive trend in New Zealand politics since the introduction of the mixed-member proportional voting system in 1996.{{cite book|last1=Roper|first1=Juliet|last2=Holtz-Bacha|first2=Christina|last3=Mazzoleni|first3=Gianpietro|title=The Politics of Representation: election campaigning and proportional representation|publisher=Peter Lang|publication-place=New York|date=2004|isbn=978-0-8204-6148-9|page=40}}{{cite web|last1=Carmichael|first1=Kelly|title=Proportional Representation leads to right-wing populism? Really?|url=https://www.nationalobserver.com/2016/03/21/opinion/proportional-representation-leads-right-wing-populism-really|access-date=17 June 2017|website=National Observer|date=21 March 2016|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170920142829/http://www.nationalobserver.com/2016/03/21/opinion/proportional-representation-leads-right-wing-populism-really|archive-date=20 September 2017}} The New Zealand Labour Party's populist appeals in its 1999 election campaign and advertising helped to propel the party to victory in that election.{{cite book|last1=Boston|first1=Jonathan|title=New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002|date=2003|publisher=Victoria University Press|isbn=978-0-86473-468-6|pages=239–40|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=N-ql-Xs9hhkC&pg=PA240|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171102114515/https://books.google.com/books?id=N-ql-Xs9hhkC&pg=PA240|archive-date=2 November 2017}} New Zealand First has presented a more lasting populist platform; long-time party leader Winston Peters has been characterised by some as a populist who uses anti-establishment rhetoric,{{cite news|last=Moore|first=John|title=Political Roundup: Could anti-Establishment politics hit New Zealand?|url=http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11746493|access-date=16 June 2017|newspaper=The New Zealand Herald|date=11 November 2016|language=en-NZ|archive-date=3 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171003001031/http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11746493|url-status=live}} though in a uniquely New Zealand style.{{cite book|last1=Landis|first1=Dan|last2=Albert|first2=Rosita D.|title=Handbook of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives|date=2012|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|isbn=978-1-4614-0448-4|page=52|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-kmTe1XVcW4C&pg=PA52|language=en|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171102114515/https://books.google.com/books?id=-kmTe1XVcW4C&pg=PA52|archive-date=2 November 2017}}{{cite web|last1=Trotter|first1=Chris|title=Chris Trotter: Winston Peters may be a populist but that does not make him NZ's Trump|url=http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/opinion/89350598/chris-trotter-winston-peters-may-be-a-populist-but-that-does-not-make-him-nzs-trump|publisher=Stuff.co.nz|access-date=16 June 2017|date=14 February 2017|archive-date=19 October 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171019005427/http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/opinion/89350598/chris-trotter-winston-peters-may-be-a-populist-but-that-does-not-make-him-nzs-trump|url-status=live}}

{{Further|Populism in New Zealand}}

In much of Africa, populism has been a rare phenomenon.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=39}} The political scientist Danielle Resnick argued that populism first became apparent in Africa during the 1980s, when a series of coups brought military leaders to power in various countries.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=102}} In Ghana, for example, Jerry Rawlings took control, professing that he would involve "the people" in "the decision-making process", something he claimed had previously been denied to them.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=102}} A similar process took place in neighbouring Burkina Faso under the military leader Thomas Sankara, who professed to "take power out of the hands of our national

bourgeoisie and their imperialist allies and put it in the hands of the people".{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=103}} Such military leaders claimed to represent "the voice of the people", utilised an anti-establishment discourse, and established participatory organisations through which to maintain links with the broader population.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|pp=103–104}}

In the 21st century, with the establishment of multi-party democratic systems in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, new populist politicians have appeared. These have included Kenya's Raila Odinga, Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade, South Africa's Julius Malema, and Zambia's Michael Sata.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|p=106}} These populists have arisen in democratic rather than authoritarian states, and have arisen amid dissatisfaction with democratisation, socio-economic grievances, and frustration at the inability of opposition groups to oust incumbent parties.{{sfn|Resnick|2017|pp=106–107}}

File:President Rodrigo Roa Duterte poses for a photo with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi prior to the start of the bilateral meeting at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi.jpg of the Philippines and Narendra Modi of India, 2018. They are both considered populist leaders of the left and right, respectively.]]

In North Africa, populism was associated with the approaches of several political leaders active in the 20th century, most notably Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser and Libya's Muammar Gaddafi.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=39}} However, populist approaches only became more popular in the Middle East during the early 21st century, by which point it became integral to much of the region's politics.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=39}} Here, it became an increasingly common element of mainstream politics in established representative democracies, associated with longstanding leaders like Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=39–40}} Although the Arab Spring was not a populist movement itself, populist rhetoric was present among protesters.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|p=40}}

In southeast Asia, populist politicians emerged in the wake of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In the region, various populist governments took power but were removed soon after: these include the administrations of Joseph Estrada in the Philippines, Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea, Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan, and Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand.{{sfn|Mudde|Rovira Kaltwasser|2017|pp=38–39}}

In India, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which rose to increasing power in the early 21st century adopted a right-wing populist position.{{sfn|McDonnell|Cabrera|2019|p=484}} Unlike many other successful populist groups, the BJP was not wholly reliant on the personality of its leader, but survived as a powerful electoral vehicle under several leaders.{{sfn|McDonnell|Cabrera|2019|p=485}}

{{cols|colwidth=21em}}

• Labourism
• {{ill|Neopopulism|es|Neopopulismo}}
• Fiscal populism
• Argumentum ad populum
• Black populism
• Class warfare
• Communitarianism
• Demagogue
• Elite theory
• Empire of Democracy
• Extremism
• Fanaticism
• Fundamentalism
• List of populists
• Iron law of oligarchy
• Judicial populism
• Ochlocracy (mob rule)
• Paternalism
• Penal populism
• Politainment
• Polite populism
• Political polarization
• Poporanism
• Populism in Latin America
• Post-democracy
• Radical politics
• Reactionism
• Third party (politics)
• Tyranny of the majority

{{colend}}

{{reflist}}

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{{refend}}

{{Commons category}}

• {{Britannica|470472}}
• [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/populist-a-database-of-populist-farleft-and-farright-parties-using-expertinformed-qualitative-comparative-classification-eiqcc/EBF60489A0E1E3D91A6FE066C7ABA2CA The PopuList]: a database of populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since 1989

{{Populism}}

{{Political ideologies}}

{{Political philosophy}}

{{Authority control}}

Category:Comparative politics

Category:Political ideologies

Category:Political terminology

Category:Political theories