DF-21

The basic variant DF-21 had a range of 1,770+ km, and a payload of {{convert|600|kg|lb|abbr=on}} consisting of a single 500 kt nuclear warhead, with an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of 300~400 m; this version did not enter operational service.{{cite web|url=http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp|title=DF21C|work=SinoDefence|date=13 July 2007|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080201232409/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp|archive-date=2008-02-01}} The DF-21A was operational by 1996 and has improved accuracy with an estimated CEP of 100~300 m. This version is reported to have a similar 1,770+ km range, with a potential extended range of {{convert|2150|km|mi|abbr=on}}.{{Cite web|url=https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/|title=DF-21 (Dong Feng-21 / CSS-5)|website=Missile Threat}}

Revealed in 2006, the DF-21C is a terminally guided version that has a maximum range believed to be about {{convert|1700|km|mi|abbr=on}}{{cite report |url=http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/naic/NASIC2009.pdf |title=Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat |work=National Air and Space Intelligence Center |publisher=Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency |id=NASIC-1031-0985-09 |date=April 2009 |access-date=20 February 2013}} and accuracy estimated to be 50~100m.{{Cite web|url=https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/23a01071-5dac-433a-8452-09c542163ae8/From-Bottle-Rockets-to-Lightning-Bolts--China-s-Mi|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304204038/https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/23a01071-5dac-433a-8452-09c542163ae8/From-Bottle-Rockets-to-Lightning-Bolts--China-s-Mi|url-status=dead|title=Pradun: From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts, p.11|archive-date=March 4, 2016}} The missile was the first dual-capable version, able to be armed with either a nuclear or conventional warhead. In 2010, the DF-21C was being deployed in central Western China.

{{see also|Anti-ship ballistic missile}}

File:Dongfeng-21D.JPG

File:PLA ballistic missiles range.jpg

This is an anti-ship ballistic missile that has a maximum range exceeding {{convert|1450|km|mi nmi}}, according to the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. The Intelligence Center did not believe it was deployed in 2009. {{as of|2009}}, the guidance system was thought to be still in an evolutionary process as more UAVs and satellites are added.[http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/03/plan-asbm-development.html PLAN ASBM development], informationdissemination.net, March 28, 2009.

The US Department of Defense stated in 2010 that China has developed and reached initial operating capability (IOC){{cite web|url=http://defensetech.org/2010/12/28/chinas-carrier-killer-ballistic-missiles-are-operational/|archive-url=https://archive.today/20120707183615/http://defensetech.org/2010/12/28/chinas-carrier-killer-ballistic-missiles-are-operational/|url-status=usurped|archive-date=July 7, 2012|title=China's Carrier Killer Ballistic Missiles are Operational|work=Defense Tech}} of a conventionally armed{{cite web|url=http://geimint.blogspot.com/2008/11/oth-radar-and-asbm-threat.html|title=IMINT & Analysis|author=Sean O'Connor|work=geimint.blogspot.com|date=11 November 2008}} high hypersonic{{cite web|url=https://www.usni.org/forthemedia/ChineseKillWeapon.asp|title=Report: Chinese Develop Special "Kill Weapon" to Destroy U.S. Aircraft Carriers|website=U. S. Naval Institute|date=March 31, 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130121141828/http://www.usni.org/news-and-features/chinese-kill-weapon|archive-date=21 January 2013}} land-based anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21. This is the first ASBM and weapon system capable of targeting a moving aircraft carrier strike group from long-range, land-based mobile launchers.Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008, p. 2 (p12 of PDF){{cite news |url=http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=c5e8d58715cbe110VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD&ss=China&s=News |title=How China could scupper US naval power |access-date=2009-01-10 |newspaper=SCMP |date=10 July 2009 |archive-date=2012-07-13 |archive-url=https://www.webcitation.org/697meav4E?url=http://www.scmp.com/portal/site/SCMP/menuitem.2af62ecb329d3d7733492d9253a0a0a0/?vgnextoid=c5e8d58715cbe110VgnVCM100000360a0a0aRCRD |url-status=dead }}{{cite news |url=http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012270241.htmls |title=U.S. commander says China aims to be a 'global military' power |access-date=2011-01-05 |newspaper=Asahi Shimbun |date=28 December 2010}} The DF-21D is thought to employ maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) with a terminal guidance system. Such a missile may have been tested in 2005-6, and the launch of the Jianbing/Yaogan satellites would give the Chinese targeting information from SAR (synthetic-aperture radar) and visual imaging respectively. The upgrades enhance China's ability to prevent US carriers from operating in the Taiwan Strait.Gertz, Bill, "Inside the Ring: China's anti-carrier missiles", The Washington Times, Sep 3, 2009, p. B1. Some have also suggested China could develop a DF-21D with multiple reentry vehicles.{{cite magazine|last=Kazianis|first=Harry|title=China's Anti-Access Missile|url=https://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/11/18/chinaa-anti-access-missile/|magazine=The Diplomat|access-date=2011-12-29}}

Between 2009 and 2012, China launched a series of satellites to support its ASBM efforts:

• Yaogan-VII electro-optical satellite - 9 December 2009
• Yaogan-VIII synthetic aperture radar satellite - 14 December 2009
• Yaogan-IX Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation (3 satellites in formation) - 5 March 2010."Chinese Anti-ship Missile Could Alter U.S. Power", Wendell Minnick, Defense News, p6a, 5 April 2010
• Yaogan-XVI Naval Ocean Surveillance System (NOSS) constellation - 25 November 2012

China was reported to be working on an over-the-horizon radar in 2013 to locate the targets for the ASBM.{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf|title=CRS RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress}} An apparent test of the missile was made against [https://fas.org/man/eprint/gobi.pdf a target] in the Gobi Desert in January 2013.{{cite web|url=http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/130130/chinas-test-df-21d-missile-mock-us-aircraft-carrier-gobi-d|title=China tests DF-21D missile on mock US aircraft carrier in Gobi desert|author=Daniel DeFraia|work=GlobalPost}}

In 2014, the U.S. Navy reported that images that have appeared on the internet showed similarities of a DF-21D re-entry vehicle to the American Pershing II missile's RV, which was withdrawn from service in 1988. The Pershing II's RV weighed {{convert|1,400|lb|kg|abbr=on}} and was fitted with four control fins to perform a 25-G pull-up after reentering the atmosphere, traveling at Mach 8 and then gliding {{convert|30|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} to the target to pitch into a terminal dive. Army training manuals about the missile are available on the internet and public open-source literature extensively describes it; the DF-21 has a comparable range and payload. Though much is made of the DF-21D's damage infliction ability based solely on velocity and kinetic energy, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has calculated that the energy of an inert {{convert|500|kg|lb|abbr=on}} RV impacting at Mach 6 had similar energy to the combined kinetic and explosive power of the American subsonic Harpoon anti-ship missile, which is one-quarter the energy of the Russian supersonic {{convert|12,800|lb|kg|abbr=on}} Kh-22 missile traveling at Mach 4 with a {{convert|2,200|lb|kg|abbr=on}} warhead.{{cite web|url=http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/AW_01_27_2014_p18-657278.xml&p=1|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006085611/http://aviationweek.com/awin/us-navy-sees-chinese-hgv-part-wider-threat|archivedate=October 6, 2014|title=U.S. Navy Sees Chinese HGV As Part Of Wider Threat|website=Aviationweek.com|date= 27 January 2014}}

In 2009, the United States Naval Institute stated that there was "currently ... no defense against [a warhead able to destroy an aircraft carrier in one hit]" if it worked as theorized. It was reported in 2010 that China was finalizing development of a MaRV warhead for the DF-21.{{cite magazine|url=https://www.wired.com/2010/03/china-testing-ballistic-missile-carrier-killer/|title=China Testing Ballistic Missile 'Carrier-Killer'|date=March 29, 2010|magazine=Wired}}{{cite news|url=http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201008250379.html|title=China's anti-ship missile is nearly operational|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100827131804/http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201008250379.html|archivedate=August 27, 2010|newspaper=Asahi Shimbin|date=August 26, 2020}}{{cite web|url=https://www.andrewerickson.com/2010/12/china-testing-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm/|title=China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Updated With Latest Analysis & Sources|date=December 25, 2010|website=andrewerickson.com}} The United States Navy has responded by switching its focus from a close blockade force of shallow water vessels to return to building deep water ballistic missile defense (BMD) destroyers. The United States has also assigned most of its ballistic missile defense capable ships to the Pacific, extended the BMD program to all Aegis destroyers and increased procurement of SM-3 BMD missiles.{{cite web|url=http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf|title=China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress.}} The United States also has a large network optimized for tracking ballistic missile launches which may give carrier groups sufficient warning in order to move away from the target area while the missile is in flight.Pomfret, John. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/24/AR2010122403009.html "Military strength is eluding China."] The Washington Post, 25 December 2010. Kinetic defenses against the DF-21D would be difficult. The Navy's primary ballistic missile interceptor, the SM-3, would not be effective since it is designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course phase in space, so it would have to be launched almost immediately to hit before reentry or from an Aegis ship positioned under its flight path. The SM-2 Block 4 can intercept missiles reentering the atmosphere, but the warhead will be performing high-G maneuvers that may complicate interception.[http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-carrier-killer-really-threat-the-us-navy-13765 Is China's "Carrier-Killer" Really a Threat to the U.S. Navy?] - Nationalinterest.org, 2 September 2015 By 2016, the US Navy was testing the vastly more capable SM-6, which is designed to intercept ballistic missiles in the terminal phase.{{Cite web|url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-the-us-navy-trying-make-chinas-carrier-killer-missiles-18766|title=How the U.S. Navy is Trying to Make China's 'Carrier-Killer' Missiles Obsolete|first=Dave|last=Majumdar|date=December 16, 2016|website=The National Interest}} The SM-6 began deployment in 2013.{{cite web|url=https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/standard-missile-6/|title=Projects: Standard Missile-6|publisher=Naval Technology|accessdate=August 4, 2021}}

In late 2013, a Russian Military Analysis report of the DF-21D concluded that the only way to successfully counter it would be through electronic countermeasures. Conventional interceptions of high-speed objectives have worked in the past, with the Russian report citing the 2008 interception of a malfunctioning satellite by a U.S. cruiser, but in that situation the warship had extensive knowledge of its location and trajectory. Against an attack from the Mach 10 DF-21D without knowing the missile's launch point, the U.S. Navy's only way to evade it would be through electronic countermeasures.[http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/year-2013-news/december-2013-navy-naval-forces-maritime-industry-technology-security-global-news/1423-electronic-countermeasures-maybe-only-way-to-counter-chinese-df-21d-ballistic-missile-.html Electronic Countermeasures maybe only way to counter Chinese DF-21D Ballistic Missile] - Navyrecognition.com, 14 December 2013

Use of such a missile has been said by some experts to potentially lead to nuclear exchange, regional arms races with India and Japan, and the end of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, to which the People's Republic of China is not a party.{{cite journal |last1=Erikson |first1=Andrew S. |last2=Yang |first2=David D. |year=2009 |title=On the Verge of a Game-Changer |journal=Proceedings Magazine |volume=135 |issue=5 |publisher=United States Naval Institute |url=http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-05/verge-game-changer |access-date=3 February 2011 }}{{cite news |title=Can a treaty contain China's missiles? |author=Mark Stokes |author2=Dan Blumenthal |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123104108.html |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=2 January 2011 |access-date=3 February 2011}}

The emergence of the DF-21D has some analysts claiming that the "carrier killer" missiles have rendered the American use of aircraft carriers obsolete, as they are too vulnerable in the face of the new weapon and not worth the expense. Military leaders in the U.S. Navy and Air Force, however, do not see it as a "game changer" to completely count carriers out.{{Cn|date=January 2021}}

First, the missile may not be able to single-handedly destroy its target, as the warhead is believed to only be enough to inflict a "mission kill" that makes a carrier unable to conduct flight operations.[http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2013/December%202013/1213china.aspx China's Carrier Killer: Threat and Theatrics] - AirForcemag.com, December 2013

Secondly, there is the problem of finding its target. The DF-21D has a range estimated between {{convert|1,035|to|1,726|mi|nmi km|abbr=on}}, so a carrier battle group would need to be located through other means before launching. Over-the-horizon radars cannot pinpoint a carrier's exact location, and would have to be used in conjunction with Chinese recon satellites. Though recon aircraft and submarines could also be used to look for the carrier, they are vulnerable to the carrier battle group's defenses.

Finally, although the DF-21D has radar and optical sensors for tracking, it has not yet been tested against a ship target moving at-sea at up to {{convert|55|km/h|kn mph|abbr=on}}, let alone ones using clutter and countermeasures. The missile's "kill chain" requires processing and constantly updating a carrier's location details, preparing the launch, programming information and firing. The U.S. military's AirSea Battle concept involves disrupting such kill chains. Some U.S. analysts believe that the DF-21D does not fly any faster than Mach 5.[http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/house-gop-defense-heavies-slam-china-after-hypersonic-missile-test/ House GOP Defense Heavies Slam China After Hypersonic Missile Test] - Breakingdefense.com, 14 January 2014

The DF-21D may also not be as fast as theorized. While ballistic missiles reenter the atmosphere at speeds between Mach 8-15 at an altitude of {{cvt|50|km|ft|abbr=on}}, increasing air resistance in the denser low-atmosphere region reduces terminal speed to around Mach 2 at {{cvt|3-5|km|ft|abbr=on}}. It cannot acquire its target until this point due to ionization blockage, leaving a relatively short time to actually search for a ship. This could enable the target to leave the area if the missile is detected soon enough before it engages its terminal sensors, and the slower speed upon reentry leaves it vulnerable to missile interceptors.[https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3996716 Can China's DF-21D missile destroy US aircraft carriers as advertised?]. Taiwan News. 29 August 2020.

The missile was shown to the public during the parade in Beijing celebrating 70 years since the end of World War II on September 3, 2015.{{cite web|url=http://www.defenseworld.net/news/13938/China___s____Carrier_Killer____Missile_Is_For_Real|title=China's 'Carrier-Killer' Missile Is For Real|work=defenseworld.net}}{{Cite web|url=https://www.janes.com/defence-news|title=Janes | Latest defence and security news|website=Janes.com}} A parade video shows missiles marked as DF-21D.{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wC8jyxbBfRM |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160313042519/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wC8jyxbBfRM |archive-date=2016-03-13 |url-status=dead|title=CHINA SHOWS OFF ITS MILITARY POWER ON V-DAY 70TH PARADE; Strategic Strikes Module Displays MISSILES|last=WORLD TV|date=3 September 2015|via=YouTube}}

On 26 August 2020, along with a DF-26B, a DF-21D was launched into an area of the South China Sea between Hainan and the Paracel Islands, one day after China said that an American U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without its permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in Bohai Sea off its north coast{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-missiles-south-china-sea-warning |title=Chinese military fires 'aircraft-carrier killer' missile into South China Sea in 'warning to the United States' |website=South China Morning Post |author=Huang, Kristin |date=26 August 2020 |access-date=26 August 2020 |quote=The move came one day after China said a US U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without permission during a Chinese live-fire naval drill in the Bohai Sea off its north coast. |archive-date=26 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200826140231/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3098972/chinese-military-launches-two-missiles-south-china-sea-warning |url-status=live }} and came as Washington blacklisted 24 Chinese companies and targeted individuals it said were part of construction and military activities in the South China Sea.{{cite news |title=China fires missiles into South China Sea as U.S. sanctions Beijing |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/08/27/asia-pacific/missiles-south-china-sea-us-sanctions/ |agency=The Japan Times |publisher=The Japan Times |date=Aug 27, 2020}}{{cite news |title=U.S. targets Chinese individuals, companies amid South China Sea dispute |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-southchinasea-companies/us-targets-chinese-individuals-firms-amid-south-china-sea-dispute-idUSKBN25M1O6 |work=Reuters |publisher=Reuters |date=Aug 26, 2020 |quote=A U.S. defense official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Reuters that on Wednesday China launched four medium-range ballistic missiles that hit the South China Sea between Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands.}} US officials subsequently assessed that the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had fired four medium-range ballistic missiles in total.{{cite news |title=U.S., China trade jibes as military tensions worsen |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-defence-china/us-china-trade-jibes-as-military-tensions-worsen-idUSKBN25N0D6 |work=Reuters |date=August 27, 2020}} The missile tests drew criticism from Japan, the Pentagon and Taiwan.{{cite news |title=Tsai calls on China to 'restrain itself' |url=https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2020/08/28/2003742411 |agency=Taipei Times, CNA and Bloomberg |date=August 28, 2020}}

{{Main|DF-26}}

The DF-26 is an enhancement of the DF-21 with range increased to more than {{convert|5,000|km|mi|abbr=on}}. Its existence was officially confirmed by the Chinese state in the mid-2010s, but it had already been in service for several years.{{cite news |url=http://www.janes.com/article/53896/china-previews-new-ballistic-missiles-in-practices-for-3-september-parade |title=China previews new ballistic missiles in practices for 3 September parade |author=Richard D Fisher Jr, James Hardy |publisher=IHS |work=Jane's Defence Weekly |date=30 August 2015 |access-date=3 September 2015}}{{cite web|url=http://missilethreat.com/china-produces-guam-killer-2/|title=China Produces A Guam Killer|work=Missile Threat|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141025223347/http://missilethreat.com/china-produces-guam-killer-2/|archive-date=2014-10-25}}

On 26 August 2020, a DF-26B was fired from Qinghai province into an area between Hainan and the Paracel Islands as a response to a U.S. U-2 spy plane entering into a no-fly zone during a Chinese live-fire naval drill the day earlier.

Anti-satellite and Anti-ballistic missile version based on DF-21. Multiple test was conducted. The missile is capable of targeting ballistic missiles and satellite outside of the Earth atmosphere.{{cite web|url=https://indsr.org.tw/uploads/enindsr/files/202206/fe289bec-3b2f-43ab-b2b6-0aa5cedac64f.pdf |title=China's Missile Defense Capability |website=Taiwan Defense Research Institute |author=Hsiao-Huang Shu* }}{{cite web|url=https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf |title=2007 Chinese Anti-Satellite Test Fact Sheet |website=Secure World Foundation |first=Brian |last=Weeden }}

The "KF-21" (possible Chinese designation,{{cite web|url=https://www.twz.com/air/chinas-h-6k-bomber-seen-firing-air-launched-ballistic-missile-for-first-time |title=China's H-6K Bomber Seen Firing Air-Launched Ballistic Missile For First Time |website= The War Zone |date=1 May 2024 |first=Thomas |last=Newdick }} NATO designation: CH-AS-X-13) is reported to be an air-launched variant of the DF-21{{cite report |last1=Nouwen |first1=Veerle |last2=Wright |first2=Timothy |last3=Graham |first3=Euan |last4=Herzinger |first4=Blake |date=January 2024 |title=Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability |url=https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/01/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the--asia-pacific-implications-for-regional-stability/ |publisher=The International Institute for Strategic Studies |page=12 |docket= |access-date= |quote=}} with a nuclear or anti-ship role. It is a two-stage missile with a range of 3000 km. Weight may have been reduced by using composite materials.{{cite web|url= https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/revealed-chinas-nuclear-capable-air-launched-ballistic-missile/ |title= Revealed: China's Nuclear-Capable Air-Launched Ballistic Missile |website=The Diplomat |date=10 April 2018 |first= Ankit |last=Panda }} The War Zone reported two possible warhead configurations; a DF-21D-style "double-cone" tip, and a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) similar to the DF-ZF on the DF-17 missile.

It was in development by 2018. In 2018, the United States projected it would be ready for deployment by 2025.

The missile is carried by the Xian H-6N bomber; the aircraft has a recessed underside to carry the missile externally.

{{Main|Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force}}

The DF-21 may have been exported to Saudi Arabia.{{Cite book |author=The International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance 2024 |date=13 February 2024 |publisher=Routledge |location=London |isbn=978-1-032-78004-7 |page=384 }} In January 2014, Newsweek reported that the missiles were purchased in 2007. Conventionally-armed DF-3 missiles were bought by Saudi Arabia in 1988, but were not used during the 1990-1991 Gulf War due to their poor accuracy and the potential for collateral damage. Saudi Arabia wanted the shorter-ranged but much more accurate DF-21 as an upgrade. The United States approved of the purchase on the condition that the missiles were conventionally-armed.{{cite web |last1= |first1= |title=Exclusive: CIA Helped Saudis in Secret Chinese Missile Deal |url=https://www.newsweek.com/exclusive-cia-helped-saudis-chinese-missile-deal-227283 |website=Newsweek |date=22 April 2014 |access-date=2 June 2024}} The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) examined the modified nosecones and concluded that nuclear warheads that might be purchased from China or Pakistan could not be fitted.{{cite web |last1=Fitzpatrick |first1=Mark |title=Saudi Arabia's ballistic-missile programme: an overview |url=https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/08/saudi-arabia-ballistic-missile-programme/ |website=International Institute for Strategic Studies |date=27 August 2021 |access-date=2 June 2024}}

• Dong Neng-3

{{Reflist}}{{S-start}}

{{Succession box|title=DF-21 |before=DF-5 |after=DF-31 |years=1999-}}

{{S-end}}

{{Chinese_Missiles}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Df-21}}

Category:Ballistic missiles of the People's Republic of China

Category:Weapons of the People's Republic of China

Category:Nuclear missiles of the People's Republic of China

Category:Anti-satellite missiles

Category:Synthetic aperture radar

Category:Medium-range ballistic missiles

Category:Military equipment introduced in the 1990s

Category:Surface-to-surface missiles of China