France–Germany relations

Image:Partage de l'Empire carolingien au Traité de Verdun en 843.JPG

Both France and Germany track their early history from the territories of Gaul and Germania, and to the time of Frankish Empire under Charlemagne, which included most of the area of both modern-day France and Germany, as well as the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, and northern Italy.

Predecessors, which lived on the territory of modern France and Germany fought together in the Gallic War against Julius Caesar and the Roman Republic between 58 and 50 BC. According to Caesar, the Gallic Volcae Tectosages had once crossed the Rhine and colonized parts of Germania, but had since become militarily inferior to the Germani (Germanic people).{{cite book |last=Caesar |author-link=Julius Caesar |translator-last1=McDevitte |translator-first1=William Alexander |translator-last2=Bohn |translator-first2=W. S. |year=1869 |title=Commentaries on the Gallic War |url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Commentaries_on_the_Gallic_War |at=6. 24}} He also writes that Germani had once crossed the Rhine into northeast Gaul and driven away its Gallic inhabitants, and that the Belgae claimed to be largely descended from these Germanic invaders.{{harvnb|Caesar|1869|loc= 2. 3–4}} Years later, Both Gaul and Germania were both invaded by the Roman Empire.

Years after the Fall of the Western Roman Empire, The death of Charlemagne's son Louis the Pious and the following partition of the Frankish Empire in the 843 Treaty of Verdun marked the end of a single state. While the population in both the Western and Eastern kingdoms had relative homogeneous language groups (Gallo-Romanic in West Francia, and Low German and High German in East Francia), Middle Francia was a mere strip of a mostly blurring, yet culturally rich language-border-area, roughly between the rivers Meuse and Rhine – and soon partitioned again.{{Cite web |title=Treaty of Verdun {{!}} Carolingian Empire, Charlemagne, Louis the German {{!}} Britannica |url=https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Verdun |access-date=2024-06-14 |website=www.britannica.com |language=en}} After the 880 Treaty of Ribemont, the border between the western and eastern kingdoms remained almost unchanged for some 600 years. Germany went on with a centuries-long attachment with Italy, while France grew into deeper relations with England.{{Cite web |title=The birth of two states: the Oaths of Strasbourg - 842 – DW – 11/16/2009 |url=https://www.dw.com/en/the-birth-of-two-states-the-oaths-of-strasbourg-842/a-4619104 |access-date=2024-06-14 |website=dw.com |language=en}}

Despite a gradual cultural alienation during the High and Late Middle Ages, social and cultural interrelations remained present through the preeminence of Latin language and Frankish clergy and nobility.

The Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, a member of the Austrian House of Habsburg, inherited the Low Countries and the Franche-Comté in 1506. When he also inherited Spain in 1516, France was surrounded by Habsburg territories and felt under pressure. The resulting tension between the two powers caused a number of conflicts such as the War of the Spanish Succession, until the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 made them allies against Prussia.

The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), devastating large parts of the Holy Roman Empire, fell into this period. Although the war was mostly a conflict between Protestants and Catholics, Catholic France sided with the Protestants against the Austrian-led Catholic Imperial forces. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 gave France part of Alsace. The 1679 Treaties of Nijmegen consolidated this result by bringing several towns under French control. In 1681, Louis XIV marched into the city of Strasbourg on 30 September, and proclaimed its annexation.John A. Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV: 1667–1714, p. 163.

Meanwhile, the expanding Muslim Ottoman Empire became a serious threat to Austria. The Papal States initiated a so-called Holy League against the "hereditary enemy" of Christian Europe ("Erbfeind christlichen Namens"). Far from joining or supporting the common effort of the Holy Roman Empire and Poland-Lithuania, France, under Louis XIV, invaded the Spanish Netherlands in September 1683, a few days before the Battle of Vienna. While Austria was occupied with the Great Turkish War (1683–1699), France initiated the War of the Grand Alliance (1688–1697). The attempt to conquer large parts of southern Germany ultimately failed when Imperial and Imperial circle troops were withdrawn from the Ottoman border and moved to the region. However, following a scorched earth policy that caused a large public outcry at the time, French troops devastated large parts of the Palatinate, burning down and levelling numerous cities and towns in southern Germany.

{{main|French–German enmity}}

{{Unreferencedsect|date=May 2024}}

File:Seydlitz at Rossbach.jpg. Johann Christoph Frisch, 1799.]]

In the 18th century, the rise of Prussia as a new German power caused the Diplomatic Revolution and an alliance between France, the Habsburgs and Russia, manifested in 1756 in the Treaty of Versailles and the Seven Years' War against Prussia and Great Britain. Although a German national state was on the horizon, the loyalties of the German population were primarily with smaller states. The French war against Prussia was justified through its role as guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia, and it was in fact fighting on the side of the majority of German states.{{According to whom|date=July 2020}}

Frederick the Great led the defense of Prussia for 7 years, and though heavily outnumbered, defeated his French and Austrian invaders. Prussia and France clashed multiple times, and many more times than the other countries. This started years of hatred between the two countries. Frederick the Great was soon respected by all of his enemies, and Napoleon himself used him as a model for battle.

The civil population still regarded war as a conflict between their authorities, and did not so much distinguish between troops according to the side on which they fought but rather according to how they treated the local population. The personal contacts and mutual respect between French and Prussian officers did not stop entirely while they were fighting each other, and the war resulted in a great deal of cultural exchange between the French occupiers and German population.

File:Charles Meynier - Entrée de Napoléon à Berlin. 27 octobre 1806.jpg by Charles Meynier, 1810. French troops entering Berlin after the Battle of Jena.]]

German nationalism emerged as a strong force after 1807, as Napoleon conquered much of Germany and brought in the new ideals of the French Revolution. The French mass conscription for the Revolutionary Wars and the beginning formation of nation states in Europe made war increasingly a conflict between peoples rather than a conflict between authorities carried out on the backs of their subjects.{{According to whom|date=July 2020}}

Napoleon put an end to the millennium-old Holy Roman Empire in 1806. Napoleon formed his own Confederation of the Rhine, and reshaped the political map of the German states, which were still divided. The wars, often fought in Germany and with Germans on both sides, as in the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig, also marked the beginning of what was explicitly called French–German hereditary enmity. Napoleon directly incorporated German-speaking areas such as the Rhineland and Hamburg into his First French Empire and treated the monarchs of the remaining German states as vassals. Modern German nationalism was born in opposition to French domination, under Napoleon. In the recasting of the map of Europe after Napoleon's defeat, the German-speaking territories in the Rhineland adjoining France were put under the rule of Prussia.

Bavaria as the third-largest state in Germany after 1815 enjoyed much warmer relations with France than the larger Prussia or Austria. From 1670 onwards, the two countries were allies for almost a century, primarily to counter Habsburg ambitions to incorporate Bavaria into Austria. This alliance was renewed after the rise of Napoleon to power with a friendship treaty in 1801 and a formal alliance in August 1805, pushed for by the Bavarian Minister Maximilian von Montgelas. With French support, Bavaria was elevated to the status of a Kingdom in 1806. Bavaria supplied 30,000 troops for the invasion of Russia in 1812, of which very few returned. With the decline of the First French Empire, Bavaria opted to switch sides on 8 October 1813 and left the French alliance in favour of an Austrian one through the Treaty of Ried.[http://www.br.de/radio/bayern2/wissen/radiowissen/geschichte/bayern-napoleon-128.html Der große Schritt nach vorne] {{in lang|de}} Bayerischer Rundfunk, published: 27 April 2015, accessed: 20 October 2015[https://books.google.com/books?id=mVwCTRhdYmsC&dq=bavarian+french+alliance&pg=PA126 Early Modern Germany, 1477-1806] Google book review, author: Michael Hughes, accessed: 20 October 2015

{{main| International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)}}

File:Wernerprokla.jpg at the Palace of Versailles, 18 January 1871, by Anton von Werner]]

{{Main| Franco-Prussian War}}

During the first half of the 19th century, many Germans looked forward to a unification of the German states; one issue was whether Catholic Austria would be a part. German nationalists believed that a united Germany would replace France as the world's dominant land power. This argument was aided by demographic changes: since the Middle Ages, France had the largest population in Western Europe, but in the 19th century its population stagnated (a trend which continued until the second half of the 20th century), and the population of the German states overtook it and continued to rapidly increase.G. P. Gooch, Franco-German relations, 1871–1914 (1923).

The eventual unification of Germany was triggered by the Franco-German War in 1870 and subsequent French defeat. German forces defeated the French armies at the Battle of Sedan. Finally, in the Treaty of Frankfurt, reached after a lengthy siege of Paris, France was forced to cede the mostly Germanic-speaking Alsace-Lorraine territory (consisting of most of Alsace and a quarter of Lorraine), and pay an indemnity of five billion francs. Thereafter, Germany was the leading land power.Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy: 1814–1914 (1993), pp 184-250.

File:Au Reviour - Germany and France.jpg: Au Revoir!, Punch 6 August 1881]]

Although initially against it, Bismarck eventually gave into the Army and to intense public demand in Germany for acquisition of the border provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, thereby turning France into a permanent, deeply committed enemy. Theodore Zeldin says: "Revenge and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine became a principal object of French policy for the next forty years. That Germany was France's enemy became the basic fact of international relations."Theodore Zeldin, France, 1848–1945: Volume II: Intellect, Taste, and Anxiety (1977) 2: 117. Bismarck's solution was to make France a pariah nation, encouraging royalty to ridicule its new republican status, and building complex alliances with the other major powers – Austria, Russia and Great Britain – to keep France isolated, diplomatically.Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 1871–1900 (1941), pp 1-2.Mark Hewitson, "Germany and France before the First World War: A Reassessment of Wilhelmine Foreign Policy" English Historical Review (2000) 115#462 pp. 570-606 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/579667 in JSTOR]

File:The Geography Lesson or "The Black Spot".jpg

The short-term French reaction to defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 was Revanchism: a deep sense of bitterness, hatred and demand for revenge against Germany, especially because of the loss of Alsace and Lorraine.Karine Varley, "The Taboos of Defeat: Unmentionable Memories of the Franco-Prussian War in France, 1870–1914." in Jenny Macleod, ed., Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) pp. 62-80; also Karine Varley, Under the Shadow of Defeat: The War of 1870–71 in French Memory (2008) Paintings that emphasized the humiliation of the defeat came in high demand, such as those by Alphonse de Neuville.Robert Jay, "Alphonse de Neuville's 'The Spy' and the Legacy of the Franco-Prussian War," Metropolitan Museum Journal (1984) 19: pp. 151-162 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/1512817 in JSTOR]

The Alsace-Lorraine issue remained a minor theme after 1880, and Republicans and Socialists systematically downplayed the issue and the monarchists (who emphasized the issue) faded away. Revanchism was not a major cause of war in 1914 because it faded after 1880. J.F.V. Keiger says: "By the 1880s, Franco-German relations were relatively good."J.F.V. Keiger, France and the World since 1870 (2001) pp 112–120, quoting p 113.Frederic H. Seager, "The Alsace-Lorraine Question in France, 1871-1914." From the Ancien Régime to the Popular Front: Essays in the History of Modern France edited by Charles K. Warner, (1969): 111-26.E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1870-1914 (1931) pp 47-48.

After 1880, the rapid growth in the population and economy of Germany left France increasingly far behind. In the 1890s, relationships remained good, as Germany supported France during its difficulties with Great Britain over African colonies. Any lingering harmony collapsed in 1905, when Germany took an aggressively hostile position to French claims to Morocco. There was talk of war and France strengthened its ties with Great Britain and Russia.J.F.V. Keiger, France and the World since 1870 (2001) pp 112-17

{{Main|Causes of World War I|Diplomatic history of World War I|French Third Republic#First World War}}

File:Maurice Neumont, War is the National Industry of Prussia, 1917, Cornell CUL PJM 1185 01.jpg

The French public had very little interest in foreign affairs and elite French opinion was strongly opposed to war with its more powerful neighbor.Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (5th ed. 1995) pp 288–299. French foreign policy was based on a fear that Germany was larger and steadily growing more powerful.Margaret Macmillan, The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (2013) ch 6. In 1914 the chief pressure group was the Parti colonial, a coalition of 50 organizations with a combined total of only 5,000 members.Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France's Bid for Power in Europe, 1914-1940 (1995) p 6 When war broke out in 1914, recovery of the two lost provinces became France's primary war aim.Frederic H. Seager, "The Alsace-Lorraine Question in France, 1871–1914." in Charles K. Warner, ed., From the Ancien Régime to the Popular Front (1969): 111-126.

After Bismarck's removal in 1890, French efforts to isolate Germany became successful; with the formation of the Triple Entente, Germany began to feel encircled.Samuel R. Williamson Jr"German Perceptions of the Triple Entente after 1911: Their Mounting Apprehensions Reconsidered" Foreign Policy Analysis 7.2 (2011): 205-214. Foreign minister Delcassé, especially, went to great pains to woo Russia and Great Britain. Key markers were the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894, the 1904 Entente Cordiale with Great Britain, and finally the Anglo-Russian Entente in 1907 which became the Triple Entente. This formal alliance with Russia, and informal alignment with Britain, against Germany and Austria-Hungary eventually led Russia and Britain to enter World War I as France's Allies.Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (1954) pp 345, 403–26G.P. Gooch, Before the war: studies in diplomacy (1936), chapter on Delcassé pp 87-186.

{{Further|International relations (1919–1939)}}

The Allied victory saw France regain Alsace-Lorraine and briefly resume its old position as the leading land power on the European continent. France was the leading proponent of harsh peace terms against Germany at the Paris Peace Conference. Since the war had been fought on French soil, it had destroyed much of French infrastructure and industry, and France had suffered the highest number of casualties proportionate to population. Much French opinion wanted the Rhineland, the section of Germany west of the Rhine river and the old focus of French ambition, to be detached from Germany as an independent country. In the end they settled for heavy German reparation payments, the military occupation of the Rhineland (1918–1930) and the demilitarization of it and an area stretching 50 kilometers east of the Rhine. On the remote Eastern end of the German Empire, the Memel territory was separated from the rest of East Prussia and occupied by France, before being annexed by Lithuania. In response to German failure in 1923 to pay reparations as required under the Treaty of Versailles, France occupied the industrial Ruhr area of Germany, the center of German coal and steel production, until 1925.{{Cite web |last=Godfroid |first=Anne |date=18 September 2015 |editor-last=Daniel |editor-first=Ute |editor2-last=Gatrell |editor2-first=Peter |editor3-last=Janz |editor3-first=Oliver |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Heather |editor5-last=Keene |editor5-first=Jennifer |editor6-last=Kramer |editor6-first=Alan |editor7-last=Nasson |editor7-first=Bill |title=Occupation after the War (Belgium and France) |url=https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/occupation_after_the_war_belgium_and_france |access-date=13 November 2023 |website=1914–1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War |publisher=Freie Universität Berlin}} Also, the French-dominated International Olympic Committee banned Germany from the Olympic Games of 1920 and 1924, illustrating French desire to isolate Germany.

{{main|Locarno Treaties}}

In late 1924 German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann made his highest priority the restoration of German prestige and privileges as a leading European nation. French withdrawal from the occupied Ruhr was scheduled for January 1925, but Stresemann sensed that France was very nervous about its security and might cancel the withdrawal{{Citation needed|date=September 2024}}. He realized that France deeply desired a British guarantee of its postwar borders, but that London was reluctant. Stresemann came up with a plan whereby all sides would get what they wanted through guarantees set out in a series of treaties. British Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain enthusiastically agreed. France realized that its occupation of the Ruhr had caused more financial and diplomatic damage than it was worth and went along with the plan. They convened a conference of foreign ministers in the Swiss resort of Locarno and worked out the treaties. The first was the most critical: a mutual guarantee of the frontiers of Belgium, France, and Germany, which was guaranteed by Britain and Italy. The second and third treaties called for arbitration between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France regarding future disputes. The fourth and fifth were similar arbitration treaties between Germany and Poland, and Germany and Czechoslovakia. Poland especially, and Czechoslovakia as well, felt threatened by the main Locarno agreement, and the treaties were attempts to reassure them. The success of the Locarno agreements led to the admission of Germany to the League of Nations in September 1926, with a seat on its council as a permanent member. The result was the euphoric "Spirit of Locarno" across Europe—a sense that it was possible to achieve peace and a permanent system guaranteeing that peace.Norman Rich, Great Power Diplomacy since 1914 (2003) pp 148-49.

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 102-10038, Mainz, Abzug der französischen Truppen.jpg troops gathering before their departure from Rhineland, occupied Mainz, 1930]]

{{Further|French–German enmity}}

The Great Depression on 1929-33 soured the mood in France, and plunged Germany into economic hardship and violent internal unrest. From 1933 under Adolf Hitler, Germany began to pursue an aggressive policy in Europe. Meanwhile, France in the 1930s was politically divided. Above all, the country dreaded another war; the French feared would again be fought on their soil for the third time, and again destroy a large percentage of their young men. France's stagnant population meant that it would find it difficult to withhold the sheer force of numbers of a German invasion; it was estimated Germany could put two men of fighting age in the field for every French soldier. Thus in the 1930s the French, with their British allies, pursued a policy of appeasement of Germany, failing to respond to the remilitarization of the Rhineland, although this put the German army on a larger stretch of the French border.{{citation needed|date=March 2024}}

Image:German soldiers before Arc du Carrousel 1940.jpg soldiers in front of the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel, occupied Paris, 1940]]

Finally, however, Hitler pushed France and Great Britain too far, and they jointly declared war when Germany invaded Poland in September 1939. But, France remained exhausted and in no mood for a rerun of 1914–18. There was little enthusiasm and much dread in France at the prospect of actual warfare after the Phoney War. When the Germans launched their blitzkrieg invasion of France in 1940, the French Army crumbled within weeks, and with Britain retreating, an atmosphere of humiliation and defeat swept France.

A new government under Marshal Philippe Pétain surrendered, and German forces occupied most of the country. A minority of the French forces escaped abroad and continued the fight under General Charles de Gaulle and Free France. On the other hand, the French Resistance conducted sabotage operations inside German-occupied France. To support the invasion of Normandy of 1944, various groups increased their sabotage and guerrilla attacks; organizations such as the Maquis derailed trains, blew up ammunition depots, and ambushed Germans, for instance at Tulle. The 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, which came under constant attack and sabotage on their way across the country to Normandy, suspected the village of Oradour-sur-Glane of harboring resistance members, arms and explosives. In retaliation, they destroyed the town in the Oradour-sur-Glane massacre, killing 642 of its inhabitants.

There was also a free French army fighting with the Allies, numbering almost five hundred thousand men by June 1944, one million by December and 1.3 million by the end of the war. By the war's end, the French army occupied south-west Germany and a part of Austria.

Marshal Petain, who ruled France under German supervision, 1940–44, adopted the ideology of National Revolution which was originally based on ideas which had been discussed for years. When the Franco-German reconciliation committee "Comité France-Allemagne" ("French-German Friendship Committee") founded in 1935 in Paris it was an important element for Germany to get closer to France. It adopted Pro-European, Pro-German, anti British, anti liberal political and economic views. Key members of the Committee became the key leaders of the French collaborators with Nazis after 1940.Sarah Shurts, "Continental Collaboration: The Transition from Ultranationalism to Pan-Europeanism by the Interwar French Fascist Right." French Politics, Culture & Society 32#3 (2014): 79-96.Robert Soucy, French Fascism, The Second Wave, 1933-1939 (1995).

When Marshal Petain officially proclaimed the collaboration policy with Nazi Germany in June 1941, he justified it to the French people as an essential need for the New European Order and to keep the unity of France. Therefore, much of WW2 French propaganda was pro-European, exactly as German propaganda was. Therefore, a group called "Group Collaboration" had been established during the war in France, and led a myriad of conferences promoting Pro-Europeanism. The very first time the expression "European Community" was used was at its first sessions, as well as many conferences and guests lectures sponsored by the German government, propagating French-German reconciliation, French renewal and European solidarity.{{cite book|author=Mark Mazower|title=Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=opefF4rAL6YC&pg=PT522|date= 2013|publisher=Penguin |pages=522–32|isbn=9780141917504}}

{{Main|Cold War}}

File:Fotothek df pk 0000178 036.jpg, occupied Berlin, 1946]]

The war left Europe in a weak position and divided between capitalism in the West, and communism in the East. For the first time in the history of Europe, both Americans and Soviets had a strategic foothold on the continent. Defeated Germany was under the control of the U.S., USSR, United Kingdom and France, until 1949. Soviet troops remained in those countries in Eastern Europe that had been liberated by the Red Army from the Nazis and ensured the political success of Communist parties controlled by the Kremlin.Yugoslavia was an important exception--its Communist rulers were not under Kremlin control.Cyril E. Bloack et al. Rebirth: A Political History Of Europe Since World War II (2nd ed. 200) pp 57-103.

The French, under De Gaulle, hoped to be a balancing act in 1945–46. French fears of a resurgent Germany made it reluctant to support the plan to merge the British and American zones of occupation. However, growing anger at the Soviets behaviour in Poland, and the need for American economic assistance, led the French to merge their zone into what became West Germany.Heike Bungert, "A New Perspective on French-American Relations during the Occupation of Germany, 1945–1948: Behind-the-Scenes Diplomatic Bargaining and the Zonal Merger." Diplomatic History 18.3 (1994): 333-352.

In 1947, the American Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced the Marshall Plan to help economic recovery, economic integration, and business-oriented modernization in Europe. Large sums went to France and Germany, which helped restore trade and financial relations. The Marshall Plan recipients set up the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948.Michael Holm, The Marshall Plan: A New Deal For Europe (2016) pp 159-61. [https://books.google.com/books?isbn=1317426053 excerpt]

The idea of a Franco-German federation was a proposed merger between France and Germany after the end of World War II. The idea was promoted by French politician Robert Schuman in his declaration on May 9, 1950, which is now celebrated as Europe Day. The aim of the proposal was to create a lasting peace between the two countries and to promote economic cooperation.

The Franco-German federation proposal envisioned a common government, currency, and military. It also sought to establish a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which would integrate the coal and steel industries of France and Germany. The ECSC was created in 1952 and was the first step toward the creation of the European Union.

While the idea of a Franco-German federation never fully materialized, the proposal laid the foundation for the European Union and the close cooperation between France and Germany that has been a driving force behind European integration. Today, France and Germany are considered to be the engine of European integration and have played a key role in the creation of the European Monetary Union, the Schengen Agreement, and the European Stability Mechanism.

Earlier in 1948, there were significant key leaders in the French civil service who favoured an agreement with the Germans as well as an integrated Europe that would include Germany. The French European Department was working on a coal and steel agreement for the Ruhr-Lorraine-Luxembourg area, with equal rights for all. One French civil servant recommended 'laying down the bases of a Franco-German economic and political association that would slowly become integrated into the framework of the evolving Western organization'. Deighton strongly illustrated that the French leaders sought the cooperation with the Germans as key factor on the path of integrated Europe.

On a more practical level the increased level of cooperation between West Germany and France were driven by de Gaulle’s desire to build a power-bloc independently of the US, while Adenauer sought a fast integration into the western structures to receive full rights for the still occupied West German state as well as protection against the Soviet threat. The issue of dependency on the USA remained a sore spot at least for as long as DeGaulle remained in office (e.g. the West German parliament included a pro-NATO preamble into the Élysée Treaty, which caused considerable consternation with the French government). However, their shared interest in increased cooperation still existed and was also driven by strong support in the respective civil society, as it was seen as the best solution to prevent further bloodshed between the two nations.

In like manner, the German minister of economics Ludwig Erhard created a significant evolution in the German economy and a durable, well established trading relationship between the Federal Republic and its European neighbours as well. Later on when the Treaty of Rome came into action in 1958, it took the responsibility to strengthen and sustain the new political and economic relationships that had developed between the German nation and its former victims in Western Europe. The treaty beside it included side deals; it created a customs union and established the rules needed to make the competition mechanism work properly.

As a sequence of this, booming European economies, fired by West Germany, led to the formation of the new customs union known as the European Economic Community (EEC). But it did not go well as the organization of Europe, because only the members of the coal and steel community 'ECSC' ("the six": Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) joined the EEC. Seven of the remaining nations belonging to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which administered the Marshall Plan, did not join the EEC, but instead formed an alternative body, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). It was a free trade area as opposed to a customs union with common external tariffs and a political agenda, competing with the EEC as it was remarkably successful.{{according to whom|date=December 2014}}

{{See also|Aachen Treaty|Élysée Treaty}}

File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F026336-0020, Paris, Empfang Einweihung Deutsche Botschaft.jpg Embassy building in Paris, 1968]]

With the threat of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, West Germany sought its national security in the re-integration into Western Europe, while France sought after a reestablishment as a Grande Nation. The post-war Franco-West German cooperation is based on the Élysée Treaty, which was signed by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer on 22 January 1963.{{Cite news|url= http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-elysee-treaty-has-been-a-cornerstone-of-european-stability-a-879002.html|title= Treaty Heralded New Era in Franco-German Ties|access-date=22 January 2013|newspaper= Spiegel Online|date= 22 January 2013|last1= Gunkel|first1= Christoph}} The treaty contained a number of agreements for joint cooperation in foreign policy, economic and military integration and exchange of student education.

File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F011021-0002, Köln, Staatsbesuch de Gaulle, Begrüßung Adenauer.jpg and Konrad Adenauer in 1961]]

File:Bundesarchiv B 145 Bild-F076314-0006, Manching, Manöver Frankreich-Deutschland.jpg and Helmut Kohl in 1987]]

The treaty was signed under difficult political situations at that time and criticized both by opposition parties in France and West Germany, as well as from the United Kingdom and the United States. Opposition from the United Kingdom and the United States was answered by an added preamble which postulated a close cooperation with those (including NATO) and a targeted German reunification.

The treaty achieved a lot in initiating European integration and a stronger Franco-West German co-position in transatlantic relations.

The initial concept for the Franco-German cooperation however dates back a lot further than the Élysée Treaty and is based on the overcoming the centuries of Franco-German hostilities within Europe. It was compared to a re-establishment of Charlemagne's European empire as it existed before division by the Treaty of Verdun in 843 AD.

The Schuman declaration of 1950 is regarded by some as the founding of Franco-German cooperation, as well as of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951, which also included Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

File:Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, 9 dec.jpg and French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris in December 2019]]

The cooperation was accompanied by strong personal alliance in various degrees:

• Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle (1958–1963)
• Willy Brandt and Georges Pompidou (1969–1974)
• Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1974–1981)
• Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand (1982–1995)
• Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac (1995–1998)
• Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac (1998–2005)
• Angela Merkel and Jacques Chirac (2005–2007)
• Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012)
• Angela Merkel and François Hollande (2012–2017)
• Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron (2017–2021)
• Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron (2021–2025)
• Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron (2025–present)

Image:DeGaulleAdenauer.jpg

• European Space Agency (with many other European states)
• EADS (with two CEOs)
• Airbus (also present in the UK and Spain)

Franco-German collaborative enterprises include;

• Areva
• Aventis
• ODDO BHF, a Franco German bank

• Promotion of French and German language in both countries (See Alsace).
• Creation of a joint Franco-German History Coursebook to promote a "shared vision of History"
• The Franco-German University was created in 1999 to enable cooperation in tertiary education.{{cite web|url=https://www.dfh-ufa.org/english/|title=Franco-German University - facts & figures|website=dfh-ufa.org|access-date=1 March 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180301225232/https://www.dfh-ufa.org/english/|archive-date=1 March 2018|url-status=dead}}
• Arte, Franco-German cultural TV-channel

• From its inception during the 1960s, the Eurocorps has contained large contingents of French and German troops at its core, while other EU nations have contributed soldiers to the multinational force. The Franco-German Brigade takes much of its infantry from France and much of its armour from Germany.

• France has an embassy in Berlin and consulates-general in: Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Saarbrücken and Stuttgart.{{Cite web|url=https://de.ambafrance.org/-Francais-|title=Frankreich in Deutschland|website=de.ambafrance.org}}
• Germany has an embassy in Paris and consulates-general in: Bordeaux, Lyon, Marseille and Strasbourg.{{Cite web|url=https://allemagneenfrance.diplo.de/fr-de/vertretungen/botschaft|title=Deutsche Vertretungen in Frankreich|first=Auswärtiges|last=Amt|website=allemagneenfrance.diplo.de}}

File:Berlin, Mitte, Pariser Platz, Botschaft Frankreich.jpg|Embassy of France in Berlin

File:Frankfurt, Bockenheim, Französische Botschaft.JPG|Consulate-General of France in Frankfurt

File:German Embassy in Paris 4.jpg|Embassy of Germany in Paris

File:Lyon 6e - 33 Boulevard des Belges - Consulat Général d'Allemagne.JPG|Consulate-General of Germany in Lyon

• Alsace
• Causes of World War II
• Foreign relations of Germany
• International relations (1814–1919)
• List of Ambassadors of France to Germany
• List of Ambassadors of Germany to France

{{notelist}}

{{reflist}}

• Keiger, J.F.V. France and the World since 1870 (2001), a wide-ranging survey to the 1990s
• Krotz, Ulrich. History and foreign policy in France and Germany (Springer, 2015).

{{main|International relations (1814–1919)#Further reading|

International relations (1919–1939)#Further reading}}

• Albrecht-Carrié, René. A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (1958), 736pp; basic survey
• Andrew, Christopher, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale: a Reappraisal of French Foreign Policy 1898-1905 (1968)
• Brandenburg, Erich. (1927) From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914 (1927) [https://web.archive.org/web/20170315175229/http://www.dli.ernet.in/handle/2015/12322 online].
• Burrin, Philippe. France Under the Germans, Collaboration and Compromise. (1996) 1940-44.
• Bury, J.P.T. "Diplomatic History 1900–1912, in C. L. Mowat, ed. The New Cambridge Modern History: Vol. XII: The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898-1945 (2nd ed. 1968) [https://archive.org/stream/iB_CMH/12#page/n3/mode/1up online] pp 112-139.
• Carroll, E. Malcolm, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs 1870–1914 (1931). [https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069649799 online].
• Carroll, E. Malcolm. Germany and the great powers, 1866–1914: A study in public opinion and foreign policy (1938) [https://web.archive.org/web/20180920183321/https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015002369133]
• Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914 (2013)
• Fryer, W. R. "The Republic and the Iron Chancellor: The Pattern of Franco-German Relations, 1871–1890," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society (1979), Vol. 29, pp 169–185.
• Gooch, G.P. History of modern Europe, 1878–1919 (2nd ed. 1956) pp 386–413. [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.125610 online], diplomatic history
• Gooch, G. P. Franco-German relations, 1871-1914 (1923) [https://archive.org/details/francogermanrela0000gooc online] 80pp
• Gordon, Bertram, ed. Historical Dictionary of World War II France. The Occupation, Vichy and the Resistance, 1938-1946. (1998).
• Hensel, Paul R. "The Evolution of the Franco-German Rivalry" pp 86–124 in William R. Thompson, ed. Great power rivalries (1999) [https://books.google.com/books?id=qAZ4I-8tQIsC online]
• Hewitson, Mark. "Germany and France before the First World War: a reassessment of Wilhelmine foreign policy." English Historical Review 115.462 (2000): 570-606; argues Germany had a growing sense of military superiority. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/579667 online]
• Jackson, Julian. France, The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (2001), a major scholarly survey.
• Keiger, John F.V. France and the origins of the First World War (1983), a major scholarly survey.
• Lambi, Ivo Nikolai. The navy and German power politics, 1862-1914 (Routledge, 2019).
• Langer, William. An Encyclopedia of World History (5th ed. 1973); highly detailed outline of events [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.234117 online]
• Langer, William. European Alliances and Alignments 1870–1890 (1950); advanced history [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.237096 online]
• Langer, William. The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–1902 (1950); advanced history [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.177815 online]
• Lichtenberger, Henry. Relations Between France and Germany (1923) [https://archive.org/details/relationsbetween017036mbp online]
• MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (2013), full-scale diplomatic history
• Nolan, Michael E. The inverted mirror: mythologizing the enemy in France and Germany, 1898-1914 (Berghahn Books, 2005).
• Paxton, Robert. Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (1972).
• Piller, Elisabeth Marie. "The Transatlantic Dynamics of European Cultural Diplomacy: Germany, France and the Battle for US Affections in the 1920s." Contemporary European History 30.2 (2021): 248-264. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/9845E0A8ECE419EDDA2E47A5F5F814EB/S0960777321000035a.pdf/div-class-title-the-transatlantic-dynamics-of-european-cultural-diplomacy-germany-france-and-the-battle-for-us-affections-in-the-1920s-div.pdf online]
• Rich, Norman. Great Power Diplomacy: 1814–1914 (1991), comprehensive survey
• Rich, Norman. Great Power Diplomacy since 1914 (2003) comprehensive survey
• Schuman, Frederick L. War and Diplomacy in the French Republic (1931) [https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.24960 online]
• Seager, Frederic H. "The Alsace-Lorraine Question in France, 1871-1914." From the Ancien Régime to the Popular Front: Essays in the History of Modern France edited by Charles K. Warner, (1969): 111-26.
• Steiner, Zara S. The lights that failed: European international history, 1919–1933 (2007), 940pp detailed coverage;
• Steiner, Zara. The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933–1939 (2011) detailed coverage 1236pp
• Taylor, A.J.P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (1954) 638pp; advanced history and analysis of major diplomacy.
• Varley, Karine. Under the shadow of defeat: the war of 1870–71 in French memory (Springer, 2008).
• Watt, D.C. "Diplomatic History 1930–1939" in C. L. Mowat, ed. The New Cambridge Modern History: Vol. XII: The Shifting Balance of World Forces 1898-1945 (2nd ed. 1968) [https://archive.org/stream/iB_CMH/12#page/n3/mode/1up online] pp 684–734.
• Weinberg, Gerhard.The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933-36 (v. 1) (1971); The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937–1939 (vol 2) (University of Chicago Press, 1980) {{ISBN|0-226-88511-9}}.
• Wetzel, David. A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War (2003)
• Young, Robert France and the Origins of the Second World War (1996)

• Baun, Michael J. "The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration." Political Science Quarterly (1996): 110#4 pp. 605–624 [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2151886 in JSTOR]
• Bozo, Frédéric, and Christian Wenkel, eds. France and the German Question, 1945-1990 (Berghahn, 2019)
• Creswell, Michael, and Marc Trachtenberg. "France and the German question, 1945–1955." Journal of Cold War Studies 5.3 (2003): 5-28. [https://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/jcws5.3creswell01.pdf online]
• Friend, Julius W. The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950–1990 (1991)
• Friend, Julius W. Unequal Partners: French-German Relations, 1989–2000. (Greenwood 2001)
• Gillingham, John. Coal, steel, and the rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955: the Germans and French from Ruhr conflict to Economic Community (Cambridge UP, 2004).
• Gordon, Philip H. France, Germany and the Western Alliance. (Westview 1995) {{ISBN|0-8133-2555-2}}.
• Gunther, Scott. "A New Identity for Old Europe: How and Why the French Imagined Françallemagne in Recent Years." French Politics, Culture & Society (2011) 29#1
• Humbert, Laure. "French politics of relief and international aid: France, UNRRA and the rescue of European displaced persons in postwar Germany, 1945–47." Journal of Contemporary History 51.3 (2016): 606-634.
• Krotz, Ulrich. "Three eras and possible futures: a long-term view on the Franco-German relationship a century after the First World War," International Affairs (March 2014) 20#2 pp 337–350
• Krotz, Ulrich, and Joachim Schild. Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford University Press, 2013)
• Krotz, Ulrich. "Regularized intergovernmentalism: France–Germany and beyond (1963–2009)." Foreign Policy Analysis (2010) 6#2 pp: 147-185.
• Krotz, Ulrich. Structure as Process: The Regularized Intergovernmentalism of Franco-German Bilateralism (Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 2002) [http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/5081864.pdf online]
• Krotz, Ulrich. "Social Content of the International Sphere: Symbols and Meaning in Franco-German Relations" (Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, 2002.) [http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ces/publications/docs/pdfs/Krotz2.pdf online]
• Kulski, W.W. DeGaulle And The World: The Foreign Policy Of The Fifth French Republic (1966)
• Rich, Norman. Great Power Diplomacy since 1914 (2003) comprehensive survey
• Schild, Joachim. "Leadership in Hard Times: Germany, France, and the Management of the Eurozone Crisis." German Politics & Society (2013) 31#1 pp: 24-47.
• Schramm, Lucas. "Bilateral leadership in critical moments: France, Germany, and the management of major European integration crises." Comparative European Politics (2023): 1-22. [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41295-023-00344-6 online]
• Sutton, Michael. France and the construction of Europe, 1944–2007: the geopolitical imperative (Berghahn Books, 2011)
• Tint, Herbert. French Foreign Policy since the Second World War (1972) [https://archive.org/details/frenchforeignpol00herb/page/n0 online] pp 28–165.
• Urwin, Derek W. The community of Europe: A history of European integration since 1945 (Routledge, 2014).

• [http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/jacques-delors-and-joschka-fischer-discuss-50-years-of-the-elysee-treaty-a-878755.html France and Germany Celebrate 50 Years of Friendship] (Spiegel Online interview with Jacques Delors and Joschka Fischer)
• [https://archive.today/20080619063315/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=HNKV02FO31QATQFIQMFCFGGAVCBQYIV0?xml=/news/2001/06/05/wpiq05.xml Spanish irritation of excessive dominance of the EU agenda by France & Germany]
• [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/AAmt/Koordinatoren/D-FRA-Koordinator/D-FBeauftragter.html The Commissioner for Franco-German Cooperation]
• [http://www.lagazettedeberlin.de La Gazette de Berlin] The Newspaper in French for Germany (1 Page in German)
• [http://www.dfjw.org/english-version The Franco-German Youth Office (FGYO)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170702000557/https://www.dfjw.org/english-version |date=2 July 2017 }}

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